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The thesis, which is based on extensive archival materials, explores the origins of the on-
going conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan by focusing on the emergence of the first 
Armenian Republic in 1918 and its territorial issues with Azerbaijan, in order to understand 
the factors which led to this conflict. It examines the background to the creation of the first 
Armenian Republic by researching the location of the ‘historical Armenian homeland’, the 
construction and reconstruction of the notion of the ‘Armenian homeland’, the aspects 
facilitating the way in which the ideology and strategy of the Armenian national movement 
developed, and the factors instrumental in the construction of the Armenian identity. The 
work provides a historical background to the Armenian claims to Garabagh and Nakhchyvan 
and analyses the ethnic, historical, economic, geographical and security arguments used by 
the first Armenian Republic to substantiate its vision of the territorial delimitation between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan with regard to these regions at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. 
The thesis also considers the positions of the external powers involved in the South Caucasus 
vis-à-vis the Garabagh and Nakhchyvan issues and assesses the impact of their stance on the 
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The South Caucasus, which includes Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, is one of the most 
challenging regions in the world, owing to its long lasting and on-going conflicts. One of 
these conflicts is between Armenia and Azerbaijan. It has continued over twenty years 
without any prospect of a settlement in the near future.  
 
The aim of the thesis is to shed light on the origins of the problem by focusing on the 
emergence of the first Armenian Republic and its territorial conflicts with Azerbaijan in 1918-
1921 in order to understand the factors which led to its rise and continuation up to the present 
day. The need for this research comes from considerable gaps in comprehensive and balanced 
study on the subject. The perceptions and policies of the international community have largely 
been shaped by works of Armenian scholars from the strong Armenian diaspora in different 
parts of the world, including the Western countries. This process has been further influenced 
by the on-going territorial claims of Armenia to Garabagh in Azerbaijan and the involvement 
of the Armenian lobby in different countries in justification of these claims through different 
means, including history and the absence of works by Azerbaijani scholars on the topic in the 
West.  
 
The subject of the current thesis is a constituent part of the whole issue of the ‘Armenian 
question’, which emerged after the Berlin Congress in 1878. Existing studies deal with 
different aspects of this question and offer general information on the first Armenian 
Republic. Most of these works highlight the issue within either the history of the Armenian 
people or the South Caucasus in general terms. Western historiography, with its leading 
representative on the subject, Richard Hovannisian has dedicated more research to the topic 
than the Soviet historiography, which either passed it by or examined it through the prism of 
Soviet ideology. Azerbaijani historians did not study the emergence of the first Armenian 
Republic in the Soviet period, whereas the territorial problems between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan started being studied after the open stage of the territorial claims of Soviet 
Armenia to Soviet Azerbaijan in 1987. The same cannot be said about the Armenian 
historians, whose works in the Soviet times on any period of the history of the Armenians 
revealed that they considered the territory between the Kur and Araz Rivers in the Azerbaijan 
2 
SSR as part of ‘historical’ Armenia and considered the territorial issues from this point of 
view.       
 
Unlike the Soviet period, when there were many academic publications by Armenian 
historians in Russian on different aspects of Armenian history, after 1991, when the Soviet 
Union collapsed and Armenia regained its independence, the number of scholarly works by 
such historians on Armenian history in Russian decreased. After the restoration of 
Azerbaijan’s independence in 1991, the number of works by Azerbaijani scholars on the 
historical aspects of the territorial problems between the two countries, including in 1918-
1921, has increased. They can be characterised as responses to the Armenian publications on 




The thesis examines the development of the Armenian national movement in terms of the 
factors that facilitated its development, and the way its ideology and strategy developed over 
time. It explores the background to the creation of the first Armenian Republic, the processes 
of state formation and the way in which the boundaries of the state were determined. The 
thesis also addresses a number of very specific research questions: 
 
1. Where was the ‘Armenian homeland’ historically? 
2. Why was the location of the ‘Armenian homeland’ moved from Eastern Anatolia to 
the South Caucasus? 
3. What were the factors that facilitated the creation of the Armenian republic? 
4. How were the borders of the Armenian republic set? 
5. What are the causes of the long lasting and on-going conflict between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan over Garabagh?  
 
Structure of the thesis 
 
The thesis is divided into three parts. In Part 1, Chapter 1 reviews the scholarly works on the 
subject, to identify their limitations, whereas Chapter 2 examines the literature on nations, 
3 
nationalism, state formation and territorial delimitation of the state and comes up with 
theoretical arguments on the Armenian case, setting it in a comparative perspective.  
 
Part 2 includes five chapters. Chapter 3 explores the initiation of an ‘Armenian homeland’ 
project in the Ottoman Empire in the last decades of the nineteenth century and its results. 
Chapter 4 discusses the factors instrumental in the construction of the Armenian identity and 
compares it with the Azerbaijani and Georgian cases. Chapter 5 examines the developments 
related to the ‘Armenian homeland’ project during the First World War in 1914-1916 and 
their consequences. Chapters 6 and 7 analyse the impact of the war, the February and October 
Revolutions of 1917 and the political situation afterwards on the ‘Armenian homeland’ 
project. Part 2 demonstrates the change in the initial direction of the Armenian nationalist 
movement and the original idea of where the ‘Armenian homeland’ was to be located.  
 
Part 3 includes two case study chapters, which provide historical background to the Armenian 
aspirations with regard to Garabagh and Nakhchyvan, analyse the Armenian ethnic, historical, 
economic, geographical and security arguments about these regions and illustrate how the 
question of the delimitation of the territory of the first Armenian Republic was decided in 




The first step in writing the current thesis was to outline the existing gaps in scholarly 
treatment of the subject. Having done this, a research agenda and strategy were prepared with 
the formulation of the research questions to be addressed in the dissertation. Since the central 
issues are state-formation and territorial problems, theoretical literature on nations, 
nationalism, state-building and border/territorial questions were examined and the 
peculiarities and significance of the Armenian case defined.  
 
After identifying the research questions, the next priority was the research methods to be 
applied to the sources, as they constitute the basis of any unbiased and scholarly work. Thus, 
writing about historical events involves three major procedures: the collection of data, its 
4 
critical evaluation and then presentation.17 A sound piece of history is a logically consistent 
picture of a subject supported by all available data.18 Relevant information for the topic was 
collected and the available materials, which can be divided into primary and secondary 
sources, categorised. The primary sources included archival documents and official 
publications, whereas the secondary ones included books, journal and newspaper articles, 
memoirs, eyewitness accounts and maps.  
 
In order to avoid superficial and distorted accounts of the subject and present an impartial and 
systematic view of the problem, it is first necessary to collect all the required and available 
data on the research questions and then assess and evaluate the evidence to deal with ‘fraud 
and forgery, interpolation and distortion’.19 This is achieved by the application of external and 
internal criticism methods, which in their turn include comparative20 and content analysis.21 
External criticism involves authenticating evidence or documents to establish their 
authenticity, while the internal criticism deals with the statements contained in documents to 
establish credibility.22 
 
When dealing with primary sources like archival documents in Russian, Azerbaijani and 
English, the researcher tried to find the available originals of these sources, compare them 
with their archival and published copies and define any differences. After the process of 
verification, the date of the documents was dealt with, i.e. whether they were written ‘at the 
time specific events occurred’23; as well as the state/s ‘behind’ these documents; its/their 
interests; and the political situation during that period. This process was followed by analysis 
of the content of the documents. The researcher compared the use of the primary sources by 
different historians in different languages to check for differences. It was also important to 
check whether these documents were used with a selective approach out of context, and if so, 
                                                 
17 Bajaj S, Research Methodology in History, New Delhi, 2000, p 231 
18 Harvey Ch and Press J, Databases in Historical Research: Theory, Methods and Applications, London: 
Macmillan, 1996, p 2 
19 Bajaj S, op cit., p 223 
20 Dawson C, Introduction to Research Methods: A Practical Guide for Anyone Undertaking a Research Project, 
Oxford: How To Books Ltd, 2009, pp 120-121; Ragin Ch, The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond 
Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies, Berkeley and Los Angeles, California; London: University of California 
Press, 1987, pp 13-18 
21 Neuendorf K, The Content Analysis Guidebook, London: Sage, 2002, pp 1-25 
22 Ibid., p 231 
23 Mcdowell W, Historical Research: A Guide, London: Longman, 2002, p 55 
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why, and whether historians used all the necessary and available archival documents, and if 
not, why not.  
 
While dealing with sources like memoirs and eyewitness accounts, after establishing their 
authenticity as in the case of archival sources, the researcher tried to answer similar 
questions: when they were written, who wrote them, and how they were written. The same 
approach was applied when dealing with newspaper materials and maps and their usage by 
historians. Concerning secondary sources like books, and journal and newspaper articles, 
notes of useful ideas were made and the opinions of any single author tested against the 
evidence supplied by other authors and, if possible, primary sources.24  
 
The research for this thesis was conducted in the UK National Archives, State Archive of the 
Republic of Azerbaijan, State Archive of Political Parties and Social Movements of the 
Republic of Azerbaijan, and Central Historical Archive of Georgia. Owing to the 
impossibility of conducting research in the Armenian archives because of the ethnic origin of 
the author of this thesis, all available documents relating to the position of the Armenians on 
the subject were obtained from the above-mentioned archives. Many secondary sources by 
authors of Armenian origin were consulted during the course of this research, both in Russian 
and in English. Since the author of this thesis does not know Armenian, some of the 
Armenian nationalist publications in Armenian were read in translation into Russian and 
English, and also numerous scholarly works which discuss these sources at length were 
consulted in Russian and English before being critically assessed. Moreover, the author of the 
current thesis arranged for two historical books and one historical document to be translated 
from Armenian into Azerbaijani in 2011.  
 
Contribution of the thesis 
 
Based on historical evidence gathered in different archives, from published archival 
documents, and through the analysis of testimonies of eyewitnesses and direct participants, 
and owing to the knowledge obtained from a great range of literature on the various aspects of 
                                                 
24 Ibid., p 122 
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the ‘Armenian question’, the thesis will fill the existing gaps in the study of the establishment 
of the first Armenian Republic and its territorial conflicts with Azerbaijan.  
 
The academic novelty of this thesis lies in its complex empirical analysis of Armenian, 
Azerbaijani, Georgian, Turkish, Russian, Soviet and Western sources by applying external 
and internal criticism and comparative and content analysis methods and theorisation of the 
formation of the new Armenian identity, emergence of the first Armenian Republic, 
delimitation of its borders and settlement of territorial conflicts with Azerbaijan for the first 
time in the scholarly literature. The thesis, with its empirical and theoretical findings, will 
make a contribution to the study of nations, nationalism and state-building, as well as the 

































Chapter 1: Overview of the Historiography 
 
In order to achieve its aim, the thesis will, first of all, critically analyse the academic discourse 
on the Armenian ‘ethnic homeland’, the Armenian national movement, the emergence of the 
first Armenian Republic, and its conflicts with Azerbaijan over Garabagh and Nakhchyvan, to 
identify the limitations of the existing historiography on the subject.  
     
1.1 The Armenian ‘ethnic homeland’ 
 
The scholarly works on the formation of the Armenian people or its ‘ethnic homeland’ are 
usually divided into ‘classical’ and ‘revisionist’ conceptions. Among the famous 
representatives of the former are Nicolas Adontz and Igor Diakonoff. According to them, the 
Armenian people was formed by the second century BC in Eastern Anatolia from a mixture of 
Indo-European tribes originally from the Balkans and the local peoples of Eastern Anatolia.25 
The leading supporters of the ‘revisionist’ conception are Boris Piotrovskiy, Grigoriy 
Kapantsian and Suren Eremian. They had a similar view to the ‘classical’ conception 
representatives with regard to the final period (by the second century BC) and the area of 
formation of the Armenian people (Eastern Anatolia), but expressed differences over the 
question of the nucleus of the Armenian people, whom they considered to be local tribes of 
Hayasa-Azzi in north-eastern Anatolia.26     
 
Different historians tend to draw an unbreakable line between past and present, arguing about 
the ancient political, geographical and ethnic links between the Armenians of Eastern 
Anatolia and the South Caucasus. Thus, Louise Nalbandian wrote that the Armenian king 
                                                 
25Adontz N, Armenia in the Period of Justinian: The Political Conditions based on the Naxarar System, Lisbon: 
Galouste Gulbenkian Foundation, 1970, pp 306-310; D’yakonov I, Predystoriya armyanskogo naroda: Istoriya 
Armyanskogo nagor’ya s 1500 po 500 g. do n.e. Khurrity, Luviytsy, protoarmyane, Erevan: Izdatel’stvo 
Akademii Nauk Armyanskoy SSR, 1968; Diakonoff I, The Pre-history of the Armenian People, Delmar, N.Y.: 
Caravan books, 1984 
26Piotrovskiy B, O proiskhozhdenii armyanskogo naroda, Erevan: Izdatel’stvo Akademii Nauk Armyanskoy 
SSR, 1946, pp 31-36; Kapantsian G, Khayasa – kolybel’ armyan: Etnogenez armyan i ikh nachalnaya istoriya, 
Erevan: Izdatel’stvo Akademii Nauk Armyanskoy SSR, 1947; Eremian S, ‘Protsess formirovaniya armyanskogo 
naroda’, Istoriko-filologicheskiy zhurnal, Izdanie Akademii Nauk Armyanskoy SSR, no 2, 1970, pp 54-56 
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Artaxias I in the first half of the second century BC ‘achieved Armenian independence, which 
lasted for nearly two centuries. Not only did he unite the country by military efforts, but he 
developed in his people a sense of unity and nationalism. He made the universal use of the 
Armenian language compulsory and strove to assimilate foreign elements in order to make a 
strong, homogenous nation.’27 The territory of the country, she went on, was expanded by 
Tigranes II in the first half of the first century, who ‘extended his domains from the Kur River 
in the north [according to the ‘Historical Map of Armenia’ by Nalbandian, the northern border 
of Armenia extended as far as the juncture of the Kur and Araz Rivers28 – I.K. ] to Egypt in 
the south […] For the first and only time in history, the Armenians saw the whole geographic 
area of their country united under one ruler.’ However, Nalbandian continued, ‘the empire of 
Tigranes the Great was short-lived’ and ‘disintegrated in 69-66 BC under the stress of military 
defeats’.29  
 
Nalbandian used the term ‘nationalism’ for the second century BC, which is an anachronism. 
She did not cite any evidence for her argument, which declared the area from the ‘Kur River 
in the north to Egypt in the south’ ‘the whole geographic area’ of Armenia.  
 
Richard Hovannisian,30 Hagop Manandian,31 Simon Payaslian,32 Robert Hewsen,33 Bagrat 
Ulubabian,34 Gagik Sarkisian,35 Suren Eremian,36 Genrik Svazian37 and Vardges Mikaelian38 
                                                 
27 Nalbandian L, The Armenian Revolutionary Movement: The Development of Armenian Political Parties 
through the Nineteenth Century, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963, p 6 
28 Ibid., p 2  
29 Ibid., pp 7-8 
30 Note: On the one hand, Richard Hovannisian, specialist on the first Armenian Republic, referred to the ‘great 
Armenian Plateau in eastern Anatolia,’ where the ‘Armenian nation had taken form in the first millennium 
before the Christian era’; on the other hand while giving the description of this ‘plateau’ he included in its area 
the territories beyond Eastern Anatolia, up to Garabagh in the South Caucasus, calling it the ‘north-eastern 
reaches of the Plateau’ (Hovannisian R, Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918, Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1967, p 1). He did not provide any evidence to substantiate his opinion. He 
contradicted himself further, writing that ‘the land on which they [Armenians of the South Caucasus – I.K.] lived 
often seemed much less significant to them and warranted less attention than the “real homeland”, Turkish 
Armenia’ (Ibid., p 23). This meant that for the Armenians of the South Caucasus, the territories where they lived 
were not considered a ‘real homeland’.    
31 Manandian H, A Brief Survey of the History of Ancient Armenia, New York: Diocese of the Armenian Church 
of America, 1975, pp 7, 9-10 
32 Note: Simon Payaslian considered the greater part of the South Caucasus to be historically Armenian. But the 
historian’s reference and lack of objection to the words of Bogos Nubar Pasha, Head of the Armenian National 
Delegation, representing Ottoman Armenians, at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, that the ‘existing small 
republic [the first Armenian Republic – I.K.] […] was not established in the historic lands of Armenia,’ revealed 
a contradiction (Payaslian S, The History of Armenia, New York; Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007,             
p 153). 
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also extended the area of ancient Armenia up to the juncture of the Kur and Araz Rivers in the 
South Caucasus.  
 
Unlike many scholars dealing with the history of the Armenians, Ronald Suny considered 
nationality formation ‘an open-ended process, never fully complete, moving back and forth 
between consolidation and consciousness, assimilation and loss of cohesion.’39 According to 
him, ‘though political solidarity was weak among Armenians, there was a commonality of 
language, an attachment to territory, and fierce devotion to the national religion, first pagan, 
later Armenian Christian.’40 Religion, he wrote, was the ‘primary identification of this people, 
coinciding roughly with the linguistic and territorial community.’41 As for the area under 
which Suny assumed ‘geographical Armenia’, he was not unequivocal. Thus, he considered 
Garabagh to be the ‘easternmost edge of the great Armenian-mountain-plateau’.42 In the same 
book he also wrote that ‘proto-Armenians migrated into eastern Anatolia, the Armenian 
Plateau, in the mid-sixth century BC’.43 He apparently localised this ‘plateau’ in Eastern 
Anatolia, but while talking about Garabagh, extended its area to include the latter. Suny 
further argued that the modern period of Armenian history, from the eighteenth century up to 
the present, was separated from the earlier periods of Armenian history ‘not only by time but 
also by place […] for a geographical shift in the centres of Armenian life from Eastern 
Anatolia to dispersed colonies occurred during the long hiatus of early modern times’. It was 
‘away from the “fatherland”,’ he noted, that ‘the first generation of patriotic intellectuals 
                                                                                                                                                        
33 Hewsen R, ‘The Geography of Armenia’ in Hovannisian (ed.), The Armenian People from Ancient to Modern 
Times, Volume I, pp 1-17 
34 Ulubabian B, ‘Toponimy ‘Albaniya’, ‘Agvank’ i ‘Aran’’, Istoriko-filologicheskiy zhurnal, Izdanie Akademii 
Nauk Armyanskoy SSR, no 3, 1971, p 126  
35 Istoriya armyanskogo naroda, Erevan: Izdatel’stvo Yerevanskogo Universiteta, 1980, pp 36-45 
36 Istoriya armyanskogo naroda, chast’ I, Erevan: Aypetrat, 1951, pp 32-35, 44; Note: Suren Eremian, himself a 
representative of the ‘revisionist’ conception, in his map of the ‘Armenian plateau’ drawn in 1952 localised the 
‘plateau’ in Eastern Anatolia (see Map 3). However, in Istoriya armyanskogo naroda (History of the Armenian 
people), published in 1980, he wrote that ‘historically the Armenian people lived in the territory which in the 
geographical science is known as the Armenian plateau. Soviet Armenia occupies the north-eastern part of this 
territory’ (Istoriya armyanskogo naroda, 1980, p 7).  
37 Svazian G, Istoriya strany Aluank (s drevneyshikh vremyon po VIII vek), Erevan: Institut Istorii Natsional’noy 
Akademii Nauk Respubliki Armeniya, 2008, pp 52-279 
38 Mikaelian V, ‘Eshche raz o yuridicheskikh i istoricheskikh osnovakh prava karabakhskikh armyan na 
samoopredelenie’, Istoriko-filologicheskiy zhurnal, Izdanie Akademii Nauk Armyanskoy SSR, no 3, 2001, p 60 
39 Suny R, Looking toward Ararat: Armenia in Modern History, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993,              
p 11 
40 Ibid., p 8 
41 Ibid.  
42 Ibid., p 193 
43 Ibid., p 7 
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emerged and provided a new definition for a vision of Armenian nationhood’.44 It appears, 
according to Suny, that the ‘fatherland’ of the Armenians was in Eastern Anatolia, which 
means that he did not consider Garabagh in the South Caucasus as part of this ‘fatherland’. 
However, he regarded Garabagh as the ‘easternmost edge of the great Armenian-mountain-
plateau’, which he also localised in Eastern Anatolia.  
 
James Russell defined the ‘Armenian plateau’ in the following way: ‘In the mid-second 
millennium BC, “Western” Indo-European Luwians and Hittites lived in western and central 
Asia Minor. As one moved eastward onto what later came to be called the Armenian plateau, 
the Hurrian and Urartian languages predominated.’45 The main mass of the Urartian-speaking 
people, according to Igor Diakonoff, lived inside the territory of the formation of the 
Armenian people (see Map 1), i.e. in Eastern Anatolia, and merged with it. A considerable 
part of the Hurrians lived outside of this territory, and did not merge with the Armenians.46 In 
this case, the ‘Armenian plateau’ should have occupied part of Eastern Anatolia. If by ‘under 
the Hurrian and Urartian languages’ Russell meant the area of all the languages close to them, 
then his ‘Armenian plateau’ should have been extended up to Chechnya.47 This definition of 
the ‘Armenian plateau’ was vague and controversial, which would not have happened if 
Russell had given its geographical description, since under this notion he meant geographical 
area.  
 
Salahi Sonyel identified the ‘homeland’ of the Armenians in the ‘Armenian plateau’ and, 
without reference to primary sources, called it a ‘very old geographical term’ occupying a 
large area from Eastern Anatolia to Central Transcaucasia.48  
 
 
                                                 
44 Ibid., pp 54-55 
45 Russell J, ‘Formation of the Armenian Nation’ in Hovannisian (ed.), The Armenian People from Ancient to 
Modern Times, Volume I, p 25 
46 Diakonoff I, The Pre-history of the Armenian People, p 128 
47 Note: According to Diakonoff, ‘linguistic ties can be traced between the Hurro-Urartian languages and the 
north-eastern Caucasian (Nakh-Dagestan) group, particularly, in vocabulary, with their Nakhian subgroup, 
whose representatives live today in the central regions of the Greater Caucasus, principally on its northern slopes 
(the Chechens, the Ingush, and on the southern slopes, the Batsbians), as well as with their Lezghian sub-group 
in its southeast; and in grammar, with the Ando-Avarian subgroup in the northeast of the Caucasus.’ (Ibid., p 8) 
48 Sonyel S, The Ottoman Armenians: Victims of Great Power Diplomacy, London: K.Rustem & Brother, 1987, 
p 3 
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The review of the works of the above-mentioned historians showed that, although they 
presented a whole range of views, they did not offer a clear picture of 1) what areas they 
meant when they discussed the ‘Armenian plateau’ and ‘Armenian state’ and/or the 
differences between them; 2) which territories Artaxias I and Tigran II had to return back after 
their defeats and which areas remained under Armenian rule; and 3) which areas constituted 
geographical Armenia and which were ethnically Armenian, i.e. the Armenian ‘ethnic 
homeland’.  
 
During her study of the academic works on Armenian history, the researcher could not find 
clear answers to these questions in the works of the above-mentioned historians. They used 
vague notions while describing the area of the formation of the Armenian people. The same 
can be said about the ‘Armenian plateau’, with its different sizes depending on the historian 
writing about it. Igor Diakonoff and Suren Eremian localised it in Eastern Anatolia in their 
maps, although Eremian changed his mind later.  
 
The issue is further complicated when different historians discuss the non-Armenian peoples 
in the area between the Kur and Araz Rivers. Thus, in 1908, Nicolas Adontz, while touching 
upon the population of Sunik, the area of which corresponded to that of the present-day 
Nakhchyvan part of Azerbaijan Republic and a considerable part of the Armenian Republic, 
wrote that in the 5th-6th centuries AD, its population was non-Armenian.49 In 1915, Nikolay 
Marr wrote that some of the Christian Albanians were assimilated by the Armenians and some 
by the Georgians by the eleventh century.50 Iosif Orbeli called Garabagh a ‘part of ancient 
Albania’51 in 1963. Ronald Suny, in 1993, wrote that in ancient and medieval times, the 
Garabagh region had been part of the kingdom of the Caucasian Albanians, whose upper 
classes were Armenianised over time.52 In 1958, Suren Eremian wrote about the 
Armenianisation of some of the Christian Albanians living between the Kur and Araz Rivers 
by the eighth century AD.53  
 
                                                 
49 Adontz N, op cit., pp 324, 325, 172 
50 Marr N, Kavkazskiy kul’turniy mir i Armeniya, Petrograd: Senatskaya Tipografiya, 1915, pp 20-21 
51 Orbeli I, Izbranniye trudy, Erevan: Izdatel’stvo Akademii Nauk Armyanskoy SSR, 1963, p 146 
52 Suny R, op cit., p 193 
53 Eremian S, ‘Ideologiya i kul’tura Albanii III-VII vv.’ in Ocherki istorii SSSR, Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Akademii 
Nauk SSSR, 1958, pp 328, 330 
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Ziya Bunyadov noted in 1965 that the Gregorianisation of the Christian Albanians in the 
mountainous places of Caucasian Albania started after its fall in the early eighth century 
AD.54 Farida Mammadova refuting the Armenian arguments on the borders of ancient 
Armenia reaching the juncture of the Kur and Araz Rivers, in 2005 argued that the 
Armenianisation of the Garabagh Albanians took place in the early nineteenth century.55 
Concerning the Armenians in the South Caucasus, she wrote that in the fifteenth century the 
‘seat of the [Armenian] Catholicos was transferred from Cilicia to Echmiadzin near Erevan’, 
and since then Echmiadzin has become a centre of all spheres of the Armenian life as a 
consolidating and organisational power. Armenian historians, she continued, introduced into 
academic circulation a new notion of ‘Eastern Armenia’, under which, in the 16th-20th 
centuries, they indicated the territories of Garabagh, Zangazur, Iravan (Erevan) and Ganja. 
This meant that the ‘notion of “Eastern Armenia” shifted both in time and in area from the 
east of the Euphrates River to Caucasus.’56 After the occupation of the South Caucasus by 
Russia in the early nineteenth century, the first compact Armenian settlers from the Ottoman 
Empire and Persia appeared in the South Caucasus, including in the Iravan (Erevan), 
Nakhchyvan and Garabagh khanates. Russia established the first Armenian unit in the 
Caucasus with the title ‘Armenian oblast’ (province) on the basis of the khanates of Iravan 
(Erevan) and Nakhchyvan.57  
 
The settlement of the Armenians in the South Caucasus, including in the territory of present-
day Armenia, has also been examined by George Bournoutian, who wrote that ‘the Armenian 
population at no time prior to the Russian takeover formed a majority in Eastern Armenia [the 
author meant the territory of present-day Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia between the Kur 
and Araz Rivers58 – I.K.].’59 He explained the hitherto minority situation of the Armenians in 
the area by the ‘centuries of warfare between the Ottomans and the Persians and the despotic 
                                                 
54 Bunyadov Z, Azerbaydzhan v VII-IX vekakh, Baku: Izdatel’stvo Akademii Nauk Azerbaydzhanskoy SSR,  
1965, p 97 
55 Mamedova (Mammadova) F, Kavkazskaya Albaniya i albany, Baku: Tsentr Issledovaniy Kavkazskoy Albanii, 
2005, pp 118-122, 591-615 
56 Ibid., pp 650-652 
57 Ibid., p 655  
58 Bournoutian G, ‘The Ethnic Composition and the Socio-Economic Condition of Eastern Armenia in the First 
Half of the Nineteenth Century’ in Suny (ed.), Transcaucasia: Nationalism and Social Change, Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1983, p 69 
59 Ibid., p 78 
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rule of local khans’.60 In 1983, he argued that ‘until the mid-fourteenth century, Eastern 
Armenia had an Armenian majority […] By the nineteenth century the Armenian population 
of Eastern Armenia had shrunk considerably.’61 In 1997, he came to a somewhat different 
conclusion and wrote that ‘it is probably that until the seventeenth century, the Armenians 
still maintained a majority in Eastern Armenia, but the forced relocation of some 250,000 
Armenians by Shah Abbas and the numerous exoduses […] had reduced the Armenian 
population considerably […] Only in the mountain regions of Karabagh and Zangezur did the 
Armenians manage to maintain a solid majority.’ The Armenian population, he wrote, was 
generally concentrated in the fortress cities of Erevan, Nakhchyvan, Ganja, Shusha, 
Sardarabad, and in the villages surrounding the town of Vagarshabad, which contained 
Echmiadzin.62  
 
Bournoutian did not explain why the centuries of warfare only decreased the number of 
Armenians, which implied that all the wars in the region were directed against the Armenians. 
If the wars decreased the number of the Armenians, they should have decreased the number of 
the ‘Armenians’ in the ‘mountain regions of Karabagh and Zangezur’ as well, not maintained 
their majority there. Bournoutian listed only the names of the towns as the locations of 
general concentrations of Armenians without explaining the reasons for this situation.  
 
Vardan Parsamian citing facts on the settlement of the Armenians from the Ottoman Empire 
and Persia in the nineteenth century, wrote that ‘taking into account the fact that throughout 
the centuries the Ararat valley [?- I.K.], historical cradle of the Armenian people, was almost 
deprived of its Armenian element by alien occupants […] a great importance of the 
concentration of the Armenian population in Eastern Armenia becomes clear.’ The Armenian 
oblast created by Russia in 1828, he noted, became a ‘more stable and secure centre of the 
Armenian people’.63 The historian did not cite any evidence or discuss his argument with 
regard to the ‘deprivation’ of the area of its ‘Armenian element by alien occupants’. 
 
                                                 
60 Ibid., p 77 
61 Ibid. 
62 Bournoutian G, ‘Eastern Armenia from the Seventeenth Century to the Russian Annexation’ in Hovannisian 
(ed.), The Armenian People from Ancient to Modern Times, Volume II, New York: St.Martin Press, 2004, p 96 
63 Parsamian V, Istoriya armyanskogo naroda (1801-1900 gg.). Kniga pervaya, Erevan: Izdatel’stvo ‘Hayastan’, 
1972, p 68 
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1.2 The Armenian national movement 
 
The first academic work dealing with the Armenian national movement with more emphasis 
on the activities of the Armenian revolutionary organisations in the nineteenth century in 
English belongs to Louise Nalbandian. Her book’s introduction presented the movement as a 
‘struggle for freedom’ of a people with more than twenty-five centuries of ‘national 
consciousness’ living in the area from the Mediterranean to Garabagh, who ‘awoke from 
years of lethargy’ through the stirring message of a few patriotic individuals.64 The historian’s 
argument that the Armenian people struggled for independence against their Muslim leaders 
in the 15th-19th centuries contradicted her view that ‘they [Armenians – I.K.] lived in relative 
peace during nearly four centuries of corrupt Ottoman rule and did not rise in insurrection 
against their overlords until the later half of the nineteenth century’.65   
 
Nalbandian’s work demonstrated that despite her statement on the historical Armenian 
presence in the area from the Mediterranean to Garabagh, all of the activities of the Armenian 
revolutionaries in the nineteenth century aimed to ‘liberate’ the ‘homeland’, by which they 
meant Eastern Anatolia. This in turn revealed a paradox showing the preference of the 
Armenians for Eastern Anatolia over the South Caucasus, despite the fact that the Armenian 
revolutionaries who were setting Armenians against Muslims in Eastern Anatolia were from 
the South Caucasus.66    
 
Ronald Suny’s approach to the question was somewhat different. Throughout his work he 
used ‘Turkey’ instead of the Ottoman Empire and explained the nationalism of Armenians by 
their increasing interactions with other peoples in the cities of Caucasus and the western part 
of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century, where they felt the impact of Western 
concepts of nationality and nationhood. This influenced their own self-concept, which shifted 
from that of a religious community to that of a nationality with a ‘common history and 
cultural consonants’.67  
 
                                                 
64 Nalbandian L, op cit., pp 1-8 
65 Ibid., pp 18-24, 26 
66 Ibid., pp 90-178 
67 Suny R, op cit., p 23 
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Suny, like Nalbandian, emphasised the role of Catholic Armenian monks of the eighteenth 
century as forerunners of the process, and attributed a major role in this nineteenth-century 
change to the Armenian intellectuals who articulated a secular Armenianness, which was 
influenced by two principal factors: internal and external. The former, in his opinion, was 
related to Armenian intellectual activities within the Russian and Ottoman Empires, 
manifested in the emergence of nationalist literature and periodicals in the vernacular 
Armenian and the political expression of Armenian aspirations. The external source of 
Armenian consciousness came from the Russian and Ottoman imperial authorities, which 
considered the Armenians to be most loyal subjects, but ‘in the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century forced all Armenians, even those most desirous of assimilation, to recognise 
themselves as a separate people by discriminating against Armenians and persecuting them.’68  
 
Razmik Panossian dedicated a book to Armenian nation-building, which was a ‘slightly 
shorter version’69 of his PhD dissertation at the London School of Economics and Political 
Science. Unlike the majority of authors dealing with the issue, Panossian raised theoretical 
questions and applied theories on nations and nation-building to the Armenian case. He wrote 
that ‘being autochthonous to the land is one of the most important themes in nationalist 
discourse. In this respect Armenians do indeed go very far back […] The historic territory on 
which the Armenian people lived stretched between the Kur River to the east, the Pontic 
mountain range to the north, the Euphrates river to the west and the Taurus Mountains to the 
south.’70 As a result of the Armenian national movement, no new Armenian ethnic identity 
was created. Rather, an old one, i.e. the people ‘with roots stretching well into the first 
millennium BC’ in the above-mentioned area, was ‘reinterpreted, reinvigorated, modernised 
and eventually politicised’; ‘new ethnic boundaries were not created, but existing ones 
redefined and strengthened’.71 Panossian applied existing theories on nations and nationalism 
to the Armenian case without first conducting deep empirical research into the formation of 
the Armenian people. Instead he relied on Armenian histories by Armenian authors, a great 
part of which were secondary sources. The author’s bibliography highlighted methodological 
and empirical gaps.   
                                                 
68 Ibid., pp 22-23 
69 Panossian R, The Armenians: From Kings and Priests to Merchants and Commissars, London: Hurst and 
Company, 2006, p XV 
70 Ibid., pp 33-34 
71 Ibid., pp 183-184 
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Different aspects of the Armenian national movement have been considered by various 
scholars. Thus, Simon Payaslian briefly examined the path of Armenian nationalism from 
cultural ‘reawakening’ to ‘armed revolutionary movement’, including the policies of the 
Ottoman and Russian authorities vis-à-vis Armenians in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries.72 Vahe Oshagan explored literary and intellectual aspects of the Armenian national 
movement from the eighteenth to the early twentieth century.73 Hagop Barsoumian’s paper 
shed some light on the situation of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, Ottoman reforms 
and their impact on the Armenians.74 Richard Hovannisian researched the Armenian question 
in the Ottoman Empire in 1876-1914, including the Berlin Treaty, its methods of 
implementation and results, the policy of Great Powers and the emergence of the Armenian 
revolutionary organisations and their activities.75 Gerard Libaridian analysed the 1892 and 
1907 programmes of Dashnaktsutiun, the main Armenian political party. He argued that 
miscalculated party strategy was the reason that the aims of the first programme failed, 
compelling the organisation to revise it and include socialist as well as nationalist aims in the 
second programme, thus creating a ‘curious blend of nationalism and socialism’ as a way of 
achieving its nationalist goals, although the idea of independence was rejected in the second 
programme.76  
 
Firuz Kazemzadeh examined the situation of the Armenians under Ottoman rule briefly and 
considered them ‘by no means an oppressed and miserable people’.77 Touching upon the 
activities of Dashnaktsutiun, he only treated the party’s second programme, in which the 
South Caucasus was added in 1907. He explained the inclusion of the economic demands in 
the second programme by the influence of socialism and ‘the desire of Dashnak leaders to 
affiliate with the Second International’. Kazemzadeh also analysed the armed uprisings 
prepared by the Dashnaks to attract the attention of the European Powers, which enraged the 
Muslims. The ‘Turks’ replied with Armenian massacres and in revenge Dashnaktsutiun 
                                                 
72 Payaslian S, The History of Armenia, pp 117-123 
73 Oshagan V, ‘Modern Armenian Literature and Intellectual History’ in Hovannisian (ed.), The Armenian 
People from Ancient to Modern Times, Volume II, pp 140-174 
74 Barsoumian H, ‘The Eastern Question and the Tanzimat Era’ in Hovannisian (ed.), The Armenian People from 
Ancient to Modern Times, Volume II, pp 175-201 
75 Hovannisian R, ‘The Armenian Question in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1914’ in Hovannisian (ed.), The 
Armenian People from Ancient to Modern Times, Volume II, 2004, pp 203-238 
76 Libaridian G, ‘Revolution and Liberation in the 1892 and 1907 Programs of the Dashnaktsutiun’ in Suny (ed.), 
Transcaucasia: Nationalism and Social Change, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1983, pp 185-196 
77 Kazemzadeh F, The Struggle for Transcaucasia (1917-1921), New York: Philosophical Library, 1951, p 8 
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perpetrated more murders. As for its activities in Russia, he argued that the oppressive 
policies adopted by Russia against the Armenians in the South Caucasus directed the party’s 
attention against Russia as well. Writing that a terrorist faction in the party had gained 
domination of the whole and ‘terrorised not only the Turks but often also their own people’, 
he argued that the Armenian masses of the South Caucasus, and especially the wealthier 
classes, were inclined to be on the side of the Russians and ‘let the Dashnaktsutiun return to 
its original task, the liberation of the Turkish Armenia’.78   
 
Vardan Parsamian took a different view of the formation of the Armenian nation. He 
considered this nation a ‘bourgeois’ one shaped mainly in the second half of the nineteenth 
century, with the common features characteristic of nations: language, territory, socio-
economic life and culture. This was related to the development of capitalism, and the way it 
shaped the economic, political and cultural life of the Armenian people. The bourgeois nation, 
in his opinion, could not build its own state, which meant that he disregarded the first 
Armenian Republic. According to him, the process stimulated the development of the 
Armenian national consciousness and national-liberation struggle, and the revival of national 
culture. The Armenian people, he concluded, ‘achieved its national statehood only due to the 
victory of the Soviet regime’.79      
 
Salahi Sonyel also examined the situation of the Armenians under Ottoman rule, their 
organisation into the Armenian millet, and their economic and social life. He studied the 
genesis of the ‘Armenian question’, the Armenian attempts to establish an autonomous 
Armenian province in Eastern Anatolia, the reform projects related to the Berlin Treaty, the 
analysis of their essence and the Great Power politics behind them, the establishment of the 
Armenian revolutionary organisations and their activities before and during the First World 
War and their results.80 Mim Kemal Oke studied the ‘Armenian question’, including the 
historical relations between the Armenians and the Ottoman Government, their place within 
the Ottoman millet system and their situation in the Empire. He also analysed the factors 
instrumental in the rise of Armenian nationalism, considering the Armenian Church as its 
starting point, as well as the Russian factor, which opened the ‘Armenian file’ in the area of 
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diplomacy, and the aims of the British in supporting the Christian missionaries as a way of 
obtaining the right for a protectorate over the Ottoman Empire. He explored the emergence of 
the Armenian revolutionary organisations and their methods of struggle, the 
internationalisation of the Armenian issue through the Berlin Treaty, and the politics of the 
Great Powers evolved around this treaty, which was never implemented.81  
 
1.3 Emergence of the Armenian Republic  
 
The pioneer of scholarly works on the first Armenian Republic, to our knowledge, is Bagrat 
Borian.82 Other Soviet historians who dealt with the issue were Georgiy Karadzhan 
(nicknamed Arkomed),83 Tsatur Agaian,84 Galust Galoian,85 Ashot Sarkisian86 and                         
A.Galoian.87 Apart from Bagrat Borian and Galust Galoian, who examined the first Armenian 
Republic very briefly as well, the others dealt with aspects of the subject, focusing especially 
on the events leading to the separation of the South Caucasus from Russia in April 1918. 
They considered the developments taking place in the region after the October Revolution of 
1917, including the establishment of a de facto regional government, namely the Zakavkazskiy 
Komissariat (Transcaucasian Commissariat), a regional parliament, i.e. the Zakavkazskiy 
Seym (Transcaucasian Diet) and the Zakavkazskaya Federativnaya Demokraticheskaya 
Respublika (Transcaucasian Federative Democratic Republic). In their opinion, all of these 
were the endeavours of nationalist counter-revolutionaries, who were dictated by the 
imperialist powers of Germany and the Ottoman Empire and did not have the mandate of their 
peoples. According to them, the principal parties of the region were bourgeois-nationalist, and 
separated the region from Soviet Russia, so they were enemies of their peoples, workers and 
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peasants. The three republics were referred to as so-called independent and democratic 
republics in the works of the above-mentioned historians.  
 
Firuz Kazemzadeh was the first Western historian to dedicate an academic work to the 
political history of the first South Caucasian republics – Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia – 
from the February Revolution in 1917 to their Sovietisation in 1920-1921. In his opinion, the 
collapse of the Transcaucasian Federative Democratic Republic occurred because of the 
divergent interests of the three peoples composing it, and the independence of Armenia had to 
be proclaimed because of the absence of any other alternative.88    
 
Richard Hovannisian was the first and only historian to write a thorough (four volume) work 
on the first Republic of Armenia. In addition, he dedicated his book, ‘Armenia on the Road to 
Independence, 1918’, to the emergence of the republic and its immediate aftermath.89 He 
considered the Russian expansion into the South Caucasus as an important step toward 
Armenian independence and ‘Russian Armenia’. According to him, the latter was 
geographically applied to a portion of the ‘Armenian plateau’ within the Russian Empire. 
After the conclusion of the Treaty of Turkmanchay between Russia and Persia in 1828, Tsar 
Nicholas issued a decree on the creation of an Armenian oblast, which consisted of the former 
khanates of Iravan (Erevan) and Nakhchyvan (see Map 7), and adopted for the oblast an 
official emblem reminiscent of the royal standards of the Armenian kings. The Armenians, 
Hovannisian went on, were satisfied, although it did not include several eastern districts of the 
‘plateau’, such as Akhalkalaki, Lori, Gazakh, and Mountainous Garabagh.90  
 
As noted, Hovannisian placed the ‘Armenian plateau’ in Eastern Anatolia, so it again caused 
confusion as to how any portion of the ‘plateau’, which was in Eastern Anatolia, belonging to 
the Ottoman Empire, could be found in the South Caucasus, within the Russian Empire and 
called ‘Russian Armenia’. He explained the minority situation of the Armenians in the 
Armenian oblast by ‘Moslem penetration onto the rich land along the rivers’ in the preceding 
centuries.91 He did not support his opinion with concrete facts, and the figures cited by him on 
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the exodus of Armenians from the Ottoman Empire and Persia to the South Caucasus, 
including the Armenian oblast after 1828, demonstrated the opposite.  
 
According to Hovannisian, it was on the territory of the Armenian oblast that the Republic of 
Armenia was to emerge in 1918.92 The growth of Armenian political awareness, he argued, 
led to increased dissatisfaction with the administrative subdivisions of the South Caucasus. 
The Armenian politicians advocated the introduction of the zemstvo system (agrarian districts 
with assemblies with limited economic, cultural and educational initiative) to the region, 
under which the Armenians would have three ethnically homogeneous zemstvo provinces 
encompassing the entire Erevan guberniya, two southern okrugs (district) of the Kars oblast,93 
Akhalkalaki uezd and Lori uchastok (circuit) of the Tiflis guberniya, and the mountainous 
regions of Elizavetpol guberniya94 (see Map 8). Hovannisian did not express his own view 
about this project, apart from pointing to its rejection by the Georgians and Muslims95 and the 
fact that the territorial problems passed into the period when the South Caucasus was divided 
into three separate states, which in the Armenian case arose out of the absence of any 
alternative.96  
 
Tadeusz Swietochowski studied the emergence of the first Azerbaijan Republic, and within its 
context highlighted some points related to the Armenians and their republic.97 The question 
was touched upon within the context of Armenian history by Simon Payaslian98 and Ronald 
Suny99 as well. Razmik Panossian theorised the issue, analysing the effects of the first 
Armenian Republic on Armenian identity.100  
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The emergence of the first Armenian Republic was also examined by Enis Shahin, as part of 
his work on Armenian-Ottoman relations in the period from the February Revolution of 1917 
to the Mudros Armistice of 30 October 1918. Although the book was dedicated to the Gumru 
negotiations between the first Armenian Republic and the Ottoman Empire after the signing 
of the Batumi Treaty on 4 June 1918, the work focused in detail on Ottoman–Transcaucasian 
relations, especially the Batumi negotiations on 11 May–4 June 1918, which ended in the 
signing of the peace treaties between the Ottoman Empire and three South Caucasian 
republics, including the Armenian Republic, in Batumi.101 The emergence of the first 
Armenian Republic was considered in general terms by Kamuran Gurun.102 Mim Kemal Oke 
examined the topic briefly as part of the ‘Armenian Question.’103 After the Soviet period, the 
subject was also examined as part of the background history of the emergence of the first 
Azerbaijan Republic by Jamil Hasanov104 and Aydyn Balayev.105    
 
As for the area of the first Armenian Republic, historians offer different interpretations based 
on the Batumi Treaty of 4 June 1918 between the Ottoman Empire and the first Armenian 
Republic, such as 4,400 square miles (11,395 square kilometres),106 11,000 square kilometres 
(4,247 square miles),107 and 10,000 square kilometres (3,860 square miles).108 The 
descriptions of the territorial components of the Armenian Republic change depending on the 
historian, and reveal gaps, since the Batumi treaties defined the borders of the Ottoman 
Empire with the three South Caucasian republics, not only with Armenia. Moreover, they did 
not define the borders between Armenia and the other two republics of the region. This means 
that the description and interpretation of the territorial components of the first Armenian 
Republic and subsequent calculation of its area could have been possible only after the 
definition of its borders with all of its neighbours.  
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1.4 Conflicts of the first Armenian Republic with Azerbaijan over Garabagh 
and Nakhchyvan   
 
Among Soviet historians, it was Bagrat Borian who studied the border issues between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan, but omitted discussion on the Garabagh or Nakhchyvan problems. 
He mentioned that the South Caucasian republics could not come to any decision on the 
border issues, since the Armenian nationalists were full of strong tendencies towards power 
and the Georgian and Azerbaijani nationalists did not concede to them. Although Borian 
mentioned the territories to which Azerbaijan and Georgia asserted their claims at the Paris 
Peace Conference, he made no mention of the Armenian territorial claims, limiting the 
information only to the ‘great hopes of the Armenian delegation on the Great Powers’ on its 
borders, arguing that ‘not the interests of Armenia, but the interests of the Great Powers were 
the objects of the discussion of the Commission’ organised on the Armenian issue. The 
Armenian Republic, he noted, like the other two republics, existed within the boundaries, 
which it could defend with its own forces. Enlargement of the territory depended on the 
balance of powers of the neighbouring republics and the patronage of the Allied Powers, 
whose policy was aimed at developing international antagonism, in support of bloody actions 
between the republics and in the artificial and provisional delimitation of their borders. As for 
the settlement of the borders after the first Sovietisation of Armenia, Borian cited the text of 
the agreement of 2 December 1920 between Soviet Russia and the Armenian Republic, which 
declared Armenia a Soviet Socialist Republic and described its area. The latter, among others, 
contained the Zangazur uezd of Elizavetpol guberniya and the whole of Erevan guberniya, 
including the Muslim-dominated Nakhchyvan and Sharur-Daralayaz uezds. He also referred 
to the article of the Kars Treaty of 13 October 1921 between Turkey and the three Soviet 
republics of the South Caucasus, signed with the participation of Soviet Russia, which defined 
the status of Nakhchyvan as an autonomous territory within Azerbaijan SSR. He called the 
Kars Treaty the ‘worst’ and ‘dirtiest’ peace for Armenia, since it decreased the area of 
Armenian SSR in comparison with that in the above-mentioned agreement of 2 December 
1920.109       
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Firuz Kazemzadeh considered the territorial conflicts between Armenia and Azerbaijan very 
briefly based on a few and mostly secondary Russian, British and Armenian sources. He did 
not reveal their essence and did not provide insight into the events of the mentioned period, 
including the interests and policies of the involved countries.110 Tadeusz Swietochowski 
touched upon the Garabagh and Nakhchyvan problems in general terms in the context of his 
discussion of the first Azerbaijan Republic. He briefly mentioned British policy on the 
Garabagh and Nakhchyvan problems.111 
 
Richard Hovannisian dedicated special chapters of his work to examining the territorial 
problems between the two republics. Although the reader can find much interesting 
information in these chapters from different primary and secondary sources, he made 
undocumented comments about the roots of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, which, in his 
opinion, lay in history, when, beginning in the eleventh century ‘the Azerbaijanis had swept 
into southern and eastern Transcaucasia as Turco-Islamic conquerors and had eventually 
driven the indigenous Christian population from the fertile river valleys and plains’.112 The 
fact that Hovannisian from the very beginning considered the territories claimed by the first 
Armenian Republic to be historical Armenian territories and the Azerbaijani identity existing 
in the eleventh century113 affected his study of the issue and his conclusions on the subject. 
His examination of these territorial problems and Azerbaijan’s stance on them on the eve of 
the first Sovietisation of Armenia was also misleading.114 The use of the Armenian spelling 
‘Shushi’, instead of Shusha, for the principal town of Garabagh throughout his books could be 
interpreted as an indication of a particular political position on the part of Hovannisian.  
 
Ronald Suny did not discuss the territorial problems between the two countries, except for his 
undocumented short journey into the history of the Mountainous Garabagh question in 1918-
1921, accompanied by interpretations influenced by the current stage of the conflict. He wrote 
that ‘with the revolution the Karabagh Armenians expressed their interest in joining 
independent Armenia, but the Azerbaijanis, supported by the Turks, forced the Karabaghtsis 
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to remain in Azerbaijan’.115 This sentence is misleading, since there was no revolution after 
which there emerged an Armenian state which Garabagh Armenians would desire to join. 
Then, he continued, the British, who established their hegemony in the South Caucasus in late 
1918, prevented Armenian annexation of the region. Following the establishment of Soviet 
rule in Azerbaijan, the historian continued without providing any evidence, Azerbaijan 
promised to cede Garabagh to Soviet Armenia. The Caucasian Bureau of the Central 
Committee of the Russian Communist (Bolshevik) Party adopted the relevant decision in July 
1921, but later reversed itself and decided to give Mountainous Garabagh a broad autonomy 
within Azerbaijan.116       
 
Simon Payaslian’s study of the territorial problems between the two republics was limited to 
general information on the establishment of Garabagh General-Governorship in January 1919, 
the appointment of Azerbaijani Khosrov bay Sultanov as its Governor-General, his 
recognition by Britain as such, and Armenia’s appeals to the British General, William 
Thomson, to prevent Sultanov’s governorship in Garabagh.117 When touching upon the 
settlement of the territorial problems between the two countries, Payaslian made 
undocumented and contradictory comments about Garabagh and Nakhchyvan.118 The use of 
the Armenian spelling ‘Shushi’, not ‘Shusha’, as was the case with Hovannisian’s works, 
could be interpreted as an indication of a particular political position on the part of Payaslian 
as well.    
 
Artin Arslanian’s article on British policy towards the Mountainous Garabagh question,119 
despite its small size and evident pro-Armenian bias, contained interesting information about 
the positions of the British Foreign and War Offices on the Garabagh and Nakhchyvan 
problems and the methods of settling them.  
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The stance of the first Armenian Republic on the settlement of the territorial problems with 
Azerbaijan has been briefly examined by Gayane Makhmurian.120  
 
Enis Shahin, discussed the activities of the Armenian armed bands in Garabagh and 
Nakhchyvan.121  
 
Within his above-mentioned work dedicated to the first Azerbaijan Republic and its 
international activities until the Bolshevik seizure of power in Baku on 28 April 1920, Jamil 
Hasanov explored the Armenian territorial claims to Garabagh, Armenian diplomatic efforts 
until the Mudros Armistice of October 1918 to include the area in Armenia, and the Armenian 
General Andranik Ozanian’s atrocities in Garabagh, including Zangazur. He examined 
Armenian efforts towards the inclusion of Garabagh after the South Caucasus came under the 
British control as an Allied representative after the Mudros Armistice, their failure because of 
the establishment of the Garabagh General-Governorship as a part of the Azerbaijan Republic, 
and its recognition by the British General, William Thomson. Hasanov also considered the 
British temporary handover of Nakhchyvan to Armenia in May 1919, the resistance of its 
Azerbaijani population against this decision, and the failure of this British project. He also 
analysed the US Colonel, William Haskel’s, project in October 1919 on the creation of a 
neutral zone in the Nakhchyvan region, the resistance of its Azerbaijani population, and the 
failure of the project.122 
 
The conflicts between the first Armenian and Azerbaijan Republics over Nakhchyvan and the 
Zangazur part of Garabagh have been studied by Ismayil Musayev. In addition to the above-
mentioned discussions of the issues by Jamil Hasanov, Musayev analysed the process leading 
to the transfer of a western part of Zangazur uezd to Soviet Armenia with the help of Soviet 
Russia in July 1921, and the road leading to the status of Nakhchyvan within Azerbaijan SSR 
under the Moscow and Kars Treaties in March and October 1921 respectively.123 
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The Garabagh problem in 1918-1921 has been studied by Tofig Kocharli124 and the 
Nakhchyvan problem by Vasif Gafarov,125 among other Azerbaijani historians.  
 
The current chapter has examined the views of different scholars on the issues under 
discussion. The next chapter will deal with the theoretical literature on nations, nationalism, 
state formation and delimitation of state boundaries. Going beyond the limitations of the 
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Perspectives 
 
In May 1918, three republics – Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia – emerged in the South 
Caucasus, declaring their independence in Tiflis, capital of the Transcaucasian Democratic 
Federative Republic, which had existed from 22 April to 26 May 1918. The act on the 
independence of Georgia was adopted on 26 May 1918 by the Georgian National Council. 
The text of the declaration did not define the territories included in the Democratic Republic 
of Georgia.126 The Azerbaijani National Council declared the independence of Azerbaijan on 
28 May 1918: the area of the Azerbaijani Democratic Republic would cover ‘Southern and 
Eastern Transcaucasia’,127 corresponding roughly to the present-day Azerbaijan Republic, 
northern, eastern and southern parts of the Republic of Armenia and part of southern Georgia. 
The decision on the proclamation of Armenia as a republic was adopted by the leaders of the 
main Armenian political party, Dashnaktsutiun on 29 May 1918. But on 30 May 1918, the 
Armenian National Council, declaring itself ‘the supreme and only administration for the 
Armenian provinces’, made no mention of independence or republic and did not clarify in 
geographical or administrative terms what ‘Armenian provinces’ meant. The terms 
‘independence’ and ‘republic’ were used publicly only after the signing of the Batumi Treaty 
with the Ottoman Empire on 4 June 1918.128  
 
The Ottoman Empire, Germany and Bolshevik Russia were directly involved in the regional 
processes during the emergence of the three republics. After the signing of the Armistice of 
Mudros on 30 October 1918 between the Ottoman Empire and the Allied Powers and that of 
Compiegne on 11 November 1918 between Germany and the Allied Powers, the Ottoman 
Empire and Germany were replaced by the UK and the US. In 1920, these countries were 
joined by Bolshevik Russia and Kemalist Turkey.  
 
The chapter explores the major scholarly works on nations, nationalism, state-building and 
territorial/border issues which are central to the researched topic, and raises theoretical issues 
related to the Armenian case.  
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2.1 Nations and Nationalism 
 
There is a vast literature on nationalism. The greater the number of studies, the more various 
the views on the issues. As Anthony Smith noted, the term ‘nationalism’ has been used in 
different ways: 
 
1. The whole process of forming and maintaining nations or nation-states 
2. A consciousness of belonging to the nation, together with sentiments and aspirations 
for its security and prosperity 
3. A language and symbolism of the ‘nation’ and its role 
4. An ideology, including a cultural doctrine of nations and the national will and 
prescriptions for the realisation of national aspirations and the national will 
5. A social and political movement to achieve the goals of the nation and realise its 
national will.129 
 
The different views on nations and nationalism are usually classified under three main 
theories: primordialism, modernism and ethno-symbolism.130     
 
The notion of ‘primordialism’ has been used to describe the origins and strength of ethnic 
attachments. It is thought to have originally been coined by Edward Shils in 1957 in reference 
to relationships within the family, and developed by Clifford Geertz in 1963.131 According to 
Geertz, ‘a primordial attachment is […] one that stems from the “givens” – or, more precisely, 
as culture is inevitably involved in such matters, the assumed “givens” – of social existence: 
immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly, but beyond them the givenness that stems 
from being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language, or even 
a dialect of a language, and following particular social practices. These congruities of blood, 
speech, custom, and so on, are seen to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering, 
coerciveness in and of themselves.’132 Pierre Berghe also had a socio-biological interpretation 
                                                 
129 Smith A, National Identity, London: Penguin Books, 1991, p 72 
130 Ozkirimli U, Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000, p 64 
131 Eller J and Coughlan R, ‘The Poverty of Primordialism: The Demystification of Ethnic Attachments’, Ethnic 
and Racial Studies, vol 16, no 2, 1993, p 183 
132 Geertz C, ‘Primordial and Civic Ties’ in Hutchinson and Smith (ed.), Nationalism, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1994, p 31  
29 
of ethnic and national ties.133 He saw nationalism as an ‘extension of kinship selection and 
“nepotism” which has become salient in the modern world because of large-scale population 
movements, colonialism, and conquest’.134 
 
A variation of the primordialist theory was given by the Soviet ethnologist, Yulian Bromley. 
He maintained that ‘ethnos is a historically stable entity of people developed on a certain 
territory and possessing common, relatively stable features of culture (including language) 
and psyche as well as a consciousness of their unity and of their difference from other similar 
entities (self-awareness) fixed in a self-name (ethnonym) [...] Nation is not an ethnic group 
with a titular statehood – it is exclusively that part of the group which resides on its “own” 
national territory.’135 Bromley and his followers consider that nation is the highest 
manifestation of ethnos.136   
 
As a reaction to the theory of primordialism, a new theory, modernism, emerged, challenging 
the theory of primordialism for the first time in its own terms in the article ‘The poverty of 
primordialism: the demystification of ethnic attachments’ by Jack Eller and Reed Coughlan in 
1993 and concluding that the term is ‘unsociological, unanalytical and vacuous’, advocating 
dropping it from the sociological lexicon.137  
 
The modernists saw nations as relatively new creatures, the products of the processes that 
took place after the American and French Revolutions. Thus, Ernest Gellner held that ‘nations 
as a natural, God-given way of classifying men, as an inherent though long-delayed political 
destiny, are a myth; nationalism which sometimes takes pre-existing cultures and turns them 
into nations, sometimes invents them, and often obliterates pre-existing cultures: that is a 
reality’.138 He argued that it is the need of modern societies for cultural homogeneity that 
creates nationalism. Although this is sociologically rooted in modernity, it is a product of the 
transition from ‘agro-literate’ societies, regulated by structure, to industrial societies, 
integrated by culture. Important components include the unevenness of industrialisation; the 
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leading role of an excluded intelligentsia in the invention of the nation; mass, public 
education; and the discrepancy between the romantic aspirations of nationalists and the 
utilitarian outcomes.139 Gellner distinguished three forms of nationalism: 1) ‘Habsburg’ 
nationalism, on behalf of a ‘high culture not as yet properly crystallyzed, a merely aspirant or 
in-the-making high culture’, by which he referred to the nationalisms in nineteenth-century 
Central and Eastern European countries140; 2) classical liberal Western nationalism, on behalf 
of a ‘fully effective high culture which only needs an improved bit of political roofing’, which 
corresponded with the unification nationalisms of nineteenth-century Italy and Germany141;             
3) diaspora nationalism, whose ‘most famous and dramatic case’ was Israel.142  
 
Another modernist scholar, Elie Kedourie, considered nationalism a doctrine invented in 
Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century143 and a form of secular millenarianism that 
arose from Kantian conceptions of human beings as autonomous, which, led to politics 
replacing religion as the key to salvation. He cited Rebbe, orthodox rabbi in Eastern Europe in 
1900, as an example of the use of the past by nationalists in order to subvert the present, 
where Judaism becomes a product of Jewish national consciousness.144   
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problem. Nearly two thousand years of history had left no Jewish territorial base whatever, and had moreover 
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For Eric Hobsbawm, the nation is not a primary and unchanging social entity. It belongs 
historically to a recent period and is a social entity only insofar as it relates to a certain kind of 
modern territorial state, the nation-state. He concluded that ‘nations do not make state and 
nationalism but the other way round’.145 For him, the nation was ‘invented’ by political elites 
in order to legitimise their power in a century of revolution and democratisation.146  
 
Benedict Anderson regarded the nation as an ‘imagined political community’ – imagined both 
‘inherently limited and sovereign’; limited because ‘no nation imagines itself coterminous 
with mankind’; sovereign because ‘the concept was born in an age which Enlightenment and 
Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic 
realm’; and community because ‘the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal 
comradeship’.147 He considered the main step in this process to be print technology, which 
created the possibility of a new form of imagined community, thus setting the stage for the 
modern nation. In his opinion, it was print-capitalism which precipitated the search for a new 
way of linking fraternity, power and time meaningfully and made it possible for rapidly 
growing numbers of people to think about themselves and relate themselves to others in 
profoundly new ways.148 Anderson also examined the nationalism of peoples living far away 
from their ‘homeland’, regarding that as ‘long-distance nationalism’.149  
 
Following the path of the modernists, the Russian scholar, Valeriy Tishkov, maintained that 
‘nations are constructs, created by people, by the efforts of intellectuals and by the political 
will of the state. “Nation” is an in-group definition: it is not possible to assign to it strictly 
scientific or legal formulae. As to the category “ethnos”, this is an artificial construct which 
should be removed from public and, probably, academic discourse.’150  
 
Like primordialists, modernists have also been challenged, especially by supporters of the 
ethno-symbolist approach; scholars ‘who aim to uncover the symbolic legacy of pre-modern 
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ethnic identities for today’s nations’.151 The ethno-symbolist scholar, John Hutchinson, 
criticising the modernist approach, contended that the ‘revolutionary’ model of modernisation 
cannot explain the much more evolutionary formation of national states in Western Europe, 
and that post-eighteenth century nationalism can only be understood within the framework of 
‘a wider theory of ethnic formation that refers to the factors that may be common to the pre-
modern and modern periods’.152  
 
According to Anthony Smith, nation is a ‘named population sharing an historic territory, 
common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and 
common legal rights and duties for all members’.153 He identified three reasons why the 
origins of the nation should be sought in pre-modern ethnic ties: 1) the first nations, England, 
France, Spain and to a lesser extent Holland and Sweden, whose nationhood was attributed to 
their possession of military and economic power, were formed on the basis of pre-modern 
ethnic cores and provided models for the formation of nations in many parts of the world; 2) 
the basis of the pre-modern ‘demotic’ kind of community was ethnic and it survived into the 
modern era in many parts of the globe; 3) a coherent mythology and symbolism of a 
community of history and culture were forged out of available cultural components as 
conditions of national survival and unity if there were no important ethnic antecedents and 
any ethnic ties were shadowy or fabricated, since without some ethnic lineage the nation-to-be 
could fall apart.154 
 
Smith defined nationalism as an ‘ideological movement for attaining and maintaining 
autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to 
constitute an actual or potential “nation”’.155 He identified two types of nationalism:                 
1) Territorial: a) pre-independence movements based on civic and territorial concepts of the 
nation seek to eject foreign rulers and substitute a new state-nation for the old colonial 
territory. Smith called these ‘anti-colonial nationalisms’; b) post-independence movements 
based on civic and territorial concepts of the nation often try to integrate disparate ethnic 
populations into a new political community and to create a new ‘territorial nation’ out of the 
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old colonial state. He called these ‘integration nationalisms’.156 2) Ethnic: a) pre-
independence movements based on ethnic and genealogical concepts of the nation seek to 
secede from a larger political unit (or secede and gather in a designated ‘ethnic homeland’) 
and set up a new political ‘ethno-nation’ in its place. Smith considered these ‘secession and 
diaspora nationalisms’; b) post-independence movements based on ethnic and genealogical 
concepts of the nation seek to expand by including ‘kinsmen’ outside the present boundaries 
of the ‘ethno-nation’ together with the lands they inhabit, or by forming a much larger ‘ethno-
national’ state through the union of culturally and ethnically similar ethno-national states. He 
called these ‘irredentist and ‘pan’ nationalisms’.157 Smith later added a third method of 
nation-formation: formation of immigrant nations largely from the fragments of other ethnic 
communities, like in the US, Canada and Australia.158  
 
Looking at the role of intelligentsia in the construction of the nation, which was advanced by 
the modernists, Miroslav Hroch noted that ‘nation-building was never a mere project of 
ambitious or narcissistic intellectuals, and ideas could not flow through Europe by their own 
inspirational force. Intellectuals can “invent” national communities only if certain objective 
preconditions for the formation of a nation already exist.’159 According to his definition, 
nation is a ‘large social group integrated not by one but by a combination of several kinds of 
objective relationships (economic, political, linguistic, cultural, religious, geographical, 
historical), and their subjective reflection in collective consciousness’.160 He distinguished 
two distinct stages in the nation-building process in Europe: 1) in Western Europe (England, 
France, Spain and others); and 2) in most of Central and Eastern Europe.161  
 
Hroch divided the national movements in the Central and Eastern European countries into 
three phases: Phase A: inquiry into and dissemination of an awareness of the linguistic, 
cultural, social and sometimes historical attributes of the non-dominant group; Phase B: 
patriotic agitation of a new range of activists, who sought to win over their ethnic group to the 
project of creating a future nation; and Phase C: formation of mass movements with political 
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programmes.162 Moreover, he identified four types of national movement in Europe:  1) The 
inception of national agitation, which occurred under the old regime of absolutism, but 
acquired a mass character in times of revolutionary changes in the political system. The 
leaders of this phase developed their national programmes in conditions of political 
upheaval163; 2) National agitation got under way under the old regime, but the transition to a 
mass movement was delayed after a constitutional revolution, which was the result of either 
uneven economic development or foreign oppression 164; 3) The national movement acquired 
a mass character under the old regime, which produced armed insurrections165; 4) National 
agitation began under constitutional conditions. The national movement acquired a mass 
character quite early, while in other cases it did so only after long national agitation.166           
 
Like primordialists and modernists, ethno-symbolists have also been challenged. The main 
criticism claimed that they underestimated the differences between modern nations and earlier 
ethnic communities and that it is impossible to speak of nations and nationalities in pre-
modern eras.167 Reacting to these criticisms, Anthony Smith admitted that his definitions of 
nation and ethnic communities were closely aligned, but argued that ethnic communities 
lacked clearly delimited territory, a public culture, economic unity and legal rights and duties 
for everyone, which differentiated them from nations. Ethno-symbolists tried to trace in the 
historical record ‘the often discontinuous formation of national identities back to their pre-
existing cultural foundations and ethnic ties – which is the matter for empirical observation 
rather than a priori theorising’.168 In reply to the modernist, John Breuilly’s, criticism that 
pre-modern identities lacked an institutional basis, Smith acknowledged the important role 
institutions played as carriers and preservers of collective identities. He noted that although 
significant numbers of people were included in schools, temples, monasteries and a host of 
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legal and political institutions, their inclusion in linguistic codes and in popular literature, in 
rituals and celebrations, in trade fairs and markets, and in ethnic territories or homelands was 
more important.169   
 
Other approaches either contain elements of these three theories or present debatable 
perspectives. According to Stalin, ‘a nation is a historically constituted, stable community of 
people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and 
psychological make-up manifested in a common culture’.170 By common economic life, he 
meant the growth of economic life, the development of means of communication and the rise 
of capitalism.171 This contained elements of the modernist approach, but Stalin’s ‘nation’ 
preceded the formation of a state. His reference to Georgia as an example, which, in his 
opinion, ‘came on the scene as a nation only in the latter half of the nineteenth century’,172 
meant that he considered Georgians as a nation when there was no Georgian state. Stalin’s 
approach contained elements of primordialist theory as well, such as a historically constituted 
stable community of people with common language, territory and culture, which means that 
his interpretation of nation can be classified as mixed primordialist and modernist.  
 
In addition to the requirements in Stalin’s theory of nation, according to the Soviet nationality 
policy, a ‘nation’ had to number over 100,000 people. Apart from the nation, there were 
notions like natsional’nost (nationality), etnos (a wider ethnic community), ethnographic 
group, narod (people), narodnost’ (numerically small people) and indigenous and non-
indigenous people.173 The aim of this policy was to satisfy to some extent political and 
cultural autonomy aspirations of different peoples inhabiting the multi-national country, the 
realisation of which would, in their view, consolidate and strengthen the Soviet rule.   
 
The Russian case examined by Vera Tolz presented a debatable perspective. She argued that 
although modernist and ethno-symbolist approaches had something to contribute to the 
understanding of the Russian case, none of them was sufficient to provide a comprehensive 
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analysis of Russian nation-building.174 Her study of the Russian case demonstrated that 
different definitions of a nation can be used by politicians in their political and economic 
interests. In her opinion, ordinary Russians seemed to be more inclined to regard a nation as 
civic than the majority of intellectuals. She considered underdevelopment of civil society, and 
the major rift between political and business elites on the one hand and the majority of the 
population on the other, as obstacles to the creation of a civic Russian nation, although she 
held that the ‘route from state to nation might well lead to the formation of a civic nation in 
the RF, as has usually been the case elsewhere’. For this scholar, rich and poor in modern 
Russia are ‘two nations’.175 
 
2.2 Formation of state and territorial issues 
  
Touching upon the issue of the circumstances under which the nationalist challenge is most 
likely to succeed, James Mayall described three great waves of modern state creation – in 
Latin America in the nineteenth century, in Europe after 1919, and in Asia, Africa, the 
Caribbean and the Pacific after 1945, all associated with the collapse of empires. As a single 
case of state-creation through successful separation since 1945, he noted Bangladesh, which 
separated from Pakistan in 1971 with the support of India.176 Mayall did not mention the 
emergence of states in 1918, namely the three republics of the South Caucasus which were 
connected with the nationalist movements and the collapse of the Russian Empire. Moreover, 
not all nationalist movements ended in state-building as a result of the collapse of empires, as 
shown by the Kurdish case. The Kurdish nationalist movement developed during the second 
half of the nineteenth century in parallel with other nationalist movements in the Ottoman 
Empire,177 but the collapse of the Ottoman Empire did not produce a Kurdish state, which can 
be explained by the absence of the Great Power support. On the other hand, Great Power 
support was central in the creation of the Jewish homeland in Palestine in 1919 and the 
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establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. The establishment of Albania in 1912 is another 
example which was also facilitated by the support of Great Powers. States can also be created 
without nationalist movements, as in the case of the Republic of Liberia, established in 1847, 
which has never been a formal colony and was founded by settlers who arrived from 1822 
onwards, originally freed US slaves offered passage to the area by US philanthropic 
societies.178  
 
According to international law, a permanent population and a defined territory are considered 
important qualifications of statehood, together with a government and capacity to enter into 
relations with other states. There is no rule prescribing the minimum area of a state’s territory, 
as the examples of Monaco and Nauru show. The same is applicable to the population of a 
state, where there is also no minimum: see Nauru and San-Marino.179  
 
As for the borders of a newly emerged state, according to Boris Klimenko, for the definition 
or delimitation of a state territory, self-determination should be accepted as a major principle. 
This has two faces: external self-determination – the right of people to enter into this or that 
state or to establish their own state; and internal self-determination – the determination by 
people of their own internal order. For territorial delimitation, he wrote, external self-
determination is of primary importance, since in deciding to enter this or that state or to 
establish their own, a self-determining people resolves the issue of its territory belonging to 
this or that state, or turning into a separate state territory if it creates its own state. 
Identification of which territory changes its status by virtue of self-determination and the 
definition of the boundaries of this territory depend on the establishment of the subject of self-
determination. It is accepted that the subject of self-determination is either a nation or people. 
However, there is no unified definition of ‘nation’ or ‘people’.180  
 
Klimenko continued to say that the boundaries of the area of settlement of a self-determining 
group are the basis for the establishment of the borders of its territory. This criterion cannot be 
taken in isolation from other factors, otherwise any movement of population would create a 
right to territory. Moreover, different national groups can live in any place. In this case, other 
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factors like economic, historical, and historically established and stable internal social and 
cultural relations of the self-determining population group help to ascertain the truth. 
Touching upon the economic factor, Klimenko argued that in itself it cannot be the only basis 
for the establishment of borders, otherwise every economic expansion would mean a right to 
territory. Settlement and historicity, including the establishment of economic relations, should 
be taken into account. Historicity also needs a careful and dialectical approach, since 
throughout history many peoples have changed location, moved, mixed with other peoples 
and created new and stable economic, social and other relations. Historicity suggests a long 
process and in isolation from other factors can serve groundless territorial claims.181     
 
Here it should be mentioned that there are two conceptions in public and academic political 
discourse related to historical rights with regard to territorial disputes: one emphasises the 
‘primacy of the national group in the history of the territory over which it demands 
sovereignty’; and the second focuses on the ‘primacy of that territory in the history of the 
national group demanding the sovereignty’.182 In the first conception, the fact of occupation of 
the claimed territory by one national group earlier than others is considered crucial for the 
purpose of determining sovereignty over it, whereas in the second conception, primary 
importance is given to the role of the claimed territory in forming the historical identity of the 
group.183 
 
Examining the methods of delimiting national territory borders, Yuriy Barsegov held that the 
borders can be defined on the basis of the settlement area of a national group, which is 
conditionally called the ‘ethnic’ principle in international law.184 In his opinion, ethnic and 
language factors should be combined with economic, historical and other factors when 
delimiting national territories. The economic factor suggests economic and trade relations, 
division of labour between different provinces of the national territory, the presence of 
markets and the basis of raw materials. This factor also includes the necessity of access, if 
possible, to the sea or to international water arteries, taking into account the character of 
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national transport systems and their importance for the economy of the country. But the 
consideration of the economic factor excludes the possibility of territorial expansion with 
reference to economic needs to establish ‘vital space’ for some countries.185 
 
Robert Strausz-Hupe and Stefan Possony described twelve criteria for delimiting a frontier: 
linguistic, religious, cultural, military, economic, historical, administrative, ideological, 
geographical, racial, sociological and psychological.186 Andrew Burghardt contested that 
claims based on these considerations lack a strong legal basis, but added that such claims are 
often sympathetically heard by individual Great Powers or by the United Nations and can be 
placed in one or more of the following categories: 1) effective control, 2) historical, 3) 
cultural, 4) territorial integrity, 5) economic, 6) elitist claims, which state that minorities have 
the right or duty to control certain territories, and 7) ideological.187  
 
The case of Northern Ireland, discussed by Burghardt,188 highlights the issue of demography, 
which also influences the viability of borders. The growth of the population of non-titular 
people may pose a threat to the ability of titular people to maintain control: the British 
plantation of Scots Ulsterman in Northern Ireland in order to outnumber the Catholic Irish 
cannot be regarded as successful, taking into account the increase of the number of Catholic 
Irish. On the other hand, the growth of titular people – be it natural or through migration – 
may lead to claims for larger territory in order to accommodate the growing population by 
creating settlements or colonisation, as in the case of Israel. By creating Jewish settlements in 
the West Bank and Gaza amidst the Arab population in Palestine, Israel expanded its area and 
demonstrated in practice that a state does not need to have defined and fixed borders. Another 
case is that where one state occupies the territory of another state, not because of the 
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accommodation of the growing population, but because of a nationalist and expansionist 
policy to have a mono-ethnic state with a bigger area, as is the case with Armenia. Although 
Armenians have been emigrating, leading to its population decreasing dramatically after 
gaining independence in 1991, the Armenian Government encourages Armenian settlements 
in Garabagh, the territory of Azerbaijan which was occupied by Armenia in 1991-1994 and is 
still under occupation. The aim is to expand the area of the Armenian Republic and impede 
the return of the internally displaced Azerbaijanis to their lands in the future by creating facts 
on the ground, increasing the number of Armenians in the occupied territories by these new 
settlements.       
 
Burghardt argued that three interrelated types of claim to territory possess the greatest 
persuasive power: effective control, territorial integrity, and a combination of culture and 
history.189 The principal legal and strongest claim to territory, in his opinion, is the 
‘uncontested administration of the land and its resident population’.190 A special form of 
effective control occurs when a newly independent state inherits its territory from the pre-
existing colonial system. Uti possidetis, ita possideatis – as you possess, so you may continue 
to possess – is the operative principle. He raised the example of the Latin American states, 
which claimed sovereignty over the territories they had held as colonies.191   
 
Burghardt’s combination of cultural and historical, ethnic and duration of occupation, 
suggested the closest possible man-land symbiosis. The most powerful claim based on 
history, he wrote, is when the territory is seen as the nation’s homeland, which includes both 
priority and duration. The land becomes an indispensable part of the nation’s self-identity. 
Historical claims are strengthened by duration, the existence over a long period of time of 
those features that form the basis of the claim. Rather than town dwellers, owners and 
managers of estates, a peasantry that has lived in a territory for centuries is the strongest non-
legal claim. A timeless peasantry, Burghardt argued, is such a powerful claim to territory that 
states with such minority groups have tried various methods of liquidating the problem: 
forced uprooting and dispersal, exchange of population, assimilation, which succeeds better 
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with urbanites than with peasants, and finally, plantation of colonies of loyal people within 
the area concerned.192 
 
Cultural claims include all those based on the sense of a group of people belonging together, 
which includes ethnic, religious and other cultural characteristics that bind people together. 
The ultimate cultural-political ideal is expressed in the notion of ‘self-determination’. 
Attempts to implement self-determination immediately lead to questions around defining the 
area concerned and its size. The cultural argument tends to lead to majority rule. According to 
this principle, the largest cultural group is entitled to control the administration of the 
territory. Although majority rule is highly venerated in the world today, Burghardt added that 
it has been shown to be almost unworkable in states with strong self-conscious minorities, 
such as Cyprus, Ceylon, Northern Ireland, and Yugoslavia before 1945.193  
 
Territorial integrity includes all claims based on the relative location of an area. Burghardt 
cited Yugoslavia as an example, which claimed Trieste on the grounds of geographical unity. 
The Romanians, he continued, claimed the entire Banat because of its supposed indivisibility, 
regarding Banat not as a geographical term, but as a complete and indivisible geographical 
region and province throughout the ages. When the territory under question is seen not only as 
contiguous but also as necessary to the security of the claimant, such claims are strengthened, 
for example the Soviet seizure of Karelia from Finland in 1940 to move the boundary farther 
away from Leningrad.194 
 
Concerning geographical claims, referring to Surya Sharma, Klimenko mentioned that neither 
theory nor practice of settlement of territorial disputes recognises territorial claims based 
exceptionally on geographical characteristics of the places: they only have any sense in 
combination with other factors.195 Barsegov also assigned strategic and geographical factors 
an auxiliary role in territorial settlement. In his opinion, military-strategic and geographical 
factors are considered for security reasons during the establishment of state borders. Wherever 
possible, natural boundaries are also used for territorial delimitation. In this case, military-
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strategic and geographical factors complement each other. Barsegov referred to examples 
when mountains, rivers and watersheds serve as borders between countries: the French-
Spanish border along the Pyrenees, the Indian-Chinese border along the Himalaya, the US-
Mexican border along the Rio-Grande-del-Norte River, etc.196       
 
Where some area of the territory is disputed, it can be settled by plebiscite, i.e. by the 
expression of the will of the population of the area as to which state this area should belong. 
The right of self-determination of peoples and nations is the basis of the plebiscite. The 
subject of a plebiscite in a territorial dispute can be a relatively small group of people who do 
not have the characteristics of a nation, otherwise this would be not a territorial dispute, but an 
issue of realisation of the principle of self-determination. Rare and accidental settlements in 
the disputed territory cannot serve as a basis for a plebiscite. It cannot involve new settlers of 
one of the disputing sides; the population must be indigenous, living there for a long time. 
The prescription of settlements suggests economic connection with the territory. A plebiscite 
on the disputed territory can only be held on the basis of agreements between disputing states. 
The existence of the territorial dispute to a certain degree depends on its admittance by the 
disputing sides as such, or other actions of the disputing sides.197 The Versailles Treaty 
between the Allies and Germany in 1919 provided for six plebiscites, whereas other peace 
treaties following the First World War accorded a small place to it.198  
 
Discussing the consequences of the delimitation of borders after the war, Frank Jones wrote 
that the Austrian representatives had protested against three million of the German-speaking 
population of Austria being handed over without their consent to Czechoslovakia and to two 
hundred thousand being handed over to Italy. Mainly as a result of the peace treaties and the 
exclusion of Austria and Switzerland from consideration, thirteen or fourteen European 
countries counted German-speaking populations among their subjects. One third of the 
Magyar population of Europe – three out of nine million – were assigned to the states 
bordering Hungary199 as a result of the Trianon Treaty of 1920 between the Allies and 
Hungary, which confirmed the transfer of Slovakia to Czechoslovakia, of Croatia to 
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Yugoslavia and of Transylvania to Romania. The frontiers of Hungary, E.H. Carr noted, bear 
witness to a certain eagerness of the treaty-makers to stretch their principles wherever 
possible to the advantage of the Allies and the detriment of the enemy.200  
 
Although treaties defining the borders occupy the first place among many means applied for 
identifying the real state of borders,201 they do not mean the solution of territorial problems, 
as the defeated side does not always accept the conditions of the humiliated peace. The 
borders established on the basis of the First World War peace treaties prompted the revanchist 
aspirations of the Second World War. Not only borders, but also the right of the state to exist, 
can be contested, as was and is the case with Israel’s existence, which was and is contested by 
different Muslim, especially Arab, countries. 
       
Plebiscites, although less successful,202 are regarded as one of the means of resolving border 
disputes. As for the issues of areas within a state where non-titular nationalities are in strong 
concentration, these can be solved by minority status either in the form of political (self-rule) 
or cultural rights. It should be admitted that solutions to minority problems are usually guided 
by political considerations, as they are most often seen as a threat to the state’s territorial 
integrity. For that reason, approaches to the problem can be different. Thus, according to 
Aviel Roshwald, minority treaties were signed by fourteen European states after the First 
World War. He mentioned that for the Western powers, the fundamental objective of the 
treaties was to smooth the path to the peaceful assimilation of minorities into state-promoted 
frameworks of national identity. The weakness of the treaties’ enforcement mechanisms, 
Roshwald held, in practice meant the freedom of the new and expanded states to abuse their 
minorities. Referring to Poland, he pointed to the Polonisation of the Belorussians, application 
of forced Polonisation and divide-rule strategies among Ukrainians and so on. In his opinion, 
attempts at the nationalisation of culture and identity by Poland stimulated the consolidation 
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of separate ethno-national identities among its minorities, something repeated in various 
forms in all other states of East Central and Eastern Europe between the two world wars.203  
 
Although minority treaties guaranteeing political rights, religious freedom, the provision of 
schools, and the use of their language before the courts and with the authorities, were signed 
with the newly created states, as well as other states which had received large accessions of 
territory after the First World War, Germany was not asked to subscribe to any minority 
obligations.204  
     
As for minority rights in the Soviet Union, these were based on the belief that effective 
control and management of a vast multi-ethnic state could be achieved only through a 
combination of political and economic centralism and limited ‘self-determination’ for non-
Russian peoples, especially in the ethno-cultural sphere. This strategy was realised by the 
application of Stalin’s plan of national-territorial delimitation, under which some 
nationalities were classified as ‘first-class’, ‘second-class’ or even ‘third class’, while others 
were not recognised at all and were incorporated within larger ethnic communities. Only 
fifteen out of a hundred nationalities acquired ‘first-class status’, with their own union 
republics and more extensive rights; the status of others was either an autonomous republic, 
province, region, district within a union or republic, or they were denied any form of 
autonomy or homeland. All unions and autonomous republics had their own legislative, 
executive and juridical institutions, academies of sciences, mass media, higher schools, 
national schools using national languages, national theatres and publishing houses. On the 
other hand, Moscow sought to merge representatives of different ethnic groups into the 
supra-national entity of ‘Soviet people’ in order to form a civic Soviet nationality through 
introducing a Cyrillic alphabet across almost the whole country, the promotion of the 
Russian language as the lingua franca and the use of Russian in higher education as the sole 
language of instruction, which facilitated the assimilation of some ethnic groups, especially 
those deprived of their own territory. Decisions about political recognition of particular 
ethnic groups tended to be political: for example, Tatars, who had a lengthy tradition of 
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statehood, were only granted an autonomous republic within Russia.205 However, the 
Armenians, in addition to their union republic, also had an autonomous region within 
Azerbaijan, but the Azerbaijanis who compactly resided in Armenia in greater numbers than 
those of Armenians in the autonomous region were refused political autonomy in Armenia 
by both Moscow and the Armenian government.  
 
The establishment of territorial autonomies on an ethnic basis in the union republics created 
a strong power to keep the latter in constant dependence and prevent any actions which 
would jeopardise Moscow’s interests. The skilful manipulation of the autonomies, part of 
this well-planned strategy, proved its viability even after these republics regained their 
independence. This is the best illustration of how ethnic factors and minority rights can be 
used for separatist purposes and destabilisation of states, especially when they are instigated, 
directed and supported from outside powers with political interests.   
 
2.3 The Armenian case 
 
Each of the theories on nations raises issues with regard to the Armenian case. By applying 
primordialist theory, one discovers similarities between it and the views of most scholars who 
have created an unbreakable direct link between the modern Armenian people and the 
Armenians of millennia ago. This in its turn raises a question as to the connection between the 
modern Armenian population of Garabagh and the Christian Albanians of the region whose 
name appears in primary sources up until the early nineteenth century, whereas no such name 
can be seen in the sources produced after that period. This suggests that there was a change in 
the composition of the Armenian people in the nineteenth century. The application of 
modernist theory raises a question as to the means by which the Christian Albanians of 
Garabagh were Armenianised in the nineteenth century. The ethno-symbolist approach is 
helpful in the study of the Armenianisation process.    
 
Examination of the theoretical issues on the definition of borders of the newly emerged states 
has revealed that the most powerful historical claim to the territory is considered to be the 
‘historical homeland’ of the self-determining people, where it was formed or occupied the 
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territory under consideration earlier than other claimants. Therefore, nationalist activists in the 
19th-early 20th centuries, including those among the Armenians, conducted heated debates on 
the location and borders of these ‘national historical homelands’.   
 
All three theories of nationalism have similarities stressing the importance of cultural 
homogeneity: natural, invented or a combination of both. The typologies of nationalism 
proposed by Gellner, Anderson and Smith have showed that all three scholars distinguished 
diaspora nationalism as one of the types of nationalism. The Jewish example raised by Gellner 
is similar to the Armenian case, since the Armenians were also a diaspora people, although a 
great number of them, unlike Jews, continued living in their ‘historical homeland’ in Eastern 
Anatolia. However, unlike Jews, Armenian nationalism did not end in the declaration of the 
Armenian state in that ‘historical homeland’. Taking into account that the case of Liberia 
suggests that states can be established without nationalist movements, the Armenian case can 
be regarded as a distinct case between Liberia, as a dispersed people who established their 
state without a nationalist movement and not in their ‘historical homeland’, and Israel, as a 
result of diaspora nationalism, which led to state construction in the ‘historical homeland’.  
 
The positions of Kedourie and Smith show similarities related to ethno-religious 
communities, which can be applied to the Armenian case and the Jewish example. Religion 
and confession were the main indicators of Armenianness until the Armenian nationalist 
movement. It was Christian, including a monophysite identity of Armenians, which was 
replaced by Armenian ethnic identity under the Armenian nationalist movement. The Jewish 
and Armenian cases have other similarities as well: neither Israel nor Armenia would have 
emerged without external power support. As in the Jewish case, this support was crucial in the 
settlement of the Armenians in the South Caucasus and the declaration of the Armenian 
Republic in the region, whereas its absence was instrumental in the failure of Armenian 
nationalism in the Ottoman Empire. As in the case of Israel, the declaration of the Armenian 
Republic was preceded by waves of voluntary settlements in the area of the state-to-be, war, 
tragic events and displacement. The declaration of their state was followed with 
dissatisfaction with their area, wars with their neighbours over territory and subsequent 
displacement of indigenous populations. Another similarity is that both countries could 
separate one part of the neighbouring country from another: Nakhchyvan and other parts of 
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Azerbaijan are disconnected from each other through Armenia, whereas Gaza and the West 
Bank of Palestine were separated from each other through Israel. 
 
The Armenian case demonstrates that the settlement of territorial problems is not a guarantee 
of stable borders and prevention of further territorial claims. Although the mountainous part 
of Garabagh was granted ethno-territorial autonomy within Azerbaijan SSR, Armenia was not 
satisfied with this settlement. Referring to the ‘policy of discrimination’ against Armenians in 
the Mountainous Garabagh Autonomous Oblast (MGAO) of Azerbaijan, which Azerbaijan 
considered as unsubstantiated,206 Armenia continued making claims to this region up until the 
last days of the USSR. This led to the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan and resulted in 
the occupation of the autonomy and surrounding districts of Azerbaijan by Armenia.  
 
The following chapters will test the empirical views of Chapter 1 against the findings from 
diverse primary and secondary sources and will apply the theoretical approaches discussed in 
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Chapter 3: Construction of an ‘Armenian Homeland’ in the Ottoman 
Empire before the First World War 
 
The notion of the ‘ethnic’ or ‘historical’ homeland, as it crystallised in the nineteenth century, 
played an important role in the development of nationalist activists’ arguments about nation-
states, whose creation they strove to achieve. This chapter explores the process of 
constructing an ‘Armenian homeland’ in the Ottoman Empire up until the First World War. 
The Armenian nationalist movement is also discussed. Moreover, the chapter studies the 
cultural, social, economic and legal situation of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and 
analyses a change in the attitude of the Armenian nationalist leaders towards the Ottoman 
rule. The discussion continues with the consideration of the emergence of an article related to 
the Armenians in the Berlin Treaty of 1878, statistics on the population of the area claimed by 
the Armenians, interests and policies of the powers-signatories of the Berlin Treaty vis-à-vis 
the ‘Armenian homeland’ project and related activities of the Armenian revolutionary 
organisations.  
 
3.1 Construction of the notion of an ‘Armenian homeland’  
 
The notion of an ‘Armenian homeland’ with clear political aims was constructed in the 
second half of the nineteenth century to include Ottoman provinces in Eastern Anatolia with 
their scattered historical Armenian minority, as well as parts of two other provinces on the 
Mediterranean Sea (see Map 5). 
 
Academic conceptions on the Armenian ‘historical homeland’ 
 
The current section discusses different scholarly views on the formation of the Armenian 
people, which are classified as ‘classical’ and ‘revisionist’ conceptions. The ‘mythic’ 
conception will be discussed in the next chapter.  
 
Supporters of the ‘classical’ conception adhere to the mixed origins of the Armenian people: 
migrational (from the Balkans) and local (Eastern Anatolian). Thus, in 1908, Nicolas Adontz, 
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founder of modern Armenian scholarly historiography, wrote that in the seventh century BC, 
the Phrygians,207 ‘driven out of their territory, crossed the Euphrates and drove a wedge into 
the local Aramean population. Some of the latter remained in the north, and some in the south, 
while the conquered middle group mingled with the conquerors. The core of the Armenian 
nation was formed from this fusion of invading Phrygians and of natives who were in the 
main of Aramean descent. The best of the double composition of this core is the double name 
of the Armenians: Hay to themselves, Armenios to their neighbours, one derived from the 
invaders, the other from the aborigines.’208  
 
Adontz noted, ‘under the Achaemenids [550 BC-330 BC – I.K.]209 the territory subsequently 
called Armenia was inhabited by various peoples and made up two satrapies [provinces – 
I.K.]. The Paktyians and the Armenians, together with their neighbours as far as the Black 
Sea, formed the Thirteenth satrapy, while the Matienians, Saspirians and Alarodians formed 
the Eighteenth. On the western border of Armenia lived the Cilicians, and on the eastern one 
the Matienians. Moreover, the Armenians were separated from the former by the Euphrates, 
and from the latter by one of the tributaries of the Tigris, probably the Zab.’210 In his opinion, 
‘other peoples joined the original nucleus, new ethnic currents continually flowed into it from 
the frontiers, from the lands of Atropatene, Iberia, Cappadocia and Syria.’ The ‘assimilation’ 
of the peoples, he went on, continued until the early second century BC, ‘when an important 
period for the Armenians came to an end’,211 which ‘manifested itself in the formation of a 
single language accessible to all’.212 
 
As it appears from Adontz’ approach, the formation of the Armenian people in the areas of 
the above-mentioned two provinces of the Achaemenid Empire, which was confined to 
Eastern Anatolia, was completed by the second century BC. A similar view was held by Igor 
Diakonoff, the leading representative of the ‘classical’ conception. According to him, two 
                                                 
207 Note: According to Igor Diakonoff, a movement of Phrygian tribes from the Balkans to the Upper Euphrates 
took place between the end of the 13th – beginning of the 12th centuries BC through the 10th or 8th centuries BC 
(Diakonoff I, The Pre-history of the Armenian People, Delmar, N.Y.: Caravan books, 1984, p 67). 
208 Adontz N, Armenia in the Period of Justinian: The Political Conditions based on the Naxarar System, 
Lisbon: Galouste Gulbenkian Foundation, 1970, p 309 
209 Note: The Achaemenid Empire was the first Persian Empire, which existed from 550 BC to 330 BC and at its 
peak extended from Libya to India.  
210 Adontz N, op cit., p 306 
211 Ibid., p 310 
212 Ibid., p 307 
50 
satparies existed in the ‘Armenian Highland’,213 which became unilingual, i.e. Armenian-
speaking, not later than the end of the first century BC.214 Exploring the formation of the 
Armenian people in the same work in 1968, Diakonoff wrote that the ‘Armenian nation’ was 
formed from four components in two stages. The first stage, in the 12th-6th centuries BC, 
which he called the formation of the ‘Old Armenian nation’, included the local population of 
the Upper Euphrates such as the Hurrians and the Luwians, and the Proto-Armenians (the 
Mushki (the Assyrians’ name for the Thraco-Phrygian tribes from the Balkans), and possibly 
the Urumeans, whose origins are very difficult to identify). The second stage in the 5th-2nd 
centuries BC included the merger of the Urartians, who lived on the upper reaches of the 
Upper Zab River, next to Van Lake, and further north in the direction of the Araz River, with 
the ‘Old Armenian nation’. The Hurrians and Urartians constituted the main mass of the 
‘nation’ and determined the basic line of biological succession, while the language of the 
‘nation’ was taken over from the Proto-Armenians. The Luwians made a less significant 
contribution215 (see Map 1). As for the name of the ‘Armenian nation’, who call themselves 
Hay, Diakonoff supposed that when the Urartians merged with the ‘Old Armenian nation’, the 
name ‘Hittites’ which the Urartians called the language of the Proto-Armenians, became their 
own self-designation. ‘Hittites’, which could have sounded like Hatiyos in Proto-Armenian, 
according to the rules of the Old Armenian phonetics, had to develop into hayo.216      
 
The American scholar of Armenian studies, James Russell, who inclined toward the 
‘classical’ conception, wrote that ‘ancient Armenians’ meant a ‘people identifying themselves 
as such, their main common denominator usually being the Armenian language’.217 Based on 
this, he constructed a tentative model of Armenian origins in the following way: related 
Phrygian and Armenian populations in the mid-second millennium BC moved from the 
Balkans to Anatolia, some of whom moved the farthest eastward and became the ancestors of 
the future Armenian people, interacting in the new area with the local Hurro-Urartians. The 
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Armenians adopted the name of the ‘Hittite nation’ over whose lands they passed in their 
eastward migrations from south-eastern Europe, which was perhaps connected to the crisis 
and decline of the Hittite Empire. The ethnonym Hay is possibly the result of the loss of an 
intervocalic -t-, and comes from an original form Hati-yos (Hattian).218  
 
The ‘classical’ conception has been challenged by supporters of the ‘revisionist’ conception. 
According to this conception, put forward in the second half of the 1940s by Soviet scholars, 
Armenians were not of Balkan-Eastern Anatolian origin, but a mixture of indigenous 
inhabitants of Eastern Anatolia.219 Thus, Grigoriy Kapantsian wrote that the Armenian people 
was formed from Hays in Hayasa-Azzi (1400-700 BC) located between the upper reaches of 
the Euphrates (Karasu), Chorokh and Araz Rivers through mixture with semi-Syrianised 
Hurrians (Subarians) in the countries of Arime and Shupria on the upper reaches of the Tigris 
in the 7th-early 2nd centuries BC220 (see Map 2).  
 
According to Suren Eremian, the formation of the Armenian people is divided into four 
periods, corresponding to four ethno-cultural and historical centres in the ‘Armenian plateau’ 
(see Map 3). The first period: Hayasa-Azzi (15th-13th centuries BC) populated by Mushks–
Proto-Armenians–Arimes–Urumeans. The second period: penetration of the Mushks and the 
Urumeans from the central provinces of Anatolia and Hayasa-Azzi into the territory of 
Sophena and Arzanena in the upper reaches of the Tigris in around 1165 BC, where a new 
tribal unity arose on the basis of local Hurrian and Urartian tribes, as well as alien Mushks-
Arimes. From now on, he noted, the Assyrians and the Urartians called the country of Shupria 
‘Arme’ or ‘Ur(u)me’. The third period: from 860 BC, Armenian tribes penetrated the basin of 
the Van Lake, i.e. central provinces of Urartu, which promoted the strengthening of the 
Armenian element in the centre of this state. Eremian considered that the internal crisis of 
Urartu paved the way for the assimilation of the Urartians by the Armenians, who became one 
of the main components of the Armenian people. Referring to the Armenian historical 
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tradition, he connected the origins of the Armenians with the town area of Van, the centre of 
Urartu. In this period, he wrote, Hayk, the name that the Armenians called themselves and 
their country, originating from the ethnonym Hayasa, already existed. The fourth period: 
completion of the formation of the Armenian people in the 6th-5th centuries BC. This period, 
according to Eremian, was connected with the ‘Ayrarat’ province, which became the 
‘attractive centre of the Armenian tribes on their way to final mixture into one people’.221 
Later the Armenian people spread to the whole territory of the ‘Armenian plateau’ (see Map 
3) and by the second century BC the process of the final formation of the Armenian people 
was completed.222 Most scholars, including supporters of the ‘classical’ conception, reject the 
‘revisionist’ conception.223  
 
Application of the theories on nations to the Armenian case suggests that both conceptions 
were primordialist, since according to them, the formation of the Armenian people was 
completed at the latest by the early second century BC in Eastern Anatolia.  
 
Political considerations versus academic conceptions 
 
The Armenian revolutionary movement of the last decades of the nineteenth century brought 
the issue of the ‘Armenian homeland’ to the forefront. The discussions revealed that the 
projected homeland was to cover not only the area of both conceptions in Eastern Anatolia, 
but also parts of the Adana and Halep provinces on the Mediterranean (see Map 5), which 
they called Cilicia, to be discussed in the current section.   
 
The projected Armenian homeland was also the subject of an interview between the Armenian 
Istanbul Patriarch, Nerses Varzhapetian, and the British Ambassador to Istanbul, Austin 
Layard, on 18 March 1878. When the British Ambassador asked the Patriarch ‘what he 
understood by “Armenia,” and what part of Turkey in Asia he considered ought to be 
included in the autonomous province that he had in view’, the reply was as follows: ‘Armenia 
should contain the Pashalics [provinces – I.K.] of Van and Sivas, the greater part of that of 
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Diyarbekir, and the ancient kingdom of Cilicia.’224 In other words, taking into account the 
administrative divisions of 1877-1878, the ‘Armenia’ of the Patriarch included Van, Bitlis, 
Mamuret-ul-Aziz, Sivas and Diyarbakyr vilayets (provinces), and parts of Adana and Halep 
vilayets (see Map 5).   
 
The Patriarch excluded Erzurum from the list of provinces of his ‘Armenia’, although this 
province formed part of the ‘Armenian homeland’ according to both conceptions. Taking into 
account the date of this meeting between the Yeşilköy (San-Stefano) Preliminary Treaty of 3 
March 1878 and the Berlin Treaty of 13 July 1878, it can be argued that the exclusion of 
Erzurum from the list was connected to uncertainty around this province, parts of which were 
ceded to Russia under the San-Stefano Preliminary Treaty.225  
 
Excluding Erzurum, the Patriarch included Cilicia in his definition of ‘Armenia’. In contrast, 
the Armenian Echmiadzin Catholicos, Simeon Erevantsi (1763-1780), had not considered the 
Cilician Kingdom of the 12th-14th centuries as Armenian land either, when talking one century 
earlier about the Cilician Kingdom and the situation of Armenians there. He wrote that ‘when 
the seat of Catholicos had been transferred to Rum-Kale [in 1117 - I.K.], our people started 
gradually moving there; clerics and laypeople even established a kingdom there for a while. 
However, as the land was Greek, and inhabited by Greeks, our settlers mixed with them and 
adopted their customs, manners, language, dress, food and other features of daily life to the 
extent that only the name ‘Armenian’ and ‘Gregorian’ confession (and even this not fully) 
still belonged to us.’226 The comparison of the views of the Armenian Echmiadzin Catholicos 
and Armenian Istanbul Patriarch suggests that the aim of the Patriarch’s inclusion of Cilicia in 
the notion of ‘Armenia’ was political: to provide access to the Mediterranean Sea.  
 
The immediate objectives of the main Armenian political parties, Hnchak (Bell) and 
Dashnaktsutiun (Federation), established in 1887 and 1890 respectively, were connected with 
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the Ottoman territories and were ‘political and national independence of Turkish Armenia’ 
(according to the programme of the Hnchak Party) or ‘political and economic freedom of 
Turkish Armenia’ (according to the first programme of 1892 of the Dashnaktsutiun Party).227  
Although it is quite clear that by ‘Armenian homeland’ these parties meant Ottoman 
territories, they did not list the names of the places which they included in so-called Turkish 
Armenia. Nevertheless, as the activities of these parties covered six main Eastern Anatolian 
provinces (Van, Bitlis, Diyarbakyr, Mamuret-ul-Aziz, Sivas and Erzurum) and parts of Adana 
and Halep provinces, it can be concluded that by so-called Turkish Armenia, Armenian 
political parties meant the above-mentioned provinces (see Map 5).   
 
As for the Armenians of the South Caucasus, in the words of Richard Hovannisian, by the end 
of the nineteenth century, they had ‘definite aspirations’: not independence, but ‘local native 
administration’ and the division of South Caucasus into ‘distinct ethnic provinces’.228 
According to Hovannisian, for them, ‘the land on which they lived often seemed much less 
significant’ and ‘warranted less attention than the “real homeland,” Turkish Armenia’.229 ‘The 
traditional Armenia, the focus of nineteenth-century reform and revolutionary movements,’ 
Hovannisian wrote, ‘lay to the west in Turkish Armenia’.230 A similar view can be found in 
Bagrat Borian’s quotation from the 1876 Armenian source, ‘Forts’: ‘Turkish “Armenia should 
be recognised as Armenia by the Sublime Porte, and when it comes to the question of the  
Armenians, this territory should be considered their fatherland and the source of their rights 
[…] The attention of all Armenians should be called solely to this country.”’231 The words of 
Bogos Nubar Pasha, Head of the Armenian National Delegation representing the Ottoman 
Armenians at the Paris Peace Conference, and his supporters about the first Armenian 
Republic saying that ‘the existing small republic […] was not established in the historic lands 
of Armenia’232 suggest that, even in the early twentieth century, Ottoman Armenian 
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nationalist activists did not consider the territory of the Armenian Republic to be the 
‘historical homeland’ of the Armenians.  
 
3.2 Armenian diaspora nationalism  
 
Diaspora, according to its broad definition by Walker Connor, is ‘that segment of a people 
living outside the homeland’.233 As discussed in the previous section, according to the 
academic conceptions, the ‘Armenian homeland’ was in Eastern Anatolia, where it was 
formed as a people. Consequently, the Armenians who lived outside Eastern Anatolia could 
be classified as the diaspora. This was the place where the Armenian nationalist movement 
originated.  
 
The initial period of the national movement, which Miroslav Hroch called Phase A – ‘inquiry 
into and dissemination of an awareness of the linguistic, cultural, social and sometimes 
historical attributes of the non-dominant group’234 – in the Armenian case started in the early 
eighteenth century and included the works of Catholic Mekhitarists235 of Istanbul, Venice and 
Vienna on grammars of vernacular and classic Armenian, the dictionary of the Armenian 
language, and the publication of works of ancient Armenian historians. The first history 
written by Mekhitarists themselves in the person of Mik’ayel Ch’amch’yants’, which was 
published in three volumes in 1784-1786, was followed by researches of other Mekhitarists, 
who focused on the archaeology, ethnography and geography of ancient Armenia.236 Their 
‘ancient Armenia’ included territories in the South Caucasus.  
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The Armenian diaspora in the Russian Empire also passed Phase A. However, this phase was 
mixed with Phase B features of Hroch, when ‘a new range of activists emerged, who now 
sought to win over as many of their ethnic group as possible to the project of creating a future 
nation, by patriotic agitation to “awaken” national consciousness among them’.237 The 
foundation of the Lazarev Institute and its press in Moscow accordingly in 1815 and 1829, 
with the Armenological direction which it gained by 1850, and the establishment of the 
Nersesian College in Tiflis in 1824,238 where the first steps in forging the modern literary 
Armenian in Russia were taken, can serve as evidence. The process was finalised in 1855 with 
the publication in vernacular Armenian of the poetry of Rafael Patkanov. The son of a 
Mekhitarist-trained father and famous for his nationalistic poems, Patkanov was the founder 
of the first newspaper in modern Armenian in the Russian Empire, entitled Ararat (1850-
1852).239 The same happened in the Armenian diaspora of Istanbul, where Phase A, which 
had started in the early eighteenth century, continued into the second half of the nineteenth 
century240 and was mixed with the features of Phase B, which started around the mid-
nineteenth century.241    
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Mekhitarist Contributions to Armenian Culture and Scholarship. Notes to accompany an exhibit of Armenian 
printed books in the Widener Library displayed on the 300th anniversary of Mekhitar of Sebastia, 1676-1749, 
Boston: Middle Eastern Department, Harvard College Library; Panossian R, The Armenians: From Kings and 
Priests to Merchants and Commissars, London: Hurst and Company, 2006, pp 101-188 
237 Hroch M, loc cit. 
238 Oshagan V, op cit., pp 148-150; Vigasin A, Khokhlov A, Shastitko P (ed.), Istoriya otechestvennogo 
vostokovedeniya s serediny XIX veka do 1917 goda, Moscow: Izdatel’skaya firma ‘Vostochnaya literatura’ 
Rossiyskoy Akademii Nauk, 1997, pp 27-29, 32 
239 Oshagan V, op cit., pp 149-150; Note: According to Ronald Suny, Ararat was printed from 1849 to 1851, 
when it was closed by the censor ‘for a trivial breach of decorum’ (Suny R, Looking toward Ararat: Armenia in 
Modern History, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993, p 59). 
240 Note: In 1851, Paris-educated Gregor Otian published a pamphlet on a proposal to modify the Armenian 
vernacular and make it the common language, and in 1853, Nahapet Rusinian, also Paris-educated, published a 
book on the correct speaking of modern Armenian. Although the use of this book was prohibited by a patriarchal 
declaration in 1855, attempts to reform the language were carried out in the pages of Armenian journals. Masis 
journal, previously called Hayastan, the official organ of the patriarchate, became the most widely read 
Armenian journal in the Ottoman Empire from 1852 to 1907. It introduced Western ideas to Armenians and 
made attempts to purify the Armenian vernacular language from foreign words (Artinian V, The Armenian 
Constitutional System in the Ottoman Empire (1839-1863): A Study of its Historical Development, Istanbul, 
1988, pp 68, 70-72). 
241 Note: If in 1847 there were twenty-four Armenian elementary schools in Istanbul, owing to the efforts of the 
Armenian youth who studied in Europe their number increased by 1859 to forty-two schools, which taught 
grammar, geography, history, religion, philosophy, algebra, physics, different languages and music. By the last 
decades of the nineteenth century, schools, cultural organisations, clubs, printing and periodic presses and 
theatres had been organised as forums for nationalist activities (Artinian V, op cit., p 70; Oshagan V, op cit., 
160). 
57 
Phase C, the formation of mass movement with political programmes,242 did not happen 
simultaneously in all Armenian diaspora communities either. The Armenian community of 
Madras had already published two works243 in 1772/1773 and 1787/1788, the most 
remarkable feature of which, according to Sebouh Aslanian, was ‘their radical re-imagining of 
the nation’s ‘‘center’’ […] Breaking away from traditional modes of thinking, these works 
advocated that such a center could only be located on the native territory of the homeland, the 
myth-symbol complex represented by the land of Ararat. More importantly, they asserted that 
only a popularly elected senate or parliament […] not the sacral institution of Echmiadzin and 
its ruling Catholicos – could serve the role of ‘‘centering center’’ for the Armenian nation.’244 
Another representative of the Armenian community of British India from Calcutta, Joseph 
Emin, also published his ideas about the ‘liberation of Armenians through education and 
armed struggle’ in London in 1792.245 This Phase C also contained features of Phases A and 
B, since the Armenian diaspora of India was active in the publication of different journals and 
translation of the works of European authors, as well as in financing the publication of works 
of Catholic Mekhitarists in Venice and Trieste and their dissemination among world 
Armenians.246 Phase C in the Armenian diaspora of Russia started in the second half of the 
nineteenth century,247 almost a century later than that of the British Indian diaspora.  
 
The Armenian ‘historical homeland’ in Eastern Anatolia was the last place reached by 
Hroch’s Phase A in the second half of the nineteenth century: this was also mixed with 
elements of Phases B and C.248 Although Louise Nalbandian wrote that the first Armenian 
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political party, Armenakan, was founded in Van, Eastern Anatolia, in 1885; she additionally 
noted that its founder was Istanbul-born Mkrtych Portukalian, a son of a wealthy Armenian 
banker, whose activities were directed by Armenian political and revolutionary leaders in 
Russia.249 According to Vardan Parsamian, the party was founded in Marseilles, France.250 
The analysis of the information given by both Armenian historians demonstrates that the most 
important component of Phase C originated in the diaspora, like the other Armenian political 
parties Hnchak251 and Dashnaktsutiun252 which were founded in Geneva in 1887 and in Tiflis 
in 1890 respectively.  
 
The above-mentioned facts show that although the Armenian national movement contained 
features of Hroch’s three phases, these phases did not replace each other in chronological 
order, since each phase contained elements of the other two. In turn, the typology of national 
movements offered by Hroch for European countries applies fully to the Armenian case, as 
national movement acquired a mass character under the old regime and produced armed 
insurrections.253   
 
Since all phases of the Armenian national movement started in the diaspora and were only 
later brought to the Armenian ‘historical homeland’ in Eastern Anatolia, the Armenian case 
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can be classified as Gellner and Smith’s diaspora nationalism. Anderson’s ‘long-distance 
nationalism’ classification can also be applicable to the Armenian case as nationalism of the 
people who lived away from their ‘homelands’. 
 
3.3 Armenian political aspirations in the projected homeland  
 
Armenian life in the Ottoman Empire can be divided into two periods: before and after the 
late nineteenth century nationalist movement, which had its origins in the Ottoman-Russian 
war of 1877-1878. One of the Russian aims in this war was to separate the eastern provinces 
of the Ottoman Empire, which were populated by, among other peoples, Christian Armenians. 
This war brought a visible change in the attitude of the Ottoman Armenian nationalists, 
headed by the Armenian Istanbul Patriarch, towards the Ottoman Government. However, this 
change was not of a mass character. It was the activities of Armenian political organisations 
in the late nineteenth century that mobilised the Armenian masses in the eastern provinces 
against the government and Muslims and brought about a significant deterioration in 
Ottoman-Armenian relations.  
 
Ottoman Armenians before the 1877-1878 Ottoman-Russian War 
 
In 1876, when Bulgarians of the Ottoman Empire rebelled, the Ottoman Sultan appealed to all 
Ottoman subjects to support the government in the current situation. Armenian Istanbul 
Patriarch Varzhapetian appealed to the Armenian community of the Empire as follows: if the 
Armenian nation had survived so far as a nation and preserved its religion, church and 
language, and historical and cultural values, all these were because of the patronage, support 
and sympathetic attitude of the Ottoman Government. The Armenians were obliged to help 
the Ottoman State, enrolling in the Ottoman Army and defending the ‘homeland’ for the sake 
of ‘national interest and pride’.254 
 
The Armenian Patriarch’s appeal suggests the following vision: first, the Ottoman Empire 
was considered the ‘homeland’ of the Armenians; second, the Armenian nation had survived 
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by 1876 owing to the Ottoman Government; and third, the ‘national interest and pride’ of the 
Armenians were synonymous to those of the Ottoman State. Although it should be 
acknowledged that the statement was made under particular political and historical 
circumstances, which might have shaped the position which the Patriarch felt obliged to 
articulate, the relatively good condition of non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire are indeed 
documented by historians. 
 
Thus, examining the situation of the Ottoman, especially Eastern Anatolian, Armenians until 
the mid-nineteenth century, Hagop Barsoumian wrote that it was on an individual level that 
the non-Muslims of the Ottoman Empire felt discrimination in the legal, social and financial 
spheres most strongly. The distinctive clothing, the show of deference to Muslims, the 
interdiction against non-Muslims to bear arms or to ride on a horse and the non-acceptance of 
the testimony of a non-Muslim against a Muslim in a court of law were still in evidence.255  
 
It should be mentioned that the problems mentioned by Barsoumian were eliminated at least 
on paper with the Imperial Edicts of 1839 and 1856. These Tanzimat (Reform) laws 
‘enunciated the abolition of tax farming and abuses associated with it, the establishment of a 
regular system of taxation, and the setting up of an orderly recruitment for the army. It also 
provided for public and fair trial for all crimes, as well as equality before the law for all 
subjects “of whatever religion or sect they may be”.’256 In 1855, the poll tax was abolished 
and conscription into the army for non-Muslims recognised, with the option of paying an 
exemption tax.257 Despite this law, it was only in 1912 that Christians were enlisted in the 
Ottoman Army for the first time, for the Balkan War.258       
 
The legal, social and economic problems which Armenians faced did not exclude Eastern 
Anatolian Muslims. William Palgrave, British Consul to Trabzon, in his report of 1868, wrote 
that ‘the Christians have at the capital and throughout the Empire as many Courts of Appeal 
and redress-demanding representatives as there are Consulates, Agencies, and, sometimes, 
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Embassies, at hand. Indeed, not only are their complaints listened to when made, but even 
fabricated for them when not made.’259 However, ‘the Mahometan population is absolutely 
“unrepresented,” at the central, irresponsible, and dissevered government of Constantinople, 
where the Mahometan subjects of the Sultan have really no one to whom they can make 
known their interests or expose their wrongs.’ The British Consul concluded that ‘as matters 
now stand, the Ottoman Government lies under the very serious charge of oppressing its 
Mahometan in favour of its Christian subjects. I regret to have to confirm the charge.’260 As 
Palgrave claimed, the grievances of the Eastern Anatolian population were connected not with 
their ethnic origin or religion, but with the maladministration of the Ottoman Government. 
This weakness affected the Muslim population of the Empire more than its Christian 
population, since the grievances of the latter were at least heard by the Ottoman State under 
the pressure of the Great Powers, whereas the Muslims were helpless from both sides. 
 
Concerning the economic situation of the Armenians in the Empire, Barsoumian wrote that 
urban Armenians kept commerce and most of the handicrafts in Eastern Anatolia under their 
control, but they had been in slow decline since the eighteenth century, which accelerated 
after the 1830s as they could not compete with better quality and cheaper European goods. 
This resulted in the disappearance of some of these handicrafts, which affected Armenian 
society in the provinces.261 The decline of the handicrafts, however, affected Muslims in far 
larger numbers than non-Muslims, including Armenians.262  
 
As for the rural Armenians, Barsoumian added that during the long centuries of Ottoman rule, 
Armenian peasants lost fertile and well-maintained pieces of their land to Turks or Kurds. The 
latter lent the Armenian peasants money at rates of 50 percent interest or more, which would 
force the peasants to sell their land to pay back this money, turning them into landless 
peasants.263 The problem also affected the Muslims of the Empire, including those in Eastern 
Anatolia, where Muslim Kurds were turned into landless peasants working as serfs for their 
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Kurdish chieftains.264 Charles Issawi wrote that the Turks, handicapped by conscription, fell 
into the hands of Armenian, Greek or European bankers to whom the whole property or estate 
was soon sacrificed.265 According to Feroz Ahmad, after the reform edicts, rural 
moneylenders were largely non-Muslims: peasants in the countryside became dependent on 
them and sometimes gave up their land in lieu of debts. He argued that the reason was a 
marked increase in commercial activity which forced the peasantry to produce more and more 
for the market so as to be able to pay their taxes and buy imported necessities.266    
 
Barsoumian wrote that the number of landless Armenian peasants grew rapidly in the 1860s 
and 1870s, especially in mixed areas of Armenians and Kurds. But Bagrat Borian 
demonstrated the opposite. Referring to the Tiflis Armenian newspaper Mshak (Labourer) in 
1877-1878, he wrote that during the military campaign of Russia against the Ottoman Empire, 
the Russian Army saw rich Armenian villages in Eastern Anatolia with full barns and great 
numbers of cattle that none of the guberniyas (provinces) in the South Caucasus had.267 
Borian, based on Sarkisian, continued that ‘the Armenian peasant in Turkey does not 
complain of shortage of arable land as we see in Alexandropol guberniya’ and that ‘public 
landownership in Turkey does not exist’ and land ownership depended on one’s own 
resources. The economic conditions of Christian peasants were better than those of Muslim 
Turks, Kurds and others.268 
 
Vladimir Mayewski, the Russian Consul-General to Van and Erzurum, wrote in 1916 that 
Armenian peasants of the Ottoman Empire always had great abundance of food and their 
material welfare was higher than that of Russian peasants in central Russia. However, he 
noted that villagers of Eastern Anatolia, including Muslims, were not protected from the 
arbitrariness of violent elements among the Kurds, but this does not mean that Armenian 
peasants lived constantly under the fear of Kurdish massacre. If this was the case, then the 
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Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire would have become poorer and even 
disappeared.269 
 
Armenian peasants, according to Barsoumian, also paid different taxes (official taxes like the 
tithe of annual produce, property taxes, taxes for the use of roads, for birth, marriage and 
death, for the transfer of goods, war taxes and non-official taxes to Kurdish or Turkish 
chieftains, who ‘owned’ or ‘protected’ the village or the district), which varied from place to 
place and from year to year. The Armenian peasants paid dues and gave gifts to their churches 
and clerics, made donations at the birth and baptism of a child, at marriage and death and on 
religious feast days. The peasants also worked without pay for a certain number of days on 
land owned by the church or the nearby monastery.270      
 
Concerning the official taxes, according to Barsoumian, it was the Armenian Istanbul 
Patriarch, the head of the Armenian millet (Armenian nation), which included monophysite 
Armenians, Assyrians (Jacobites), Copts and Nestorians, who was responsible for the 
collection of state taxes from members of his community. The patriarch himself was exempt 
from taxation and had the power to appoint state tax collectors.271  
 
Here it is necessary to touch upon the issue of taxes paid by non-Muslims for exemption from 
military service. The British Consul to Trabzon, Palgrave, in his report of 1868, wrote that 
‘the whole burden of military service, active and reserve, falls exclusively on the Mahomedan 
population. The Christians do indeed pay into the public Treasury a small – a trifling sum, 
bearing no real proportion soever to the advantages it obtains them for their exemption; but, 
even were the ‘Bedel Askeri,’ or Ransom Service Tax [military exemption tax – I.K.], 
weighty enough to balance the effective value of such exemption to the Christians, it could 
never equipoise the misery which it entails on the Mahomedan fellow-subjects by the 
enormous burden of the conscription thus thrown on their unassisted shoulders.’ This is the 
reason why the Muslim population proportionately decreased, and the Christian increased. He 
added that Muslims were systematically overburdened, not to say oppressed, while the 
Christians, ‘under the protection of advantageous position in the Ottoman Empire, have been 
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enriching themselves for the last half century mainly by questionable speculation or by direct 
fraud and usury’.272   
 
The Armenians not only enjoyed a relatively good economic position within the Ottoman 
Empire, they also held high government posts. There were Armenian Pashas (the highest 
government rank), ministers, senators and deputies in the first Ottoman parliament in 1876, 
Under-Secretaries of State, a number of ambassadors, consuls-general and consuls, many 
counsellors, directors, Councillors of State, deputy governors-general of provinces and sub-
governors of districts, university professors and many other high ranking civil servants.273   
 
As for the Armenian peasants compelled to work without pay on land owned by the churches 
or monasteries, this was an internal issue of the Armenian millet, in which the Ottoman 
Government did not interfere. The Armenian Istanbul Patriarch, as the head of the millet, 
enjoyed complete jurisdiction over the religious, charitable and educational institutions of the 
Armenian millet and had his own court and prison, where he could try all cases except those 
involving ‘public security and crime’.274     
  
The above-mentioned evidence demonstrates that the legal, social and economic problems of 
the Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire, including Eastern Anatolia, were common 
to the entire population of the Empire. The Armenians – regardless of whether they were 
contented or discontented with their situation – who did not seem to be complaining until the 
reform edicts of 1839 and 1856, which benefited the Ottoman Christians more than the 
Muslims, started complaining after them, especially that of 1856. The power behind this 
process can be explained by Phase B, both in the ‘diaspora’ and ‘homeland’.  
 
Anthony Smith explains the change of stable, if sometimes uneasy, relations between the 
populations of the Eastern Europe and parts of the Middle East that had long lived side by 
side into competition and even conflict by their intense preoccupation with ‘authentic’ 
vernacular culture and history.275 This view is applicable to the Armenian case in the sense 
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that it was during and after the Phase B of the Armenian national movement that the relations 
between the Muslims and Armenians started to deteriorate.  
 
Armenian nationalist activists stressed the intolerable situation of the Armenians under 
Ottoman rule. The evidence is more ambiguous. The Armenian Patriarch in 1876 made a pro-
Ottoman appeal to the Ottoman Armenians. However, following the success of Russia in the 
Russian–Ottoman war of 1877-1878, the same Patriarch voiced complaints against the 
Ottoman Government and came out in favour of the ‘Armenian homeland’ project which will 
be discussed further in the thesis. This demonstrates that the views of the Armenian 
nationalist leaders, including the Patriarch, on the situation of the Armenians were 
conditioned by political expediency. The change in position of the Armenian nationalist 
leaders can be explained by the changing political circumstances: the defeat of the Ottoman 
Empire in its frequent wars with Christian powers which, together with the success of the 
nationalist rebellions of the Balkan Christians, accompanied its gradual decay, and the 
increase in Armenian national and political awareness. These factors gave stimulus to 
Armenian self-confidence: their nationalist leaders started thinking that they could take 
control of the destiny of their people and construct a ‘national homeland’, following the 
example of other Christians, in Eastern Anatolia with Great Power help. The turning point 
was the Russian success in 1877-1878 in the Ottoman-Russian war.  
 
Ottoman Armenians after the 1877-1878 Ottoman-Russian War 
 
The Russian success in the Ottoman-Russian war brought about visible changes in the 
positions of the nationalist leaders of the Ottoman Armenians. In accordance with the Edirne 
(Adrianople) Armistice, signed on 31 January 1878, Bulgaria was declared an autonomous 
principality, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro won independence, and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina became autonomous provinces.276 Thus, with the Adrianople Armistice, which 
declared Bulgaria an autonomous principality, Russia lost its pretext of interfering in Ottoman 
affairs and was in need of a new tool. The Armenians, whom the Armistice did not mention, 
became this tool. The active engagement of the Russian authorities with the Armenian clergy 
                                                 
276 Imranli K, Sozdanie armyanskogo gosudarstva na Kavkaze: Istoki i posledstviya, Moscow: Nauchno-
izdatel’skiy tsentr ‘Ladomir’, 2006, p 12; the source cited by Imranli K: Sbornik dogovorov Rossii s drugimi 
gosudarstvami (1856-1917), Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo politicheskoy literatury, 1952, p 168 
66 
resulted in the inclusion of Article XVI on the Armenians in the text of the San-Stefano 
Preliminary Treaty of 3 March 1878. The article read: ‘As the evacuation by the Russian 
troops of the territory, which they occupy in Armenia and is to be restored to Turkey, might 
give rise to clashes and complications detrimental to the good relations between the two 
countries, the Sublime Porte undertakes to carry out, without any delay, the improvements 
and reforms deriving from the local requirements in the provinces inhabited by Armenians, 
and to guarantee their security from Kurds and Circassians.’277 
 
The Armenian-Kurdish problem was mentioned above. According to Stephan Astourian, the 
Armenian-Circassian problem was related to the land seizure issues which arose as a result of 
the settlement of Circassian refugees from Russia in the Ottoman Empire between 1856 and 
1878, including in Zeytun, Hajin and Marash in Cilicia.278    
 
Although the word ‘Armenia’ was used for the first time in an international pact, in the San-
Stefano Treaty, Armenian leaders were not satisfied with it, as it did not mention anything 
about autonomy. Britain was also unsatisfied with this treaty, as it would jeopardise its 
interests in the East.279 For that reason, Britain declared that no separate Russian-Ottoman 
treaty, which would change the conditions of the Paris Treaty (1856) and London Convention 
(1871),280 could be considered legal without the consent of the other European powers.281 In 
order to get this consent, it was decided to convene a conference in Berlin, where on 8 July 
1878 the article proposed by Britain was adopted. Article LXI of the Berlin Treaty of 13 July 
                                                 
277 Sbornik dogovorov Rossii s drugimi gosudarstvami (1856-1917), p 168 
278 Astourian S, ‘The Silence of Land: Agrarian Relations, Ethnicity, and Power’ in Suny, Gocek and Naimark 
(ed.), Question of Genocide: Armenians and Turks at the end of the Ottoman Empire, Oxford: Oxford University 
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279 Note: The Russian annexation of Eastern Anatolia or Batumi, Ardahan and Kars was considered from four 
points of view with regard to British interests in the East in the letter of Austin Layard, British Ambassador to 
Istanbul, to the Earl of Derby, British Foreign Secretary on 4 December 1877: 1) its effect upon the Muslim 
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and Asia-Minor; 3) its consequences for the direct British communication with India; and 4) its impact upon 
British commerce. Taking into account these implications for the British interests, Britain on 4 June 1978 
concluded a secret agreement with the Ottoman Empire, according to which, in return for the Sultan’s consent to 
the occupation and administration of Cyprus by Britain, the latter would defend by force the Sultan in Batumi, 
Ardahan, Kars or any of them if they should be retained by Russia and if any attempt shall be made at any future 
time by Russia to take possession of any further portion of the Asiatic territories of the Sultan (British 
Documents on Ottoman Armenians. Volume I (1856-1880), no 50, p 135; no 72, p 179). 
280 Note: Under the Paris Treaty of 1856, the Black Sea was declared neutral and access was closed to all 
warships. The article was amended by the London Convention of 1871, which eliminated the restriction to 
Russian military presence at the Black Sea. The London Convention also stipulated that articles of the Paris 
Treaty, except for the amended ones, could not be revised without the consent of all powers-signatories.  
281 British Documents on Ottoman Armenians. Volume I (1856-1880), no 50, p 135 
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1878 replaced Article XVI of the San-Stefano Preliminary Treaty in the following edition: 
‘The Sublime Porte undertakes to carry out, without any delay, improvements and reforms 
deriving from local needs in the provinces populated by Armenians, and to guarantee their 
security from Circassians and Kurds. It will regularly report on the measures taken to that end 
to the powers, which will observe their implementation.’282  
 
Thus, the word ‘Armenia’ of Article XVI of the San-Stefano Preliminary Treaty was replaced 
by the ‘provinces populated by Armenians’ in Article LXI of the Berlin Treaty, which was 
signed by Russia, Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Austro-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire. 
Moreover, the preference the San-Stefano Preliminary Treaty gave to Russia in the 
observation of the implementation of the reforms in Eastern Anatolia was replaced by the 
observation of six powers-signatories.  
 
Statistics on the provinces populated by Armenians  
 
The implementation of the Berlin Treaty, first of all, necessitated the definition of the area 
inhabited by Armenians. According to the British project of August 1881, the ‘country 
inhabited by Armenians’ covered the vilayets (provinces) of Erzurum, Van, Bitlis, Mamuret-
ul-Aziz, Diyarbakyr (excluding Malatya sanjak (county)); sanjaks of Sivas, Karahisar and 
Tokat of the vilayet of Sivas, Marash sanjak of the vilayet of Halep and part of Sis sanjak of 
the vilayet of Adana283 (see Map 5).   
 
The tables below provide statistics on the Armenian and Muslim population of the above-
mentioned six main provinces on the basis of Armenian Istanbul Patriarch (1881), official 
Ottoman (1890) and European (1892) sources (see Tables 3.1 and 3.2). As is seen from these 
tables, the figures of the Armenian Patriarch are of 1881, whereas those of the Ottoman 
Ministry of Justice and Vital Cuinet, a French geographer, are closer, in 1890 and 1892. 
However, the differences were more likely related to inaccuracy rather than time, since such 
huge difference between the first and other two sources cannot be a matter of growth over ten 
years.   
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Thus, according to the Patriarch’s figures, Armenians constituted a significant majority in 
Bitlis (86%), a significant minority in Van (40%), Erzurum (41%) and Mamuret-ul-Aziz 
(about 39%). According to official Ottoman figures, Armenians did not constitute a majority 
in any of these provinces and had a significant minority in Bitlis (39%). According to Cuinet, 
Armenians again did not constitute a majority in any of these provinces and had a significant 
minority in Bitlis (33%).  
 
Examining the issue of the reliability of these sources, the British Foreign Office source noted 
that Ottoman official figures were based on ‘taxation registry and recruiting rolls; 
consequently they usually tend to underestimate the population, as females are not directly 
included and the desire to avoid taxation and military service is universal. There is additional 
difficulty in estimating nomad or migratory tribes.’284 Regarding the Armenian figures, the 
same source noted, ‘there has also been flagrant misrepresentation. Armenian ecclesiastical 
figures, though usually exaggerated, supply a useful maximum figure.’285 
 
The most reliable statistics, according to the Foreign Office source, were those of Cuinet and 
Henry Lynch, a British traveller.286 The data provided by Lynch was not complete and 
covered three provinces and one sanjak: the provinces of Erzurum (in 1887: 106,768 
Armenians and 428,495 Muslims), Mamuret-ul-Aziz (in 1890: 93,000 Armenians and 
182,000 Muslims), and Bitlis (in 1893: 97,184 Armenians and 145,454 Muslims), and the 
sanjak of Van in the Van province (in 1890: 75,644 Armenians and 52,229 Muslims).287 
 
According to the official Ottoman statistics in 1894, there were total 27,208,683 people in the 
Empire, of whom 21,507,304 were Muslims (79%) and 994,065 were Armenians (3.6%).288 
Since we do not possess the same information for the discussed period from the Armenian 
Istanbul Patriarch and European sources, they are not referred to in the section, but pre-1914 
statistics from different sources will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
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Table 3.1 Armenian and Muslim population in six eastern provinces: in figures289 
 
Provinces Armenian Istanbul Patriarch (1881) Ottoman Ministry of Justice (1890)     Vital Cuinet, French geographer 
(1892) 
Arm Mus Population 
in total 
Arm Mus Population 
in total 
Arm Mus Population 
in total 
Erzurum 136,147 196,269 333, 731 109,819 441,671 555, 159 134,967 500,782 645,702 
Sivas 243,515 694,030 942,686 118,085 735, 489 892,201 170,433 839,514 1,086,015 
Diyarbakyr - - - 55,614 240, 574 312, 444 79,129 328, 644 471,462 
Mamuret-
ul-Aziz 
107,059 169,364 276, 423 80,611 300,194 381,350 69,718 504,946 575,314 
Bitlis 130,460 21,121 151, 581 107,804 167,054 276,998 131,390 254,000 398, 625 
Van 133,859 107, 726 337, 111 
 
71,582 282,582 418, 494 79,998 241,000 430,000 
Total 751,040 1,188,510 2,041,532 543,515 2,167,564 2,836,646 665,635 2,668,886 3,607,118 
 
Table 3.2 Armenian and Muslim population in six eastern provinces: in percentages 
 
 
                                                 
289 Sbornik diplomaticheskikh dogovorov. Reformy v Armenii (26 noyabrya 1912 goda-10 maya 1914 goda), Petrograd: Gosudarstvennaya tipografiya, 1915, pril 6, pp 273-
287; FO 371/3405, ‘Historical and Ethnological Notes on Armenians’, p 8; Note: The tables include only the Armenian and Muslim population of the six provinces and 
exclude other peoples.  
Provinces Armenian Istanbul Patriarch (1881) Ottoman Ministry of Justice (1890)       Vital Cuinet (1892) 
Arm Mus Population 
in total 
Arm Mus Population 
in total 
Arm Mus Population 
in total 
Erzurum 41% 59% 333, 731 20% 79.5% 555, 159 21% 77.5% 645,702 
Sivas 26% 74% 942,686 13% 82.5% 892,201 16% 77.5% 1,086,015 
Diyarbakyr - - - 18% 77% 312, 444 17% 70% 471,462 
Mamuret-
ul-Aziz 
38.7% 61.3% 276, 423 21% 79% 381,350 12% 88% 575,314 
Bitlis 86% 14% 151, 581 39 % 60.5% 276,998 33% 64% 398, 625 
Van 40% 32% 337, 111 
 
17% 67.5% 418, 494 19% 56% 430,000 
Total 37% 58% 2,041,532 19% 76.5% 2,836,646 18.5% 74% 3,607,118 
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Berlin Treaty signatories and the Armenian project 
 
The minority situation of the Armenian population in Eastern Anatolia was admitted by the 
Armenian Istanbul Patriarch in his meeting with British Ambassador in March 1878.290 
However, the Patriarch still favoured the creation of Armenian autonomy there. In his 
opinion, Armenian autonomy would be accepted by the Turkish population as well, as it 
would afford ‘protection for their lives and property’.291       
 
The British Ambassador Layard, reacting to the project of the Patriarch in his report of 18 
March 1878 to the Earl of Derby, British Foreign Secretary, wrote that ‘an autonomous State, 
such as the “Armenia” of the Patriarch, could long preserve even its semi-independence, no 
one acquainted with the populations which inhabit the provinces it is proposed by sanguine 
Armenians to include within its boundaries, could for one moment believe. Autonomy must 
end in annexation to Russia, an event which the Patriarch evidently seemed to 
contemplate.’292  
 
For the Ottoman Government, according to Kemal Karpat, the aim of the Berlin Treaty 
reforms in the Armenian-populated provinces was the creation of an Armenian administrative 
autonomy, to be followed by independence. The Muslims in these provinces feared that the 
Armenians would embark on a drive ‘to exterminate them or force them to flee their ancestral 
homes’, the strategy which was used by the Russians and Bulgarians in 1877-1878 in order to 
secure a Christian majority in the autonomous principality of Bulgaria in advance of the San-
Stefano and Berlin Treaties.293       
 
The same concern was expressed in another report by Layard in 1880, where he wrote that 
‘the Mussulmans of Asia Minor have learnt the fate of their brethren in the autonomous 
Christian provinces of European Turkey. They would not be disposed to submit to a similar 
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fate without resistance. A demand for autonomy in Armenia might lead to massacres, which 
would bring about the immediate interference of Russia, and its inevitable consequences.’294 
 
Here lay the problem of the realisation of the Armenian autonomy project: ‘annexation to 
Russia’ and British fear of this ‘annexation’. This fear made Britain active in 1880-1881 on 
the implementation of Article LXI of the Berlin Treaty.295 However, British failure to achieve 
six signatory power unanimity on the issue led to the postponement of its initiative in 1881, 
since the French and German Governments were of the opinion that the discussion of the 
Armenian issue might create problems for the negotiations on the settlement of the Greek 
borders.296 
 
The second time, in 1881, again fear of Russian interference compelled Britain to return to the 
issue with its project on the reforms.297 During the joint work of British and Russian 
ambassadors on the project, some of the points underwent changes,298 and on 9 February 
1882, the final project was presented to other ambassadors, unanimously accepted and sent to 
the governments of these powers.299 This time the British failure to gain German and Austrian 
support brought another postponement of the issue. In his meeting with the British 
ambassador to Berlin, the German Prince Bismarck asked him to convey to Granville, the 
British Foreign Secretary, that Germany supported the British policy on Egypt and was ready 
to help the implementation of the Berlin Treaty, but in one issue it did not support Britain: the 
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‘Armenian question’. Germany called on Britain not to press the Ottoman Government 
regularly, since such pressure might again open the way for Russian ambitions in the East. He 
also added that Russia was passive on this issue at the moment, but encouragement of 
Armenian nationalist aspirations could incite it to return to active politics, including the use of 
military power.300 Austria did not have direct interest in the issue, since it would not gain any 
political dividend from it, except for irritating the Ottoman Sultan, which it did not want to do 
without good reason.301 
 
With the refusal of the Ottoman Empire to sign the treaty on the legalisation of the British 
seizure of the Nile basin after the occupation of Egypt in 1882,302 Britain changed its position 
towards its traditional ally and started encouraging the Armenian nationalists against the 
Ottoman Empire.303 According to Gerard Libaridian, in 1883 Russia lost interest in the 
Armenians and sought an accommodation with the Ottoman Empire.304 This can be explained 
by the evidence the Russian authorities had vis-à-vis Armenian revolutionary activities in 
Russia, which were also supported by Britain.305 Despite its claims on the reforms in the areas 
populated by the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, Russia sought the prevention of the 
construction of railways in Eastern Anatolia, which impeded the development of the region, 
including the welfare of the Armenians, after it became the target of the Armenian 
revolutionaries itself.306 The change towards the Armenians was also connected with the 
assassination of the Russian Tsar Alexander II by the Russian terrorist organisation, 
Narodnaya volya (People’s will), which included, among others, Armenian revolutionaries.307 
As for Britain, its aim in supporting Armenian nationalist ideas in both Empires was to make 
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the Ottoman Sultan dependent on Britain on the one hand, and to keep Russia busy against 
nationalism within its own Empire on the other. In 1895, convinced that the Armenian issue 
was not a matter of strong enough interest for Russia to cause another Ottoman-Russian war, 
Britain lost interest in the Armenian issue as well308 as did Russia until the Balkan war of 
1912.  
 
Thus, Great Power politics in the Armenian issue were related to the location and extent of the 
area claimed by Armenians from the Mediterranean to the Russian borders, with the following 
interests of the major powers-signatories of the Berlin Treaty: 
 
 Russia wanted to occupy Eastern Anatolia in order to expand its territory to the 
Mediterranean. This posed a challenge to the economic and strategic interests of 
Britain, France and Germany. In the face of international opposition Russia’s ambition 
in the region was left in suspension after 1883, and only in 1912 was it reactivated.         
 Britain was interested in preventing Russia from penetrating into Eastern Anatolia, 
since it was of economic and strategic importance on its way to Mesopotamia, Persia 
and British India, which were rich with natural resources, especially oil, cotton and 
grain.    
 France had economic interests in Cilicia, as an agricultural region suitable for cotton 
cultivation, in order to decrease the dependence of its textile industry on the cotton of 
the USA and the British Empire. Cilicia was regarded by France as the northern part 
of Syria, which was of strategic importance at the crossroads of the major trade roads 
connecting Europe, Asia and Africa.  
 Germany was looking for concessions from the Ottoman Sultan for the construction of 
a Konya-Baghdad-Basra railway through Cilicia.309  
 
The region was also important for the Ottoman Empire as it constituted a great portion of its 
territories in Anatolia. Support of any of the Great Powers for the Armenian project would 
bring an immediate clash of interests, which Abdulhamid II (1876-1908) realised and used to 
prevent the construction of Armenian autonomy in the region. Moreover, Abdulhamid II tried 
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to achieve internal unity among Ottoman Muslims with his ‘Islamism’ ideology. In his 
opinion, this would prevent the further dismemberment of the Empire into national states. 
While he preferred to maintain peace at all costs, as he thought that the integration of the 
Muslim population and Empire’s territorial integrity were dependent on peace, at the same 
time he used the threat of jihad (Muslim holy war) to prevent the interference of the powers 
with Muslim colonies in the domestic affairs of the Empire. Being aware of the real intentions 
of the powers-signatories of the Berlin Treaty, he balanced the ambitions of one signatory 
power against another.310 The manoeuvres of Abdulhamid II after the Berlin Treaty prevented 
the further dismemberment of the Empire for several decades and deprived the powers-
signatories of active political involvement in Eastern Anatolia under the disguise of Armenian 
reforms.  
 
Armenian revolutionary organisations and the Armenian project   
 
The aims of the major Armenian revolutionary organisations, Hnchak and Dashnaktsutiun, 
were declared to be the improvement of the conditions of Eastern Anatolian Armenians,311 
which they believed could be achieved through the construction of an ‘Armenian homeland’ 
in the large area where Armenians constituted a minority. Both parties were aware that the 
achievement of this uneasy goal would be impossible without Great Power help, so they were 
ready to resort to various means, including terror tactics modelled after the Russian 
revolutionary organisation, Narodnaya volya (People’s will),312 to obtain this intervention.  
 
The view is supported by Dr Cyrus Hamlin, the founder and first president of Robert College 
in Istanbul. In his letter of 23 December 1894 to the ‘Congregationalist’ of Boston in the US, 
Dr Hamlin wrote that the Hnchak bands, organised all over the Empire, ‘will watch their 
opportunities to kill Turks and Kurds, set fire to their villages, and then make their escape into 
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the mountains. The enraged Moslems will then rise and fall upon defenceless Armenians, and 
slaughter them with such barbarities that Russia will enter in the name of humanity and 
Christian civilization and take possession.’313  
 
This passage suggests that the Ottoman Armenians did not have serious insecurity problems, 
as was stipulated in the Berlin Treaty and the programmes of the Armenian political parties, 
otherwise they would be no need to artificially create ‘already existing’ insecurity by setting 
Muslims against Armenians. The aim of the Armenian nationalists in inciting Muslims 
against Armenians was not only aimed at gaining the intervention of the Great Powers by 
creating evidence of their sufferings under the ‘barbaric’ Muslims. Another problem was the 
lack of mobilisation of the Armenian nationalists’ own people around the ideas they 
promoted. If there was indeed strong enmity between Armenians and Muslims, there would 
be no need for Armenian armed provocations, since this enmity would have already existed, 
to be easily used by the Armenian nationalists. It was the lack of this enmity that concerned 
the Armenian nationalists.  
 
Testimony is provided by the words of Grigor Artsruni, Dashnaktsutiun member and founder 
of Mshak (Labourer), the first major periodical in Armenian in Tiflis. In 1872, Artsruni 
appealed through the pages of his journal to Ottoman Armenians to rebel. Not being able to 
get the expected result, he protested that ‘there should be external influence, external power’ 
to increase the spiritual mood of Armenians and to ‘liberate’ them.314  
 
The indifference or opposition of the Armenians to the Armenian revolutionary movement 
compelled the nationalists to shed the blood of their own people as well. The Russian Consul-
General in Van and Erzurum Mayewski, who himself visited the Van, Bitlis, Erzurum, 
Diyarbakyr and Mosul provinces in 1895-1897, testified that Armenian revolutionary 
organisations shed so much of their own people’s blood and demonstrated so much barbarity 
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and cruelty that he doubted their possession of any human feelings.315 One victim was the 
Armenian bishop in Van. He was murdered by Armenian nationalists in 1896 for warning 
Van youth against the harmful methods of revolutionaries.316 Mayewski testified to the 
prayers of Armenian villagers to rid them of the attacks of ‘cruel and heartless 
Dashnaktsutiun’.317 
 
The Russian Consul-General added that the Christians of the Ottoman Empire had one very 
clear idea, i.e. the creation of anarchy to provoke the intervention of foreign powers. They 
tried their best to present Turks as torturers of Christian, in which one of the leading roles 
belonged to the imaginations of a daily press full of false and wrong interpretations about 
Muslims, including Turks. He asked how, if Christians had indeed suffered under Muslim 
rule, had they survived so many centuries until the birth of the nationalist movement? If this 
was the case, then why was the elimination of the anarchy created by these political 
provocateurs followed not by continuous disturbances and chaos, but by peace for many years 
until new provocations commenced?318 
    
The fact that the idea of Armenian autonomy proceeded chiefly from Armenian committees 
abroad, Armenian press and influential Armenians of the diaspora in Russia, Europe and 
Istanbul was supported, among others, by the British Ambassador to Istanbul in his report to 
the British Foreign Secretary in 1880. However, the ambassador warned that ‘any attempt to 
their realisation, under present circumstances, might lead to very grave consequences and to 
disasters to the Armenians themselves. It must not be forgotten that they form the minority, 
and in many districts the very small minority, of the population.’319  
 
The Berlin Treaty Article on the Armenian reforms in Eastern Anatolia and the activities of 
the Armenian revolutionary organisations indeed aroused the suspicions of the Muslims with 
regard to the aims for Armenian autonomy on the territories, where the majority of the 
population was Muslim. The examples of Balkan separatism compelled the Muslims to 
believe that their territories were going to be included in an autonomous Armenia, and, as in 
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the case of the separated Balkan countries, the Muslim population would face the danger of 
being expelled from their own territories to create a homogenous Armenian state. The Berlin 
Treaty preference for one more Christian people against Muslims and negotiations with the 
Ottoman Government on the reforms in Eastern Anatolia, including the six signatory powers’ 
note of 7 September 1880 strengthened these suspicions. In reply to the initiative of the 
Ottoman Government of applying the Berlin Treaty reforms to all parts of the Empire, the 
powers expressed their special concern about the Berlin Treaty reforms for Armenians. The 
powers considered it indispensable that the communes and administrative groups in Eastern 
Anatolia should be divided so as to unite as many homogenous elements as possible, ‘the 
Armenians, or, when necessary, the Armenians and the Osmanlis [Turks – I.K.], being 
grouped together to the exclusion of the Kurds’.320 Moreover, the powers suggested that the 
nomadic Kurdish element ‘should not be included in the census by which the majority of the 
inhabitants of each village will be determined’.321      
 
The implementation of the Berlin Treaty in the suggested form, on one hand, would 
exacerbate Armenian-Kurdish relations, and on the other hand, would pave the way for 
Kurdish enmity against the Ottoman Government, and subsequent Kurdish separatism. This 
intention is very clearly read from the abovementioned note of the six powers. The negative 
consequences of this project were assessed correctly by Abdulhamid II. The Ottoman 
Government had already encountered problems with the centralisation of the Ottoman Empire 
and subjection of different Kurdish tribes to the Centre. If Abdulhamid II implemented the 
Berlin Treaty reforms as suggested by the powers, it would undermine further the already 
weak government control over the Kurdish populated areas, with anarchy and turmoil in the 
border areas with Russia, who would use it as a pretext to intervene. In order not to allow this 
to happen, resorting to the help of the ‘Islamism’ ideology, Abdulhamid II co-opted the 
Kurdish tribal chiefs and in 1891 created the Hamidiye alaylary (Hamidian cavalry), named 
after himself, which he used to secure the border with Russia following the example of the 
Cossacks. In return for promises of allegiance, the Sultan gave the Kurdish tribal leaders 
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ranks, orders, money and guns. The Hamidian cavalry was also used against the Armenian 
rebellion organised by Hnchak in Sasun district of the Bitlis province in 1894.322   
 
Abdulhamid II’s use of the clash of Great Power interests was also instrumental in the failure 
of the Armenian autonomy project. The growing lack of Great Power interest in the Armenian 
project fuelled the disturbances created by Armenian revolutionary organisations in the 
Ottoman Empire. They resorted to desperate methods to attract the Great Powers’ attention. 
The Hnchak leaders tried to justify their actions, which resulted in the bloodshed of 
Armenians and Muslims, declaring that it was because of the demonstration in the Armenian 
Cathedral in Istanbul in 1890, Sasun rebellion in 1894 and demonstration in Bab Ali in 1895 
that the Great Powers, especially Britain and Russia, again turned their attention to the 
‘Armenian question’.323 The Dashnaktsutiun believed that the Ottoman system would soon 
collapse as a result of the revolutionary assault from within and European pressure from 
without, since the foundations of the system were weak.324 This did not happen, and the 
Armenian revolutionary methods did not result in Armenian autonomy, nor did they bring 
about the collapse of the Empire.   
 
However, the revolutionary movement of Ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyyeti (The Committee of 
Union and Progress – CUP), known as the Young Turks, brought about the restoration of the 
Ottoman Constitution, which Abdulhamid II had suspended in 1878, in 1908. The CUP also 
overthrew Abdulhamid II in 1909. The main aim of the CUP was the achievement of 
‘Ottomanism’, i.e. the unity of all religious and ethnic communities of the Empire, and 
simultaneous decentralisation of administration. The latter signified ‘administrative local 
autonomy in a single “Ottoman Empire” for the various parts inhabited by the different 
national elements.’ In the view of the CUP, this would prevent the dismemberment of the 
Empire.325  
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The Ottomanism and administrative decentralisation aim of the CUP was not accepted by 
different revolutionary committees, including Armenian ones, since they advocated the 
system of political decentralisation without the recognition of Ottomanism.326 In the words of 
Jemal Pasha, a member of the CUP and Ottoman statesman, in accordance with the Act of the 
Ottoman Constitution, the CUP expressed a desire to form the country’s different 
revolutionary committees into one ‘Political Committee of Ottoman Unity’. In August 1908, 
the CUP opened negotiations with Dashnaktsutiun. During these talks, the CUP explained the 
drawbacks of political decentralisation for the Ottoman Empire. After uneasy negotiations, the 
Dashnaktsutiun proposed that it would work hand in hand with the CUP ‘to safeguard the 
constitution in the Ottoman Empire, but otherwise each Committee retains full freedom of 
action both as to the realisation of its main programme and the choice of means’.327 This 
meant that the Dashnaktsutiun would maintain its revolutionary organisation in the country 
openly as a political committee and its members would work in public. This proposal was 
accepted by the CUP.328 The other Armenian revolutionary organisations, Hnchak and 
Reformed Hnchak, refused to enter into negotiations with the CUP and their leaders in 
Istanbul entered into open relations with the Russian Embassy.329  
 
According to Michael Reynolds, the new Unionist government launched a comprehensive 
crackdown on lawbreakers in Eastern Anatolia, appointing aggressive administrators to 
Eastern Anatolia and arresting known bandits, including Hamidiye commanders. The new 
regime permitted Armenians to carry arms and in 1909 made them eligible for conscription. 
This idea offended many Kurds and further aggravated their relations with the government. 
Still worse, he wrote, was the demand of the Armenians for the return of confiscated lands. 
The state’s strong assertion of its own power and its defence of the legal rights of the 
Armenians offended the Kurdish tribal elites, as, in their opinion, it backed the assertive 
Armenian community.330 However, the cooperation between the CUP, whose aim was the 
recognition of Ottoman unity by all of the elements of the Empire, and the Dashnaktsutiun, 
whose aim was autonomy, did not last long.  
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Razmik Panossian tried to connect the failure of CUP-Dashnaktsutiun relations with a change 
in the CUP ideology. In his opinion, by 1911, the CUP had shifted from the concept of 
‘Ottomanisation’ to ‘“Turkification” of all the subjects and the inherent superiority of the 
Muslims,’ and that ‘consequently Armenians realised that even their minimal demands could 
not be met by the Porte’.331  
 
Jemal Pasha wrote that ‘to those who reproach us with having pursued a “purely Turkish 
policy”, I reply emphatically that our policy was not a “Turkish” policy, but the policy of 
Ottoman unity’.332  Jemal Pasha asked, ‘can it be said that the “Turkification” of the nations 
was involved in the demand that the Turkish language should be the official tongue in the 
Ottoman Empire?’333 He added that ‘just after the inauguration of the constitution a number of 
national committees were established in Constantinople, committees such as the “Arab 
Union” […] the “Albanian Club”, and many others. Then why is it said that the foundation of 
the “Ottoman Home” proves that the Unionist Government had “Turkification” designs?’334 
He explained, ‘I am primarily Ottoman, but I do not forget that I am a Turk, and nothing can 
shake my belief that the Turkish race is the foundation-stone of the Ottoman Empire.’335 
 
As for the concept of ‘Turkism’, according to Karpat, from 1912-1913, efforts were made to 
transform the Ottoman-Muslim nation, which consisted of different ethno-linguistic groups, 
into an ethnic Turkish nation, as the Young Turks needed to base the state on a new political 
community anchored in a core ethnic group identified with and entirely loyal to the state. 
Ethnic Turks had to be the foundation of the nation. The principal exponents of Turkism, 
Yusuf Akchura and Ziya Gokalp, believed that ethnic Turkishness should define the identity 
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of the nation and that Turkism was the ideology necessary to create and disseminate this 
identity.336    
 
Karpat’s explanation of the essence of Turkism shows that it was aimed at the transformation 
of different Muslim peoples of the Empire, who were previously classified as Ottoman millet, 
into a Turkish nation. This ideology did not intend the Turkisation of non-Muslims, including 
Armenians.  
  
Feroz Ahmad wrote that ‘it is conventional wisdom that Turkism (and even pan-Turkism) had 
become a key element in Unionist circles, especially after 1912.’337 He argued that in early 
1914 Turkism was far from dominant and the prevailing ideology was Ottomanism.338 If this 
is true, then even the Turkisation of the Muslim peoples of the Empire, least of all non-
Muslims, was not a dominant trend until early 1914. 
 
The reality was that, be it ‘Ottomanism’ or ‘Turkism’, these conceptions excluded separatism. 
As the main goals of CUP and Dashnaktsutiun clashed, it was predictable that their 
relationship would not work or would last until there was any hope of achieving the Armenian 
aims. This hope constituted Russia’s active politics in Eastern Anatolia with its renewed 
interest in the Armenian issue in 1912 with the start of the Balkan war and increase in the 
number of its consulates, establishing them at Diyarbakyr, Sivas, Mamuret-ul-Aziz and 
Mosul.339  
 
In Panossian’s words, Armenians were encouraged by the facts that ‘Russia had once again 
taken up the Armenian cause’ and ‘Balkan Christian nations were continuing to succeed in 
their liberation struggles against the Ottomans’.340 Here Panossian contradicted himself and 
showed that the real reason for the failure of CUP-Dashnaktsutiun relationship was not 
Turkism.     
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The main provisions of the Russian Armenian project of 8 June 1913 were the creation of one 
province consisting of Erzurum, Van, Bitlis, Diyarbakyr, Mamuret-ul-Aziz and Sivas 
(excluding portions of its suburbs and north-west area) and appointment of a Christian 
general-governor to this province – either an Ottoman subject or, preferably, a European, for a 
five year term with the consent of the powers. The condition of Armenians outside this 
province, especially in Cilicia, was also on the list of reforms.341 The project was accepted by 
the two other countries of the Triple Entente, Britain and France, with minor changes.342  
 
In its note of 25 June 1913, addressed to Triple Alliance members, Germany, Austria and 
Italy, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted that the preservation of Ottoman 
territorial integrity depended upon the restoration of peace and security in the above-
mentioned projected province. Peace and security, according to the note, depended on the 
implementation of the necessary reforms without delay. The Russian Foreign Ministry, 
connecting the ‘Armenian question’ with the Russian administration in the South Caucasus, 
warned that Russia could not tolerate continual disorders and anarchy in the areas near its 
Ottoman frontiers. This might lead to events to which Russia could not remain indifferent and 
could be prevented only by the immediate adoption of a united collective stance by the Great 
Powers.343  
 
The real Russian intention behind the ‘implementation’ of the Berlin Treaty is obvious from 
this note. The project would have to end in the annexation of the above-mentioned projected 
province by Russia. In order to realise this plan, Russia was ‘using the Kurds to destabilise the 
region and make intervention possible’.344 Russian propaganda among the Kurds against the 
Ottoman Government was also confirmed in the letter of Nicolas Girs, Russian ambassador to 
Istanbul, to Sergey Sazonov, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, dated 2 June 1913. The 
letter mentioned Russian propaganda against the Ottoman Government among the Kurds and 
the related Ottoman fear of Kurdish rebellion.345    
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Although the Ottoman Government was against the Russian project on Armenian reform, the 
Kurds of Eastern Anatolia were of a different opinion. They thought that the government 
‘consented that the six vilayets should be sacrificed to the benefit of Armenians under the 
name of Armenian reforms’. Their concern was that the six provinces would be named 
‘Armenia’ and Armenians would enjoy ‘special privileges’.346 They thought that Assyrians 
also, despite being Christians, ‘will never consent that privileges should be given to 
Armenians, and that the Kurds and Assyrians be left uncared for’. They urged turning out all 
the Ottoman officials of the provinces, districts and villages by force of arms for this alleged 
consent to the project.347  
 
The Russian aim behind the project was also recognised by Germany, which objected with its 
note of 26 June 1913. It argued that under this project, six Armenian provinces would be 
united under the European General-Governor appointed by the Sultan, which would constitute 
a separate province from the Empire in military and administrative terms. If realised, Armenia 
would cover half of Anatolia, with a very weak connection with the Ottoman Empire. It 
would be difficult to object to other Ottoman regions demanding the same privileges, which 
would lead to the factual dismemberment of the Empire. Germany expressed its wish that the 
desires of the Ottoman Government should also be taken into account.348 The German State-
Secretary for Foreign Affairs warned of the danger of the further partition of the Ottoman 
Empire, this time in Anatolia, and declared that Germany wished to avoid this partition. He 
added that in most Armenian centres, Armenians did not exceed 42% of the population and 
consequently were a minority. For that reason, he considered it reasonable to focus on more 
optimal reform project which would be acceptable to the Ottoman Empire.349  
  
Finally, after continuous diplomatic negotiations, on 8 February 1914, agreement on the 
reforms in the areas populated by Armenians was signed between Russia and the Ottoman 
Empire. The main points stated that two foreign general inspectors would be appointed to two 
sectors of Eastern Anatolia: the provinces of Erzurum, Trabzon and Sivas; and the provinces 
of Van, Bitlis, Mamuret-ul-Aziz and Diyarbakyr. They would control administration, justice, 
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and policing in their sections. The reforms would allow laws, orders and government news to 
be announced in each section in the local languages. The local languages would have the right 
to be used in contact with the administration, if the general-inspector found this to be 
possible.350  
 
The general inspectors, one from the Netherlands and another from Norway, initialled their 
contracts with Talat Pasha, the Ottoman Interior Minister, on 23 May 1914.351 However, with 
the outbreak of the First World War, the Ottoman Empire officially annulled its decision on 
the issue on 31 December 1914.352 Thus, the last Russian attempt at occupation of Ottoman 
territories using Armenians via the Berlin Treaty failed. The reason was again the clash of 




Based on the academic conceptions on the formation of the Armenian people, the chapter has 
argued that the Armenian ‘historical homeland’ was in Eastern Anatolia. In the second half of 
the nineteenth century, the notion of the ‘Armenian homeland’, to include Erzurum, Van, 
Bitlis, Mamuret-ul-Aziz, Diyarbakyr and Sivas provinces of the Ottoman Empire, which were 
involved in the formation of the Armenian people, as well as parts of Adana and Halep 
provinces on the Mediterranean Sea, which were not connected with the formation of the 
Armenian people, was constructed by the Armenian nationalists with political aims to provide 
access to the sea. These primordialist conceptions, which claimed that the Armenian people 
was formed by the second century BC in Eastern Anatolia, revealed a gap in the explanation 
of the connection between the Armenians of Eastern Anatolia and Garabagh, since they did 
not include the latter in the area of formation of the Armenian people.   
 
Armenian nationalism was a diaspora nationalism and contained all of Hroch’s features of 
nationalist movements in Central and Eastern European countries. However, it did not pass 
through all three phases in chronological order, and the phases were not strictly separated, 
which means that his theory is only partly applicable to the Armenian case. But the typology 
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of nationalist movements in Europe offered by Hroch proved itself in the Armenian case, 
since national movement indeed acquired a mass character under the old regime, which 
produced armed insurrections.  
 
The complaints of the Ottoman Armenians about legal, social and economic discrimination 
were common for the entire population of the Empire, including Muslims and the situation of 
the Armenians was better than that of the Muslims. The satisfaction of the cultural rights of 
the Armenians was the duty of the Armenian Istanbul Patriarch, who as the head of the 
Armenian millet enjoyed complete jurisdiction over religious, charitable and educational 
institutions of his flock, and even had his own court and prison. The change of the positive 
position of the Armenian nationalist leaders with regard to the Ottoman Government was 
related to the gradual decay of the Empire, accompanied by its defeats in the frequent wars, 
and to the success of the nationalist movements of the Balkan Christians and the increase in 
Armenian national and political awareness. These factors were instrumental in the increase of 
the self-confidence of the Armenian nationalists with regard to controlling the destiny of their 
people and constructing a national homeland in Eastern Anatolia, where they constituted a 
dispersed minority, with Great Power help. The chance sought by the Armenian nationalist 
leaders was provided by the Russian success in the 1877-1878 Ottoman-Russian war and the 
inclusion of an article on the Armenians in the Berlin Treaty of 1878.  
 
The encouragement of Armenian nationalist ideas started with Russia, which wanted to use 
the disturbances in Eastern Anatolia as a pretext for intervention in Ottoman territories. After 
the signing of the Berlin Treaty in 1878 until the early 1880s, when the Ottoman Sultan 
refused to satisfy the British demands on the Nile project, Britain sided with the Ottoman 
Government and was interested in keeping Russia away from the region, which was of 
strategic importance on its way to British India. However, after the deterioration of Ottoman-
British relations, Britain started encouraging Armenian nationalists both in the Ottoman and 
Russian Empires: to make the Ottoman Sultan dependent on Britain and to keep Russia busy 
with separatism within its own borders. After being sure that Russia was not interested for the 




The Ottoman Sultan Abdulhamid II sought to prevent the further dismemberment of his 
Empire for several decades and deprive the powers-signatories of Berlin Treaty of the active 
political involvement in Eastern Anatolia, making use of the clash of Great Power interests 
and the ‘Islamism’ ideology, with the help of which he tried to achieve internal unity among 
Ottoman Muslims. The successful manoeuvres of the Ottoman Sultan were instrumental in 
the lack of interest of the Great Powers in the Armenian project, which in turn gave rise to the 
Armenian nationalist belief in the achievement of their cause through revolutionary methods, 
including terror. The methods, although attracting the temporary attention of Great Powers, 
did not give the expected result.  
 
The revolutionary movement of the Committee of Union and Progress restored the Ottoman 
Constitution in 1908 and paved the way for the working relationship between the CUP and 
Dashnaktsutiun, which did not last long because the CUP sought political centralisation, and 
Dashnaktsutiun political decentralisation. The failure of this relationship was connected with 
the renewed Russian interest in the Armenian question after the Balkan War of 1912. The 
latter resulted in the new project in 1913, which suggested the creation of one Armenian 
province out of six Eastern Anatolian provinces, and was replaced with a new project on the 
interference of Germany. The last project envisaged the establishment of two sectors in 
Eastern Anatolia: one made from three provinces and another from four provinces, with two 
foreign general inspectors for each. The project failed because of the outbreak of the First 
World War. Thus, the ‘Armenian homeland’ project, which started with the Russian success 
in the 1877-1878 Ottoman-Russian war, could not be realised until the First World War 
because of the Armenian minority distribution over the claimed area and the absence of Great 











Chapter 4: Construction of the Ethnic Armenian Identity 
 
The chapter explores the process of the construction of the ethnic Armenian identity as one of 
the most important factors in the reconstruction of the notion of the ‘Armenian homeland’. 
The examination of the issue is especially important for understanding the factors 
instrumental in the construction of the Armenian Republic in the South Caucasus and its 
territorial claims. It necessitates discussion of the rewriting of the Armenian history, the 
settlement of the Armenians in the South Caucasus and the Armenianisation of the 
monophysite Albanians living between the Kur and Araz Rivers. The chapter also compares 
the Armenian case with the Azerbaijani and Georgian ones and applies existing theories to 
these cases.   
 
4.1 Reconstruction of the notion of the ‘Armenian homeland’  
 
For the Armenian political nationalist movement, the notion of the ‘Armenian homeland’ did 
not have the same meaning in the twentieth century as it had in the nineteenth century. This 
change is evident when comparing programmes of the main Armenian political party 
Dashnaktsutiun from 1892 and 1907. In the first programme, attention was directed at so-
called Turkish Armenia, whilst its second programme also included the South Caucasus. 
Apart from local Armenian autonomy within an Ottoman federation, the second programme 
also aimed at the creation of a South Caucasian democratic republic within a Russian 
Federation. The republic was to be divided into ethnic autonomous cantons.353  
 
The inclusion of the South Caucasus in the Dashnaktsutiun programme was a clear 
modification to the Armenian political agenda, the realisation of which was projected in the 
region through the construction of autonomous Armenian cantons. This in itself was a sign of 
reconstruction of the notion of the ‘Armenian homeland’, expanding its area from Eastern 
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Anatolia to the juncture of the Kur and Araz Rivers in the South Caucasus. The appearance of 
the South Caucasus in this programme in the early twentieth century was the result of a long 
process which had started in the late eighteenth century.  
 
Emergence of modern ‘national’ history of Armenians   
 
The basis of the reconstruction of the notion of the ‘Armenian homeland’ with the 
construction of the Armenian national territory from the Mediterranean to the juncture of the 
Kur and Araz Rivers was laid down in the Armenian history written by Mik’ayel 
Ch’amch’yants’ (1738-1823), an Armenian Catholic monk from a Mekhitarist congregation. 
Ch’amch’yants’ was the author of the first work on the history of Armenians from ancient 
times to the eighteenth century, published in three volumes in 1784-1786 and in an abridged 
version in 1811, the latter being translated into English and Turkish (in Armenian 
characters).354  
 
In the words of Johannes Avdall, author of the preface to the English translation of 
Ch’amch’yants’s work in 1827 in Calcutta, the aim of the translation was to ‘excite in the 
breasts of Christians of every denomination a feeling of sympathy for the fate of my 
oppressed country, and rouse the dormant embers of patriotism in the bosoms of my 
expatriated countrymen to exert all their power for the regeneration of Armenia […] once a 
great and happy land’.355 The ‘greatness’ of Armenia was demonstrated with the ‘Map of 
Armenia’, placed at the very beginning of the book, the area of which extended from the 
Mediterranean to the juncture of the Kur and Araz Rivers in the South Caucasus (see Map 4).  
 
The methodological approach of Ch’amch’yants’ was typical for his period. As noted by 
Gevork Bardakjian, he ‘made no distinction between primary and secondary sources’, ‘used 
the accounts of later historians to reconstruct the history of earlier periods’, and ‘did not 
question the authenticity of some of his sources, and frequently accepted sheer legends as 
                                                 
354 Bardakjian K, The Mekhitarist Contributions to Armenian Culture and Scholarship. Notes to accompany an 
exhibit of Armenian printed books in the Widener Library displayed on the 300 th anniversary of Mekhitar of 
Sebastia, 1676-1749, Boston: Middle Eastern Department, Harvard College Library, p 17 
355 Ch’amch’yants’ M, History of Armenia: From B.C. 2247 to the Year of Christ 1780 or 1229 of the Armenian 
Era (translated from the original Armenian text by Johannes Avdall), Volume II, Calcutta: Bishop’s College 
Press, 1827, p LXI 
89 
solid facts’.356 Nevertheless, it was the most popular Armenian history for almost a century, 
enhancing ‘national consciousness’ and stirring a ‘desperately needed sense of unity’ among 
Armenians.357 
 
Similar methodological deficiencies were evident in the geographical source Ch’amch’yants’ 
used for his history. This source, which was first published in 1683 in Armenian in 
Marseilles, France, was first translated into Latin in 1736 by the Whiston brothers, translators 
of the ‘History’ by Moisey Khorenski, ‘father’ of Armenian history. The translation, together 
with its Armenian text, was placed at the end of the translation of the ‘History’ as the ‘Mosis 
Chorenensis Geographia’. The date of this ‘geographical’ source was debated between the 
fifth and the tenth centuries.358 According to the British scholar on ancient Armenian studies, 
Robert Thomson, the original of this work ‘remains a matter of dispute’, as ‘not only are there 
numerous interpolations in the printed editions, absent from the earliest manuscripts (which in 
turn only date from the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries), the picture is further complicated 
by the existence of two recensions, a longer and shorter (LR and SR). Both of these 
recensions share corrupted readings.’359  
 
According to this geography, ancient Armenia, consisting of ‘Minor’ or ‘Lesser’ and ‘Major’ 
or ‘Greater’ Armenia, covered an area from the Mediterranean to the juncture of the Kur and 
Araz Rivers in the South Caucasus, as in Ch’amch’yants’s map360 (see Map 4). One very 
important point on Ch’amch’yants’s map is related to the localisation of ‘Ararat’ province, 
which sheds light on the issue of the ‘expansion’ of Armenia into the South Caucasus. 
‘Ararat’ province on this map was localised on both banks of the Araz River. When the 
Armenian history of Ch’amch’yants’ was published in 1784-1786, this area covered parts of 
the territories of the Ottoman Empire in Eastern Anatolia and Iravan (Erevan) khanate, which 
was de facto independent but de jure part of Persia (compare Maps 4 and 6).   
                                                 
356 Bardakjian K, loc cit. 
357 Ibid. 
358 Armyanskaya geografiya VII veka po R.Kh. (pripisyvavshayasya Moiseyu Khorenskomu) (perevod s 
drevnearmyanskogo i kommentarii K.P.Patkanova), Saint Petersburg: Tipografiya Imperatorskoy Akademii 
Nauk, 1877, pp III-VI  
359 Khorenats’i M, History of the Armenians (translation and commentary on the literary sources by Robert 
Thomson), Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978, p 52 
360 Istoriya Armenii Moiseya Khorenskago (noviy perevod  N.O.Emina s primechaniyami i prilozheniyami), 
Moscow: Tipografiya V.A.Gattsuk’’, 1893, pp 290-294; Armyanskaya geografiya VII veka po R.Kh. 
(pripisyvavshayasya Moiseyu Khorenskomu) (perevod s drevnearmyanskogo i kommentarii K.P.Patkanova),              
pp 33-35, 42-54 
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In order to address this question, it is first necessary to study the issue of the ‘localisation’ of 
the ‘Ararat’ Mountains. According to Lloyd Bailey, scholar of the Old Testament, at least 
eight landing places were pinpointed for Noah’s ark on the ‘Ararat’ Mountains by ancient 
traditions.361 Among them, ‘the one associated with Ağri Daği [Turkish and Azerbaijani name 
for the modern ‘Ararat’ Mountains in the border of Eastern Anatolia and the South Caucasus, 
which the Armenians call Masis – I.K.] seems to be very late – likely the latest, since it dates 
to the eleventh/twelfth centuries C.E. at the earliest’.362 Bailey noted that ‘there is no evidence 
in Armenian literature that it was thought to be the ark’s landing place prior to the 11th-12th 
centuries’.363  
 
Mardiros Ananikian, in his work on Armenian mythology, wrote that the name Masis which 
the Armenians use for the mountains on the border of Eastern Anatolia and the South 
Caucasus ‘seems to have been unknown to the old Urartians. It may be an Armenian 
importation, if not a later Northern echo of the Massios, which was in Assyrian times the 
name of the great mountain in the plain of Diyarbekir. According to Nicholas of Damascus 
(see Josephus, Ant. I.iii, 6) this mountain was known also by the name of Baris.’364 According 
to the Armenian historian, Kevork Aslan, there were Massios Mountains on the north of 
Nisibis,365 seemingly the place mentioned by Ananikian on the border of modern Turkey and 
Syria. 
 
It can be suggested that Masis, Massios, Baris, Gordian (Qardu)366 and Korduk367 were 
different ancient names given to the mountains in the border area of modern Turkey, Syria 
                                                 
361 Bailey L, ‘Wood from ‘‘Mount Ararat’’: Noah’s Ark?’, The Biblical Archaeologist, vol 40, no 4, 1977,              
pp 137-138 
362 Bailey L, Noah: The Person and the Story in History and Tradition, Columbia: University of South Carolina, 
1989, p 81 
363 Bailey L, ‘Wood from ‘‘Mount Ararat’’: Noah’s Ark?’, p 138 
364 Ananikian M, Armenian Mythology: Stories of Armenian Gods and Goddesses, Heroes and Heroines, Hells 
and Heavens, Folklore and Fairy Tales, Los Angeles: Indo-European Publisher, 2010, p 67 
365 Aslan K, Armenia and the Armenians: From the Earliest Times until the Great War (1914) (translated from 
the French by Pierre Crabites), New York: The Macmillan Company, 1920, p 2  
366 Note: The German scholar, Johann Hübschmann, in 1901 also argued that ‘the Armenian literature of the fifth 
through the tenth centuries knows nothing of Masis as the mountain of the ark’ and that ‘the older Armenian 
writers all understood the Gordian (Qardu) Mountains [now Hakkari Mountains on the border between Turkey 
and Iraq – I.K.] to be the ark’s landing place’ (Cited in Bailey L, Noah: The Person and the Story in History and 
Tradition, pp 194, 76). 
367 Note: Robert Thomson in 1976 also noted that Armenian writers as late as the twelfth century were unaware 
of the precise mountain on which Noah’s ark had come to rest, although they considered it to have been in the 
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and Iraq. The area was populated by different peoples of Semitic and Iranian origins. One 
could also argue that the Armenians’ transfer of the Assyrian Massios further north, to name 
the mountains on the border of Eastern Anatolia and the South Caucasus as Masis dates back 
to the period after the 11th-12th centuries. This in turn suggests that the localisation of the 
‘Ararat’ province on both banks of the Araz River by Ch’amch’yants’ on his map of ‘ancient 
Armenia’ could have been related to the later ‘transfer’ of the ‘Ararat’ Mountains of the Bible 
further north after the 11th-12th centuries and the establishment of the Echmiadzin 
Catholicosate in 1441 closer to these mountains, in the area to the north of the Araz River in 
the South Caucasus by the Armenian churchmen headed by Tomas Metsopetsi from Van.368 
The ‘localisation’ of ‘Vagarshabad’ (see Map 4), the residence of the first Armenian 
Catholicos of the fourth century, in the area where the Echmiadzin Catholicosate was 
established in the fifteenth century could have been guided by political and economic 
intentions to turn Echmiadzin into the sacred place for all Armenians and guarantee its 
supremacy over other Armenian Catholicosates.369  
 
The map of ancient Armenia by Ch’amch’yants’ also inspired Armenian nationalists to search 
for ‘Armavir’, as a ‘capital’ of ancient ‘Armenia’, in the area closer to Echmiadzin (see Map 
4). According to the Russian scholar, Mikhail Nikol’skiy, the Blur hills, which contained the 
ruins of ancient constructions located twenty-five versts (about 27 kilometres or 16.5 miles) 
from Echmiadzin, and Tapadibi village on the foothills of Blur were regarded by Armenians 
as ‘Armavir, ancient mythic capital of Armenia, founded, according to Moisey Khorenski, by 
                                                                                                                                                        
Korduk Mountains (Agathangelos: History of the Armenians (translation and commentary by R.W.Thomson), 
Albany: State University of New York Press, 1976, note 1, p 454). 
368 Note: For the account of the establishment of the Echmiadzin Catholicosate see Metsopetsi T, Pamyatnaya 
zapis’ (perevod s drevnearmyanskogo, predislovie i kommentarii K.S.Ter-Davtian), Erevan: Nairi, 2007 
369 Note: For the conflicting explanations of the reasons behind the aim of some Armenian clerics to establish a 
new Catholicosate in the South Caucasus see Metsopetsi T, op cit., pp 17-24; Erevantsi S, Dzhambr. 
Pamyatnaya kniga, zertsalo i sbornik vsekh obstoyatel’stv Svyatogo prestola Echmiadzina i okrestnykh 
monastyrey (perevod s drevnearmyanskogo S.Malkhasiantsa pod redaktsiey i s predisloviem P.Arutyuniana),             
p 6; Ormanian M, The Church of Armenia: Her History, Doctrine, Rule, Discipline, Liturgy, Literature, and 
Existing Condition (translated from the French edition by Gregory Marcar Gregory and edited by Terenig 
Poladian), second revised edition, London: Mowbray, 1955, pp 56-59; Kouymjian D, ‘Armenia from the Fall of 
the Cilician Kingdom (1375) to the Forced Emigration under Shah Abbas (1604)’ in Richard Hovannisian (ed.), 
The Armenian People from Ancient to Modern Times, Volume II, New York: St.Martin Press, 2004, pp 35-40; 
Grigorian G, Ocherki istorii Syunika (IX-XV vv.), Erevan: Izdatel’stvo Akademii Nauk Armyanskoy SSR, 1990, 
pp 276-285; Mamedova (Mammadova) F, Kavkazskaya Albaniya i albany, Baku: Tsentr Issledovaniy 
Kavkazskoy Albanii, 2005, pp 560-562, 650-652  
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Armais, the grandson of Hayk in 2000 BC and destroyed in the first century BC.’370 In 1880, 
he continued, the Moscow Preparatory Committee of the Fifth Archaeological Congress, to be 
held in 1881, decided to organise excavations at the supposed site of Armavir, which were 
realised in October 1881 by Earls Aleksey Uvarov and Praskov’ya Uvarova. Based on the 
archaeological investigations in Blur and the surrounding area and the neighbouring hills, as 
well as in the graves, it was concluded that the constructions and the graves in the area were 
not later than the third century AD and could not be connected with the Armenian Armavir, if 
it ever existed.371 
 
Nikol’skiy noted that neither Archbishop Mesrop Sumbatiants372 nor Professor Kerope 
Patkanov from Saint Petersburg University were satisfied with the outcome of the excavations 
and insisted on their continuation.373 He explained their insistence by the ‘erroneous opinion 
on the character and origins of the cuneiforms and understandable interest of Armenian 
scholars in finding the ancient capital of Armenia.’ In the opinion of Nikol’skiy, on another 
bank of the Araz River, in the territory of present-day Turkey, there was indeed a residence of 
Van satraps, ‘the memories of which created the legend about the Armenian capital which 
existed in this area in several millennia BC’.374 As for the ‘understandable interest of 
Armenian scholars’ mentioned by Nikol’skiy, this can be explained by the Armenian 
nationalist movement and its nation-building aims. 
 
Analysis of official nineteenth century Russian maps revealed that none contained the names 
‘Armavir’ or ‘Artashat’, another ‘capital’ city related to ancient Armenian history, which was 
                                                 
370 Nikol’skiy M (ed.), Drevnosti Vostochniya. Trudy Vostochnoy Kommissii Imperatorskago Moskovskago  
Arkheologicheskago Obshchestva, tom I, vyp 1, Moscow, 1889, p 381 
371 Note: Nikol’skiy wrote that ‘both Blur and the surrounding area and the neighbouring hills, as well as the 
graves on the east of this hill were dug up in the most careful manner, and in most places down to the 
foundations. The excavations, which lasted seven days, gave a negative result. According to Earl [Uvarov]’s 
careful investigation, the constructions and artefacts of the graves go back no earlier than the third century AD 
and subsequently have nothing to do with a suggested ancient town, like Armavir. Apparently, the cuneiforms 
found up until, during and after the excavations served only as building materials for later constructions and had 
been brought from another place, possibly from somewhere closer to Blur. As it appeared later, the cuneiform 
inscriptions are not of Midian origin, as suggested by Kossovich, but from Van, and their language has nothing 
to do with Armenian, so they cannot have any connection with the Armenian Armavir, if it indeed existed.’ 
(Ibid.) 
372 Note: Archbishop Mesrop Sumbatiants in the early 1860s, after reading in the works of the Catholic 
Mekhitarists that there were cuneiform inscriptions in the places where Armenians lived, started collecting them, 
suggesting that they were closely related to the ancient history of Armenia (Ibid., p 378). 
373 Ibid., pp 381-382 
374 Ibid., p 382 
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localised by Ch’amch’yants’ closer to ‘Armavir’ (see Map 4). Only on late nineteenth century 
Russian maps can one see the name ‘Vagarshabad’ to the east of Echmiadzin, but no 
‘Armavir’ or ‘Artashat’. This suggests that ‘Vagarshabad’ found its way onto official maps 
only after the Armenian nationalist movement,375 although still in 1958 Varazdat Arutyunian 
wrote that the ‘exact location of the citadel and approximate size of the area of ancient 
Vagarshabad were not yet defined, but it is suggested that it occupied nearly the identical 
plain as that on which Echmiadzin is located now’.376 This means that the localisation of 
Vagarshabad was based on ‘suggestions’, which, as it appears from Arutyunian’s paper, relied 
on Armenian historical narratives.377  
 
Here it should be noted that it was in 1888, that the Russian historian Nikolay Marr, of mixed 
Scottish-Georgian origins, was offered a specialisation in Armenian studies by the above-
mentioned Kerope Patkanov, Professor and Chair of Armenian Studies at Saint Petersburg 
University. According to Nadezhda Platonova, this almost certainly implied that Marr would 
inherit the Chair. The Armenian diaspora of Saint Petersburg was dissatisfied with this 
decision and a group of wealthy Petersburg Armenians made a special visit to the Ministry of 
Education with the request ‘“not to invite a non-Armenian to the Armenian Chair”’.378 As it 
appears from the study of Vasiliy Bartol’d, a Russian scholar of Oriental studies, until Marr, 
the agenda of Armenian research in Russia was defined by Armenian scholars.379 
 
In 1892, Marr initiated archaeological excavations in Ani. Being convinced that his Armenian 
studies would be an ‘excellent tool’ to promote ‘Russia’s unity as a multi-ethnic community’, 
and also eliminating the concerns of the Russian administration in the Caucasus on the 
possible contribution of his research to the rise of separatism among the Armenians, in 1904 
                                                 
375 Note: Until then, it was called Echmiadzin. Turks and Azerbaijanis explain the word through ‘Uchmuazzin’. 
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Marr succeeded in creating a museum of artefacts found during the archaeological 
excavations in Ani.380 Marr’s conclusions on Ani after the excavations in its ruins, which 
made a scholarly contribution to the study of the history of 10th-11th century ‘Armenia’,381 
faced ‘ardent attacks’ from Armenian nationalists who regarded his views on the mixed 
Armenian-Muslim nature of the culture of Ani and its economic prosperity under Muslim rule 
after the fall of the Armenian Bagratid dynasty as an attempt to ‘take Ani from the Armenians 
and give it to the Russians’.382 Marr criticised the subjection of the academic study of the 
Caucasus to nationalist agendas by Armenian scholars and accused his Armenian colleagues 
of ‘being no different in their views from “rabid nationalists”’ and of ‘deliberately 
downplaying the impact of Islam on the Armenian culture and history’, since it did not 
correspond to the nationalistic views on the history of culture held by the Armenian 
intelligentsia. He also criticised the ‘biased European scholars’ who, in his opinion, performed 
a ‘“great sin” for being “completely indifferent to the historical fate of peoples of Caucasus 
without their own literacy [in the vernacular], the Caucasus’ indigenous inhabitants”’.383  
 
In contrast to their opposition to Uvarov’s and Marr’s conclusions on Armavir and Ani 
respectively, Armenian nationalist activists doubted the views of Raffi, ideological father of 
the Armenian nationalist movement, on the history of Garabagh, which he expressed after his 
visit to the region in 1881. Nationalist friends of Raffi regarded his stories about the 
‘Armenian counties’ of Garabagh as a ‘figment of the imagination’.384 Referring to Raffi, in 
1991 the historian, Bagrat Ulubabian, in his preface to the Russian translation of Raffi’s work, 
noted that until Raffi ‘the ancient history and historical geography of Artsakh-Garabagh had 
not been studied by anyone intentionally’ and that ‘until him, scholars, and not only scholars, 
stated with an inexplicable insistence – and would maybe continue to state for a rather long 
time – that Armenian princedoms had ultimately ceased to exist as far back as the Tartar-
Mongol rule [by ‘Armenian princedoms’ meaning the above-mentioned Cilician Kingdom on 
the Mediterranean – I.K.].’385 The doubts of the Armenian nationalists were not only 
connected with the history of Garabagh presented by Raffi, but also with the territory in 
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which the first Armenian Republic was established in 1918, which, as mentioned earlier, 
Ottoman Armenian nationalists headed by Bogos Nubar Pasha did not consider to be the 
‘historical lands of Armenia’.386  
 
Interestingly enough, Avetis Aharonian, Head of the Delegation of the Republic of Armenia 
at the Paris Peace Conference, in his statement at the meeting of the Council of Ten on 26 
February 1919, attended also by Nubar Pasha, localised ‘nearly all capitals of the various 
dynasties of Great Armenia’ ‘within the territory of the Armenian Republic’ in the South 
Caucasus.387 Another interesting point is that the list, which contained the names of Armavir, 
Vagarshabad, Dvin, Artashat, Ervandakert, Ervandashat and Ani,388 to be discussed in 
Chapter 9, did not include any place name localised in either Nakhchyvan or Garabagh. 
Seemingly the border area of Eastern Anatolia and the South Caucasus was of more 
‘historical’ importance to the Armenian nationalist leaders.  
 
One more interesting point is that the archaeological expeditions of the Institute of 
Archaeology of the Academy of Sciences of the Armenian SSR in and after the 1960s in 
‘Armavir’, as well as ‘Artashat’, which, in the words of Lori Khatchadourian, remained 
‘largely untouched by scientific research’ in the nineteenth century,389 localised both places in 
the territory of Soviet Armenia, around its border with Turkey.390 Babken Arakelian, who led 
archaeological investigations in ‘Armavir’ in 1962, disagreed with Uvarov, writing that the 
latter misinterpreted the archaeological materials, as well as the remnants of the walls of the 
town citadel, concluding that these were not the ruins of ‘ancient Armavir, but those of some 
castle of the fourth century AD’.391 Despite his disagreement with Uvarov, Arakelian’s paper 
on ‘some results of archaeological study of ancient Armavir’ could not convince that the place 
under investigation was indeed suggested Armavir, ‘capital’ of ancient ‘Armenian kingdom’. 
The major findings in the archaeological area of 60 ha (about 0.6 square kilometres or 0.2 
square miles) such as the remnants of the defence system of the town citadel of 2 ha (about 
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0.02 square kilometres or 0.008 square miles), the foundations of a few buildings and artefacts 
from the 8th-1st centuries BC cited by Arakelian are not suggestive of a capital city of a 
kingdom, but of some small provincial centre or settlement.392 Based on the cuneiform 
inscription discovered by the Armenian Archbishop Sumbatiants in 1869, which contained a 
text about the Urartian town of Argishtikhinili, founded in the eighth century BC, Arakelian 
argued that the most ancient period of ‘Armavir’ was connected with Argishtikhinili. The 
archaeologist did not explain the connection between these two names in terms of writing, 
pronunciation and historical links.393  
 
Khatchadourian wrote that excavations at ‘Armavir’ and ‘Artashat’ did not produce clear 
evidence for occupation in the 6th-5th centuries BC, and the ‘archaeological record did not 
correspond to historical assertions of developed statehood. Evidence for bureaucracy and 
administration were (and still are) lacking for these centuries.’394 However, this did not 
prevent the localisation of these places by Soviet Armenian archaeologists where 
Ch’amch’yants’ localised them on his map. This suggests that Ch’amch’yants’s map of 
ancient Armenia played a crucial role in the localisation of these names and even pre-defined 
the outcome of the archaeological investigations in Soviet Armenia. 
 
Thus, the ‘localisation’ of the ‘Ararat’ Mountains of Bible in the border of Eastern Anatolia 
and the South Caucasus after the 11th-12th centuries, the establishment of the Echmiadzin 
Catholicosate in the closer area of the territory of the South Caucasus in 1441 and the 
‘localisation’ of Vagarshabad closer to Echmiadzin paved the way for the reconstruction of 
Armenian history by Ch’amch’yants’. These factors were instrumental in his construction of 
an Armenian national territory from the Mediterranean to Garabagh with ‘Ararat’ Mountains 
and province in the centre of this vast area which was later to be claimed by Armenian 
nationalist leaders as the ‘historical homeland’ of the Armenians from time immemorial. 
 
The case of Ch’amch’yants’ can be studied with the approach of Anthony Smith regarding 
how nationalist activists politicise cultural heritage through the cultivation of its poetic spaces 
and the commemoration of its golden ages. The cultivation of poetic spaces in the Armenian 
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case is related to the ‘Ararat’ Mountains, which Armenians considered the ‘epicentre of their 
country’ and ‘a symbol of their national aspirations’,395 from where together with relocated 
Vagarshabad ‘the light of ethnic selection shone forth to consecrate the whole land’,396 both in 
Eastern Anatolia and the South Caucasus. As for commemoration of golden ages, this was 
best illustrated with the references of Ch’amch’yants’ and Armenian nationalists to Armenia 
as a ‘once great and happy land’ from the Mediterranean to Garabagh and the first country in 
the world to adopt Christianity.397 
 
The Armenian history of Ch’amch’yants’ was also used by the Russian Tsar to refer to the 
‘Ararat’ Mountains and ancient Armenia in his declaration of 21 March 1828 on the 
conclusion of the Turkmanchay Treaty between Russia and Persia. One of the predecessors of 
this reference was the Russian Imperial map titled ‘Map of the Caucasian lands with the part 
of Greater Armenia’ in 1823 before the second war with Persia in 1826-1828, on which the 
word ‘Armenia’ was placed on the area of Iravan (Erevan) and Nakhchyvan khanates. This 
map and the references to the ‘Ararat’ Mountains and ancient Armenia provided a kind of 
historical justification for the occupation of these khanates by the ‘protector of Christians’, the 
Russian Empire. Ch’amch’yants’s geography also offered historical justifications for the 
establishment of an Armenian oblast in 1828, where the number of Armenians was more than 
three or five times less than that of Muslims, which is discussed in the next sub-section.   
 
These historical justifications, used by the Russian Empire for the occupation of two Muslim 
khanates and their subsequent reorganisation into an Armenian oblast on the one hand, and 
used by Armenian nationalist intellectuals and politicians later in the reconstruction of the 
notion of the ‘Armenian homeland’ on the other, confirm the opinion of Benedict Anderson 
on the role of maps in the construction of historical narratives of the realm by colonial states 
and their adoption and adaptation by the nation-states, which in the twentieth century became 
the colonial states’ legatees.398 
 
                                                 
395 Nalbandian L, The Armenian Revolutionary Movement: The Development of Armenian Political Parties 
through the Nineteenth Century, p 2 
396 Smith A, National identity, p 127 
397 Panossian R, The Armenians: From Kings and Priests to Merchants and Commissars, note 77, p 106 
398 Anderson B, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, London: Verso, 
1983, pp 174-175 
98 
By applying Miroslav Hroch’s typology, one could argue that Ch’amch’yants’, himself a 
Catholic convert from monophysite confession, was the founder of Phase A, inquiring into 
and disseminating an ‘Armenian awareness’ of ‘their’ history, discovering his ‘ethnic group’ 
and thus laying the basis for the subsequent construction of a new Armenian identity.399  
Ch’amch’yants’s work also fits with Smith’s argument that nationalists were interested, not in 
enquiring into ‘their’ past for its own sake, but in the reappropriation of a mythology of the 
territorialised past of ‘their people’: where history was deficient for the pursuit for their aims, 
it would have to be reconstructed and even invented.400 Smith explains the nationalists’ appeal 
to history by the fact that they sought their ‘“homeland”, that is an historic territory which 
their people can feel is theirs by virtue of a convincing claim of possession and efflorescence 
sometime in the past’.401  
 
The emergence of ‘Greater Armenia’ towards the end of the eighteenth century in 
Ch’amch’yants’s history was not accidental. It relied on several factors: the existence of 
Caucasian Albanians in the South Caucasus, who were monophysites like the Armenians; the 
aspirations of the Armenian Echmiadzin Catholicosate to subordinate the Albanian 
Catholicosate; and the expansionist plans of Russia as a great Christian power towards the 
South Caucasus and then towards the Mediterranean. The realisation of Ch’amch’yants’s 
history by Armenian nationalists depended on the success of the last two factors, discussed in 
the next sub-sections.        
 
Settlement of Armenians in the South Caucasus as a factor in the reconstruction of the 
notion of the ‘Armenian homeland’  
 
After the occupation of the South Caucasus from the late 18th-early 19th centuries, one of the 
aims of Russia was to create a Christian buffer zone in its borders with the Muslim Ottoman 
Empire and Persia, which would separate the Muslims of the South Caucasus from their co-
religionists in these countries. The settlement of the loyal Christian population among the 
                                                 
399 Hroch M, ‘From National Movement to the Fully-Formed Nation: The Nation-Building Process in Europe’ in 
Eley and Suny (ed.), Becoming National: A Reader, p 63 
400 Smith A, National identity, p 127 
401 Smith A, Myths and Memories of the Nation, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, p 219 
99 
Muslims of the occupied territories would in turn disrupt their compact habitation in the 
region and create barriers for their future unity – geographical or political.  
 
Within the framework of the annexation of Georgia to the Russian Empire, Emperor Paul, in 
his rescript dated 23 January 1801 to General-Lieutenant Carl Knorring, wrote about the 
reasonability of attracting Armenians to the Russian borders, which he considered one of the 
most reliable means of ‘establishing the numerical superiority of Christians’.402 To that end, 
he assented to ‘patronise Araratian Patriarchal monastery of Echmiadzin and keep friendly 
relations with the head of this church’.403  
 
Cossacks were also considered by the Russian authorities as suitable candidates as loyal 
Christians. In this regard, Ivan Enikolopov, using Georgian archival documents, wrote that the 
border with Persia, before the idea of the transfer of Armenians, had been planned to be 
settled with 80,000 Cossacks.404 Vardan Parsamian mentioned that, in his report of 5 January 
1829, General Ivan Paskevich proposed to transfer 20,000 Cossack families to the Russian 
bank of the Araz River, the basin of the Sevan Lake and the border with the Ottomans, but 
this idea could not be realised, so it was decided to replace them with the loyal Armenian 
population. Although the historian noted that Nerses Ashtaraketsi, head of the Armenian 
diocese of Georgia and Imeretia, was one of the main organisers, and Lazar Lazarev, a 
Russian Colonel of Armenian origin, was the head of the settlement of Armenians,405 
Alexander Griboedov, the Russian Ambassador to Persia during the settlement of Armenians 
from Persia, in his report to the Tsar, wrote that Lazarev considered himself to be the main 
initiator of this emigration.406 
 
The Armenian clergy, headed by Archbishop Ashtaraketsi during the war with Persia in 1826-
1828, tried to prove his diligence with all his powers, appealing to the Armenian people, 
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M.Martirosiantsa, 1901, p СХVII 
403 Ibid. 
404 Enikolopov I, Griboedov i Vostok (vtoroe pererabotannoe izdanie), Erevan: Izdatel’stvo ‘Ayastan’, 1974,                
p 119 
405Parsamian V, Istoriya armyanskogo naroda (1801-1900 gg.). Kniga pervaya, Erevan: Izdatel’stvo ‘Hayastan’, 
1972, pp 65, 49-50 
406 Griboedov A, Sochineniya v dvukh tomakh, tom 2, Moscow: Izdatel’stvo ‘Pravda’, 1971, p 339 
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providing necessary information on the enemy, etc.407 The ‘friendly relations’ of the Russian 
Government with the Armenian clergy brought about the realisation of the idea of the 
settlement of Armenians, which had found its final solution in the Treaty of Turkmanchay of 
10 February 1828 between Russia and Persia. On the basis of Article XV, General Paskevich 
ordered the settlement of Armenians, especially in the former Iravan (Erevan) and 
Nakhchyvan khanates408 (see Map 6), which were reorganised into the Erevan and 
Nakhchyvan provinces of the Armenian oblast, established in 1828 (see Map 7) after the 
Russian occupation, and partly in Garabagh.409 
 
According to the Russian official, Ivan Shopen, Head of the Department for Revenues and 
Government Properties of the Armenian oblast, after the conclusion of the Turkmanchay 
Treaty, most of the districts of Erevan and Nakhchyvan provinces (see Map 7) were left 
without inhabitants, who hid during the war either in the neighbouring Ottoman provinces or 
in the mountains. In 1828, when the Armenians from Persia obtained permission to settle in 
the territories occupied by Russia to the north of the Araz River, they seized empty villages 
occupying houses, lands, gardens, mills and other properties belonging to the local scattered 
population. After the conclusion of peace, from 1829, the scattered population started to 
return, and found their houses seized by Armenians. They had to ask the Armenians for small 
parts of the most unfavourable lands of their villages, where they built new houses. Others 
established new villages in the mountains. Thus, Shopen concluded, the best districts of the 
Armenian oblast were left to the Armenian settlers, who were given a six-year exemption 
from taxes and obligations.410  
 
                                                 
407 AKAK, tom 7, Tiflis: Tipografiya Glavnago Upravleniya Namestnika Kavkazskago, 1878, dok 436, p 486; 
Note: For his ‘service to Russia during the war and as a sign of special goodwill to all Armenian nation’, Russian 
Emperor Nicolas I with his rescript of 25 January 1828 awarded Archbishop Nerses Ashtaraketsi  the order of 
Saint Alexander Nevski (Imranli K,  op cit., p 40; the source cited by Imranli K: Ezov G, op cit., pp CXXIX – 
CXXX). 
408 Note: Iravan (Erevan) and Nakhchyvan khanates had emerged in the mid-eighteenth century and existed until 
1828, when they came under the rule of Russia. Although these khanates were de jure part of Persia, they were 
de facto independent, and were ruled by khans of Turkic origin and Shi’a confession of Islam, i.e. present-day 
Azerbaijanis. 
409 Enikolopov I, loc cit.  
410 Shopen I, Istoricheskiy pamyatnik sostoyaniya Armyanskoy Oblasti v epokhu eya prisoedineniya k Rossiyskoy 
Imperii, Saint Petersburg: Tipografiya Imperatorskoy Akademii Nauk, 1852, p 1217 
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Griboedov wrote that the Armenians settled mostly on the lands of Muslim landowners, the 
majority of whom were in camps.411 He tried to disseminate the suspicions of the Muslims 
with regard to the permanent occupation of their lands by the Armenians, who were allowed 
there for the first time.412  
 
According to Shopen, 35,560 Armenians from Persia and 21,666 Armenians from the 
Ottoman Empire, i.e. a total of 57,226 Armenians were settled in the newly established 
Armenian oblast after the Russian-Persian war of 1826-1828 and Russian-Ottoman war of 
1828-1829.413 The settlement of Armenians in the South Caucasus was not limited to the 
newly established Armenian oblast and the period after these wars. In 1911, Nikolay 
Shavrov, an official directly involved in Russian colonial policy, wrote that apart from 
more than 40,000 Armenians from Persia and 84,000 Ottoman Armenians who were 
officially settled in the South Caucasus from 1828 to 1830 by Russia and were placed ‘in 
the best state lands in the guberniyas of Elizavetpol414 and Erevan,415 where the number of 
Armenians was insignificant’, and in the Borchaly, Akhaltsikh and Akhalkalaki uezds of 
the Tiflis guberniya,416 ‘a great number of Armenians settled in the region unofficially, so 
                                                 
411 Griboedov A, op cit., p 340 
412 Ibid., p 341 
413 Shopen I, op cit., pp 637-638 
414 Note: Elizavetpol guberniya was established in 1868 and consisted of Gazakh, Nukha, Elizavetpol, Shusha, 
and Zangazur uezds. In 1873, the borders of these uezds were readjusted. Nukha uezd was divided into two: 
Nukha and Arash uezds, and on the basis of Elizavetpol, Shusha and Zangazur uezds, two more uezds were 
established: Jabrayil and Javanshir. Thus, Elizavetpol guberniya had eight uezds: Nukha, Arash, Gazakh, 
Elizavetpol, Javanshir, Shusha, Jabrayil and Zangazur (Mil’man A, op cit., pp 156-157). The territory of the 
Elizavetpol guberniya in 1911 almost corresponded to the combined territory of the Garabagh, Ganja and Shaki 
khanates and Gazakh and Shamshaddil sultanates (compare Maps 6 and 8), which were organised into Garabagh 
province, Elizavetpol okrug, Shaki province and Gazakh and Shamshaddil distances accordingly after the 
Russian occupation of these regions in the early nineteenth century.    
415 Note: Erevan guberniya was established in 1849 and consisted of five uezds: Erevan, Alexandropol, New 
Bayazid, Nakhchyvan and Ordubad. In 1873, it was divided into seven uezds: Alexandropol, Echmiadzin, 
Erevan, New Bayazid, Surmali, Sharur-Daralayaz and Nakhchyvan (Kavkazskiy kalendar’ na 1858, Tiflis: 
Tipografiya Kantselyarii Namestnika Kavkazskago, 1857, pp 23-24; Geografichesko-statisticheskiy slovar’ 
Rossiyskoy Imperii, tom 5, Saint Petersburg: Tipografiya ‘V.Bezobrazov i Kompaniya’, 1885, p 857). The 
territory of the Erevan guberniya in 1911 almost corresponded to the combined territory of Nakhchyvan and 
Iravan (Erevan) khanates, which were organised into Nakhchyvan and Erevan provinces of the Armenian oblast 
in 1828 (compare Maps 6, 7 and 8).   
416 Note: Tiflis guberniya was created in 1846 and consisted of Tiflis, Gori, Telavi, Signakh, Elizavetpol, Erevan, 
Nakhchyvan and Alexandropol uezds. When Erevan guberniya was established in 1849, Erevan, Nakhchyvan 
and Alexandropol uezds were excluded from the guberniya in favour of the new guberniya. In 1862, the Lori 
steppe, i.e. all northern parts of the former Pambak okrug, was included in Tiflis guberniya (Sbornik 
statisticheskikh svedeniy o Kavkaze, tom 1, otdel I, chast’ III, p 3; Geografichesko-statisticheskiy slovar’ 
Rossiyskoy Imperii, tom 5, p 857).  
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the total number of settlers considerably exceeded 200,000’.417 He went on to report that 
the Russian-Ottoman war of 1877-1878 brought about 50,000 Armenians and 40,000 
Greeks to the Kars oblast. Moreover, General Tergukasov brought 35,000 Ottoman 
Armenians to Surmali uezd of Erevan guberniya, after which a ‘continuous flow of 
Armenians from Asia Minor started’, both individuals and families. During the Armenian 
disturbances in the Ottoman Empire in 1893-1894, they ‘moved on an even larger scale’, 
and by 1897, the number of settled Armenians was about 90,000. From 1896 to 1908, he 
noted, Russia settled more than 300,000 Armenians in the South Caucasus. In general, he 
concluded, from 1828 to 1911 more than 1,000,000 Armenians were settled in the region 
by the Russian Government.418  
 
The next stage of the Armenian settlement in the South Caucasus was during the First 
World War. According to Istoriya armyanskogo naroda (History of the Armenian people), 
about 350,000 Armenians were settled in the South Caucasus in 1914-1916,419 whereas 
according to Avetis Aharonian, Head of the Delegation of the Republic of Armenia at the 
Paris Peace Conference, ‘within the territory of the Armenian Republic, there are at present 
from 400,000 to 500,000 Turkish Armenians who have escaped massacres by the Turks 
during the war’.420   
 
As seen from the above-mentioned official accounts on the settlement of Armenians, the 
process, launched officially in 1828 by Russia, continued in various stages in different 
periods up until the establishment of the Armenian Republic in 1918. These settlements can 
be characterised as results of the Russian policy of creating a Christian buffer zone at its 
borders with its Muslim neighbours, its wars with Persia and the Ottoman Empire, as well as 
voluntary settlements in the territory of Russia.    
 
The acquisition of lands is considered by Gellner to be the main problem for diaspora 
nationalism. This was the problem in the Jewish case, where it was necessary to create a ‘few 
                                                 
417 Shavrov N, Novaya ugroza russkomu delu v Zakavkaz’ye: predstoyashchaya rasprodazha Mugani 
inorodtsam, Saint Petersburg: Tipografiya Redaktsii periodicheskikh izdaniy Ministerstva Finansov, 1911, p 59 
418 Ibid., pp 59-60 
419 Istoriya armyanskogo naroda, Erevan: Izdatel’stvo Yerevanskogo Universiteta, 1980, p 268 
420 Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Paris Peace Conference, 1919. Volume IV,                  
p 151 
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surrogate peasants’ from urban Jews to effectively settle the land.421 According to Shopen, 
Armenian settlers from Persia were more inclined towards trade and craft than agriculture, 
whereas those from the Ottoman Empire were more inclined towards agriculture (arable 
farming) and cattle-breeding than craft and trade.422 Unlike the Jewish case, the Armenian 
case did not go ‘counter to the global trend’, as there was no need to create a ‘peasantry’, 
considered a very powerful claim to territory. The possession of Muslim lands by Armenian 
settlers meant that the main problem for diaspora nationalism started to be solved in the 
Armenian case in 1828 and was already not an issue by the early twentieth century, as this 
power had already existed through their settlement in the South Caucasus throughout the 19th-
early 20th centuries.  
 
Comparison of the statistics provided by Shopen for 1829-1832 and Kavkazskiy kalendar’ 
(Caucasian calendar), the Russian official source, for 1916 shows that the Armenian 
population in Erevan guberniya, the area of which, with about 23,195 square versts (about 
26,396 square kilometres or 10,192 square miles)423 corresponded almost to the area of the 
former Nakhchyvan and Iravan (Erevan) khanates, organised into the Armenian oblast in 
1828 with about 24,000 square versts (about 27,312 square kilometres or 10,545 square 
miles),424 significantly increased from 25,151425 local Armenians426 in 1828 to 669,871 in 
                                                 
421 Gellner E, Nations and Nationalism (introduction by John Breuilly – 2nd ed.), Oxford: Blackwell, 2006, p 103 
422 Shopen I, op cit., p 708 
423 Kavkazskiy kalendar’ na 1917 god, Tiflis: Tipografiya Kantselyarii Namestnika Y.I.V. na Kavkaze, 1916,            
p 218 
424 Shopen I, op cit., p 353; Note: Richard Hovannisian, based on Art. Abegian, wrote that the area of the 
Armenian oblast was 8,000 square miles (about 20,720 square kilometres) (Hovannisian R, Armenia on the Road 
to Independence, 1918, p 10). 
425 Note: According to the survey of 1829-1832 of Shopen, the number of local Armenians in the newly 
established Armenian oblast, was 25,151 and that of Muslims, consisting of Tartars (Azerbaijanis) and Kurds, 
81,749 (Shopen I, op cit., pp 639-640). However, according to George Bournoutian’s calculations, the number of 
Muslims was 117,000 (Bournoutian G, ‘The Ethnic Composition and the Socio-Economic Condition of Eastern 
Armenia in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century’ in Suny (ed.), Transcaucasia: Nationalism and Social 
Change, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1983, pp 70-71).  
426 Note: Shopen wrote that Armenians found in the Armenian oblast before the settlement of 1828 were 
immigrants ‘moved here in different times and under different circumstances’. According to him, ‘real local 
Armenians’ were only in Echmiadzin, Gulpi and Ordubad okrug (Shopen I, op cit., pp 706-707). Although one 
can agree with Shopen’s view on Echmiadzin and Gulpi, the latter being in the territory of present-day Turkey, 
with regard to Ordubad okrug one can argue that among other sources, Arakel Davrizhetsi, the Armenian 
historian and contemporary of the deportations of Shah Abbas in the early seventeenth century, identified 
Ordubad in the ‘country of Albania’ (Davrizhetsi A, Kniga istoriy (perevod s armyanskogo, predislovie i 
kommentariy L.A.Khanlarian), Moscow: Izdatel’stvo ‘Nauka’, 1973, pp 46-47). According to Shopen, there 
were 20,073 Armenians in the Erevan province of the Armenian oblast. The places with higher distribution of 
‘local’ Armenians were Surmali (5,892), Karpibasar (5,290), Sardarabad (3,214) and Gyrkhbulag (1,396) 
districts, and Erevan town (2,369). In the rest of the districts of the province, the number of Armenians varied 
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1916427 (a 26.6 times increase). The number of Muslims in the guberniya increased from 
81,749428 (or 117,000429) in 1828 to 373,582 in 1916430 – a mere 4.6 times increase by 
Shopen’s figures or 3.2 times by those of George Bournoutian. This was without any 
settlement from abroad and was due to their gradual exodus to Muslim Persia and the 
Ottoman Empire. The number of Armenians in the guberniya in 1916 was about twice that of 
Muslims, although before Armenian settlement in the region in 1828, the number of Muslims 
was more than three times (or about five times according to Bournoutian) more than that of 
Armenians.   
 
According to the Russian statistics of 1810, Garabagh consisted of 79% Muslims (9,500 
families) and 21% (2,500 families) ‘Armenians’.431 However, owing to the settlement of 
Armenians from abroad and the exodus of Muslims from Garabagh to Persia, the ratio of 
Armenians in Garabagh increased from 21% in 1810 to 42% in 1916, whereas that of 
Muslims decreased from 79% in 1810 to 56% in 1916.432 
 
Makar Barkhudariants, one of the Echmiadzin bishops, gave information in his Artsakh on the 
Armenian settlers from abroad. According to him, about twenty-four villages in Garabagh had 
settlers from Persia, with about 900 families.433 In addition to this, he mentioned 640 more 
Armenian settlers in some villages.434 As for the settlement of Armenians in other places apart 
from Garabagh, Nakhchyvan and Erevan, again according to Barkhudariants, at least 15,480 
                                                                                                                                                        
between 603 and 5. Except for the most Armenian-populated Surmali district, in the territory of present-day 
Turkey, the other districts had been settled by Armenians in different periods beginning from the first half of the 
fifteenth century onwards (Shopen I, op cit., pp 635-636; Erevantsi S, Dzhambr, Chapter 13; Papazian A, 
Agrarniye otnosheniya v Vostochnoy Armenii v XVI-XVII vekakh, Erevan: Izdatel’stvo Akademii Nauk 
Armyanskoy SSR, 1972, pp 114-115; Papazian A, Persidskie, arabskie i turetskie ofitsialniye dokumenty 
Matenadarana XIV-XIX vekov i ikh znachenie dlya izucheniya sotsial’no-ekonomicheskoy zhizni stran Blizhnego 
Vostoka, Moscow: Izdatel’stvo vostochnoy literatury, 1960, p 14).     
427 Kavkazskiy kalendar’ na 1917 god, p 219 
428 Shopen I, op cit., pp 639-640 
429 Bournoutian G, ‘The Ethnic Composition and the Socio-Economic Condition of Eastern Armenia in the First 
Half of the Nineteenth Century’ in Suny (ed.), Transcaucasia: Nationalism and Social Change, pp 70-71 
430 Kavkazskiy kalendar’ na 1917 god, pp 220-221; The number of Armenians in Erevan, the centre of the 
Erevan guberniya, increased from 2,369 in 1828 to 37,223 in 1916 (a 15.7 times increase), whereas the number 
of the Muslims increased from 7,331 in 1828 to 12,566 in 1916 (a mere 1.7 times increase) (Shopen I, op cit.,              
pp 635-636; Kavkazskiy kalendar’ na 1917 god, pp 219-221). 
431 AKAK, tom 4, Tiflis: Tipografiya Glavnago Upravleniya Namestnika Kavkazskago, 1870, dok 37, pp 38-39 
432 Note: Compare the statistics of 1810 with that of 1916 for Javanshir, Shusha, Jabrayil and Zangazur uezds of 
Elizavetpol guberniya (Kavkazskiy kalendar’ na 1917 god, pp 190-197). 
433 Barkhudariants M, Artsakh (translation from Armenian into Russian by Yargulian in 1981), Baku: Scientific 
Archive of the Institute of History of the Azerbaijani Academy of Sciences, pp 38, 54, 62-65, 67-71, 83 
434 Ibid., pp 92, 110, 116, 117, 139, 143, 146 
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Ottoman Armenian families were settled in the territories of Gazakh, Shaki, Arash, Goychay 
and Guba uezds and Zagatala okrug by the time he visited these places in 1890-1893. The 
author noted that this figure was not the total of Armenian settlers from the Ottoman 
Empire.435 Taking into account the fact that the figures given by Barkhudariants covered the 
period until 1895 and that the settlement of the Ottoman Armenians accelerated after 1895, 
since more than 300,000 Ottoman Armenians were settled in the South Caucasus in 1896-
1908,436 the ratio of Armenians originating from the Ottoman Empire and Persia in the total 
number of the South Caucasian Armenians increased.  
 
The settlement factor, which was crucial in the future Armenian claims to South Caucasian 
territories, was also instrumental in the reconstruction of the notion of the ‘Armenian 
homeland’ to include the ‘historical homeland’ in Eastern Anatolia and the diaspora areas of 
Erevan, Tiflis and Elizavetpol guberniyas in the South Caucasus.  
 
Liquidation of the Albanian Catholicosate as another factor in the reconstruction of the 
notion of the ‘Armenian homeland’  
 
The liquidation of the Albanian Catholicosate and the subsequent subordination of its 
dioceses to the Echmiadzin Catholicosate in the early nineteenth century brought about the 
change of the church identity of the Christian Albanians in the western part of the area which 
would be arranged into the Elizavetpol guberniya in 1868. The area of the guberniya 
corresponded to the area of Garabagh, Ganja and Shaki khanates, and Gazakh and Samshaddil 
sultanates, which existed until the early nineteenth century (compare Maps 6 and 8). The 
change in church identity became instrumental in the ethnic Armenianisation of these 
Albanians and construction of the new Armenian identity with the efforts of the Armenian 
nationalist activists. This in its turn facilitated the inclusion of the area populated by these 
Albanians in the reconstructed notion of the ‘Armenian homeland’. 
 
The argument about the existence of the Christian Albanian identity in Garabagh and Ganja 
khanates, as well as Gazakh and Shamshaddil sultanates in the 18th-early 19th centuries can be 
                                                 
435 Barkhudariants M, Aghuanits erkir yev dratsik (Albania and its neighbours) (translation from Armenian into 
Azerbaijani by Khalid Bayramov at the personal request of Kamala Imranli-Lowe in 2011), Tiflis, 1893, part 92 
436 Shavrov N, op cit., p 60 
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supported by evidence from primary sources. Thus, the Echmiadzin Catholicos, Simeon 
Erevantsi (1763-1780) in the 1760s, reacting to the election of Nerses as Albanian Catholicos 
in 1726, wrote that Nerses was accepted by ‘nepostoyanniy, dikogo nrava agvanskiy narod’ 
(unstable and wild-tempered Albanian people).437 Another Albanian, Catholicos Israel, in a 
letter of 1765 to the Georgian Tsar Irakli II, who mediated between the Echmiadzin and 
Albanian Catholicoses around the attempts of Echmiadzin to subordinate the Albanian 
Catholicosate, argued that the Garabagh and Ganja Christians were not Armenians, but 
Albanians. The differences between Armenians and Albanians Israel paralleled those of the 
Samaritans and Jews, and he wrote that, like them, Albanians and Armenians were also 
separate.438  
 
The liquidation of the Albanian Catholicosate was long sought by Armenian Catholicoses, 
especially by Simeon Erevantsi in the second half of the eighteenth century. For Erevantsi, to 
be Armenian meant to belong to the Echmiadzin Church and accept its divine right as the 
sacral centre of the Armenian nation.439 This means that with his efforts to liquidate the 
Albanian Catholicosate, Erevantsi intended the Armenianisation of the monophysite 
Albanians.440  
 
In 1901, Gerasim Ezov wrote that the area of jurisdiction of the former Albanian 
Catholicosate corresponded to the Elizavetpol guberniya and the Caspian shore.441 Elizavetpol 
                                                 
437 Erevantsi S, Dzhambr, p 155; Note: This passage has been translated into English by Bournoutian as ‘the 
changeable and wild-tempered people of Caucasian Albania’ (Erevantsi S, Jambr (Archival Chamber) 
(introduction and annotated translation by George A.Bournoutian), p 176). The absence of the Armenian text of 
this work does not allow us to give an exact translation of the passage. However, it is certain that Erevantsi did 
not use the word ‘Caucasian’ before ‘Albania’. Moreover, it is hardly believable that Erevantsi would call his 
own Armenians ‘unstable and wild-tempered’. The analysis of both translations of this work suggests that here 
the author referred to ethnic Albanians, not ethnic Armenians, which Bournoutian tried to imply with his 
translation. 
438 Erevantsi S, Dzhambr, p 15; Erevantsi S, Jambr (Archival Chamber), p 14; Divan Hayots Patmutiun 
(Archives of Armenian history), Volume III (translation of the cited document from Armenian into Azerbaijani 
by Sarlan Hasanov at the personal request of Kamala Imranli-Lowe in 2011), Tiflis: Tipografiya M.Sharadze, 
1894, p 414 
439 Aslanian S, Dispersion history and the polycentric nation: the role of Simeon Erevantsi’s Girk or Koci 
Partavcar in the 18th century national revival, Venice: S.Lazarus, 2004, p 46 
440 Note: A majority of the Caucasian Albanians adopted Islam in different periods from the seventh century to 
the first half of the eighteenth century and are today known as Azerbaijanis. A small part of the Albanian 
population adhered to Christianity, some of whom were later Armenianised and some Georgianised. Since the 
Islamisation and Georgianisation are not directly connected with the topic of the current thesis, they will not be 
discussed in this section.    
441 Ezov G, Nachalo snosheniy Echmiadzinskogo patriarshego prestola s russkim pravitel’stvom. Istoricheskoe 
issledovanie po neizdannym dokumentam, Tiflis: Skoropechatnya M.Martirosiantsa, 1901, pp 1-2 
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guberniya included Shusha, Zangazur, Jabrayil, Javanshir, Nukha (Shaki), Arash, Elizavetpol 
and Gazakh uezds. In other words, according to Ezov, the area of jurisdiction of the Albanian 
Catholicosate in the late 18th-early 19th centuries corresponded to the area of Garabagh, Ganja, 
Shaki and Baku khanates, and Gazakh and Shamshaddil sultanates (see Maps 6 and 8). The 
Russian publicist and public official, Vasiliy Velichko, in his work dedicated to Caucasus in 
1904, also touched upon the issue of the area of jurisdiction of the former Albanian 
Catholicosate. He wrote that the Albanian Catholicosate, which existed until the early 
nineteenth century, included the ‘present-day Elizavetpol guberniya, parts of Tiflis guberniya 
and Dagestan’.442   
 
It was not until after the Russian occupation of Ganja443 and Garabagh khanates in 1804 and 
1805 respectively (see Map 6) that the aim of the liquidation of the Albanian Catholicosate 
could come closer to its realisation. In 1808, Hovannes, Echmiadzin Archbishop in Georgia, 
asked the Russian authorities to implement the promise of purchasing from the Russian 
Emperor submission of the dioceses of the Albanian Catholicosate in the territories recently 
occupied by Russia to Echmiadzin.444 It should be noted that the Ganja diocese of the 
Albanian Catholicosate had already been subordinated to Echmiadzin after the occupation of 
Ganja khanate in 1804,445 but the Ganja Albanians did not want to implement this decision 
and about five hundred Albanians gathered at the Ganja monastery and threw stones at the 
Echmiadzin bishop Minas.446 When the Albanian Catholicos asked the reason for this 
subordination of Ganja diocese to Echmiadzin, the Russian authorities justified it by the 
‘efforts and loyalty to the imperial throne of His Imperial Majesty’ of the Armenian 
Archbishop Hovannes.447  
 
It was not only due to the loyalty and efforts of the Echmiadzin Catholicosate, since the 
Christian Albanian leaders from the times of Peter the Great had also striven to bring 
                                                 
442 Velichko V, Kavkaz. Russkoe delo i mezhduplemenniye voprosy. Polnoe sobranie publisisticheskikh 
sochineniy, vol I, Saint Petersburg: Tipografiya Arteli Pechatnogo Dela, 1904, p 88 
443 Note: After the occupation of the Ganja khanate by Russia in 1804, the name Ganja was changed to 
Elizavetpol. The khanate was turned into a uezd and was included in the Georgian guberniya (Mil’man A, op 
cit., pp 62-63). 
444 AKAK, tom 3, Tiflis: Tipografiya Glavnago Upravleniya Namestnika Kavkazskago, 1869, dok 152, p 81 
445 Ibid., dok 149, p 80 
446 Ibid., dok 151, p 80 
447 Imranli K, op cit., p 35; the source cited by Imranli K: Prisoedinenie Vostochnoy Armenii k Rossii. Sbornik 
dokumentov, tom 1 (1801-1813), Erevan: Izdatel’stvo Akademii Nauk Armyanskoy SSR, 1972, dok 323, p 388  
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Christian Russian rule to the region. A convincing reply to the question of the Albanian 
Catholicos would be found almost one hundred years later in the report of the Russian Interior 
Minister of 15 October 1903, which explained the prerogatives given to the Echmiadzin 
church with the ‘lack of information on the historical past of the Armenian church and the 
influence of the temporary political considerations, which was determined to seek assistance 
of the supreme Armenian hierarchy to extend our influence to Turkey’.448 That was the only 
difference between Christian Albanians and Armenians for the Russian authorities, as the 
former did not have their brethren in the Ottoman Empire to realise Russia’s plans for the 
occupation of the Ottoman territories, while the Armenians had, and the help of the Armenian 
clergy in the realisation of these plans was very much needed.  
 
As is apparent from the letter of the Echmiadzin Patriarch Efrem to Russian General Nikolay 
Rtishchev on 18 February 1814, Echmiadzin did not have any success in the subordination of 
the Albanian dioceses in Ganja (Elizavetpol after 1804), Garabagh, Shaki and others.449 One 
of the reasons was that Sarkis continued to act as an Albanian Catholicos and refused to 
submit to Echmiadzin. General Rtishchev, in his letter to Prince Orbeliani on 19 October 
1813, instructed the latter to call Sarkis and tell him not to call himself Garabagh Patriarch, 
but Garabagh Archbishop, and that the Russian Emperor recognised only Echmiadzin 
Patriarch Efrem.450 The instruction was implemented, as can be seen from Orbeliani’s 
report.451 However, in 1815, according to Efrem’s letter of 31 January 1815, Sarkis continued 
to act as Patriarch.452 According to Raffi, one of the Armenian nationalist leaders, in 1815 
Echmiadzin, with the help of the Russian authorities, compelled Sarkis to give up the title of 
Catholicos and accept the title of Metropolitan with the rights of Archbishop,453 whereas for 
Makar Barkhudariants, one of the Echmiadzin bishops, this was in 1828.454  
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After the Russian occupation and subsequent liquidation of the Albanian Catholicosate, 
church schools, which were under the supervision of Echmiadzin, started indoctrinating the 
Armenian identity among the former flock of the Albanian Catholicosate. The process of 
obliterating Albanian traces was also facilitated by the transfer of the documents of the 
Albanian Catholicosate to Echmiadzin in 1836.455 According to Kerope Patkanov, the ancient 
text of the work of the Caucasian Albanian historian, Moisey Kalankatuyski, on Albanian 
history, which was in the library of Echmiadzin in the 1850s, was not there anymore when he 
visited it in 1877.456 This gives reason to suspect that ancient manuscripts related to the 
history of the Albanians were eliminated by the Armenian Catholicosate to obliterate 
Albanian traces.   
 
The church activities were followed by those of the Armenian nationalist societies at the end 
of the nineteenth century, one of which emerged in the 1880s in Shusha, Garabagh. Its main 
aim included elements of Phase B, i.e. to familiarise its members with Armenian history, 
language and culture.457 As mentioned earlier, Raffi visited Garabagh in 1881 with the aim of 
writing a history of Garabagh of the 16th-early 19th centuries and presenting it as the last 
refuge of the Armenian national idea. Although the author tried to interpret the history of 
Albanian melikates (counties) of the 15th-18th centuries in Garabagh as that of Armenian 
counties, he failed, since his evidence demonstrated their Albanian origins.458 Further 
evidence was found in an unpublished brochure of Sarkis Jalal from the dynasty of the 
Albanian Catholicoses, with which Raffi became acquainted in Garabagh. This source, called 
‘History of Albania’, was about the above-mentioned counties of Garabagh. Raffi did not hide 
his surprise as to why the author did not call their meliks (counts) either Hayk or Aram, which 
was applicable to ethnic Armenians; for that reason, he did not use this source.459 Sebouh 
Aslanian, in his work dedicated to the role of Simeon Erevantsi in the eighteenth-century 
national revival of Armenians, cited one letter of 1776 from two Armenians of India to 
                                                                                                                                                        
190, 194, 209, 215, 217, 258, 261, 270;  Barkhudariants M, Artsakh (translation from Armenian into Russian by 
Yargulian in 1981), pp 39, 44, 46, 61, 66, 71, 73-75, 86, 89, 104-107, 130, 134, 136, 155-157, 159, 170 
455Papazian A (ed.), Persidskie dokumenty Matenadarana, I, Ukazy, vyp 1 (XV-XVI vv.), Erevan: Izdatel’stvo 
Akademii Nauk Armyanskoy SSR, 1956, p 137 
456 Patkanov K, Bibliograficheskiy ocherk armyanskoy istoricheskoy literatury, Saint Petersburg: Tipografiya 
brat’yev Panteleyevykh, 1880, pp 18-19 
457 Nalbandian L, The Armenian Revolutionary Movement: The Development of Armenian Political Parties 
through the Nineteenth Century, pp 139-140 
458 Raffi, op cit., pp 18-25 
459 Ibid., pp 198-199 
110 
Erevantsi, who counselled latter ‘to mediate a pact between King Heraclius of Georgia and 
the ‘‘princes of Alowank [Albania – I.K.]’’ (i.e. the meliks of Gharabagh)’.460 This evidence 
also shows that the counts of Garabagh were Albanian.461  
 
Apart from history, language was another problem in the realisation of Armenian nationalist 
ideas, especially in Garabagh. Touching upon the need for a standardised and commonly 
understandable Armenian language in the nineteenth century, Razmik Panossian wrote that 
while some Armenians spoke a form of vernacular Armenian, the rest of the population spoke 
‘either Turkish or various Armenian-based but often mutually incomprehensible dialects’, 
which continues up to the modern period. He referred to Garabagh as ‘the most notable case’, 
adding that it is ‘incomprehensible to other Armenians; a sort of “secret code” of 
communication’.462  
 
Pavel Florenski, the philosopher and famous churchman from the dynasty of Malik-
Baylarovs and one of the above-mentioned Garabagh counts, from his mother’s side, in a 
letter to his family of 20 September 1916 wrote that ‘Garabagh Armenians are not 
Armenians, but a distinct tribe of Udis […] in the ancient times they were called Albanians, 
whom Armenians called Akhavans […] Garabagh Armenians preserved distinct dialect and 
traditions.’463 The Armenians also considered themselves ethnically distinct from the 
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Albanians. Armenians originating from the Ottoman Empire and Persia still call the 
Garabagh Armenians ‘shurtvats hayer’, or ‘converted Armenians’. This expression in itself is 
proof of the continuing antithesis.  
 
Thus, the liquidation of the Albanian Catholicosate and the subsequent Armenianisation of 
the Albanians in the western part of the Elizavetpol guberniya played an important role in the 
reconstruction of the notion of an ‘Armenian homeland’ and the Armenian nationalist claims 
to the area, which, among others, included Garabagh region, to be discussed later in the thesis.   
  
4.2 Identity construction: The Armenian, Azerbaijani and Georgian cases 
 
When the Armenians in Eastern Anatolia were in Hroch’s mixed A, B and C Phases in the 
second half of the nineteenth century, Azerbaijanis had just started Phase A on the Muslim-
Turkic basis. One of the reasons for this late national ‘awakening’ was Islam, which did not 
accept division based on anything other than religion. Another reason was that, unlike 
Armenians, they did not have a diaspora, especially in Europe or European-influenced 
countries, through which they would be ‘awakened’ to nationalist ideas. It was not without 
reason that all phases of the Armenian national movement started in the Armenian diaspora, 
either in Europe or British India.  
   
The factors instrumental in the construction of the Azerbaijani identity can be summarised as 
follows: 
 
 The occupation of Muslim-populated territories of the South Caucasus by Russia in 
the nineteenth century, which had both positive (Muslims became acquainted with 
Western European political and cultural values through Russia) and negative (national 
policy pursued by Russia, which excluded Muslims from the list of privileged peoples 
and had implications on their political-legal status within the Empire) consequences. 
Muslims were deprived of higher civil and military posts and admission was 
restricted to educational organisations and service. The notions of ‘inoverets’ (person 
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of alien or non-Christian religion) and ‘busurman’ (Muslim) were added to that of 
‘inorodtsy’ (alien or non-Slav peoples).464  
 Enlightenment activities of the second half of the 19th-early 20th centuries, which 
included the creation of literature, theatre and periodicals in vernacular Turkic (the 
language of Ottoman Turks was called Osmanly (Ottoman) at that time) which aimed 
at the ‘awakening’ of local Muslims; works on the Turkic language and efforts on its 
purification from Persian and Ottoman borrowings and their replacement with 
vernacular Turkic elements; translations from Persian and Russian into Turkic; 
opening of schools on the initiative of Muslim intelligentsia at their own expense, 
which apart from the Koran and Turkic, taught various technical subjects. These 
activities can be placed within Phases A and B.    
 The oil boom of the 1870s, which played an enormous role in the formation of a 
national bourgeoisie in the early twentieth century, who supported the development of 
national enlightenment, including financing the education of Muslim youth abroad, 
opening schools (including those for girls) and theatres, and issuing periodicals. On 
the other hand, the oil boom attracted a great number of Armenians from different 
places to Baku. As a result, their number in Baku increased from 55 in 1810 of total 
2,235 people465, i.e. 2.5% to 77,256 of total 405,829 in 1916,466 i.e. 19%. 
 The increase of nationally ‘awakened’ Armenians in the South Caucasus, including in 
Baku, which had its impact on the identification of the Muslims against the others, 
especially Armenians, who were favoured by the Russian Government, excluding 
short periods of persecution because of their nationalist activities. The religious and 
cultural differences between Muslims and Armenians were deepened with the 
domination of the latter in politics and economics, especially in Baku after the oil 
boom. The Armenian nationalist movement and subsequent deterioration of Muslim-
Armenian relations in both the Ottoman Empire and the South Caucasus, especially 
after the Armenian-Tartar conflict of 1905-1907, were instrumental in strengthening 
enmity and ‘them-us’ antithesis.  
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 Search for identity in the late 19th-early 20th centuries until the February Revolution of 
1917 which included discussions on identity in journals and newspapers in Turkic, 
Ottoman and Russian. It was in the late nineteenth century that the present-day ethnic 
term ‘Azerbaijani’ was considered by some Muslim intellectuals to be more 
appropriate to refer to the people who were called ‘Muslims’ and ‘Tartars’ at that time. 
The process of an identity search also included the consideration of the ideas of 
Islamism (unification of all Muslims), unification of Caucasian Muslims (which found 
its reflection also in the programmes and proclamations of the Muslim political parties 
that emerged in 1905-1907), pan-Turkism (unification of all Turks around the 
Ottoman Empire, which was abandoned after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the 
Balkan War of 1912) and Azerbaijani Turkism. These ideas, initiated by some 
members of the Muslim intelligentsia, were not widespread, and in this period 
ancestors of present-day Azerbaijanis mostly identified themselves on the basis of 
Islam and region467 (for example: from Garabagh, Iravan (Erevan), Shirvan, Shaki and 
so on). This period contained features of Phases A and B.   
 The February and October revolutions of 1917 in Russia, followed by the autonomy 
demand for Azerbaijan by the leading Muslim and Tartar political party of Musavat 
(Equality) in its draft programme of June 1917 and adopted programme of October 
1917.468 Winning support for this programme necessitated efforts containing elements 
of Phases A, B and C. Since the Azerbaijani national movement started with the 
‘awakening’ of Turkic-speaking Caucasian Muslims with works in Azerbaijani Turkic 
passed through Islamism and Turkism ideas and their propaganda, and ended in 
activities for territorial autonomy for Azerbaijan, it can be concluded that Hroch’s 
theory of phases of national movements in Central and Eastern countries is applicable 
to the Azerbaijani case.   
 Establishment of the Azerbaijan Republic in May 1918, when real steps were made in 
constructing an Azerbaijani identity on the basis of Turkic, Dagestani and Iranian-
speaking Muslims.    
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 Sovietisation of Azerbaijan in 1920, after which the Azerbaijani identity started 
consolidating, and restoration of Azerbaijani independence in 1991, which has further 
consolidated the Azerbaijani identity.  
 
As for Georgians, as adherents of the Georgian church, they identified themselves as 
Georgians (Kartvelian in Georgian). However, Kartvelians of the late eighteenth century, 
when Kartli voluntarily joined Russia, and those of the twentieth century were not the same. It 
is enough to compare the Russian Imperial censuses of the mentioned periods to discover that 
some of the peoples who had non-Georgian identities in the early nineteenth century were 
identified as Georgians in the early twentieth century. This means that construction of 
Georgian identity also had its origins in Russian rule, which brought kin peoples under one 
political rule. The process was further consolidated after the establishment of the first 
Georgian Republic and Soviet Georgia, when Pshavs, Khevsurs, Tushins, Gurians, Svans, 
Imeretians and Mingrelians ended up being identified as Georgians. According to Ronald 
Suny, apart from the introduction of Western education to the Georgian elite after the Russian 
occupation, increased contact with Armenians, who dominated Georgian urban centres and 
had a different language, church and values, had its impact on the self-definition of 
Georgians.469  
 
Comparing the Armenian, Azerbaijani and Georgian cases, it can be argued that the diaspora 
nationalism of Armenians was one of the factors influencing the construction of the three 
national identities. The diaspora nationalism and scattered distribution necessitated the 
Armenian need for land, which they tried to solve with the construction of ‘homelands’ both 
in Eastern Anatolia and the South Caucasus. The land claims of Armenian nationalists in the 
South Caucasus, stimulated by the February Revolution of 1917 in Russia, were instrumental 
in the territorial autonomy ‘awakening’ of Tartars and Georgians. The latter two peoples, 
unlike Armenians, had compact distribution in the South Caucasus, living there for many 
centuries, so did not need to pay attention to the issue until they were ‘awakened’ by the 
Armenian nationalist ‘threat’ to their lands. Passing a difficult road through one more 
revolution in October and other political and military developments, this ‘awakening’ ended 
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with the declaration of three republics in the South Caucasus with implications for the 
construction of the Georgian and Azerbaijani national identities.  
 
The Armenian case demonstrated that the construction of a new Armenian identity preceded 
the construction of the Armenian Republic in 1918, since it was due to the Armenian church, 
i.e. religion and confession, not the Armenian state, that the new people was added to the 
composition of the Armenians. The confessional identity of the Christian Albanians turned 
them into followers of the Armenian church, and the new church identity, owing to the efforts 
of the Armenian nationalists, became their new ethnic identity. If not for the Armenian 
Echmiadzin Church, Christian Albanians living in Garabagh were unlikely to be converted 
into Armenians, since, despite the efforts of the Armenian nationalists, Garabagh could not be 
included in the first Armenian Republic, nor was it included in the second Armenian 
Republic, i.e. Soviet Armenia in 1921. But the Armenians could use the existing church 
identity for the construction of the new Armenian ethnic identity. The latter would turn into 
Armenian national identity after 1918 for some of the Armenians, as many of them, including 
those in Garabagh, would live outside the Armenian Republic.    
 
The primordial approach is not helpful for understanding the Armenian case, since the 
evidence suggests that the Armenians of the second half of the first millennium BC were not 
the Armenians of the late nineteenth century. No nationality is ever ethnically homogenous, 
and those, including Armenian nationalist leaders of the 19th-early 20th centuries who claimed 
purity of the Armenian people existing from time immemorial, to be discussed in Chapter 8, 
and scholars who have been claiming the existence of such homogeneity extending from the 
second century BC to the present have been influenced by nationalist approaches to historical 
research, which crystallised in the nineteenth century. The approaches of modernist scholars, 
including Eric Hobsbawm, who wrote that ‘nations do not make state and nationalism but the 
other way round’,470 or Valeriy Tishkov, who noted that ‘nations are constructs, created by 
people, by the efforts of intellectuals and by the political will of the state’,471 also do not apply 
to the Armenian case. Both scholars would appear to be right, if Azerbaijanis, the major 
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minority people in the first Armenian Republic, and other minorities in Armenia accepted the 
Armenian state identity as their national identity, but this did not happen and none of these 
minorities identified themselves as Armenians. This was also the case in the first Azerbaijan 
Republic, where the state identity did not turn out to be the national identity of its Armenian 
citizens, although it brought about the adoption of the Azerbaijani identity by some of its 
Muslim citizens. The Georgian case was also different from the Armenian case and similar to 
the Azerbaijani one, as neither Armenian nor Azerbaijani citizens of Georgia identified 
themselves as Georgians, whereas a number of kin peoples identified themselves as 
Georgians. These facts prove that the Armenian state did not result in the emergence of the 
new Armenian nation in terms of its ethnic composition. Simply, after the Armenian Republic 
came into being, part of the constructed Armenian ethnic community became the Armenian 
nation.   
 
The approaches of ethno-symbolist scholars such as Anthony Smith, Miroslav Hroch and 
John Hutchinson, who, unlike the modernists, did not disregard the ethnic factor in the 
formation of nations, apply to the Armenian case. For Smith, nation is a ‘named population 
sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a 
common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members’.472 Bearing in mind 
Smith’s view that nationalists could reconstruct, even ‘invent’, history when it was 
deficient473 and applying his definition of nation to the Armenian case, it can be concluded 
that it was the presence of constructed historic territory, common myths and historical 
memories that brought about the construction of the Armenian ethnic community in the 
nineteenth century and its transformation into the Armenian nation after the emergence of the 
Armenian Republic in 1918. On the other hand, it was because of the absence of ‘a mass, 
public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members’ that 
the Armenians who were not citizens of the Armenian Republic could not be part of the 
Armenian nation. On the contrary, the lack of common myths and historical memories made 
the perception of the minorities of the Armenian Republic as belonging to the Armenian 
nation impossible. 
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Hroch regarded nation as a large social group integrated by a combination of economic, 
political, linguistic, cultural, religious, geographical, historical relationships, and their 
subjective reflection in the collective consciousness.474 It was the absence of some of these 
components, namely linguistic, cultural and religious factors, that meant that non-Armenian 
peoples of the Armenian state did not identify themselves as part of the Armenian nation. On 
the other hand, it was due to the absence of economic and political relationships within one 
state that the ethnic Armenians outside Armenia could not be regarded as part of the 




In the imagination of the Armenian political national movement, the notion of the ‘Armenian 
homeland’ was reconstructed in the early twentieth century, expanding from Eastern Anatolia 
to the juncture of the Kur and Araz Rivers in the South Caucasus. The basis of this 
reconstruction was laid down in the Armenian history by Ch’amch’yants’. His construction of 
Armenian national territory was further facilitated by three factors: the existence of 
monophysite Caucasian Albanians in the South Caucasus; the aim of the Armenian 
Echmiadzin Catholicosate to subordinate the Albanian Catholicosate; and the expansionist 
plans of Christian Russia towards the South Caucasus and the Mediterranean. 
 
The realisation of Ch’amch’yants’s history and the reconstruction of the ‘Armenian 
homeland’ notion were further facilitated by the mass settlement of the Armenians from 
Persia and the Ottoman Empire in the South Caucasus in the 19th-early 20th centuries. This led 
to the emergence of compact Armenian masses in some parts of the region and became 
instrumental in the inclusion of the area of Erevan guberniya, the western half of Elizavetpol 
guberniya and southern parts of Tiflis guberniya in the reconstructed ‘Armenian homeland’. 
This settlement started solving the land problem in the diaspora by creating an Armenian 
‘peasantry’, a powerful claim to territory, and in the early twentieth century, because of the 
significant increase in their numbers due to the extensive settlement, these lands and 
Armenian peasants turned into a tool of Armenian nationalism in the region. 
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The Armenianisation of the monophysite Albanians in the western part of the Elizavetpol 
guberniya in the nineteenth century was another factor in the reconstruction of the ‘Armenian 
homeland’. The liquidation of the Albanian Catholicosate and the subordination of its 
dioceses to Echmiadzin, with the help of Russia, led to a change in the Albanians’ church 
identity, which turned into ethnic identity under the Armenian nationalist movement and 
further promoted the inclusion of the larger, western part of Elizavetpol guberniya in the 
reconstructed ‘Armenian homeland’.  
 
Comparing the Armenian, Azerbaijani and Georgian cases it was argued that unlike 
Armenians, the latter two peoples had compact distribution in the region, living there for 
many centuries, so they did not take the land issue into account until they were ‘awakened’ by 
the Armenian nationalism ‘threat’ to their lands. Under the influence of different factors, 
including the revolutions in Russia and other political and military developments in the region 
afterwards, this land ‘awakening’ ended with the declaration of three republics in the South 
Caucasus with implications for the construction of Georgian and Azerbaijani national 
identities.  
 
The construction of the new Armenian identity preceded the construction of the Armenian 
Republic in 1918, since it was due to the Armenian church in the nineteenth century, not the 
Armenian state in 1918, that the new people was added to the composition of the Armenians. 
This in itself disproved the primordialist and modernist theories, making the ethno-symbolist 












Chapter 5: The First World War and the Armenian Homeland Project 
 
Wars, including the collapse of empires, are conducive to realising the goals of nationalist 
movements. The Armenian nationalists held this view when Russia declared war on the 
Ottoman Empire on 2 November 1914, followed by Britain and France on 5 November 1914. 
The First World War created favourable conditions for the realisation of the ‘Armenian 
homeland’ project.  
 
The chapter examines the expectations of the Armenian nationalist movement during the First 
World War and their results, up to the February Revolution in Russia in 1917.  
 
5.1 The First World War and relocation of Armenians 
 
Ovannes Kachaznuni, one of the founders and leaders of Dashnaktsutiun and the first premier 
of the Armenian Republic, in his report submitted to the conference of the foreign committees 
of Dashnaktsutiun in 1923, wrote that during autumn 1914, before the Ottoman Empire even 
entered the war, Armenian volunteer units had been organised with great energy in the South 
Caucasus. Dashnaktsutiun played an active role in both the organisation of volunteer units 
and military actions against the Ottoman Empire with the full belief that it would be defeated 
and dismembered. It was unconditionally orientated towards Russia and believed that thanks 
to the loyalty, efforts and help of the Armenians, the Tsarist Government would grant them 
autonomy in the ‘liberated Armenian provinces of Turkey and Transcaucasian Armenia’.475   
 
During his speech to the Council of Ten on 26 February 1919, Avetis Aharonian, Head of the 
Delegation of the Republic of Armenia at the Paris Peace Conference, stated, ‘at the 
beginning of the war, our nation not only forgot all grievances against Tsarist rule and rallied 
whole-heartedly to the Russian flag in support of the Allied cause, but our fellow-countrymen 
in Turkey and all over the world offered to the Government of the Tsar (the archives of the 
Russian Embassy at Paris prove this) to establish and support Armenian legions at their own 
expense to fight side by side with Russian troops under the command of Russian generals. 
The Tsar’s Government stated, through its Ambassador in Paris, that it would be preferable if 
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individual Armenians enlisted in the Russian Army […] Armenian volunteers from all parts 
of the world fought for the Allied cause side by side with their fellow-countrymen who were 
regulars in the Russian Army; more than 180,000 Armenians defended the freedom of 
nations, and this devotion to the common cause called down on the Armenian people the 
hatred of Ottomans and Young Turks, which gave rise to massacres lasting two years and laid 
waste all the Armenian vilayets of the Ottoman Empire.’476  
 
Not all Ottoman Armenians and Dashnaktsutiun members were on the Russian side. Bagrat 
Borian explains that Shahrikian Efendi and Zorian, Ottoman Armenians and members of 
Dashnaktsutiun, were against the organisation of volunteer units and the activities of 
Dashnaktsutiun against Turks.477 The British author, Christopher Walker, also wrote that 
many Ottoman Armenians were enlisted in the Ottoman army and services were held in 
churches for an Ottoman victory, although this was not a universal loyalty. The Hnchak Party, 
quite influential at that time, pledged defiance of the Ottoman Empire. Leading 
Dashnaktsutiun member and Ottoman deputy, Garegin Pastyrmajian, fled to Tiflis to assist in 
the formation of Armenian volunteer units for operation against the Ottoman Empire before 
the latter entered the war.478 The Eastern Bureau and Istanbul Committee of Dashnaktsutiun 
decided to act on the order of the Russian diplomacy. According to the Russian military 
authorities’ plan, Armenian volunteer units were to penetrate the lines of the Ottoman army, 
and create anarchy, together with the rebels. This would help ensure the advancement of the 
Russian army and the occupation of Eastern Anatolia.479 When Andranik Ozanian, the 
Ottoman Armenian and head of one of the Armenian volunteer units, approached Van, 
Dashnak fighters had to take leave in the mountains and rebel there. The programme of the 
rebellion was realised in April 1915, and, the Armenian Echmiadzin Catholicos reported, ‘ten 
thousand armed fighters entered the battle’.480 
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In the words of Kemal Oke, after the Ottoman Empire entered the war, the Ottoman 
Government kept receiving intelligence on the Armenian-Russian collaboration against the 
Ottoman Army and the uprisings which took place one after another in Anatolia, but avoided 
taking firm measures, thinking that events would eventually settle. Talat Pasha, the Ottoman 
Minister of the Interior, and Enver Pasha, the Ottoman Minister of War, asked the Armenian 
leaders to advise their people to be peaceful; otherwise the government would be forced to 
take strict measures.481 
 
According to Kamuran Gurun, the Armenian-Russian collaboration compelled the Ottoman 
Supreme Military Command to circulate instructions on 25 February 1915 on the 
demobilisation of Armenians from the Ottoman Army.482 On 24 April 1915, the Ottoman 
Interior Ministry ordered the closure of the Armenian revolutionary committee centres, arrest 
of their leaders and confiscation of their documents. Based on this order, 235 Armenians were 
arrested in Istanbul. This day is commemorated as ‘genocide day’ by world Armenians. On 26 
April, the Supreme Military Command sent a similar circular to its units on the trial of 
Armenian revolutionary leaders in military courts and the punishment of the guilty.483   
 
On 26 May, the Supreme Military Command informed the Interior Ministry of its oral 
decision on the relocation of the Armenians from the Eastern Anatolian provinces, from 
Zeytun, and from areas densely populated by Armenians, to the south of the Diyarbakyr 
province, to the valley of the Euphrates, to the vicinity of Urfa and Suleymaniye. It suggested 
taking into account the following points in order to prevent the reappearance of rebellion 
nests:  
 
a) Armenians should not exceed 10% of the tribal and Muslim population in the areas where 
they were relocated. 
b) Any villages built by the Armenians in the places where they were relocated should not 
exceed fifty houses. 
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c) Relocated Armenian families should not be allowed to move closer to their former 
residences, even for travel or transport reasons.484 
 
Between winter 1914 and summer 1915, the Ottoman Army suffered great territorial losses in 
Eastern Anatolia, which brought the area between the Russian-Ottoman border and the 
southern shore of Lake Van under Russian control. The Russian advance and Ottoman retreat, 
which started due to the uprising of Van Armenians in April, continued until the end of July, 
when Russian Special Forces together with the Armenian Legion attached to it advanced 
toward Bitlis. Here they met a strong Ottoman counter-offensive which compelled the 
Russian and Armenian divisions to retreat towards the Ottoman-Russian border. To avoid 
encirclement, the Russian Special Forces were commanded to withdraw to Van, but upon 
arriving they found Van province evacuated by the Fourth Corps of the Russian Caucasus 
Army on 31 July 1915. The retreating Russian divisions were followed by about 200,000 
Armenians. According to Hovannisian, having repulsed the Russian-Armenian divisions, the 
Ottoman divisions ‘concentrated upon their internal foes’ and when Russian forces together 
with Armenian units reoccupied Van in September 1915 and advanced toward Bitlis in March 
1916, ‘there remained no one to liberate’.485  
 
Analysing the 1915 events, Kachaznuni reported that ‘angered and scared, we looked for the 
guilty and immediately found Russian Government with its insidious politics. With the 
inconsistency peculiar for immature and unstable people, we went from one extreme to the 
other. Our accusation of today was as blind and unfounded as was our belief of yesterday in 
the Russian Government. It was said that Russians […] behaved so that to devastate Armenia 
and then to settle it with Cossacks to realise the well-known project of the Duke Lobanov-
Rostovskiy: “Armenia without Armenians.” […] We did not want to understand that in order 
to explain the politics of the Russian Government it was absolutely unnecessary to suppose 
that it had a project to have Armenia without Armenians. It was enough to know that its plans 
did not include the protection of the Turkish Armenians at any price […] We, political party, 
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forgot that our issue was not of interest for Russians and for that reason when it was 
necessary, they could easily step over our dead bodies without hesitation.’486 
 
When, with the active participation of the Armenian volunteer units and rebels, the Russian 
military was advancing in the Caucasian front in 1915, the Russian authorities were working 
on the expected correction of the Russian borders in the Caucasus by the annexation of 
Trabzon, Erzurum and Van provinces and part of Bitlis province. It was considered that most 
of this region was ‘above the sea level, distinguished by its relatively wild and healthy climate 
and quite suitable for the Russian settlers’.487 The Russian General, Nicolas Yudenits, in his 
report of 5 April 1915 to the Caucasian Viceroy, Illarion Vorontsov-Dashkov, wrote, ‘for the 
exploitation of the lands left by the Kurds and Turks, Armenians intend to settle there 
Armenian refugees. I consider this intention unacceptable, as it will be difficult to take the 
lands seized by Armenians back after the war or to prove that the seized lands do not belong 
to them.488 For that reason, I find it to be extremely desirable to settle the border settlements 
with Russian elements. When Eleshkirt, Diyadin and Bayazyt enter the borders of the Russian 
Empire, it is necessary to settle these territories with settlers from the Kuban and Don, and 
thus to create border Cossacks.’489 
 
Comparison of Kachaznuni’s report with that of Vorontsov-Dashkov shows that not only 
were Armenians deprived of their places, but also Muslims were turned into internally 
displaced people, in whose lands the Armenians wanted to settle Armenian refugees. The 
negative attitude of the Caucasian viceroy to this project demonstrated the change in Russian 
policy towards Armenian settlements. Chapter 4, discussing the settlement of the Armenians 
in the Russian Empire, mentioned that this was realised through the support of the Russian 
authorities who wanted to create a Christian buffer zone of loyal Armenian settlers in the 
border with the Muslim Ottoman Empire and Persia. However, after the accumulation of a 
considerable number of Armenians in the region, the Armenian nationalists directed their 
activities against Russia as well. For that reason, it would be naïve to think that Russia fought 
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in the war against the Ottoman Empire to construct an autonomous Armenia or settle these 
areas with the Armenians, whose loyalty was not trusted anymore, although as mentioned 
earlier, Dashnaktsutiun believed that for their ‘loyalty, efforts and help’ in the war against the 
Ottoman Empire, the Tsarist Government would grant them autonomy in the ‘liberated 
Armenian provinces of Turkey and Transcaucasian Armenia’.490 As seen from the above-
mentioned evidences of the Russian officials, Russian plans with regard to the occupied 
Ottoman territories, not to mention the South Caucasus, were quite different from the 
Armenian expectations.  
 
As for the Ottoman Government, on 26 May, after the Russian occupation of Van with 
Armenian help, the Interior Ministry sent a memorandum to the Cabinet of Ministers. The 
document stated that it considered necessary the removal of ‘harmful’ Armenian 
revolutionary elements from the area of operations, and the evacuation of villages which 
served as a base for the operations and refuge for the rebels against the Ottoman Empire. To 
that end, it had been decided to relocate the Armenians of the provinces of Van, Bitlis and 
Erzurum and the villages and settlements of the districts of Iskenderun, Beylan, Jisr-l Shughur 
and Antakya, with the exception of the towns of Adana, Sis and Mersin, to the sanjaks of 
Mosul and Zor, excluding the northern area of Mosul bordering Van province, to the southern 
part of Urfa, excluding Urfa town, to the eastern and south-eastern parts of the Halep 
province, and to settlements in the eastern part of Syria province.491  
 
On 27 May 1915, a provisional law on the measures to be taken by the military authorities 
against persons involved in anti-governmental activities, known as Tehcir kanunu (Relocation 
Law), was adopted, the main provisions of which were as follows:   
 
1. In wartime, should the commanders of the Army, the Army Corps, or the divisions 
face any opposition, armed aggression, or resistance to operations and arrangements 
related to the decrees of the government, the defence of the country, and the 
maintenance of public order, they were authorised and compelled to immediately 
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implement punishment through the Armed Forces, and to suppress the aggression and 
resistance.  
2. The commanders of the Army, Army Corps, and divisions may transfer and                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
settle the inhabitants of villages and towns in other quarters, should they engage in 
spying or treason, or in view of military exigencies.492 
 
On 30 May, the Cabinet of Ministers adopted the decision related to the memorandum of the 
Interior Ministry of 26 May, the main points of which can be summarised as follows: 
 
 To ensure the security of persons and possessions of the people to be relocated 
until they reached their destination and to forbid any form of persecution 
 To compensate the deportees with new property, land, and goods necessary for 
a comfortable life 
 To permit Muslim refugees to inhabit the abandoned villages only after having 
officially recorded the value of the homes and land and making clear that the 
property still belonged to the legal owners 
 To sell or rent those fields, properties, and goods not settled by Muslim 
refugees and to keep in the treasury, in the owner’s name, an account of the 
derived income, after first deducting administrative expenses 
 To authorise the finance minister to create special committees to supervise 
these transactions and to publish circulars pertaining to the compensations for 
the properties and their protection 
 To oblige all officials to comply with the law and report to the government 
during the course of its fulfilment.493 
 
The Ottoman Parliament passed the law on the relocation on 15 September 1915.494  
 
According to the report submitted by the Interior Ministry to the Cabinet of Ministers on 7 
December 1916, about 702,900 individuals were relocated. For that purpose, it had spent 25 
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million kurush in 1915 and 86 million kurush by the end of October 1916. They planned to 
spend 150 million kurush more until the end of 1916.495 
 
5.2 Statistics on the deaths resulting from the Armenian relocations   
 
The number of Armenians who suffered from the relocation is a very controversial topic. No 
figure has been agreed by Armenian, Turkish and other historians. This is also the case with 
different contemporary sources closer to the war.  
  
The figure changes depending on several factors: different pre-war Ottoman population 
statistics; different numbers for relocated Armenians; whether this number includes only that 
of the Armenians killed or also those who died of starvation, disease and weather conditions 
because of the relocation; and whether the figure includes Armenians who perished not only 
during the relocation, but during the whole period of the war.  
 
According to the statistics which the Armenian Istanbul Patriarch gave to the British in 1921, 
the number of Armenians who lived within the pre-Sevres Treaty Ottoman borders, i.e. pre- 
10 August 1920 borders, was 625,000. The figure included those who returned back after the 
relocation.496 Based on the Armenian Patriarchate statistics, the number of Ottoman 
Armenians in 1912 was 2,100,000.497 Then the number of Armenians who were absent from 
the Ottoman Empire, i.e. the Armenians who either died or left for other countries between 
1912 and 1921, should have been 1,475,000, leaving uncertainty around the number of 
Armenians who died because of the 1915 events. There is no unanimity with regard to the 
number of the Armenian refugees in the South Caucasus either. According to Istoriya 
armyanskogo naroda (History of the Armenian people), published in 1980, the number was 
about 350,000,498 whereas according to the statement of Avetis Aharonian, Head of the 
Delegation of the Republic of Armenia at the Paris Peace Conference, in the meeting of the 
Council of Ten on 26 February 1919, this figure was 400,000-500,000.499 In the first case, the 
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number of absent Armenians should have been around 1,125,000, in the second case 975,000-
1,075,000.  
 
The Ottoman official statistics for the number of Armenians in the Empire in 1914 was 
around 1,300,000.500 Then the number of the Armenians who were absent in 1914-1921 was 
about 675,000. If we deduct 350,000 or 400,000-500,000 Armenian refugees in the South 
Caucasus from this number, then we get 325,000 or 175,000-275,000 Armenians absent.  
 
The British Foreign Office number for the Ottoman Armenians in 1914 was 1,600,000. Then 
the figure of the absent Armenians in 1914-1921 was about 975,000. If we exclude from this 
350,000 or 400,000-500,000 Armenian refugees in the South Caucasus, this would leave 
around 625,000 or 475,000-575,000 Armenians absent.  
 
According to one of the British Foreign Office documents, at least 1,000,000 Armenians were 
deported during 1915 and 1916, and while exact numbers of those killed or dying through 
exposure and famine were not yet available, at least 700,000 to 800,000 must have lost their 
lives.501  
 
Arnold Toynbee, a British historian and a consultant of the British Government on 
international affairs related to the Middle East, estimated 1,600,000 Armenians in the 
Ottoman Empire in 1914, 600,000 of whom escaped deportation. According to his 
calculations, the number of refugees plus the populations of Izmir and Istanbul who escaped 
the deportations was 350,000, of which 182,000 refugees were in Russia and 4,200 in Egypt. 
He counted the number of Catholic and Protestant Armenians, converts to Islam and those 
who may have escaped in hiding as 250,000.502 As mentioned earlier, the number of 
Armenian refugees in Russia, according to Armenian sources, was 350,000 or 400,000-
500,000. This means that the number of those who escaped the deportations had to be 768,000 
or 818,000-918,000. If we add to these figures 150,000 Armenians who returned to Cilicia in 
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1919503 and 200,000-300,000 Armenian deportees who, according to the memorandum of the 
Armenian National Delegation on the Armenian question presented to Prof. Rendell Harris in 
Paris in June 1918, were alive in Northern Syria and Mesopotamia in 1918,504 we get 
1,118,000-1,218,000 Armenians in 1918-1919. If we deduct them from 1,600,000 Ottoman 
Armenians in 1914, we get 382,000-482,000 Armenians who had died.  
  
Alexander Khatisov, one of the Dashnak leaders and premier of the Republic of Armenia in 
1919-1920, considered that 600,000 Armenians were killed.505 Vahan Cardashian, founder of 
the American Committee of the Independence of Armenia, in his paper of 1920 to substantiate 
the US Mandate for Armenia wrote that in 1914 there were 2,008,000 Armenians in the 
Ottoman Empire, one million of whom had possibly perished.506  
 
Salahi Sonyel disputed the figures given in Western and Armenian sources, which put the 
number of the killed Armenians at over one million. In his opinion, this was based on the 
assumption that the pre-war Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire numbered 
2,500,000, whereas the total number of Armenians in the Empire before the war was not more 
than 1,300,000. Sonyel claimed that about one million Ottoman Armenians were alive and 
accounted for at the end of the war, living in Turkey, the Caucasus, Middle Eastern countries, 
Europe, America or elsewhere. He assumed that the number of those who relocated was about 
700,000, leaving around 300,000 Armenians who lost their lives.507 
 
As seen from these figures, the number of the Armenians who suffered from the relocation 
varies and it is impossible to determine exact number. Taking into account the official 
Ottoman figure for the number of Armenians in the Empire in 1914 as 1,300,000 and the most 
accepted Turkish figure for the suffering Armenians as 300,000, it can be concluded that 
about 23% of the Ottoman Armenians lost their lives as a result of the relocation. If we take 
into account the Armenian Patriarchate figure for the number of the Ottoman Armenians in 
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1912 as 2,100,000 and the minimum Armenian figure for the dead Armenians as 600,000, 
about 35% of Ottoman Armenians disappeared. But if we accept the number of the dead 
Armenians as about 1,000,000, about 50% of Ottoman Armenians perished.  
 
Based on these approximate calculations it can be roughly concluded that according to 
Turkish figures about 23% Ottoman Armenians lost their lives because of the relocation, 
whereas based on Armenian sources, this ratio ranges between 35% and 50% and includes 
those who disappeared during the First World War, including the relocation. In general, the 
disappeared Armenians, based on Turkish figures, can be estimated to constitute about 7% of 
4,470,000 world Armenians in 1914.508 The ratio would change to between 13.5% and 22.5% 
based on the Patriarchate and other Armenian sources. According to the Foreign Office 
document, the number of world Armenians in 1914 was 3,650,000.509 In this case, the above-
mentioned ratio changes to 8% based on Turkish sources and 16.5% and 27.4% respectively 
based on Armenian sources.  
 
The calculations made on the basis of the Toynbee’s estimations, the Armenian statement of 
February 1919 at the Paris Peace Conference and the Armenian memorandum of June 1918 
change this ratio to 24%-30% of the Ottoman Armenians. According to Bogos Nubar Pasha, 
Head of the Armenian National Delegation, representing Ottoman Armenians, at the Paris 
Peace Conference, the world Armenians numbered 4,500,000.510 In this case, the dead 
Armenians would constitute 8.5%-10.7% of the world Armenians. Based on the Foreign 
Office count of world Armenians in 1914 as 3,650,000, the ratio would change to 10.5%-
13%. 
  
5.3 Legal implications of the relocation 
 
The whole process of relocation is regarded as ‘genocide’ by Armenians. The notion of 
‘genocide’ was first coined in 1944 by Raphael Lemkin511 and found its legal definition as a 
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crime under international law in the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide, which was adopted in 1948 and came into force in 1951.512  Of course the 
earlier absence of the term does not indicate the absence of the phenomenon itself. 
 
‘Genocide’ as a concept did not exist in 1915 or until thirty three years afterwards, when it 
was adopted by the UN. According to Article 2 of the UN Convention, ‘genocide means any 
of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, 
racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious 
bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group 
conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) 
Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring 
children of the group to another group.’513  
 
This definition of ‘genocide’ raises more questions than it solves, since under this definition 
one cannot find any war during which all of the above-mentioned activities were not 
committed by enemy sides against each other. Another question is what is meant under ‘in 
part’: whether this part is a minimum of two persons or more than that or what ratio of ‘a 
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such’ should be destroyed to be defined as 
‘genocide’.  
 
Leaving aside the questions arising from the definition of ‘genocide’, this section confines 
itself to the interpretation of the intentions of the CUP with regard to the Armenian 
relocations, to define whether there was a deliberate state policy of extermination of the 
Armenian people.     
 
Answering the accusations on the intentions behind the relocation, Talat Pasha, according to 
Hovannisian, said ‘the Armenians were deported from the eastern provinces but not upon a 
premeditated plan of annihilation. The responsibility for their fate fell foremost upon the 
Armenians themselves, although it was true that the deportations were not carried out lawfully 
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everywhere and that many innocent people suffered because some officials abused their 
authority.’514 Talat claimed that those involved in atrocities against the Armenians during 
their relocation were either ‘common criminals and looters’ or those who believed that the 
‘Armenians should be punished’ and that they acted ‘for the good of country’. Unlike the first 
group, he went on, it was not easy to deal with the second ones, since they were strong and 
numerous and any punishment would have caused great discontent among the Muslim masses 
“who favoured their acts”. It was necessary to avoid the division of the country and creation 
of anarchy in Anatolia when internal unity was most needed for the war effort.515    
 
According to Jemal Pasha, another member of the Young Turk triumvirate, who was 
Commander of the Fourth Ottoman Army in Syria at the time of the relocations, he did his 
best during the whole period of the deportation to give help to the Armenians, which has been 
confirmed by the Armenians themselves and by all impartial foreigners. The organisation of 
emigrants was exclusively the concern of the civil authorities and the Army had nothing to do 
with it. However, he noted that he gave stringent orders not to allow attacks on the emigrants 
in his military zone in Syria. He confessed that ‘he heard from time to time of deeds of 
violence against the emigrating Armenians in the vilayets of Mamuret-ul-Asis and Diarbekir’ 
and ‘was continually hearing complaints that the civil authorities in the sector between 
Bozanti and Aleppo were unable to provide emigrant columns with adequate supplies, and 
that the people in consequence were being found in a condition of the greatest distress along 
the route. I made a journey from Aleppo to Bozanti to view the situation personally, issued an 
order that bread was to be provided for the emigrants from the Army depots, and ordered the 
doctors on the lines of communication to look after the sick Armenians.’516 He mentioned that 
the killings of Armenians ‘must be ascribed to seventy years of accumulated hatred between 
Turks, Kurds, and Armenians. The responsibility must lie with Muscovite policy which made 
mortal enemies of three nations who for centuries had lived together in peace. The crimes 
perpetrated during the deportations of 1915 justly roused the deepest horror, but those 
committed by the Armenians during their rising against the Turks and Kurds do not in any 
way fall short of them in cruelty and treachery […] The Government regarded deportation as 
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the most effective and speedy means of ensuring the safety of the Kurdish and Turkish 
population, the Army and the whole political existence of the Ottoman State. Yet, on the other 
hand, by these measures they opened the way for the crimes perpetrated by the Kurds and 
Turks.’517  
 
Talat Pasha and Jemal Pasha admitted that crimes had been committed against the Armenians 
during the relocation process for different reasons: the basis of most was hatred against the 
Armenians which had accumulated during the decades after the Berlin Treaty because of the 
Armenian claims to Eastern Anatolia populated in main by the Muslims, and the Armenian 
collaboration with the enemy. If the CUP leaders had a premeditated intention of the 
destruction of the Armenian people, as argued by Armenian historians, they would already 
have conducted it, not waiting for the Ottoman retreat and would not have warned the 
Armenian leaders to advise their people to avoid supporting the enemy. Christopher Walker, 
one of the supporters of the thesis on the Turkish premeditated genocide of the Armenians, 
himself wrote that ‘at least until the middle of February [1915- I.K.], there was no outward 
display of hostility toward Ottoman Armenians. Indeed, in February Enver had publicly 
thanked the Armenians for their conduct during the Sarikamish campaign.’518 This shows that 
until wide-scale provocations of the Ottoman Armenians against the Ottoman Empire and the 
betrayal of those who were on the side of the Ottoman state until the Ottoman failure, there 
were no hostile actions against Armenians. Even the demobilisation of the Armenians from 
the Ottoman Army started in the end of February 1915. If there was any premeditated 
Ottoman plan of extermination of the Armenians, its signs would have been seen before 
February 1915.  
 
The chronological development of the events leading to the relocation clarifies the motive of 
the Ottoman Government as being the prevention of the occupation of a great portion of the 
Empire in Anatolia with Armenian help. The problem was to be solved by relocating the 
Armenians from the densely Armenian-populated areas in Anatolia to Mesopotamia. 
Moreover, as cited earlier, Armenians should not have constituted more than 10% of the local 
population in the new settlements, so as not to create compact ethnic masses, and their 
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villages should not have had more than fifty houses. These arrangements suggest that the 
government was concerned that new disturbances and rebellions would occur if the 
Armenians constituted a compact majority in their new locations, which would jeopardise 
Anatolia from its southern border in the future. It seems that the CUP leaders did not want the 
Armenians to have compact settlements either in Anatolia or its borders because of the threat 
they posed and could pose in the future to the territorial integrity of the Ottoman state. The 
thesis on the premeditated extermination of the Armenians by the CUP leaders is also not 
convincing because even by exterminating those Armenians living in the whole Ottoman 
Empire, they would not be able to exterminate all of them, since it was generally agreed that 
more than half of the Armenian people lived outside the Ottoman Empire, especially in the 
South Caucasus. For that reason, it does not seem realistic that the Ottoman Government 
would aim at extermination of the Armenian people, being aware of the impossibility of its 
realisation.     
 
According to Kamuran Gurun, a special investigation council was established at the Ministry 
of War to examine the violations of the Relocation Law and relevant instructions, which 
functioned until early 1918. As a result of these investigations, 1,397 individuals were found 
guilty, sent to the martial law courts and given different punishments, including execution.519     
 
After the resignation of the Talat Pasha Cabinet on 14 October 1918, a new government 
headed by Izzet Pasha adopted a programme on the return of the relocated people on 19 
October. The programme stated that people who were relocated due to wartime considerations 
could return to their previous locations. Regarding the implementation of this programme, the 
Armenian Patriarch wrote that ‘the Armenians of Istanbul, Kutahya district and the Aydin 
province had not been required to relocate. The Armenians, who are now in the Izmit district, 
in Bursa, Kastamonu, Ankara and Konya, are those who had been relocated but now have 
returned. There are many Armenians in the Kayseri district, and in Sivas, Harput, Diyarbakyr, 
and especially in Cilicia and Istanbul, who have returned, but unable to go to their villages. 
The rest of the Armenians of Erzurum and Bitlis are in Cilicia.’520 A commission was 
established to find and gather children who were adopted and women who converted to 
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Islam.521 The relocated Armenians and Armenian refugees in the South Caucasus had also 
started returning to the parts of Eastern Anatolia occupied by Russia, i.e. Erzurum, Van, Bitlis 
and Trabzon provinces, which will be discussed in the next chapter.  
 
Tevfik Pasha, the new Ottoman Prime Minister who replaced Izzet Pasha from 18 November 
1918 had a special court formed to try the individual CUP members who would be arrested as 
war criminals. On 30 January 1919, twenty-seven people were arrested,522 the names of most 
of whom were provided by the British based on information from the Armenian Istanbul 
Patriarchate.523 
  
Taking into account that Britain was one the Allied countries fighting against the Ottoman 
Empire, the impartiality of the investigation of the 1915 events under its supervision was 
doubted by the Ottoman Government. For that reason, on 18 February 1919, Reshit Bey, the 
Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs, sent a telegram to the governments of Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Spain and Sweden, as neutral countries during the war, with the request that each 
of these states send two legal experts for the commission formed to investigate the relocation 
issue. The British tried to prevent the sending of these telegrams on the grounds of military 
censorship, then attempted to prevent the sending of these members to the commission.524 The 
British attempts to impede the investigation of the 1915 events with the involvement of the 
neutral countries demonstrate that they were not sure whether the investigation would give the 
expected results on the premeditated extermination of the Armenians. If the British were sure 
of its desired outcome, they would not prevent the neutral investigations. This means that 
Britain wanted to use the trial in its own interests. The forced resignation of Tevfik Pasha, 
initiator of the idea of neutral investigations of the relocation issue, who was replaced by the 
pro-British Ferid Pasha on 3 March 1919,525 strengthens this argument. The latter formed his 
new cabinet from the members of Hurriyyet ve Itilaf Partisi (Freedom and Accord Party) on 4 
March and established the ‘Nemrut Mustafa Pasha Martial Court’. On 10 March, sixty more 
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members of the CUP were arrested: their trial began on 27 April 1919. On 28 May, the British 
Military authorities took sixty-seven selected detainees to Malta. On 13 July 1919, the Court 
sentenced Talat Pasha, Enver Pasha, Jemal Pasha, and Dr Nazim Bey to death in absentia, as 
they had fled the country on 1 November, and Javit Bey and Mustafa Sharaf Bey to fifteen 
years’ imprisonment. The Istanbul trial was thus concluded.526  
 
Hovannisian wrote that Talat Pasha and Jemal Pasha were killed by Armenians in 1921 in 
Berlin and in 1922 in Tiflis respectively. Enver Pasha was ambushed and killed by a Soviet 
agent, supposedly of Armenian origin, in Central Asia in 1922.527 Regarding the assassination 
of Jemal Pasha by Armenians, Falih Refki wrote: ‘Sad destiny! There are many who still love 
and miss Jemal Pasha in Syria, where he condemned to death prominent Arab leaders. Jemal 
Pasha was killed by the Armenians, among whom he had saved tens of thousands with his 
own hand.’528 
 
As mentioned earlier, on 28 May, sixty-seven selected detainees in Istanbul were taken by the 
British to Malta.529 This act was opposed by the French Government, which was of the 
opinion that it was up to the Ottoman authorities to prosecute the detainees, and considered it 
an ‘arbitrary revenge’,530 indicating the absence of unanimity among the Allied countries on 
the trial, which can be explained by British-French rivalry over the partition of the Ottoman 
Empire territories among themselves. Despite French opposition, the British continued 
sending the Ottoman prisoners throughout the summer of 1919. In total, one hundred and 
forty-four prisoners were taken to Malta in 1919-1920, including about thirty important 
political prisoners, who were sent in March 1920. Following the latter, Mustafa Kemal Pasha, 
Leader of the Turkish National Movement, ordered, as a reprisal, the arrest of twenty British 
officers in Anatolia, including Colonel Alfred Rawlinson, the younger brother of General 
Henry Rawlinson.531  
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There is no unanimity on the number of Ottoman detainees in Malta. According to Bilal 
Shimshir, out of one hundred and forty-four detainees in Malta, fifty-six were selected by the 
British High Commissioner in Istanbul for prosecution.532 But Kamuran Gurun wrote that one 
hundred and eighteen individuals were sent to Malta up until the end of 1920, fifty-five of 
whom were charged with respect to the relocation: sixteen with concrete accusations; 
seventeen for being in power during the relocation; and twenty-two deputies, whose 
connection with Armenian atrocities was hard to determine.533 The Maltese judge, Giovanni 
Bonello, was of the same opinion as Shimshir. Out of the fifty-five charged with war crimes, 
he wrote, forty-one were politicians, only ‘half of whom had been considered responsible for 
the Armenian atrocities’.534 This figure differs from that of Gurun. As for the legal aspect of 
the problem, Bonello noted that there existed no law to regulate the matter, as the British 
military courts could try only three of seven offences535 (breach of armistice terms, hindering 
its execution, and ill-treatment of British POWs) in the occupied territories, not in Malta. All 
of the other offences, including Armenian-related ones, ‘loomed large as legal no man’s land 
and had best be left for determination in accordance with a future peace treaty’.536  
 
An article proposed by the British Prosecutor was included in the Sevres Treaty to deal with 
crimes related to the relocation issue legally.537 According to Article 230, ‘the Turkish 
Government undertakes to hand over to the Allied Powers the persons whose surrender may 
be required by the latter as being responsible for the massacres committed during the 
continuance of the state of war on territory which formed part of the Turkish Empire on 
August 1, 1914 [the name of the Empire was the Ottoman Empire, not the ‘Turkish Empire’ – 
I.K.].’ Moreover, ‘the Allied Powers reserve to themselves the right to designate the tribunal 
which shall try the persons so accused, and the Turkish Government undertakes to recognise 
such tribunal’ and ‘in the event of the League of Nations having created in sufficient time a 
tribunal competent to deal with the said massacres, the Allied Powers reserve to themselves 
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the right to bring the accused persons mentioned above before such tribunal, and the Turkish 
Government undertakes equally to recognise such tribunal.’538 
 
On 16 March 1921, Sir Horace Rumbold, the British Ambassador to Istanbul, forwarded to 
the Foreign Office ‘evidence’ or ‘details of charges’ against each of the above-mentioned 
fifty-five or fifty-six detainees who were to be prosecuted. As it appears from this letter, very 
few witnesses were available, with the Armenian Patriarchate in Istanbul being the main 
source of information; none of the Allied, Associated or neutral governments had been asked 
to supply evidence. He found that ‘under these circumstances the prosecution will find itself 
under grave disadvantage’, with the hope that the US Government could supply ‘a large 
amount of documentary information’. The British Embassy in Washington was instructed to 
that end.539  
 
This shows that the British Government did not have strong evidence to prove the charges 
against the Ottoman detainees in Malta; otherwise there would be no need to ask the US to 
provide evidence. It also demonstrates the reason for the British prevention of the 
investigation of the issue by neutral countries in 1919.   
 
On 13 July 1921, the British Ambassador to Washington replied, ‘a member of my staff 
visited the State Department yesterday […] in regard to the Turks who are at present being 
detained at Malta with a view to a trial... He was permitted to see a selection of reports from 
United States Consuls on the subject of the atrocities committed in Armenia during the recent 
war […] I regret to inform Your Lordship that there was nothing therein which could be used 
as evidence against the Turks who are being detained for trial at Malta.’540 
 
In view of lack of legal evidence, the Foreign Office decided to use political argument, 
writing to the British Procurator General's Department that from a political point of view ‘it is 
highly desirable that proceedings should take place against all of these persons against whom 
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there is a reasonable prospect of obtaining a conviction’.541 However, on 29 July 1921, the 
British Procurator General's Department replied, ‘it seems improbable that the charges made 
against some of the accused will be capable of legal proof in a Court of Law’.542 Therefore, 
the Attorney General was ‘not in a position to express any opinion’ as to the prospect of 
success in any cases submitted for his consideration.543 
 
This reply of the Procurator General's Department prompted Foreign Office to write that 
‘from this letter it appears that the chances of obtaining convictions are almost nil... The 
American Government, we ascertained, cannot help with any evidence... In addition to the 
absence of legal evidence there is the extreme unlikelihood that the French and Italians would 
agree to participate in constituting the course provided for in article 230 of the Treaty (of 
Sevres). On the other hand we certainly cannot release any Turks until our own prisoners are 
returned.’544 
 
Despite Rumbold’s suggestion to Lord Curzon, owing to the impossibility of obtaining proper 
evidence, to exchange all the Ottoman detainees, except the eight charged with cruelty to 
British prisoners, the British Government decided to exchange all of the Ottoman detainees, 
including the eight, with all of the British prisoners in Turkey.545 Thus, on 1 October 1921, all 
the Ottoman detainees in Malta were freed and sent to Turkey and all British prisoners in 
Turkey were handed over to their authorities.546 
 
5.4 Failure of the ‘Armenian homeland’ project in 1914-1916  
 
Analysis of the sources dealing with the Armenians’ political aspirations after 1915 shows 
that there was no change in the Armenian vision of their homeland project. Armenian leaders 
thought that the minority position of the Armenian population in Eastern Anatolia should not 
be an obstacle in the way of the realisation of their project. Their argument was that if they 
could construct an ‘Armenian homeland’ with a Great Power mandate, Armenians, including 
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Armenian refugees in different parts of the world, would return to the projected area, where 
the number of Muslims also decreased during the First World War and the rest would be 
forced to leave the projected Armenia.547 
 
In 1916, the Armenian calculations were strengthened by Russian military successes on the 
Caucasian front; however these did not coincide with the Russian vision of the future of the 
concerned area. In addition to the above-mentioned correspondence of the Russian officials, 
the agreement between France and Russia of 26 April 1916 supports this argument. Under 
this agreement, Russia would annex the provinces of Erzurum, Van, Bitlis and Trabzon up to 
a point on the Black Sea coast, to the west from Trabzon, which was to be defined (see Map 
9), whereas the rest of the territory of the Armenian project, i.e. the rest of Sivas and 
Mamuret-ul-Aziz provinces, which were not under Russian occupation, and parts of Adana 
and Halep provinces, which the Armenians called Cilicia, would be left to France.548  
 
The agreement meant that the area the Armenians called ‘Turkish Armenia’ in which since 
1878 they had been projecting Armenian autonomy was divided between Russia and France. 
As for the Russian plans with regard to its portion of this area, on 5 June 1916, a temporary 
act, ‘On the administration of the Turkish provinces occupied by the right of war’, was 
adopted, which established a temporary military general-governorship. The act contained no 
word about the Armenian autonomy or the word ‘Armenian’.549  
 
The correspondence between the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Sazonov, and Caucasian 
Viceroy, Nicolas Romanov, highlights the Russian official vision on the settlement of the 
‘Armenian question’ in the occupied territories. Thus, the former wrote on 14 June 1916 that 
the settlement of the ‘Armenian question’ is usually set between two extremes: ‘one – the 
aspiration of the Armenian nationalists for full autonomy under the auspices of Russia in the 
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spirit of the reforms of 1913 proposed by us, and another – just the opposite, which relegates 
the political importance of the Armenians to zero and tries to replace them with Muslims’.550  
 
‘It seems to me,’ the Russian Foreign Minister continued, ‘the solution to this issue in one or 
another direction absolutely does not suit the Russian state interests from either internal or an 
external policy considerations. As for the issue of granting large autonomy to Armenians, one 
should not forget that in Greater Armenia, which is now occupied by Russia, the Armenians 
never constituted a majority,’ so ‘under these circumstances Armenian autonomy would in 
reality lead to the unfair exploitation of the majority by the minority.’551 Guided by these 
considerations, he considered the best way out of the situation to be the organisation of the 
recently occupied provinces in the ‘strict guidance of law, justice and completely unbiased 
attitude to all multiethnic elements in the krai [territory in the meaning of ‘border country’ – 
I.K.], not setting them against each other and not showing the exceptional protection to any of 
the peoples to the prejudice of another. Thus it would be possible to grant the Armenians 
within limits a school and church independence, the right of use of their language, as well as 
urban and rural self-administration subject to the percentage ratios of the population in the 
elections.’552 
 
With regard to the above-mentioned excerpts it should be noted that under the project of 1913 
Russia had pressed for the creation of one province consisting of Erzurum, Van, Bitlis, 
Diyarbakyr, Mamurat-ul-Aziz and Sivas (excluding some parts of its suburbs and north-west) 
and the appointment of a Christian general-governor there, i.e. the creation of an Armenian 
autonomous province, despite the fact, which Sazonov also accepted in this letter, that in this 
area ‘Armenians never constituted a majority’.553 But when half of the very area came under 
Russian control, Russia considered ‘granting large autonomy to Armenians’ to be ‘unfair 
exploitation of the majority by the minority’ and found it to be unacceptable from both 
internal and external policy considerations. This once again shows that Russia’s aim in 
demanding Armenian reforms in the Ottoman Empire under the Berlin Treaty did not derive 
from its care about the Armenians, but from the extension of its area using Armenian reforms 
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as a pretext for interfering in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire; otherwise it would 
provide the same ‘reforms’ to the Armenians when the area came under its control.  
 
As for the reply of the Caucasian Viceroy to this letter on 3 July 1916: ‘the Armenian 
question, to my unshakeable belief, is completely absent within the borders of the current 
Russian Empire, and one should not even allow reminder about it, since the Armenian 
subjects of Russia in the general-governorship are equal subjects of Russia like Muslims, 
Georgians and Russians’.554 The Viceroy shared the view of the Russian Foreign Minister 
that, not touching upon the issue of Armenian autonomy under the aegis of Russia, the 
Armenians could be granted administrative and cultural rights, including the use of the 
Armenian language, on condition that priority was given to the Russian language in all 
official cases.555 
 
The Caucasian Viceroy’s reply completely contradicts the Russian proposals together with 
those of other Allied Powers to the Ottoman Government during the Berlin reform projects, 
when they had insisted on marking the difference between Armenians and Muslims, 
especially Kurds. But when it came to Russia’s turn, it was considered to be reasonable not to 
make any difference between the subjects of Russia. This meant that another Armenian hope 





On the basis of contemporary sources it was concluded that Armenian political organisations 
headed by Dashnaktsutiun, with the exception of some of its members, and the majority of the 
Armenian people, especially those in the South Caucasus and the border areas of the Ottoman 
Empire with Russia, sided with Russia in the First World War. With the help of Armenian 
volunteer units and the Van Armenians’ rebellions, Russia occupied the Ottoman territories as 
far as Bitlis.  
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The collaboration of the Ottoman Armenians with Russia was regarded as treachery by the 
Ottoman Government and led to the forced demobilisation of Armenians from the Ottoman 
Army, the arrest and trial of Armenian nationalist leaders, and finally the relocation of 
Armenians from different parts of the Ottoman Empire to south-east Anatolia and 
Mesopotamia. The implementation of the relocation law by the Ottoman Government resulted 
in the killing of a great number of Armenians, as well as their deaths and other sufferings 
from starvation, illness and weather conditions. The number of Armenians who died as a 
result of the relocation is very controversial topic. The figures vary between 300,000 and 
more than 1,000,000.  
 
The relocation is considered as an act of ‘genocide’ by the Armenians. At that time there was 
no such legal notion, even though the absence of the term does not indicate the absence of the 
phenomenon itself. As for the accusations around the premeditated plan of the CUP leaders to 
exterminate the Armenians, it was considered that the intention of the Ottoman Government 
was the relocation of the Armenians away from enemy powers’ areas of interest, especially 
Russia, so as not to allow them to occupy Ottoman territories with Armenian help. It was also 
noted that Talat Pasha and Jemal Pasha, leading CUP figures, admitted the atrocities against 
the Armenians, explaining them with the accumulated hatred of the Ottoman Muslim masses 
against them since the Armenians started making claims to their territories at the end of the 
nineteenth century, strengthened by the Armenian collaboration with the enemy during the 
war.  
 
After the resignation of the Talat Pasha Cabinet, the new Ottoman Government adopted a 
programme in October 1918 on the return of the relocated people. According to the decision 
of the Nemrut Mustafa Pasha Martial Court of 13 July 1919, Talat Pasha, Enver Pasha, Jemal 
Pasha, and Dr Nazim Bey were sentenced to death in absentia, as they had fled the country on 
1 November 1918, and Javit Bey and Mustafa Sharaf Bey to fifteen years. The rest of the 
CUP members were also arrested by the Ottoman Government, but were sent to Malta by the 
British. Since there existed no law to regulate the matter, an article was included in the Sevres 
Treaty to deal with the crimes related to the relocation issue legally. But the lack of legal 
evidence and the necessity of releasing British prisoners kept by the Turks in 1920 compelled 
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the British to free the Turkish detainees in Malta in October 1921 in exchange for British 
prisoners.  
 
It was noted that despite the Armenian hopes and support of Russia against the Ottoman 
Empire, Tsarist Russia had no plan to construct an Armenian state or grant political autonomy 
to the Armenians, in either the occupied territories of the Ottoman Empire or the South 
Caucasus. The First World War, regarded by the Armenian nationalists as an opportunity to 
realise their goals, did not fulfil their expectations in 1914-1916. The reasons were the 1915 
events and the absence of Great Power sponsorship. However, the Armenians did not lose 
their hopes: the next emerged with the February Revolution in 1917, to be discussed in the 























Chapter 6: The ‘Armenian Homeland’ Project: From the February 
Revolution to the Ottoman-Transcaucasian War 
 
This chapter examines Armenian expectations after the February Revolution of 1917 in 
Russia vis-à-vis constructing an ‘Armenian homeland’, both in the Russian-occupied 
territories of the Ottoman Empire and the South Caucasus. It analyses the Provisional 
Government’s act on ‘Turkish Armenia’ and the administrative-territorial readjustment 
project in the South Caucasus. It also explores the situation after the October Revolution in 
1917 and the signing of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, the peace negotiations and the war between 
the Ottoman Empire and Transcaucasia. 
 
6.1 The February Revolution and the ‘Armenian homeland’ project  
 
Although Tsarist Russia had no intention of constructing an ‘Armenian homeland’ in the 
occupied Ottoman territories, the abdication of Tsar Nicolas II in the February Revolution in 
1917 and the subsequent formation of the Provisional Government created new hopes for the 
realisation of Armenian political aspirations in the occupied Ottoman provinces and the South 
Caucasus. The negative attitude of the masses, including the soldiers, to the continuation of 
the annexationist war compelled the Provisional Government to decide on ways of keeping 
the occupied territories under its control that did not demonstrate imperialistic ambitions, i.e. 
in accordance with its declared democratic principles. On 26 April 1917 the government 
adopted an ‘Act on the arrangement of administration in the Russian-occupied parts of 
Turkish Armenia’, to be valid until the final settlement of the situation of ‘Turkish Armenia’ 
by the peace treaty556 (see Map 9).  
 
On 15 May 1917, General-lieutenant Peter Aver’yanov was appointed ‘acting General-
Commissioner of Turkish Armenia and other provinces occupied during the war’, with the 
Armenian, Yakob Zavriyev, as his ‘assistant on civil affairs of Turkish Armenia’.557 One of 
the instructions given to Aver’yanov was: ‘not foreclosing the issue on the future 
                                                 
556 Barsegov Yu (ed.), Genotsid armyan. Otvetstvennost’ Turtsii i obyazatel’stva mirovogo soobshchestva. 
Dokumenty i kommentariy, tom 1, Moscow: Gardariki, 2002, dok 298, p 297 
557 Ibid., dok 301, p 299 
145 
geographical and political borders of Armenia, out of the territories occupied in Asiatic 
Turkey by the right of war the Provisional Government considers Van, Bitlis and Erzurum to 
be historical Armenian provinces’,558 so Van, Bitlis and Erzurum were considered ‘Russian-
occupied parts of Turkish Armenia’. This act and instruction aimed to create the necessary 
grounds for the future separation of the occupied territories from the Ottoman Empire, 
labelling them ‘Turkish Armenia’, and their possible annexation to Russia or bringing under 
its protectorate, depending on the course of political and military events.   
 
The same session instructed Aver’yanov to adopt measures for the gradual return of the 
Armenians who had settled within Russia during the current war and previous years, and 
equally not to impede the settlement of these provinces by former Ottoman Armenians who 
wished to return. In contrast to the favourable attitude to the Armenians, he was instructed to 
disallow the return of Ottoman Muslims (Turks, Kurds and Lazes), who had left with the 
Ottoman troops, until a special order had been issued.559 Muslims from the occupied 
territories, and also Muslims from the neighbouring Kars oblast (see Map 8), who were exiled 
in 1914 by the Tsarist Government, could not return to their lands. Touching upon the issue of 
the Muslims of the Kars oblast, Alikhan Kantemirov, a member of the Muslim Socialist Bloc, 
in his speech at the session of the Zakavkazskiy Seym (Transcaucasian Diet) on 5 (18) March 
1918, declared, ‘in 1914, the entire local Muslim population of Ardahan was exiled and the 
mosque was destroyed; in other words, everything that happens during wartime happened 
there. However, later, when the Ardahan Muslims wanted to return to their semi-destroyed 
houses, they could not do so, since a bitter grievance befell them: Ardahan was already in the 
hands of other elements [Armenians – I.K.], who seized Muslim houses, Muslim property, 
and later wanted to rule the whole okrug by the right of strength.’560 He went on to state, ‘in 
1914, the whole population of Kars was exiled, and the Muslim houses and property were 
subjected to the same destiny: seizure by the newcomers [Armenians – I.K]. The 
revolutionary powers did not take any steps to recover the injuries of the Muslim peasantry in 
the Kars oblast. Consequently, the Muslim peasantry has reason to distrust not only the 
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Tsarist autocracy, but also the revolutionary powers. The Government could not return the 
property and houses of the population of Ardahan and Kars okrugs.’561  
 
The decrease in the Muslim population in the Kars oblast is also evident when comparing 
Maps 8 and 9. Map 8 is based on the official statistics of 1916, which did not take into 
account war-related Muslim exiles, whereas the statistical information on Kars and 
Kaghyzman okrugs of Kars oblast in the Provisional Government’s administrative-territorial 
readjustment project of 21 July 1917 (see Map 9) took into account the government-arranged 
Muslim decrease in these areas. The project did not contain any statistical information on the 
pre-war Muslim-dominated Oltu and Ardahan okrugs of Kars oblast, the Muslim population 
of which was also decreased by the Tsarist Government at the start of the war. For that reason, 
the Provisional Government’s territorial-administrative readjustment project, discussed later 
in the chapter and in the last two case study chapters, did not need to redraw the borders of the 
okrugs of Kars oblast as it did in the case of administrative units of Erevan guberniya, the 
bordering uezds of the Elizavetpol guberniya and southern uezds of the Tiflis guberniya, 
where he projected redrawing the borders of the necessary uezds in order to construct 
Armenian-dominated uezds (compare Maps 8 and 9).    
  
Hovannisian wrote that about 150,000 Armenians had returned to Van, Bitlis, Erzurum and 
Trabzon by the end of winter 1917. The Armenians assumed most civil positions in the area, 
whilst the administration of Van and Bitlis was an Armenian monopoly. In his opinion, the 
revival of the occupied territories seemed at hand if the military front could be stabilised and 
the war advantageously concluded.562 
 
The number of Armenian refugees in the South Caucasus in 1914-1916 was estimated at 
about 350,000 or 400,000-500,000.563 As for the Muslims, Jemal Pasha wrote that over one 
and a half million were killed or displaced by the Armenians when they marched into Bitlis, 
Van, Erzurum and Trabzon.564 Vahan Cardashian, founder of the American Committee of the 
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Independence of Armenia, noted that in autumn 1917, only 96,000 Turks and Kurds were left 
in the provinces of Van, Bitlis and Erzurum out of about 551,000.565  
 
According to the Ottoman census of 1914, there were 1,162,676 Muslims in Van, Bitlis and 
Erzurum provinces. The Russian sources did not provide figures for all three provinces: the 
Russian Council-General in Erzurum estimated 1,047,000 Muslims in Erzurum and Bitlis in 
1912, whereas the Russian Vice-Consul in Van gave a figure of 520,000 in Van and Bitlis in 
1912. According to the Armenian Istanbul Patriarch, there were 709,000 Muslims in the three 
provinces in 1913 (see Tables 6.1 and 6.2).  
 
The statistics provided by the Ottoman, Russian and Armenian sources differ from each other. 
However, they demonstrate that the Muslims constituted a majority in Van, Bitlis and 
Erzurum provinces before the war. Cardashian’s figure of 551,000 for the number of Muslims 
in these provinces before the war significantly differs from those in Table 6.1. His statistics 
on the number of Muslims in these provinces before the war and in 1917 may not be precise, 
but they are suggestive of some dramatic changes in their population. Moreover, as mentioned 
earlier, on 15 May 1917, the Provisional Government gave instructions not to allow the return 
of Muslims, including Lazes, who left with the Ottoman troops. This means that the Muslim 
population of the Trabzon province, populated, among other Muslims, by Lazes, also suffered 
from the occupation. According to the Ottoman census of 1914, the province, almost half of 
which would be occupied by Russia during the war, had a total population of 1,122,947, of 
whom 921,128 were Muslims and 40,237 were Armenians.566 Although it is impossible to 
give an exact number for the Muslims absent from Van, Bitlis, Erzurum and Trabzon 
provinces and to check the accuracy of the official Ottoman figures, as well as those provided 
by Cardashian and Jemal Pasha, it can be suggested that the number was significant.
                                                 
565 FO 371/4156, p 44 
566 Mutlu S, op cit., p 33 
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Ottoman Census, 1914567 Russian Council-




Van,  1912569 
Armenian Patriarch, 1913570 
Mus Arm Total Mus Arm Mus Arm Mus Arm Total 




Bitlis 309,999 119,132 437,479 497,000 150,000 280,000 180,000 162,000 180,000 382,000 
Erzurum 673,297 136,618 815,432 550,000 200,000 No data No data 400,000 215,000 630,000 
Total 1,162,676 323,542 1,511,911 1,047,000 350, 000 520, 000 300, 000 709,000 580,000 1,362,000 
 
 
Table 6.2 Muslim and Armenian population in ‘Turkish Armenia’ in percentages 
 




Mus Arm Mus Arm 
Van 69% 26% 42% 53% 
Bitlis 71% 27% 42.5% 47% 
Erzurum 82.5% 16.7% 63.5% 34% 
Total 77% 21.5% 52% 42.5% 
  
                                                 
567 Mutlu S, ‘Late Ottoman Population and its Ethnic Distribution’, Nüfusbilim Dergisi/Turkish Journal of Population Studies, vol 25, 2003, pp 32, 34 
568 FO 371/3405, ‘Historical and Ethnological Notes on Armenians’, p 9 
569 Ibid. 
570 Sbornik diplomaticheskikh dogovorov. Reformy v Armenii (26 noyabrya 1912 goda-10 maya 1914 goda), pril 6, pp 275, 286, 289 
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The drastic decrease in the majority Muslim population of the occupied provinces increased 
the hopes of the Armenian nationalists for the unification of Van, Bitlis and Erzurum 
provinces with the projected Alexandropol, Erevan and Gandzak guberniyas in the South 
Caucasus under the Provisional Government’s above-mentioned administrative-territorial 
readjustment project of 21 July 1917 (see Map 9), and thus the construction of an ‘Armenian 
homeland’ from Van to Garabagh. The aim of neutralising the Muslim elements in the 
projected Armenia becomes clear when analysing the July project: to encircle the Muslim-
dominated uezds of the projected Erevan guberniya from the east with the projected 
Armenian-dominated uezds of the projected Gandzak guberniya, from the north with the 
projected Armenian-dominated uezds of the projected Erevan guberniya, from the west with 
the projected Armenian-dominated uezds of the projected Alexandropol guberniya and from 
the south with the occupied Ottoman provinces of Erzurum, Van and Bitlis, whose Muslim 
population was decreased due to the war (compare Maps 8 and 9).  
 
The method of redrawing the borders of the administrative units in the South Caucasus in this 
project together with the Provisional Government’s impediment to the return of the Muslims 
to the Kars oblast and the areas occupied in Eastern Anatolia show the real intentions of the 
Russian Government regarding the future of the South Caucasus and the recently occupied 
territories, despite its stated democratic principles. The policy aimed at the minimisation of 
the Muslim presence in the occupied territories and the areas of the South Caucasus closer to 
the pre-war Ottoman-Russian border, encircling them with the projected Armenian-dominated 
units of the projected Alexandropol, Erevan and Gandzak guberniyas.     
 
The Armenian National Congress, which met in Tiflis on 11-25 October 1917, was another 
important step towards constructing an ‘Armenian homeland’ in the South Caucasus. In its 
final session, the Congress selected a thirty-five member National Assembly, the legislative 
body of the Armenians of Russia, and fifteen member National Council, the executive body. 
Six of the fifteen places in the latter were allotted to Dashnaktsutiun, two seats each to Hai 
Zhoghovrdakan Kusaktsutiun (Armenian Populist Party),571 Social Revolutionary 
                                                 
571 Note: The party was created in March 1917 by Armenian middle-class representatives from the intellectual, 
professional and industrialist classes of Tiflis, who formerly belonged to the Russian Constitutional Democrat 
(Kadet) party or its Armenian affiliate. The party’s initial manifesto of April 1917 pledged support to the 
Provisional Government; adopted general reforms of the Russian Kadet programme; recommended Armenian 
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(Armenian)572 and Social Democrat (Armenian)573 parties, and three seats to non-partisans.574 
Thus, the Armenian National Council, which would declare the independence of the 
Armenian Republic, emerged. This means that on the day of the October Revolution, the 
Armenians selected their National Council and entered the new period one step closer to 
homeland construction.  
 
The comparison of Armenian autonomy aspirations with Tartar ones reveals that, unlike the 
Armenians, whose autonomy aims found their reflection in the 1887 Hnchak and the 1892 
and 1907 Dashnaktsutiun programmes, the leading Tartar and Muslim political party, 
Musavat (Equality), came up with the idea of autonomy for Azerbaijan only in its draft 
programme of June 1917, which was adopted on 26 October 1917, one day after the October 
Revolution. It was only on 27 May 1918, after the dissolution of the Transcaucasian 
Federative Democratic Republic on 26 May 1918, that the emergency session of the former 
Muslim members of the former Zakavkazskiy Seym (Transcaucasian Diet), to be discussed 
later, unanimously decided to declare itself the Temporary National Council of the Muslims 
of Transcaucasia with a right of co-option proportional to the composition of every faction. 
Mahammad Amin Rasulzada, the leader of Musavat, was elected Chairman of the National 
Council. The executive body of nine people headed by Musavatist Fatali khan Khoyskiy was 
elected with four members from Musavat, two from the Muslim Socialist Bloc, one from 
Hummat (Muslim Social Democrats) and one from Ittihad (Unity of Muslims of Russia).575  
 
The Georgians established their National Council on 22 November 1917 when the Georgian 
National Assembly convened. Georgian Social Democrat Menshevik Party members were 
                                                                                                                                                        
ethno-territorial autonomy within the Russian state; and the restoration of the independence of the Armenian 
Church (Hovannisian R, op cit., pp 73-74). 
572 Note: The Armenian branch of the Social Revolutionary Party was formed in 1907 from members of  
Dashnaktsutiun who considered that the latter ‘had failed to emphasize socialist goals and to participate 
sufficiently in the Russian revolutionary movement’ (Ibid., p 278, note 133).  
573Note: Armenian Social Democrats consisted of Armenian Social Democrat Bolsheviks, Social Democrat 
Mensheviks and ‘Specifists’ (members of the Social Democratic Workers Armenian Organisation). The latter 
‘contended that the realities of the Armenian situation were quite different from those affecting the general 
proletariat and that, therefore, the ‘specific’ disparities warranted particular consideration’. The ‘specifists’ 
considered themselves ‘as the only true spokesman for the Armenian toilers and advocated the principles of 
federative government, national-cultural self-determination, and within the Marxist government, regional party 
autonomy’ (Ibid., p 19).   
574 Ibid., p 90 
575 Zaqafqaziya Seyminin müsəlman fraksiyası və Azərbaycan Milli Şurası iclaslarının protokolları: 1918-ci il, 
Baku: ‘Adiloğlu’ nəşriyyatı, 2006, dok 21; Balaev A, Azerbaydzhanskoe natsional’no-demokraticheskoe 
dvizhenie. 1917-1920 gg., Baku: Elm, 1990, pp 26-27 
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elected to most places on the newly elected National Council, with Menshevik Noi Zhordania 
as its chairman. From now on, ‘Menshevik’ and ‘Georgian’ would remain synonymous.576  
 
Thus, the three main peoples of the South Caucasus passed into the period after the October 
Revolution with territorial autonomy aspirations. Their territorial claims became especially 
clear during the discussions of zemstvo (local administrative council) issues in 1917. Since the 
current thesis discusses the territorial conflicts between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the zemstvo 
problems between Armenians and Tartars in 1917 will be examined in the last two case study 
chapters.  
 
6.2 The October Revolution and the ‘Armenian homeland’ project 
 
The October Revolution in 1917 and the establishment of the Bolshevik Government 
influenced the political life of the South Caucasus. Thus, on 11 (24) November 1917, Osobiy 
Zakavkazskiy Komitet (Special Transcaucasian Committee; OZAKOM), which had been 
formed for the administration of the South Caucasus on 22 March 1917, was replaced by 
Zakavkazskiy Komissariat (Transcaucasian Commissariat). The Commissariat was created 
‘with the agreement of all socialist parties and democratic revolutionary organizations’ as a 
provisional regional power until the convocation of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, 
and did not recognise the Bolshevik Government. It was a coalition of revolutionary, public, 
official and national organisations, and in fact, the first independent government of the South 
Caucasus. The temporary government, which was supposed to function until the All-Russian 
Constituent Assembly, had to deal with a great number of issues. The main ones from the 
point of view of the current chapter were: the maintenance of the Caucasian front and the 
conclusion of peace; the introduction of zemstvo; and the settlement of the national question 
in the South Caucasus.577 The commissariat covered the whole region, excluding Baku and its 
surroundings ruled by the Baku Soviets headed by Bolsheviks from 2 (15) November 1917, 
                                                 
576 Hovannisian R, op cit., p 116 
577 Dokumenty i materialy po vneshney politike Zakavkaz’ya i Gruzii, Tiflis: Tipografiya Pravitel’stva 
Gruzinskoy Respubliki, 1919, dok 5, pp 3-7; dok 7, pp 8-10; Avalov Z, Nezavisimost’ Gruzii v mezhdunarodnoy 
politike 1918-1921 gg. Vospominaniya. Ocherki, Paris, 1924, pp 8, 27 
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and included eleven members, with three Tartars, three Armenians, two Georgians and three 
Russians.578  
 
According to the results of the elections to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, which were 
held in the Caucasus and along the Ottoman-Russian front throughout November 1917, more 
than two million votes were cast: 
 
Social Democrats (Mensheviks) – 661,934579 
Musavat – 615,816 
Dashnaktsutiun – 558,440  
Muslim Socialists – 159,770  
Social Revolutionaries – 117,522  
Social Democrats (Bolsheviks) – 93,581  
Muslim Social Democrats (Hummat) – 84,748  
Muslim Ittihadists – 66,504  
Constitutional Democrats (Kadets) – 25,673  
 
On the basis of one delegate per sixty thousand votes, the Mensheviks were allotted eleven, 
Musavatists ten and Armenian Dashnakists nine places, the rest being distributed among other 
parties.580  
 
The majority of the peoples of the South Caucasus gave their votes to the parties with 
nationalist programmes, meaning that the majority supported national-territorial autonomy 
ideas. The votes given to Musavat, the leading Muslim and Tartar nationalist party, 
demonstrated the popularity the national-territorial autonomy ideas had gained by November 
1917 among the Muslims of the region, whose national ‘awakening’ process had started only 
in the late 19th-early 20th centuries. The Armenian, Stephan Shaumian, who was a Bolshevik, 
but an Armenian nationalist by conviction, could not hide his surprise at the popularity of this 
                                                 
578 Dokumenty i materialy po vneshney politike Zakavkaz’ya i Gruzii, dok 6, pp 7-8 
579 Note: According to another source, the votes given to Mensheviks were 569,362 out of 1,887,453 votes cast 
in the region (Hovannisian R, op cit., p 288, note 10). 
580 Azərbaycan Xalq Cumhuriyyəti Ensiklopediyası, cild II, Baku: ‘Lider Nəşriyyat’, 2005, p 446; Hovannisian 
R, op cit., pp 108-109; Note: There are differences in the sources in the numbers of the seats allotted to different 
parties. However, these sources give the same number of seats to three leading parties of the region.  
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party, writing, ‘Musavat, the weakest political party in Transcaucasia from the very 
beginning, which was organised during this revolution and did not have any organisations, 
any party traditions, any power and did not play any role in the beginning of the revolution, 
by the start of the second year turned out to be the strongest political party in 
Transcaucasia’.581       
 
Another task of the Transcaucasian Commissariat was the conclusion of peace. The first 
major step was its entry into negotiations with the Ottomans on 21 November (4 December) 
1917 to consider their armistice proposal on the Caucasian front, which was achieved on 5 
(18) December 1917 in Erzinjan. The conditions of the armistice were elaborated by the 
Russian military leadership of the front. The demarcation lines between the warring parties 
were within Eastern Anatolia, from the Black Sea up to Van Lake.582 The Erzinjan armistice 
was based on the Brest-Litovsk Armistice of 2 (15) December 1917, signed between the 
Soviets and the Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and the Ottoman 
Empire).583 The Soviet ‘Declaration of Peace’ of 26 October (8 November) 1917, which had 
proposed to all warring peoples and their governments to begin peace negotiations ‘without 
annexations (i.e. without seizure of foreign territory and the forcible annexation of foreign 
nationalities) and without indemnities’,584 had already become a signal for the desertion of 
soldiers from the Caucasian Army, which was formed of Siberians, Poles, West Russians, 
Finns and others, who had no strong personal motive to maintain the demarcation line, while 
Georgian and Armenian troops  had fought on the European fronts.585 The situation compelled 
the Commander-in-Chief of the Caucasian front to order the formation of Armenian and 
Georgian army-corps in December to hold the front against the Ottomans: the Armenians held 
the left flank, the demarcation line from Van to Erzinjan and the Georgians the right one – 
along the Black Sea coast west of Trabzon.586  
 
                                                 
581 Balaev A, op cit., p 17 
582 Zakavkazskiy Seym’. Stenograficheskiy otchyot’. Sessiya pervaya. Zasedanie vtoroe. Tiflis, 13 February 1918; 
Kazemzadeh F, op cit., p 82; Dokumenty i materialy po vneshney politike Zakavkaz’ya i Gruzii, dok 8, pp 11-13; 
dok 14, pp 18-23 
583 Wheeler-Bennett J, Brest-Litovsk, The Forgotten Peace, March 1918, London: Macmillan and Co., Limited, 
1939, pp 379-380 
584 Ibid., p 375 
585 FO 371/7729, p 308 (4) 
586 Kazemzadeh F, loc cit.; Hovannisian R, ‘The Armenian Question in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1914’ in 
Hovannisian (ed.), The Armenian People from Ancient to Modern Times, Volume II, New York: St.Martin Press, 
2004, p 290 
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Meanwhile, peace negotiations between the Soviets and the Central Powers started at Brest-
Litovsk, and at the first plenary session on 9 (22) December 1917, the Soviet delegation 
presented six main tenets, three of which are of particular importance for our topic: (1) the 
liberation of the occupied territories at the earliest moment; (2) political independence to 
those nationalities which had been deprived of it since the beginning of the war; and (3) 
nationalities not hitherto enjoying political independence to be allowed the right to decide by 
referendum whether they elect to be united to other nations or to acquire independence.587   
 
On 16 (29) December 1917, Stephan Shaumian was appointed Plenipotentiary Commissar for 
Caucasian Affairs on the recommendation of Joseph Stalin at the session of Sovnarkom, the 
Soviet government.588 Shaumian’s political line was also demonstrated during the Dashnak-
Bolshevik negotiations. Referring to Ruben Ter-Minasian, one of the Dashnak leaders, 
Hovannisian wrote that Shaumian pledged to do everything in his power to reinforce the front 
with Russian troops, accepted the repartition of South Caucasus to create ethnic Armenian 
administrative units and authorised the use of Russian contingents to protect the Armenian 
provinces of the Caucasus and to support the Armenian units in the mountainous parts of 
Elizavetpol guberniya. Until the fulfilment of these terms, ‘the Bolsheviks were not to incite 
any disturbances in western Transcaucasia and Dashnaktsutiun would continue its official 
anti-Communist activity and propaganda. When Sovnarkom completed its share of the 
bargain, Dashnaktsutiun would unite with the Bolsheviks to seize control of all 
Transcaucasia.’589  
 
Further evidence of Bolshevik-Dashnak collaboration was a Soviet decree on ‘Turkish 
Armenia’ adopted on 29 December 1917 (11 January 1918) by Sovnarkom and confirmed on 
15 (28) January 1918 by the Third All-Russian Conference of Soviets. It supported the right 
of the Armenians of ‘Turkish Armenia’ occupied by Russia to free self-determination up to 
full independence, the realisation of which was conditioned by a number of initial guarantees: 
withdrawal of troops from ‘Turkish Armenia’ and immediate organisation of an Armenian 
people’s police; return of Armenian refugees, as well as Armenian emigrants to ‘Turkish 
Armenia’; and unhindered return of Armenians who were forcefully deported within the 
                                                 
587 Wheeler-Bennett J, op cit., p 117 
588 Balaev A, op cit., p 16 
589 Hovannisian R, Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918, pp 112-113 
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Ottoman Empire during the war to ‘Turkish Armenia’. The boundaries of ‘Turkish Armenia’ 
were to be defined by ‘democratically elected representatives of the Armenian people in 
agreement with the democratically elected representatives of the adjacent and disputed 
(Muslim and other) okrugs’, together with Stephan Shaumian, Plenipotentiary Commissar for 
Caucasian Affairs.590 
 
The real aim of this decree was to prepare the ground for the Soviet annexation of the 
Ottoman territories which had been occupied by Tsarist Russia in the war and had been 
reorganised into ‘Turkish Armenia’ by the Provisional Government. Soviet success in this 
task would make the establishment of Soviet rule in the South Caucasus easier and thus 
recreate Tsarist Russia in the form of Soviet Russia, which would include the occupied 
Ottoman territories and the South Caucasus. In other words, Tsarist Russia’s expansion 
through occupation under the slogan of the defence of rights of Christian peoples turned into 
Soviet Russia’s expansion under the slogan of the right to self-determination. The Armenians, 
as in the case of Tsarist Russia, were considered to be useful for the realisation of this aim.      
 
The Ottoman Foreign Minister, Ahmet Nesimi Bey, as a member of the Ottoman delegation at 
the Brest-Litovsk negotiations, on 18 January 1918 protested against this decree to Leon 
Trotsky, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of Soviet Russia, and warned him of the 
responsibility of the Soviets for its negative consequences. He added that arming the 
population of the area which did not belong to Russia591 and inciting and compelling them to 
declare independence, contradicted the tenets of the Russian revolution. In the opinion of 
Nesimi Bey, by arming the Armenians of Eastern Anatolia, Soviet Russia was pursuing a 
hostile policy against the Ottoman Empire.592  
 
In order to prevent the realisation of the Soviet policy, the Ottomans advanced a counter-
policy of separating the projected areas from Russia through the anti-Bolshevik 
Transcaucasian Commissariat. The Ottomans established contact with the Commissariat. The 
                                                 
590 Dokumenty vneshney politiki SSSR, tom 1, Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo politicheskoy literatury,  
1957, dok 43, pp 74-75 
591 Note: Here ‘arming’ means the point on the organisation of the Armenian police in the occupied territories 
after the withdrawal of Russian troops in the decree on ‘Turkish Armenia’. 
592 Şahin E, Diplomasi ve sınır: Gümrü görüşmeleri ve protokolleri – 1918, Istanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2005,  
p 32 
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latter was informed by the former that the representatives of the Central Powers at the Brest-
Litovsk peace conference were ready to recognise a Transcaucasian government, which could 
send its delegates to Brest. The Transcaucasian Commissariat promised to give its reply to 
this proposal within three weeks, as it needed to coordinate its position with other 
autonomous areas of Russia. The Commissariat set up a conference date for 1 (14) February 
with Ukraine and the South-Eastern Union, who had immediate interests in peace with the 
Ottomans, to decide about the Ottoman proposal and to give a final reply. However, Ukraine 
did not give any reply, whereas the South-Eastern Union sympathised with the idea of the 
conference but did not send representatives or provide a written reply. Under these 
circumstances, on 3 (16) February, the Commissariat sent the Ottomans its consent to start 
preliminary negotiations on peace. It was decided to conduct the negotiations in Trabzon.593  
 
6.3 The de facto Transcaucasian government and peace negotiations with 
the Ottoman Empire in Trabzon 
 
On 5 (18) January 1918, the Bolsheviks dispersed the All-Russian Constituent Assembly on 
the day of its opening because of its strong anti-Bolshevik composition. The deputies from the 
South Caucasus on 10 (23) February 1918 convened Zakavkazskiy Seym (Transcaucasian 
Diet), the supreme regional government, representing the South Caucasian peoples. The main 
seats in the body, which were defined on the basis of twenty thousand votes per delegate 
according to the results of the elections to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, belonged to 
three main party factions: the Menshevik Social Democrats, Musavat and Dashnaktsutiun. 
Although the sources are unanimous with regard to the numbers of the seats belonging to 
Musavat (together with the Muslim Non-partisan Bloc) and Dashnaktsutiun being thirty and 
twenty-seven respectively, they differ over the seats of Mensheviks being thirty, thirty-two 
and thirty-three (out of which twenty-six were Georgians).594 At its second meeting on 13 
(26) February, the first session of the Transcaucasian Diet dissolved the Transcaucasian 
                                                 
593 Zakavkazskiy Seym’. Stenograficheskiy otchyot’. Sessiya pervaya. Zasedanie vtoroe. Tiflis, 13 February 1918, 
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Commissariat and all power was transferred to the Diet until the formation of a new 
government on 13 (26) March 1918.595  
 
The vision of the future of the South Caucasus was reflected in the declarations of the main 
political factions of the Diet at its 15 (28) February session. For the leading Muslim faction, 
Musavat, the most immediate tasks were the conclusion of peace and the practical 
implementation of national-territorial autonomy in Azerbaijan.596 For the leading Armenian 
faction, Dashnaktsutiun, the main issues were the conclusion of peace which would bring 
about the ‘establishment of autonomy of Turkish Armenia’ and ‘correct’ territorial division of 
the South Caucasus into ethnic cantons and their unification into a common Transcaucasian 
federation.597 For the Menshevik Georgians, the most important issues were again the 
conclusion of peace and national-territorial autonomy in the South Caucasus.598  
   
At its 16 February (1 March) session, the Diet decided to conduct peace negotiations with the 
Ottomans in Trabzon based on the pre-1914 Ottoman-Russian border. Moreover, the 
delegation would strive to secure the right of self-determination for Eastern Anatolia, in 
particular ‘autonomy of Turkish Armenia within Turkish statehood’.599 According to the 
position of a senior representative of Dashnaktsutiun at an official session of the Diet 
Commission on peace with the Ottoman Empire on 15 (28) February, which was revealed the 
next day by Yuriy Semyonov from the Constitutional Democratic Party, ‘it will be possible to 
establish good neighbourly relations with Turkey after the departure of the Russian troops. 
Consequently, it will be possible to build good relations with the Kurds as well.’600  
 
This view expressed by a senior representative of the leading Armenian political party 
suggests the optimism of Dashnaktsutiun members in February 1918 regarding Armenian-
Ottoman relations after the departure of the Russian troops, against the background of all that 
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had happened between the Armenians and the Ottoman Muslims, including the Kurds, over 
the last forty years. This also suggests that in mid-February 1918, Dashnaktsutiun did not 
consider the withdrawal of Russian military forces from the occupied Ottoman lands to imply 
negative implications for the Armenians. This optimism gives rise to a question on the 
attitude of the Armenian nationalists towards the Ottoman Empire after the 1915 events in the 
sense that, at least in February 1918, Dashnaktsutiun did not consider that the Ittihadist 
Government had had a premeditated plan to exterminate the Armenian people in 1915; 
otherwise the senior representative of the leading Armenian nationalist party would not have 
had reason to be optimistic on the ‘autonomy of Turkish Armenia within Turkish statehood’ 
and good neighbourly relations with the Ottoman Empire, which was headed at that time by 
the same Ittihadists.  
 
At its fifth meeting of 17 February (2 March), the session adopted the list of the delegates for 
the Trabzon peace negotiations comprising five Tartars, four Georgians and two 
Armenians.601 The same day, the Diet received a telegram from Lev Karakhan, himself an 
Armenian and the secretary of the Soviet delegation at the Brest-Litovsk peace negotiations, 
that the Soviets had decided to sign the Brest-Litovsk Treaty and concede Kars, Ardahan and 
Batumi.602 The same day, the Diet sent a telegram to the Brest-Litovsk conference protesting 
against this decision. It noted that the ‘Transcaucasian Government, according to the decision 
of the Diet, considers any treaty on Transcaucasia and its borders, which was signed without 
its knowledge and approval, to be of no international importance and obligatory for itself’.603 
It also notified that the Diet had already elected a peace delegation to leave for Trabzon to 
sign a final peace with the Ottoman Empire.604 On 19 February (4 March), Vladimir Lenin, 
Chairman of Sovnarkom, sent a radio telegram to Berlin on the Sovnarkom’s decision to 
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accept the conditions proposed by the Central Powers at Brest-Litovsk, which was realised on 
3 (16) March with the signing of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty.605  
 
According to Article IV of the Treaty, Russia was committed to ‘do all within her power to 
ensure the immediate evacuation of the provinces of Eastern Anatolia and their lawful return 
to Turkey’.606 Moreover, ‘the districts of Ardahan, Kars, and Batumi will be likewise and 
without delay cleared of Russian troops. Russia will not interfere in the reorganisation of the 
national and international relations of these districts, but leave it to the population of these 
districts to carry out this reorganisation in agreement with the neighbouring States, especially 
Turkey.’607 
 
A supplementary agreement between Russia and the Ottoman Empire regulated the execution 
of this provision: Russia was forbidden to concentrate more than one division, even for drill 
purposes, on the borders of the above-mentioned three districts or in the Caucasus without 
prior notice to the Central Powers, until the conclusion of a general peace. In contrast, the 
Ottoman Empire was permitted to keep its army on a war footing.608 
 
News of the Soviet acceptance of the demands of the Central Powers led to the delay of the 
departure of the South Caucasian delegation to Trabzon. Finally, on 1 (14) March 1918, the 
Trabzon peace conference opened. The principles guiding the South Caucasian delegation did 
not change under the influence of the Soviet decision and were the same as those declared on 
16 February (1 March).  
 
At the first session of the conference on 1 (14) March, the Ottoman delegation, headed by 
Rauf Bey, asked the South Caucasians, headed by Akakiy Chkhenkeli, to make exact 
declarations on the nature, form, political and administrative organisation of the republic 
which was in the process of formation in the South Caucasus and whether it implemented the 
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necessary procedures required by international law for the establishment of a state. The South 
Caucasian delegation gave brief information on the formation of the de facto independent 
Transcaucasian government after the October Revolution, responsible before the 
Transcaucasian Diet. It added that the government entered the sphere of international 
relations, accepting the proposal of the Ottoman Government on the independent peace 
negotiations and sending a telegram to the Powers protesting against the Brest-Litovsk Treaty 
as related to the South Caucasus.609     
 
Not being satisfied with these answers, on 3 (16) March, the Ottoman delegation in a new 
declaration asked for clarifications on the answers of the South Caucasian delegation and 
simultaneously made its own position clear. It stated that the formation of a Transcaucasian 
state did not correspond to the principles of international public law and that this state did not 
make a declaration of its independence and did not gain recognition by other powers. The 
Ottoman delegation continued arguing that by declaring in its telegram of 23 January (6 
February) 1918 the need for coordination of its activities with other autonomous governments 
of Russia and abstaining from sending its delegation to Brest-Litovsk conference, the 
Transcaucasian government considered itself not independent, but part of Russia. On these 
considerations, the Ottoman delegation found the South Caucasian delegation’s declaration on 
the nullity of Brest-Litovsk Treaty as related to the South Caucasus unacceptable.610 The 
Ottoman delegation then asked the South Caucasian delegation to officially define the form of 
its government, its borders, state languages and religion and its position with regard to the 
Ottoman Empire.611  
 
On 7 (20) March, the South Caucasian delegation declared that the Brest-Litovsk Treaty was 
formally not compulsory and in nature not acceptable for the South Caucasus, as Russian rule 
in the region ended after the October Revolution and gave way to the Transcaucasian 
government. Moreover, it continued, the Ottoman Government in its telegram of 1 (14) 
January to the Transcaucasian government on the establishment of peaceful relations between 
the Ottoman Empire and Transcaucasia called it independent and had notified its readiness to 
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conduct peace negotiations for the signing of a ‘final peace treaty’. In the opinion of the South 
Caucasian delegation, the burden of negotiations should lie not on the de jure, but on the de 
facto side of the issue.612 As for the form of administration, Transcaucasia would be a 
democratic federative republic. The area of the ‘state’ included Baku, Elizavetpol, Erevan, 
Tiflis and Kutaisi guberniyas, Batumi and Kars oblasts, and Zagatala and Sukhumi okrugs. 
The official language was Russian, but the state languages would be Georgian, Armenian and 
Turkic. In international relations, Transcaucasia was in the process of negotiations with the 
Ottoman Empire on the termination of war and conclusion of a durable peace.613  
 
The Ottoman delegation replied with a broad written statement insisting on the acceptance of 
the Brest-Litovsk Treaty and stating that the objection by a new state organism, which was in 
the process of formation and not yet a state, to the obligations of the treaty, which was an 
international act, could not have legal power. Soviet Russia, the delegation noted, replaced the 
Provisional Government by right. As for the dispersal of the Constituent Assembly, it was 
considered to be further evidence of the power of this government. The non-recognition of the 
Soviet Government by Transcaucasia was an intra-state factor and could not influence 
international relations until that part completely separated and completed the process of 
formation in accordance with international law, and achieved recognition of its independence 
by other governments. Taking into account these considerations, the Ottoman delegation 
considered that all acts and treaties signed by Soviet Russia were valid from a legal point of 
view and compulsory for all parts of Russia. As for the current negotiations, the Ottoman 
delegation called them the preparation of a basis for economic and commercial relations and 
definition of their practical and technical details, which were left outside the obligations of the 
Brest-Litovsk Treaty.614     
 
The Ottoman delegation stated that official recognition of the Transcaucasian Republic could 
take place through a special article in the treaty to be signed as a result of the negotiations, 
which could start only after abandonment of all pretensions to Batumi, Kars and Ardahan. As 
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for the self-determination of Eastern Anatolia, the Ottoman delegation protested in the most 
energetic form, finding it to be interference in the internal affairs of the Empire.615  
 
On 24 March (6 April), the Ottoman delegation sent an ultimatum to the South Caucasian 
delegation to accept the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. Towards the end of the conference on 28 March 
(10 April), the South Caucasian delegation declared its acceptance of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty 
as the basis for negotiations.616 The reason was explained by the South Caucasian delegation 
at the 9 (22) April session of the Diet to be the positive hints which the official text of the 
Brest-Litovsk Treaty, received by the delegation only towards the end of the conference, 
contained with regard to the South Caucasus. This hint was considered to be ‘Russia will not 
interfere in the reorganisation of the national and international relations of these districts 
[Ardahan, Batumi and Kars – I.K.], but leave it to the population of these districts to carry out 
this reorganisation in agreement with the neighbouring States, especially Turkey’.617 In the 
opinion of the South Caucasian delegation, under ‘neighbouring States’, the article meant the 
Ottoman Empire and Transcaucasia, since, after the exclusion of Russia by the article, there 
were no other neighbouring states there.618   
 
In reply to the declaration of the South Caucasian delegation, on 31 March (13 April), the 
Ottoman delegation declared that in order to involve its allies in the peace negotiations, it was 
necessary to declare Transcaucasian independence.619 However, acceptance of the Brest-
Litovsk Treaty by the South Caucasian delegation as the basis for negotiations was not 
accepted by the Transcaucasian Diet, which on 31 March (13 April) decided to recall the 
delegation and to be at war with the Ottoman Empire.620  
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6.4 Discussions in the Transcaucasian Diet on the Ottoman-Transcaucasian 
war  
 
The discussion of the Ottoman ultimatum on the acceptance of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty in the 
Diet on 31 March (13 April) started with a statement by Evgeniy Gegechkori, head of the 
Transcaucasian government. He informed the Diet members of the peace negotiations, 
including the acceptance by the South Caucasian delegation of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty as the 
basis for negotiation on 28 March (10 April). He continued that after this acceptance, the 
Ottoman side decided to suspend hostilities, followed by the demand for the surrender of 
Batumi by 31 March (13 April). Not receiving the desired reply by the mentioned time, the 
Ottoman side had renewed hostilities.  
 
Gegechkori, on behalf of the government, declared that acceptance of the Brest-Litovsk 
Treaty would mean that ‘Transcaucasia stopped existing as an independent republic and 
become the province of the Turkish Empire’, which the government could not accept.621 This 
statement was followed by speeches from representatives of different factions. According to 
Martiros Arutyunian from Dashnaktsutiun, the Ottoman Empire tried ‘to implement its old 
programme of unification of Constantinople with Baku with solid Muslim mass’ with the help 
of internal elements of the South Caucasus.622 In his opinion, Christian Armenians, Georgians 
and Assyrians, who lived in this area, impeded the implementation of this programme, so 
Armenians were destined to die, which would be followed by the death of the Georgians.623 
The essence of his speech was that the Muslims, as ‘internal elements’ of the region, 
supported the Ottomans, who would not otherwise dare to invade the region.  
 
Arutyunian’s view contradicted that of Alexander Khatisov, another member of 
Dashnaktsutiun. At the 16 February (1 March) session of the Diet, Khatisov had declared that 
‘there are some people who, it is claimed, wanted to join Turkey. Who tried to stop them? No 
one can stop them. There is no faith in Russia. Russia has been weakened. However, they do 
not do this, because they feel themselves to be independent Caucasian citizens and members 
                                                 
621 Zakavkazskiy Seym’. Stenograficheskiy otchyot’. Sessiya pervaya. Zasedanie dvadtsat’ pervoe. Tiflis,                       
31 March 1918, p 5 
622 Ibid., pp 12-13 
623 Ibid., pp 12-14 
164 
of the Transcaucasian republic’.624 But he did not make any speech at the 31 March session 
and thus did not repeat the same views when the Muslims were accused of treachery.   
 
Ivan Lordkipanidze, the Georgian Social Revolutionary, stated that the occupation of Batumi, 
Kars and Ardahan threatened not only Armenians and Georgians, but also Muslims. Citing 
the rebellion of the Muslim Ajarians of Batumi as an example, he argued that this showed that 
the Ajarians believed in a better life under Ottoman rule. Lordkipanidze also followed 
Arutyunian, stating that the Ottomans relied on treason from inside, and considered that 
Muslim leaders should explain to the Muslim masses that their interests coincided with the 
interests of the Armenians and Georgians and that the South Caucasus would be unable to live 
without Batumi.625 Lordkipanidze did not explain the reasons for the Ajarians’ belief in a 
better life under Muslim Ottoman rule. It can be suggested that the Ajarians’ dislike of 
Russian rule stemmed from being inhabitants in a state with an alien dominant religion, and 
the suspicion with which they were treated as Muslims and Ottoman sympathisers. 
 
Alikhan Kantemirov, a member of the Muslim Socialist Bloc, in his speech during the 
discussions on the seizure of power in Ardahan by Muslims on 5 (18) March, tried to shed 
some light on the problem. Disagreeing with Menshevik Georgian and Dashnak Armenian 
members of the Diet, Kantemirov declared that the seeds of the anarchy in the Muslim 
villages in Ardahan had been sown by Tsarist Russia long before. At that time, the Muslims 
were also accused of treason and the population of Muslim villages aged from 18 to 60 were 
exiled to Siberia. The same policy was followed by the revolutionary government of 
Alexander Kerensky.626 When self-determination for all peoples was declared, the Muslims of 
the predominantly Muslim Ardahan and Oltu okrugs could not realise this, because of ‘known 
traders and merchants in Oltu and Ardahan [Armenians – I.K.]’627 who tried to rule Ardahan. 
They read chauvinistic nationalist papers and declared that Muslims should not rule the okrug 
and that the formation of police should not be trusted to them; otherwise they would engage in 
oppression and murder. Kantemirov added that, in 1914, the entire local Muslim population of 
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Ardahan was exiled, but recently when Ardahan Muslims wanted to return to their semi-
destroyed houses, they could not do so, as Ardahan was in the hands of ‘other elements 
[Armenians – I.K.],’ who seized Muslim property and wanted to rule the whole okrug by the 
right of strength. The same happened to the Muslims of Kars, whose entire population was 
exiled in 1914 and their houses seized by the same aliens. The Muslims of Ardahan, 
Kantemirov argued, did what anyone would do if exiled from their own home, which was not 
treason, but justice.628  
 
Regarding the problems of the Kars, Batumi and Ardahan Muslims, it should be added that 
the Provisional Government, with the aim of introducing zemstvo to the South Caucasus, had 
projected the creation of Armenian-dominated area with the projected Alexandropol, Erevan 
and Gandzak guberniyas (compare Maps 8 and 9). The projected Alexandropol guberniya 
would be constructed at the expense of Alexandropol and Echmiadzin uezds of the Erevan 
guberniya, Akhalkalaki uezd and parts of Borchaly and Gori uezds of the Tiflis guberniya, 
and Kars and Kaghyzman okrugs of the Kars oblast.629 Moreover, it was suggested to be more 
reasonable to annex two other okrugs of the Kars oblast (Ardahan and Oltu) to the 
Alexandropol guberniya rather than to the Batumi oblast with which they had religious and 
cultural connections630 (compare Maps 8 and 9). Kantemirov’s above-mentioned speech 
showed how the Armenians, supported by the Provisional Government, wanted to include 
Muslim-dominated Kars oblast, including Ardahan and Oltu okrugs into the projected 
Alexandropol guberniya.     
  
Tartar Sardar Aghamalov from the Menshevik Hummat also rejected the accusations of 
Muslim treason. He argued that those who thought that the interests of Muslim democracy 
would suffer more than those of Armenians with the Ottoman occupation were wrong. The 
Russian ruling elite, he argued, was also Orthodox Christian, but they had kept peasants under 
oppression, who in the end rebelled. Orthodox Georgia was always inclined towards Russia, 
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but Christian Poland had left it. The area behind the front, he noted, suffered from the 
Muslim-Armenian conflict. Armenian soldiers at the front fought against the Turks, but in 
Transcaucasia they destroyed Muslim villages and thus destroyed the region.631  
 
The sufferings of the Transcaucasian Muslims at the hands of the Armenians in the discussed 
period can be explained by the Armenian military superiority over them, which in turn can be 
explained by the fact that despite the formation of Armenian and Georgian national military 
units, the Transcaucasian Commissariat forbade the Muslim organisations to create their own 
military units. The same approach was demonstrated by the Baku Soviet, which forbade the 
Muslim National Council to arm the population and create national units. In the words of Jörg 
Barberowski, ‘the tradition of common distrust towards Muslims continued, who were 
allegedly agents of pan-Turkist imperialism’.632  
 
When thousands of Muslims were killed in Baku in March 1918 under the guidance of 
Shaumian together with other Bolsheviks and Dashnaks,633 Muslim members informed the 
Diet and asked for help. The Armenian and Georgian factions of the Diet refused to give such 
help and declared that they could not be in enmity with the Bolsheviks while there was an 
Ottoman threat.634 With reference to the Russian State Archive of Social and Political History, 
the Azerbaydzhan newspaper and the paper by A.Popov, Barberowski wrote that in March 
1918, not only in Baku, but also in Erevan, several thousand Muslims became victims of 
Armenian pogroms and turned into ‘undesirable aliens’.635 Referring to the Azerbaydzhan 
newspaper, he stated that up until March 1918, 199 Muslim villages were destroyed in Erevan 
guberniya and more than 100,000 people were either killed, died of starvation and exhaustion 
                                                 
631 Zakavkazskiy Seym’. Stenograficheskiy otchyot’. Sessiya pervaya. Zasedanie dvadtsat’ pervoe. Tiflis, 31 
March 1918,  pp 27-28 
632 Barberowski J, Vrag est vezde. Stalinizm na Kavkaze (perevod s nemetskogo V.T.Altukhova), Moscow: 
Rossiyskaya politicheskaya entsiklopediya (ROSSPEN), 2010, pp 122-123; Note: The First World War was the 
first instance, when Tsarist Russia, continuing to refuse to allow the Muslim population to be enlisted in the 
military forces, allowed the Caucasian viceroy to recruit 3,000 Muslim soldiers in the construction units of the 
Russian Army to be privately financed. The ‘Caucasian military division’, which was most commonly known as 
the ‘Wild division’, was organised with the financial assistance of Muslim industrialist, Hajy Zeynalabdin 
Taghiyev, and the local Muslim population and was sent to the Austrian-Russian front (Ibid., pp 83-84). 
633 Note: For the account of the events of March-April 1918 see Barberowski J, op cit., pp 129-138 
634 Zakavkazskiy Seym’. Stenograficheskiy otchyot’. Sessiya pervaya. Zasedanie devyatnadtsatoe. Tiflis, 20 
March 1918, p 39; Balaev A, Azerbaydzhanskoe natsional’no-demokraticheskoe dvizhenie. 1917-1920 gg.,             
pp 23-24 
635 Barberowski J, op cit., p 164 
167 
or left for the territories occupied by the Ottoman Army.636 The violence committed by the 
Armenians against the Muslims of Transcaucasia in the discussed period was far greater than 
the violence committed by the Muslims against the Armenians largely due to the military 
advantages and the Bolshevik support of the latter.     
 
Regarding the last point of Lordkipanidze’s speech, it should be mentioned that despite the 
lack of Georgian and Armenian support and open Armenian enmity towards the Muslims, 
during the Trabzon negotiations, the Tartar delegates made every effort to retain Batumi in the 
South Caucasus, bringing submissions of security, economic and political character to incline 
the Ottomans towards compromise. The position of Musavat that the seizure of Batumi by the 
Ottomans would stifle the South Caucasus was very well known to the Diet members.637 
However, this was ignored by Lordkipanidze and other members of the Diet.  
 
During their talks with Enver Pasha, the Ottoman Minister of War, who came to Trabzon and 
Batumi after the termination of the Trabzon negotiations, the Tartar delegation asked him, as 
a main figure of Ottoman politics, about his vision of the South Caucasus. According to him, 
Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia should have formed a common federative or confederative 
South Caucasus with a common Diet in close relation with the Ottoman Empire. In the case 
that it was impossible to create a common South Caucasus, an independent Azerbaijan could 
form a much closer union with the Ottoman Empire, in the same form as Austria-Hungary. 
When asked about his attitude to the independence of Armenia, he answered that the Ottoman 
Empire would not be against the establishment of an independent Armenia, if the Armenian 
people stopped their intrigues against it for the sake of Anglo-Russian politics. The views of 
Enver Pasha were not supported by Vehib Pasha, Commander of the Third Ottoman Army, 
and Rauf bey, head of the Ottoman delegation at the peace negotiations, who preferred not to 
interfere in the internal affairs of the South Caucasus for the sake of preserving peace there.638 
 
Although the Georgians and Armenians accused the Muslims of betrayal, Britain, which 
supported the Georgians and Armenians at the front against the Ottoman Empire, was of a 
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different opinion on the reasons for the discord between different peoples of the South 
Caucasus. According to the confidential outline of events by British Foreign Office staff, ‘the 
Diet itself was split upon racial lines. No force capable of offering effective resistance to the 
Turkish invasion could be got together. By the action of the Armenians and Bolsheviks the 
Mahommedan elements in all Transcaucasia had been alienated beyond hope of recovery, 
and, at least in sympathies, had gone over to the Turko-German side. The Georgians were at 
loggerheads with the Armenians owing to the continued intrigues and association of the latter 
with the Russians, both revolutionary and reactionary – in fact the Armenians in Baku had 
joined hands with the Bolsheviks while the Armenian army in Erivan and the west still 
regarded itself as under the orders of the reactionary party in Russia. Racial hatred ran higher 
than ever, and civil war appeared inevitable.’639   
 
The Muslims of the South Caucasus needed Ottoman support under the prevailing conditions 
to save themselves, as well as to liberate Baku from Bolshevik and Dashnak forces headed by 
Shaumian, who regarded Azerbaijani autonomy intentions as the ‘dream of Azerbaijani 
nationalists’ to make Baku ‘capital of a Azerbaijani khanate’.640 The Dashnak members of the 
Diet were also against the Azerbaijani government in Baku and wanted it to be international 
and the Armenian troops to remain in Baku. The reaction of the Muslim faction of the Diet 
was that the government in Baku should belong to Muslims.641  
 
Despite their sympathy for the Turks, the Azerbaijani national leaders did not seek annexation 
by the Ottoman Empire, but desired national-territorial autonomy for Azerbaijan in the South 
Caucasus; otherwise, during the Trabzon negotiations, they would have consented to the 
recommendations of Enver Pasha on the federation of Azerbaijan with the Ottoman Empire in 
the form of Austria-Hungary.642 If the Azerbaijani national leaders had favoured the 
annexation of Azerbaijan by the Ottoman Empire, there was no power to prevent it at that 
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time, as noted by Khatisov.643 It did not happen, because the Azerbaijani national leaders were 
against it.     
 
The leading Azerbaijani nationalist party, Musavat, strove for the national-territorial 
autonomy of Azerbaijan within the South Caucasus. This was proven by the fact that the Diet 
unanimously decided to declare war on the Ottoman Empire on 1 (14) April 1918, and despite 
the Georgians and Armenians ignoring the Muslim interests, the Muslims promised every 
possible help, apart from armed support, to the peoples of the South Caucasus in this war.644 
 
By that time, Ottoman troops were advancing, already liberating the territories occupied by 
Russia during the war and crossing the pre-1914 Ottoman-Russian border. On 6 (19) March, 
the Ottomans had occupied Ardahan, about 80% of the population of which was Muslim,645 
and on 1 (14) April, they occupied Batumi,646 70% Muslim.647 Thus, the Ottoman troops 
retained two of three provinces lost to Russia in the 1877-1878 Ottoman-Russian war. On 9 
(22) April 1918, the Ottomans renewed their proposal of 31 March (13 April) repeating the 
same conditions: to accept the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, not to make any claim to Batumi, 




The failure of the ‘Armenian homeland’ project both in the Ottoman Empire and its territories 
occupied by Russia during the Tsarist regime was followed by new hope emerging after the 
February Revolution with the Provisional Government’s ‘Act on the arrangement of the 
administration in the Russian-occupied parts of Turkish Armenia’, which included Erzurum, 
Van and Bitlis. The act envisaged the adoption of measures for the gradual return of 
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Armenian refugees to the area. The Armenian belief in the possibility of their project being 
realised was also strengthened with the drastic decrease of the Muslim population in the area 
after its occupation by Russia and the Provisional Government’s instruction to disallow the 
return of Muslims. The government’s administrative-territorial readjustment project in the 
South Caucasus was another source of hope. The realisation of both projects would mean the 
construction of an ‘Armenian homeland’ in the area extending from Van to Garabagh. 
 
The Bolshevik Revolution, which overthrew the Provisional Government and left the 
Armenian expectations unrealised, gave rise to new hopes for the implementation of the 
Armenian project in Eastern Anatolia with the Soviet decree on the ‘Turkish Armenia’ in 
January 1918. However, the signing of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty between the Soviets and 
Central Powers in March 1918 envisaged the return of the territories occupied by Russia 
during the First World War to the Ottoman Empire, leaving Armenian expectations for the 
realisation of the homeland project after the February and October Revolutions unfulfilled.   
 
A further hope was the establishment of a de facto government in the South Caucasus after 
the October Revolution, which did not recognise Bolshevik rule. The Ottoman counter-policy 
of building relations with the regional government to undermine the Soviet policy vis-à-vis 
the region and Eastern Anatolia led to peace negotiations between the Ottoman Empire and 
the de facto Transcaucasian government. The negotiations were unsuccessful because of the 
insistence of the former and the refusal of the latter to accept the Brest-Litovsk Treaty as the 
basis of negotiations, which led to war between the two sides. The occupation by Ottoman 
troops of Ardahan and Batumi strengthened the insistence of the Ottoman side on the 
acceptance of the treaty by Transcaucasia and its declaration of independence from Russia.  
 
Thus, although the February and October Revolutions did not bring about the realisation of 
the ‘Armenian homeland’ project, they created favourable grounds for the independence of 




Chapter 7: Construction of the Armenian Republic 
 
The chapter explores the process of declaration of the Armenian Republic in the South 
Caucasus and the efforts to extend its area to include the Eastern Anatolian territories. It 
analyses the discussions of the Transcaucasian Diet over Transcaucasian independence and 
the declaration of the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic, and the continuation 
of the peace negotiations with the Ottoman Empire in Batumi. The chapter examines the 
Transcaucasian disagreement over the Ottoman-Transcaucasian draft Treaty of Peace and 
Friendship submitted by the Ottoman Government in the peace negotiations and the 
subsequent renewal of the military developments, which led to the dissolution of the 
Transcaucasian Republic and the declaration of three republics in the region, one of which 
was the Armenian Republic.   
     
7.1 Declaration of the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic  
 
As in the case of the Ottoman-Transcaucasian war, the discussions around the declaration of 
the Transcaucasian independence on 9 (22) April 1918 revealed arguments pro and con. 
Thus, David Oniashvili, the Georgian Social Democrat, saw the only way out of the 
situation in the immediate declaration of political independence and the establishment of an 
independent Transcaucasian federative republic. His speech was greeted with applause by 
all except the Dashnaktsutiun members.649      
 
Mahammad Amin Rasulzada, from Musavat, stated that the peoples of the South Caucasus 
wanted to recreate a great democratic Russia, but could not achieve their aim. Russia signed 
peace for them and deprived the South Caucasus of Kars, Ardahan and Batumi. Concerned 
about the danger of Russia turning into a centralised imperialistic state, he considered the 
declaration of Transcaucasian independence to be necessary in order for the South 
Caucasian peoples to live in solidarity and friendship and benefit from the democratic basis 
of the Russian revolution.650     
       
                                                 
649 Zakavkazskiy Seym’. Stenograficheskiy otchyot’. Sessiya pervaya. Zasedanie dvadtsat’ vtoroe, Tiflis, 9 April 
1918, pp 6-7 
650 Ibid., pp 9-10 
172 
Grigoriy Georgadze, the Georgian Social Democrat, stated that Transcaucasia as a 
territorial, economic and strategic unit could not live in isolation without relationships with 
other states, could not enter into international-legal relations with all other states and thus 
could not be declared a subject of international-legal relations. In order to do this, it needed 
to have a certain legal aspect. Moreover, in declaring Transcaucasia as an independent state, 
its peoples would be united and go against the stream which tried to dismember it. The unity 
of its peoples was the guarantee of the successful defence of the borders of Transcaucasia. 
There was another view, he went on, which was pessimistic about the declaration of 
independence on the grounds that there was no need for independence in order to strengthen 
unity, defence and the fruits of revolution. However, the supporters of this view hoped that 
they were mistaken, and declaring and supporting independence, they would make every 
effort for this young independent state to take its place on the international stage.651   
 
Lev Tumanov, on behalf of those members of the Social Revolutionaries who were 
energetically against the declaration of the independence of Transcaucasia under existing 
circumstances, stated that the declaration of independence would turn it into Turkish 
slavery. Transcaucasia, he continued, had very small economic power to have its own 
orientation. Independence was declared under the considerations of the conclusion of peace 
with the Ottoman Empire, but an independent Transcaucasia would not get the expected 
peace, but would deepen its problems.652  
 
In the opinion of Yuriy Semyonov from the Constitutional Democrats (Kadets), the 
Mensheviks had supported the declaration of Transcaucasia under pressure from Musavat. 
Transcaucasia, he argued, was economically dependant on Baku oil. However, he declared, 
the independence of Transcaucasia had to be recognised outside of Baku, as the latter had 
achieved ‘self-determination’. By occupying Baku, he concluded, Transcaucasia would 
conduct the ‘first imperialistic act’.653   
 
Reacting to Semyonov, who referred to the occupation of Baku by Bolsheviks and Dashnaks 
as its ‘self-determination’, Rasulzada noted that the Constitutional Democrats fought against 
                                                 
651 Ibid., pp 11-13 
652 Ibid., pp 13-16 
653 Ibid., pp 17-22 
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the Bolsheviks with all their power, but now this party had changed its orientation and started 
seeing safety for Russia in the hands of the Bolsheviks, hoping that it would recreate a Great 
Russia. Musavat, he went on, heard similar aggressive objections to its demands on Baku 
from a member of the Kadets in Baku as well, who openly told Musavat representatives, 
‘declare your autonomy, federation, but leave Baku for us’.654 The Bolsheviks were of the 
same opinion as the members of the Kadets, declaring to Musavat, ‘don’t think of 
autonomous federation, since your autonomy would not be acceptable for Russian democracy 
and Russian bourgeoisie because of completely different considerations, and as a result, you 
would have not autonomy, but ruins’.655  
 
Ivan Lordkipanidze, the Georgian Social Revolutionary, stated that the Ottomans from the 
West and Bolsheviks from the East were advancing. If independence was not declared, then 
these troops from both sides would reach Tiflis. If the Batumi-Baku road was important for 
the Central Powers, then let them have it and be conquered as an independent state, since it 
was unclear how the situation might change.656  
 
As for the views of the Armenian members of the Diet on independence, apart from 
Ovannes Kachaznuni from Dashnaktsutiun, who declared that ‘his party joins the 
declaration of an independent Transcaucasian state’,657 no other member made a statement.  
 
Thus, on 9 (22) April 1918, the Transcaucasian Diet declared the independence of the 
Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic.658 The same day, Chkhenkeli, head of the 
new government, sent Vehib Pasha, Commander of the Third Ottoman Army, a telegram 
that the Transcaucasian government approved the declaration of the Transcaucasian peace 
delegation on the acceptance of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty and was ready to immediately 
dispatch the delegation to restart negotiations on the basis of this treaty in Batumi, instead of 
Trabzon. Moreover, Transcaucasia was declared an independent Federative Republic and 
the Powers had been notified of this. Subsequently, the condition the Ottoman delegation 
                                                 
654 Ibid., pp 53-54 
655 Ibid., p 54 
656 Ibid., pp 34-35 
657 Ibid., p 36 
658 Ibid., p 56 
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had mentioned in its declaration of 31 March (13 April) 1918 was implemented. Chkhenkeli 
also asked the Ottoman side to immediately suspend hostilities.659     
 
On 15 (28) April 1918, Vehib Pasha sent a telegram to the Transcaucasian Republic on its 
recognition by the Ottoman Government and sent notification to the Central Powers about this 
declaration. He also added that Batumi was accepted as the location for the peace 
negotiations.660 The same day, Kars, the last of the three districts of Article IV of the Brest-
Litovsk Treaty, was occupied by the Ottomans661 and thus the Ottoman Empire reached its 
pre-1877 Ottoman-Russian borders (see Map 11). 
 
7.2 The Batumi peace negotiations and the dissolution of the 
Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic 
 
The peace conference in Batumi opened on 11 May 1918. The Ottoman delegation declared 
that the Ottoman side could not accept the Brest-Litovsk Treaty as the exceptional basis of the 
current discussions anymore. The character of the relations between the two states had 
changed after the Transcaucasian government decided not to approve the acceptance of the 
Brest-Litovsk Treaty as the basis for peace negotiations and declared war on the Ottoman 
Empire on 1 (14) April. The Ottoman delegation noted that their troops fought not with the 
Russian Army, which had left the area after the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, but with Transcaucasian 
troops.662 
 
The Ottoman delegation presented a draft Treaty of Peace and Friendship between the 
Ottoman Government and the Transcaucasian Republic. The following territories had to be 
surrendered to the Ottoman Empire: a great part of Akhaltsikh uezd, Akhalkalaki and Surmali 
uezds entirely, and the parts of the uezds of Alexandropol (Gumru), Echmiadzin (Sardarabad), 
Erevan (Kamarli, Ulukhanly and Vedibasar), Sharur-Daralayaz (Sharur) and Nakhchyvan 
                                                 
659 Dokumenty i materialy po vneshney politike Zakavkaz’ya i Gruzii, dok 102, p 224 
660 Ibid., dok 122, p 253 
661 Ibid., dok 123, p 255 
662 Ibid., dok 131, p 314; Note: The atrocities committed by Armenians in the territories occupied by Russia and 
the three districts, especially in Kars, while they were retreating due to the Turkish advance, where they killed 
Muslim prisoners in the most horrible manner were presented as the reason for the continuation of war by the 
Turks (Şahin E, Diplomasi ve sınır: Gümrü görüşmeleri ve protokolleri – 1918, p 57). 
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(excluding Ordubad) through which the Alexandropol-Echmiadzin-Nakhchyvan-Julfa railway 
passed.663  
 
All of the territories which the Ottoman delegation demanded in the draft treaty were those 
claimed by the Armenians under the administrative-territorial readjustment project of the 
Provisional Government. The Georgians also made claims to Akhaltsikh and Akhalkalaki 
uezds in the Tiflis guberniya. The Tartars claimed most of the territories demanded by the 
Ottomans in Erevan guberniya, since the majority of the population there was Muslim.664  
 
On 13 May, the South Caucasian delegation presented its memorandum. According to the 
first point, the treaty should have been concluded not between the two countries, but rather 
between the Central Powers and the Transcaucasian Republic on the basis of the Brest-
Litovsk Treaty. In the third point it admitted that the absence of representatives of Bulgaria 
and Austria-Hungary at present should not be an obstacle to the conclusion of the treaty, as 
they could join later.665 The essence of this reply meant that the delegation, especially the 
Armenians and Georgians, were seeking German interference in the issue, as the territorial 
demands mostly concerned them, whereas the Tartars were concerned with the areas 
populated by Muslims in the Erevan guberniya, but made no objection.  
 
On 15 May, the Ottoman delegation insisted on its position that the Brest-Litovsk Treaty 
could not serve as an exceptional basis for the peace negotiations. It considered that the South 
Caucasian delegation did not have the right to express a view on the matter of who was going 
to sign the peace treaty, since it depended only on the Central Powers to define which 
questions were common and which of them concerned only the Transcaucasian Republic. As 
for Austro-Hungary and Bulgaria, whether they would join the treaty or not concerned only 
the Central Powers.666    
 
                                                 
663 Şahin E, op cit., p 78; Şahin E, Trabzon ve Batum konferansları ve antlaşmaları (1917-1918), Ankara: Türk 
Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2002, p 818 
664 Note: At present one third of these territories belong to Georgia (Akhaltsikh and Akhalkalaki); one third to 
Armenia (Alexandropol (Gumru) uezd,  Sardarabad part of Echmiadzin uezd, Kamarli (Garnibasar), Ulukhanly 
(Zangibasar) and Vedibasar parts of Erevan uezd; and one third to Azerbaijan (Sharur part of Sharur-Daralayaz 
uezd and Nakhchyvan uezd). Only the Surmali area is part of Turkey.    
665 Dokumenty i materialy po vneshney politike Zakavkaz’ya i Gruzii, dok 132, pp 268-269 
666 Ibid., dok 136, pp 272-273 
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In its second memorandum of 16 May, the South Caucasian delegation insisted on its position 
of the first memorandum. Moreover, the delegation protested against Article V of the draft 
treaty, defining the borders between the Ottoman Empire and Transcaucasian Republic. In 
their opinion, this description contradicted Article IV of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, according 
to which the destiny of the Batumi and Kars provinces should have been decided with the 
consideration of the rights and interests of these districts and neighbouring states. The South 
Caucasian delegation concluded by noting that the new circumstances arose because of the 
seizure by Ottoman troops of the territories, the occupation of which had not been envisaged 
by any international agreement.667    
 
In reply, on 19 May, the Ottoman delegation repeated the earlier arguments that the 
Transcaucasian government did not approve the acceptance of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty by its 
delegation, broke up negotiations and returned home and then declared war on the Ottoman 
Empire. The change of circumstances gave the Ottoman Government the right to rectify the 
borders. As for the international status of the territories mentioned in Article IV of the Brest-
Litovsk Treaty, the Transcaucasian government, which was not a party to the treaty and was 
not an international subject at the time of the conclusion of the treaty, did not have the right to 
make comments on the provisions of this treaty and the manner of its implementation. It 
warned the South Caucasian delegation of the consequences that its insistence on making 
comments on the mentioned article of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty might have on the process of 
peace negotiations.668         
    
In order to realise their conditions, which were stipulated in the above-mentioned draft treaty, 
the Ottoman troops renewed military operations on 15 May 1918 and occupied 
Alexandropol.669 The Transcaucasian government protested against these developments, but 
the Ottomans did not relent.670 Meanwhile, on 19 May, the German delegation, headed by 
General Otto von Lossow, proposed German mediation between the Ottoman and 
                                                 
667 Ibid., dok 137, pp 273-277 
668 Ibid., dok 145, pp 288-290 
669 Ibid., dok 134, p 271 
670 Ibid., dok 134, p 271; dok 138, p 278; dok 139, pp 278-280; dok 141, pp 282-283; dok 143, pp 284-287;              
dok 154, pp 304-305 
177 
Transcaucasian governments, which was accepted the same day by the South Caucasians,671 
but rejected by the Ottomans.672  
 
The Germans also tried to mediate between the Transcaucasian Republic and Soviet Russia on 
14 May. The latter insisted on its participation in the Batumi peace negotiations, but it warned 
that this step ‘did not suggest the recognition of the so-called Transcaucasian government by 
the Russian Government’.673 It added that it would not recognise the treaty signed without its 
participation.674 In the opinion of Georgiy Chicherin, People’s Commissar for Foreign 
Affairs, the power of the Transcaucasian government was rejected by the broad popular 
masses, who protested against their separation from Russia. Armenian cities and villages, in 
his opinion, demanded a referendum and insisted that their delegates leave the Diet. He 
continued that many Armenian and Georgian delegates had already left. All of Eastern 
Transcaucasia up to Elizavetpol had declared the group of Diet delegates usurpers.675     
 
On 22 May, the Georgian delegates met alone to discuss their next steps, seeing the only way 
out in the dissolution of the federation and the proclamation of Georgia’s independence. The 
Georgian National Council, without informing the Armenians or Muslims, decided to ask von 
Lossow for help and began secret negotiations with him and Friedrich Werner von der 
Schulenburg, formerly German consul in Tiflis. As a result, on 24 May, agreement was 
reached between the Georgians and von Lossow.676  
 
On 26 May, the Transcaucasian Diet met to discuss the declaration of the collapse of the 
Transcaucasian Republic. The proposal came from Irakli Tsereteli, the Georgian Social 
Democrat. His argument for the declaration of the collapse of the republic was that uniting 
power in Transcaucasia was weaker than separating it, which had especially developed under 
the influence of external factors. The approach to the borders of Transcaucasia and the 
subsequent invasion by the Ottoman Empire strengthened the gravitation towards the latter 
and towards the separation from the former among Muslims. Tsereteli accused the Muslims of 
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sending non-official delegations from the South Caucasus to oppose the official 
Transcaucasian delegation, arguing that the latter did not represent the will of the majority of 
the population. The Muslims were also blamed for the occupation of the region. In his 
opinion, the Transcaucasian delegation in Batumi was fully supported only by the Georgians 
in Kutaisi and Tiflis guberniyas, who were ready with all their power to resist occupation, but 
were left alone: the Armenians were separated from them and the Muslims left them. The 
fictitious existence of the Transcaucasian Republic and its delegation, he argued, deprived the 
Georgians of the chance of creating a state organisation capable of defending its interests. If 
the Georgian people wanted to defend its interests, Tsereteli concluded, it should create its 
own state organism and official representation.677  
 
In reply to the question of Shafi bay Rustambayov from Musavat as to whether this speech 
reflected the desire of the Georgian people to separate from the Transcaucasian Republic, 
Tsereteli referred to one document: the act of the Muslim population of Akhaltsikh and 
Akhalkalaki uezds of 13 (26) April to separate from Transcaucasia, including from ‘Georgia’, 
to avoid extermination of the Muslims of these uezds which had been continuing since 1914 
and because of the impossibility of the peaceful existence of Muslims there. The Muslim 
population had asked for the annexation of Akhaltsikh and part of Akhalkalaki uezd to the 
Ottoman Empire. The act had been presented to the Batumi negotiations. In the opinion of 
Tsereteli, Musavat, as a leading Muslim party, should have declared these Muslim delegations 
from almost all parts of Transcaucasia as impostors and traitors, which it did not do.678          
 
As is apparent from Tsereteli’s reply, the Georgian decision on separation from the 
Transcaucasian Republic was guided by the loss of Akhaltsikh and Akhalkalaki in addition to 
Batumi. Again, as usual, the Muslims of the Diet were blamed. However, in the same way, 
the Muslims of the Diet could have blamed the Georgian and Armenian members of the Diet 
for the occupation of predominantly Muslim Baku and Elizavetpol guberniyas by the 
Bolsheviks, since in the Caucasus they were headed by Bolshevik-Dashnak Shaumian and 
supported by 3,000-4,000 national military units of Dashnaktsutiun.679 Despite this 
occupation, the Muslim members of the Diet did not declare separation. Tsereteli did not 
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mention what he and his party had done to prevent the occupation of Baku and Elizavetpol 
guberniyas or whether they had done anything to prevent Dashnak support of the Bolsheviks 
on the one hand and their ethnic cleansing of Muslim-populated areas with the intention of 
clearing lands for the construction of an ‘Armenian homeland’ on the other. In the words of 
Movsum Israfilbayov, member of Hummat and Bolshevik Commissar, cited by Barberowski, 
‘after the events of March [1918], the Muslim masses ultimately turned their back against 
Soviet rule and impatiently waited for the arrival of the Turks, who, in their opinion, could do 
away with the domination of the Dashnaks’.680 
 
The territories demanded by the Ottoman Empire in the draft treaty showed that, availing 
itself of the situation, in addition to the territories it had lost to Russia in the 1877-1878 war 
(Kars, Ardahan and Batumi), it tried to regain Akhalkalaki and Akhaltsikh, which it had lost 
to Russia in the 1828-1829 war, and to gain strategic territories along the railways (part of the 
territories belonging to it in 1722-1736) and thus to strengthen its position against Britain and 
the Soviets. But it recognised the Transcaucasian Republic. In contrast, Soviet Russia, in the 
person of Chicherin, made it clear that it would not recognise the republic, protesting against 
its separation from Russia despite the self-determination slogan declared by the Soviets 
themselves. It was the Soviets who signed the Brest-Litovsk Treaty and opened the way for 
Ottoman demands in the region. It was the Georgians and Armenians who insisted on fighting 
the Ottoman troops, notwithstanding their military weakness, which did not end in the 
achievement of the Transcaucasian goals but in the loss of further territories. The Ottomans 
could use the miscalculations of the Transcaucasian side and its political and diplomatic 
naivety and military weakness in its favour and bring about the Transcaucasian dissolution: 
neither the Ottoman Empire nor the Muslims of Transcaucasian Republic could be blamed for 
that.  
 
After the discussions around the Georgian proposal, it was decided to declare the dissolution 
of the Transcaucasian Republic. The reason was stated to be the fundamental split between 
the peoples of the Republic on the questions of war and peace which made the representation 
                                                 
680 Ibid., p 134; Note: For the account of the March-April 1918 events see Barberowski J, op cit., pp 129-138 
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of one united authoritative power on behalf of the Republic impossible. The Powers were 
notified of the dissolution.681 
 
On the same day, 26 May, the independence of Georgia was declared and the Powers were 
notified of this act as well.682 On 28 May 1918, the Azerbaijani Muslim National Council 
declared the independence of Azerbaijan with a temporary capital in Ganja, since Baku was 
under the occupation of Dashnaks and Bolsheviks. The collaboration of the representatives of 
these two parties with contradictory programmes in Baku can be explained in part by their 
common aim of preventing Azerbaijani rule in oil-rich and predominantly Muslim Baku. 
Moreover, the Armenian nationalists sought Bolshevik support in order to realise their 
territorial aspirations, and to secure their future against what they saw as the threat to their 
very existence posed by the Ottoman and Caucasian Turks. After its liberation on 15 
September 1918 from the ‘Centro-Caspian Dictatorship’ of Social Revolutionaries and 
Dashnaks, which had replaced the Soviet rule in Baku on 31 July, the city became the capital 
of Azerbaijan.  
 
Thus, the Georgian Social Democrats declared their first national republic, followed by the 
Azerbaijanis. The Armenians, the first among the three peoples in advancing their autonomy 
aspirations, still hesitated on declaring a republic.  
 
7.3 Declaration of the Armenian Republic 
 
After the Georgians and Azerbaijanis proclaimed their independence, only the Armenians 
were left to make their decision. On 26 May, the Armenian National Council denounced the 
Georgian proclamation of independence. The Armenian Social Revolutionaries and non-
partisans decided against independence, as they thought that independence under the existing 
circumstances would subject them to the dictates of the Ottoman Empire. The Armenian 
Social Democrat and Populist Parties called for independence, seeing no alternative. The 
Dashnaks were split, the majority opposing, with some favouring independence. The same 
night a conference of Dashnak leaders in Tiflis agreed about independence and peace with the 
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Ottoman Empire. The view was also shared by Ovannes Khachaznuni and Alexander 
Khatisian, Armenian delegates in the Batumi negotiations, who stressed that the only 
possibility for survival was independence and securing peace with the Ottoman Empire, no 
matter the price. The decision was accelerated by the declaration of independence by the 
Azerbaijani National Council with ‘Southern and Eastern Transcaucasia’ as its area,683 since 
the Armenians made claims to southern Transcaucasia as well.   
 
The questions raised by the Armenian leaders after the Georgian and Azerbaijani declarations 
of independence were on whether Armenians had the capability to create their own state and 
keep it. Kachaznuni considered these questions to be ‘absurdly needless’.684 He wrote that 
history had brought the Armenians to a certain situation and the Armenians had to have 
courage and settle it so as not to be destroyed. The Armenians had to become masters of 
Armenia; otherwise it could be lost forever and become ‘res nullius’: even that territory which 
was not disputed with Armenians would be divided between Georgians, Azerbaijanis and 
Ottomans.685 
 
On the evening of 29 May, Dashnaktsutiun leaders decided on the proclamation of Armenia 
as a republic. On 30 May the Armenian National Council issued a statement:  
  
In view of the dissolution of the political unity of Transcaucasia and the new situation created 
by the proclamation of the independence of Georgia and Azerbaijan, the Armenian National 
Council declares itself the supreme and only administration for the Armenian provinces. Due 
to certain grave circumstances, the National Council, deferring until the near future the 
formation of an Armenian national government, temporarily assumes all governmental 
functions, in order to pilot the political and administrative helm of the Armenian provinces.686   
 
The declaration, as also pointed out by Hovannisian, made no mention of ‘independence’, 
‘republic’, the rights of citizenry or relations with other states.687  
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The Ottoman ultimatum, sent to the Transcaucasian government on 26 May to give its reply 
within 72 hours to the Ottoman draft peace treaty of 11 May containing further territorial 
demands,688 now was valid for each of the Transcaucasian states and was extended until the 
evening of 30 May. The same day, Khatisian informed the Ottoman side of the decision of the 
Armenian National Council to declare itself the supreme Armenian governing body and the 
Armenian delegation’s authorisation to conclude peace and accept the Ottoman conditions as 
the basis for further discussions.689  
 
On 4 June 1918, the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between the Ottoman Imperial 
Government and each of the three South Caucasian republics was signed in Batumi. The 
treaties, among others, defined the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire with these republics 
(see Map 11). According to Article III of the Batumi Treaty between the Ottoman Empire and 
the Armenian Republic, the boundaries between Armenia and Azerbaijan would be defined by 
these republics and the protocol of the agreement would be communicated to the Ottoman 
Imperial Government.690  
 
Only after the Batumi Treaty did the Armenian National Council publicly use the title 
‘Republic of Armenia’,691 although it should be noted that ‘Republic of Armenia’ was only 
one of the names of the newly established republic: ‘Ararat Republic’ or ‘Erevan Republic’ 
were most commonly used. ‘Armenia’ was the title with which they usually referred to the 
Eastern Anatolian provinces of the Ottoman Empire claimed by the Armenians. Even Bogos 
Nubar Pasha, representing Ottoman Armenians at the Paris Peace Conference, called the first 
Armenian Republic the ‘Araratian Republic’.692 This important point reveals the position of 
the Armenian nationalist leaders and other states regarding the notion of ‘Armenia’. As for the 
Azerbaijan Republic, there was no disagreement among the Azerbaijani leaders over the name 
of the republic. However, Persia and Britain, which had political and economic interests in 
Persia, were concerned over the declaration of the Republic with its ‘Azerbaijan’ name, 
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seeing this as the source of future claims to the Azerbaijan provinces of Persia on the south of 
the Araz River.693  
 
The capital of this new republic became Erevan, conceded by Azerbaijan on 29 May 1918, 
since after Alexandropol694 had gone to the Ottomans, the Armenians did not have any place 
to serve as a capital.695 
 
Although the Batumi treaties only defined the borders between the Ottoman Empire and the 
three republics, the sources have different interpretations of the area of the Armenian 
Republic on the basis of the Batumi Treaty between the Ottoman Empire and the Armenian 
Republic. According to Hovannisian in 1967, the territory of Armenia consisted of the New 
Bayazid uezd and parts of the Alexandropol, Echmiadzin and Erevan uezds, with a total area 
of about 4,400 square miles (11,396 square kilometres).696 However, in 1971, the historian 
added the eastern half of the Sharur-Daralayaz uezd to the list of the republic’s territories.697 
 
                                                 
693 Note: Until 28 May 1918, ‘Azerbaijan’ had been the geographical and administrative-territorial notion 
describing the territories on the north and south of the Araz River. A large amount of evidence supports this 
argument. For example, according to the memorandum of 1864 by Keith E. Abbott, the British Consul-General 
in Persia, ‘the country known to the Persians as Azerbaijan is divided between them and Russia, the latter Power 
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129,500 square kilometres – I.K.] are therefore about the extent of the division belonging to Russia, and 30,000 
[about 77,700 square kilometres – I.K.] of that which remains to Persia. The Russian division is bounded on the 
north and north-east by the mountains of Caucasus, extending to the vicinity of Bâkou on the Caspian. On the 
west it has the provinces of Imeritia, Mingrelia, Gooriel, and Ahkhiska (now belonging to Russia); on the east it 
has the Caspian Sea, and on the south the boundary is marked by the course of the River Arrass […] In this area 
are contained the following territorial divisions: – Georgia or Gootjistan, comprising Kakhetty, Kartaliny, 
Somekhetty, Kasakh; the Mohammedan countries of Eriwan, Nakhshewan, Karabâgh, Ghenja, Shirwan, Shekky, 
Shamachy, Bâkou, Koobeh, Salian and a portion of Tâlish.’ (Abbott K, ‘Extracts from a Memorandum on the 
Country of Azerbaijan’, Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society of London, vol 8, no 6 (1863 - 1864), p 
275) Among other sources see Tadhkirat Al-Muluk: A Manual of Safavid Administration (translated and 
explained by V.Minorsky), Cambridge: E.W. Memorial Trust: Spicer and Pegler, 1980, pp 112, 163; Perry J, 
‘Forced Migration in Iran during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries’, Iranian Studies, vol 8, no 4, 1975, 
pp 201, 204; Opisanie oblastey Azerbaydzhanskikh v Persii i ikh politicheskogo sostoyaniya, sdelannoe 
polkovnikom i kavalerom Burnashevym v Tiflise v 1786 g., Kursk, 1793, p 5; Prisoedinenie Vostochnoy Armenii 
k Rossii. Sbornik dokumentov, tom 1 (1801-1813), Erevan: Izdatel’stvo Akademii Nauk Armyanskoy SSR, 1972, 
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694 Note: According to the secret document of British Intelligence Bureau of 18 December 1917 (1 January 
1918), Alexander Khatisov, who was ex-Mayor of Tiflis, had ‘taken up a residence in Alexandropol, the possible 
centre of the future Armenian State’ (CAB 24/28, p 233(5)).  
695 ARSPIHDA, fn 970, l 1, fl 1, p 51; Note: The referenced archival document also substantiated this concession 
with the occupation of Alexandropol by the Ottomans.  
696 Hovannisian R, Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918, pp 195-196  
697 Hovannisian R, The Republic of Armenia. Volume I, pp 37, 35  
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According to Enis Shahin, the area of the Armenian Republic was 10,000 square kilometres 
(3,860 square miles).698 The British Foreign Office memorandum of 28 October 1918 wrote 
that the ‘Armenian Republic of Ararat’ consisted of Erevan and Echmiadzin uezds with an 
area of 12,000 square kilometres (4,633 square miles)699 (see Map 8). According to Ervand 
Sarkisian, the republic included the New Bayazid uezd, excluding its south-eastern 
Basarkechar area and parts of the uezds of Erevan, Echmiadzin and Alexandropol, with a 
population of 321,000, including 230,000 Armenians and 80,000 Muslims.700 Firuz 
Kazemzadeh noted that Armenia lost Kars, Ardahan, Borchaly, parts of Echmiadzin and 
Sharur, as well as the larger part of Nakhchyvan with about 11,000 square kilometres (4,247 
square miles).701 Tadeusz Swietochowski wrote that Armenia was ‘reduced to barely four 
thousand square miles [about 10,360 square kilometres – I.K.] of its territory’.702 According 
to Armen Khachikian, Armenia lost a lot of territory and was left with an area of 12,000 
square kilometres (4,633 square miles) around the Sevan Lake.703  
 
These comments about the area and territory of the Armenian Republic are questionable. 
First, if the republic did not exist until the end of May 1918, it could not lose or gain any 
territory or it was impossible to define its area only on the basis of the Batumi treaties, which 
defined the borders of the Ottoman Empire with three republics, not the borders of these 
republics themselves. Second, Armenia did not have national-territorial autonomy within 
Russia, which would allow the discussion of its area. The administrative-territorial 
readjustment project of the Provisional Government of July 1917 failed, as it was never 
adopted.704 The discussions of the project had revealed the clashing territorial aspirations of 
the Armenians, Tartars and Georgians. As a result, the following administrative units in the 




                                                 
698 Şahin E, Diplomasi ve sınır: Gümrü görüşmeleri ve protokolleri – 1918, pp 98-99 
699 FO 371/3301, p 466/4 
700 Sarkisian E, Ekspansionistskaya politika Osmanskoy imperii v Zakavkaz’ye nakanune i v gody pervoy 
mirovoy voyny, Erevan: Izdatel’stvo Akademii Nauk Armyanskoy SSR, 1962, pp 365-366 
701 Kazemzadeh F,  op cit., pp 127, 211 
702 Swietochowski T, Russian Azerbaijan, 1905-1920: The Shaping of National Identity in a Muslim Community, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, p 130 
703 Khachikian A, Istoriya Armenii (kratkiy ocherk), Erevan: Izdatel’stvo ‘Edit Print’, 2009, pp 169-170 
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 Erevan guberniya 
 Gazakh, Elizavetpol, Javanshir, Shusha, Garyagin (Jabrayil) and Zangazur uezds of 
Elizavetpol guberniya  
 Akhalkalaki and Borchaly uezds of Tiflis guberniya 
 Kars and Kaghyzman okrugs of Kars oblast705 (see Map 8) 
 
As for Ardahan and Oltu okrugs, predominantly Muslim units, even the Provisional 
Government project had not included them in the projected Alexandropol guberniya. It had 
just suggested that it would be preferable to annex them to the projected Alexandropol 
guberniya rather than to the predominantly Muslim Batumi oblast (see Maps 8 and 9). 
However, as was seen from Kantemirov’s speech at the Diet, the Muslims declared their self-
rule in these okrugs.    
 
The comments on the area of the Armenian Republic were made on the basis of the Armenian 
territorial claims during the zemstvo conferences. The claims, made with the aim of 
constructing compact Armenian units, were never adopted, and so never realised. As 
discussed earlier, the Armenian national-territorial autonomy project in the projected South 
Caucasian democratic republic as part of the projected Russian federation aimed at by 
Dashnaktsutiun in its second programme of 1907 was also not realised. In other words, the 
comments on the area of Armenian Republic made by historians or other sources are based on 
a particular, often debateable, interpretation of evidence.   
 
The Armenians were dissatisfied with the Batumi Treaty for obvious reasons. One was that 
the Batumi Treaty deprived Armenia of the territories they claimed in the western and 
southern Transcaucasia: Kars oblast with four okrugs (Kars, Kaghyzman, Ardahan and Oltu), 
Surmali uezd, a great part of Akhaltsikh uezd, Akhalkalaki uezd, half of Alexandropol, 
Echmiadzin and Erevan uezds, the Sharur part of the Sharur-Daralayaz uezd, and two thirds of 
Nakhchyvan uezd (see Map 11). This means that Armenia had to come to terms with the 
failure of half of its territorial claims in the South Caucasus under the Batumi Treaty 
(compare Maps 11, 12 and 13). Another reason was the failure to include ‘Turkish Armenia’ 
in the area of the republic. This meant that the Armenians failed not only in adding this 
                                                 
705 STsIA, fn 2080, l 1, fl 707, p 16op;  ARDA, fn 970, l 1, fl 87, p 1 
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Ottoman territory to the republic’s area, but also in gaining access to the Black Sea, thus 
being deprived of its economic benefits. The Armenians did not want Armenia to be 
surrounded by the Muslim Ottoman Empire and Azerbaijan. Tsarist Russia, Provisional 
Government and Dashnak-Bolshevik collaborators had tried their best to cut the connection 
between the Muslims of South Caucasus and the Ottoman Empire by settling Christian 
Armenians on the border and cleansing Muslims from the area, but could not fully achieve 
their aims. By the time Armenia was declared a republic, the South Caucasian and Ottoman 
Muslims still had common borders, something not desired by Armenia.  
 
Despite their mutual hatred, the Ottoman Empire and the first Armenian Republic concluded a 
peace treaty and thus the Ottoman Empire became the first country which recognised Armenia 
as an independent state. Neither Germany nor Soviet Russia wanted to recognise either 
Armenia or Azerbaijan. This became much clearer with Article 13 of the Supplementary 
Treaty to the Brest-Litovsk Treaty of Peace between Soviet Russia and the Central Powers, 
signed in Berlin on 27 August 1918, and the ratifications exchanged on 6 September 1918. 
With this treaty, Germany, which had de facto recognised Georgia on 28 May 1918,706 would 
take measures to prevent the military forces of any third power in the Caucasus overstepping 
the lines between the Kuban and Kur Rivers. In return Russia would supply Germany with 
Baku oil.707 The conclusion of this treaty meant that Germany considered both Armenia and 
Azerbaijan as being in the Bolshevik zone of influence. 
 
After the supplementary treaty, Enver Pasha confidentially informed Armenian delegates in 
Istanbul that if Armenia became an Ottoman ally against Britain and Russia and entered the 
Azerbaijani-Armenian-Ottoman confederation, it would help them in their territorial problems 
with Georgia and Azerbaijan and even extend the Armenian borders to the western border of 
Erevan guberniya. According to Hovannisian, on the confederation issue ‘the Armenian 
delegates remained as noncommittal as the occasion would permit’.708  
 
The Ottoman recognition of Armenia and Azerbaijan continued to disturb Soviet Russia, as 
also becomes clear from the third point of the draft protocol between the Ottoman Empire and 
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Germany, signed on 23 September in Berlin. According to this point, if a conflict arose 
between Soviet Russia and the Ottoman Empire because of the Ottoman recognition of 
Armenia and Azerbaijan, Germany would try to settle the dispute. The Ottoman Government 
agreed to withdraw all military units from Azerbaijan and Armenia, after which Germany 
would try to induce the Soviets to waive their objection to Ottoman recognition of these 
republics.709 
 
After Berlin, Talat Pasha told the Armenian delegates that his government was prepared to 
grant the Armenians more than they had requested during the preceding months. In his letter 
to Amazasp Ohanjanian in Berlin, Khatisian mentioned that ‘the change in Turkish heart was 
undoubtedly prompted by the unfavourable course of the war’.710 However, he considered that 
‘even at this late date, if the Ottomans were to propose a workable agreement, he would 
favour immediate acceptance. To wait for the Western allies to establish a viable Armenian 
state would be foolish […] We must create our own government and effect a fait accompli, 
and this must be done with the assistance of Turkey.’711 
 
Although these words did not imply any appreciation of the Ottoman Empire, they reflected 
one truth: if the Soviets invaded the South Caucasus before the Ottomans, there would be no 
Armenia, no Georgia and no Azerbaijan either in 1918 or today. It was the Ottoman insistence 
on the declaration of South Caucasian independence and separation from Russia and the 
following Ottoman invasions that, irrespective of Ottoman intentions, resulted in three 
independent republics in the region. Whether sincere or not, the following sentences of Avetis 
Aharonian, Head of the Delegation of the Republic of Armenia in Istanbul, on 6 September 
1918, in the audience of Mehmet the Sixth, the new Ottoman Sultan, reflected the truth: ‘it 
was the Ottoman Government which first spoke out on the creation of independent Armenia 
and it was the first which recognised it’.712  
 
The Ottoman Government prevented the construction of Armenian autonomy or state in the 
Ottoman territories and it achieved the return of all the Ottoman territories occupied by Russia 
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in the South Caucasus during the nineteenth century, although Akhalkalaki, Akhaltsikh and 
most of Batumi okrug were taken back under the Kars Treaty of 1921 and became part of 
Georgia (see Map 15). The Ottoman Government was not against the Armenian state 
anywhere beyond its boundaries, provided this state did not cause problems for it in the 
future. But the Armenian leaders were of the opinion that the area left for the Armenian 
Republic under the Batumi Treaty was too small and would be the basis of these problems.713  
 
Armenia, alongside Azerbaijan and Georgia, sent representatives to Istanbul on the invitation 
of the Ottoman Government to discuss the territorial issues at a conference to be held between 
the South Caucasian republics and the four Central Powers.714 Not being able to obtain 
protection from Germany, Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria in Istanbul, the Armenian delegates 
again turned to the Ottoman Government. The delegation wanted ‘to win German recognition 
of the Republic’ through Ottoman intercession.715 But the more interesting point among the 
goals of the Armenian delegation was its territorial demands, which now shifted against its 
neighbours in the South Caucasus: Azerbaijan and Georgia. The Armenian delegation strove 
to convince the Ittihadist leaders that ‘without a viable Armenia, there would be neither peace 
nor justice in Transcaucasia and that, therefore, certain lands disputed with Azerbaijan and 
Georgia should, with Ottoman support, be awarded to Armenia’.716   
 
7.4 Failure of the extension of the area of the Armenian Republic to Eastern 
Anatolia       
 
Although the Brest-Litovsk Treaty deprived Armenians of hope of the construction of the 
‘Armenian homeland’ in Eastern Anatolia, Article 24 of the Mudros Armistice between the 
Ottoman Empire and the Allied Powers of 30 October 1918 renewed their expectations, since 
according to it, in case of disorder in the six provinces, the Allies would reserve the right to 
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occupy any part of them.717 After the victory of the Allied Powers, the Armenian leaders were 
less concerned by the fact that the Armenians represented a significant minority in the 
projected area, and hoped that this problem could be solved by securing a mandate from the 
Great Powers.  
 
Thus, Avetis Aharonian, Head of the Delegation of the Republic of Armenia at the Paris 
Peace Conference in 1919, thought that with a mandate over ‘united Armenia’ a great number 
of Armenians would return from all over the world. With this expected influx, Armenia’s 
population would number over two million, which would almost give them a majority even at 
the present time.718   
 
According to Bogos Nubar Pasha, Head of the Armenian National Delegation, representing 
Ottoman Armenians, at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, after this war the Armenians 
would be ‘more numerous than the Turks and even than the Turks and Kurds combined. In 
fact, although the losses of the Armenians were very great, those of the Turks in the course of 
the war have not been less. A German report gives 2.5 million as the total losses of the Turks 
by war, epidemic and famine […] If, therefore, it is admitted that the Turkish population has 
at least sustained equally heavy losses, the Armenians are still in the majority after the war, as 
they were before it. But this majority will be still greater when the Armenian Republic of the 
Caucasus is united to Turkish Armenia to form one State, as both the Armenians of the 
Caucasus and those of Turkey ardently desire.’719 
 
Vahan Cardashian, founder of the American Committee of the Independence of Armenia, 
gave another view when substantiating his cause for the construction of Armenia under the 
US mandate in 1920. He wrote that there were 1,293,000 Armenians in ‘Russian Armenia’; 
three-quarters of a million native Armenians in ‘Turkish Armenia’; 494,000 Armenians in 
Georgia and Azerbaijan, 100,000 Armenians in ‘Persian Armenia’, and about half a million 
Armenians in other regions, the great majority of whom were ready to migrate to Armenia 
                                                 
717 Erim N, Devletlerarası hukuku ve siyasi tarih metinleri, cilt I (Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Andlaşmaları), Ankara: 
Turk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1953, p 524; Note: The English text brought by Hovannisian referred to ‘six 
Armenian vilayets’ (Hovannisian R, op cit., p 239).    
718 FO 608/78, pp 26-27 
719 Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Paris Peace Conference, 1919. Volume IV,            
pp 154-155 
190 
‘provided that Armenia include her natural boundaries’.720 Thus, the question of population 
would be adjusted by ‘repatriation, emigration and immigration. Armenians will immigrate 
into Armenia and a great many Turks will migrate to Anatolia’. In his estimations, ‘there will 
be in the proposed Armenian State a minimum of two and a half million Armenians and a 
maximum of one million Moslems, out of a population of about four and a half millions’.721    
 
Despite the inaccurate information about the Armenian majority in the claimed area before the 
war in the speech of Bogos Nubar Pasha, which contradicted even the Armenian Istanbul 
Patriarchate statistics, the quoted excerpts from the speeches of the Armenian nationalist 
leaders show that in spite of the Armenian minority distribution in the claimed area, which 
significantly decreased after 1915, the Armenian leaders were still optimistic about the 
extension of the area of the Armenian Republic to include Eastern Anatolia, substantiating it 
with the decrease of the Muslim population and the hope of Allied support. 
   
After the Mudros Armistice, the Great Powers also started to closely consider the extension of 
the Armenian Republic to include Eastern Anatolia. However, for them, the population issue 
was problematic. In the opinion of Dr Caleb Gates, President of Robert College (now 
Boghazichi University) in Istanbul (1903-1932), which he expressed in December 1918, it 
would be difficult to organise a state which would be Armenian in government, while the 
majority of the population were Muslims. He had two solutions for this project: either transfer 
the Muslim population from the Armenian state into the Muslim state so as to make the 
population of the Armenian state as homogenous as possible, realised through an exchange 
system where Armenians living in the Muslim state gave up their property to Muslims coming 
from the Armenian state and received in exchange the property of these Muslims; or have an 
Armenian state thoroughly controlled by some great power, so that the people governed 
would feel themselves subject to that power rather than to the Armenians. In his opinion, 
Armenians would certainly prosper, and gain the ascendancy under such conditions, and 
probably the Muslims would gradually relocate into the Muslim state.722 
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The British High Commissioner in Istanbul in May 1919 was sceptical about the success of 
this project. He questioned whether all Armenians would wish to move to a new Armenia; 
whether it would be in their own interests to do so; and whether urban Armenians would wish 
to move to an unknown land to enter into an agricultural life to which they were wholly 
unsuited. However, he mentioned that very large number of Armenians, including the Istanbul 
Armenian Patriarch, looked forward to the foundation of an independent Armenia under a 
Mandatory, in which case the US seemed eminently suited to receive the Mandate.723 The US 
Senate refused to accept a Mandate for Armenia on 31 May 1920.724 It did not want to be 
involved in the Armenian issue, except for the US President Woodrow Wilson’s arbitration on 
the delimitation of the borders between Armenia and Turkey, which would be stipulated in the 
Sevres Peace Treaty of 10 August 1920 between Turkey and the Allied Powers. According to 
this treaty, Turkey recognised Armenia as a free and independent State725 and based on this, 
the borders between the two countries were defined by Wilson on 22 November 1920 in the 
provinces of Erzurum, Trabzon, Van and Bitlis with access to the Black Sea726 (see Map 14). 
   
On 26 November 1920, Armenia issued a declaration rejecting the Sevres Treaty, a Turkish 
prerequisite for the start of the peace negotiations. The reason for this change was that, with 
the aim of occupying the territories reflected in the Sevres Treaty, Armenia had started a 
large-scale military campaign against the Turks and despite Allied support it was defeated and 
had to appeal to the Turkish Command with the proposal to start peace negotiations. On 18 
November, when the Armenian Government had started these peace negotiations with 
Kemalists, Alexander Khatisian (who was appointed by the Armenian Government to 
negotiate peace with the Kemalists), in his meeting with the British Colonel, Claude Stokes, 
the British political officer at Baku, stated that the Armenian Government realised that it was 
‘obliged to make peace either with the Turks or the Bolsheviks. It would be preferable to 
make peace with the Turks and he inclined to the belief that His Majesty’s Government would 
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also prefer this. It considered such a peace feasible as Armenia would be now content with 
much less territory than was accorded to her by the Peace Treaty with Turkey.’727  
 
The peace negotiations were concluded, apparently with the approval of the British 
Government, with the signing of the Gumru (Alexandropol) Treaty between Kemalist Turkey 
and the Armenian Republic on 2 December 1920, represented by Dashnak Armenia’s 
representatives headed by former premier, Khatisian. Under this treaty, Dashnak Armenia 
declared the Sevres Treaty annulled.728 On 24 July 1923, the Sevres Treaty, which was not 
ratified, was replaced by the Lausanne Treaty, due to the military and diplomatic 
achievements of the Kemalists. The treaty made no mention of Armenia and the above-




The failure of Transcaucasia in the war with the Ottoman Empire was instrumental in its 
acceptance of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, the declaration of its independence from Russia in the 
form of the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic and the subsequent restoration of 
peace negotiations in Batumi. In the Batumi negotiations, the aim of the Ottoman 
Government was to make use of the new situation to restore its territories lost to Russia in the 
South Caucasus in the early nineteenth century, as well as to bring the strategic areas 
containing the regional railways under its control to strengthen its position against Britain and 
Soviet Russia. The new territorial claims of the Ottoman Empire combined with the Soviet 
danger and internal disagreements within the Transcaucasian Republic accelerated its 
dissolution and the declaration of the Georgian and Azerbaijan Republics, leaving the 
Armenian leaders with no alternative but to declare the Armenian Republic.     
 
The estimations provided by different sources for the territorial extent of the Armenian 
Republic based on the Batumi treaties are questionable, since the treaties defined the borders 
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of the South Caucasian republics with the Ottoman Empire, not the borders of these republics. 
Despite the mutual Ottoman-Armenian hatred and the Armenian dissatisfaction with the 
Batumi Treaty, it was the Ottoman Government which first recognised Armenia as an 
independent state. It was not recognised by Soviet Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary or 
Bulgaria. It was again the Ottoman Government, with the help of which the Armenian 
delegation in Istanbul hoped to expand in the South Caucasus, getting ‘certain lands disputed 
with Azerbaijan and Georgia’. 
 
After failing to gain anything from the 1917 Russian revolutions, another hope emerged for 
the Armenians when the Allied Powers signed the Mudros Armistice and the Sevres Treaty. 
According to the latter, Armenia was recognised as a free and independent state by Turkey, 
and the US President Wilson defined the borders between them in the provinces of Erzurum, 
Trabzon, Van and Bitlis with access to the Black Sea. However, with the failure in the war 
against Turkey in 1920, the Armenian Republic was compelled to give up the Sevres Treaty 
and the latter was replaced by the Lausanne Treaty in 1923, which made no mention of 
Armenia: the above-mentioned provinces were left to Turkey. 
 
Unlike Zionism, which was considered by Gellner and Smith as a successful diaspora 
nationalism729 and ended in the construction of Israel in 1948 in its ‘historical homeland’, the 
Armenian diaspora nationalism did not result in the construction of an Armenian autonomy or 
state in the ‘historical homeland’ in Eastern Anatolia. The reasons were the 1915 events and 
the absence of a Great Power mandate. However, the declaration of the Armenian Republic in 
the South Caucasus proved that diaspora nationalism can end in the declaration of a state in 
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 Case study: Garabagh  
 
The chapter examines the Armenian efforts to include Garabagh in Armenia and their results. 
It explores the Armenian nationalist intentions of administrative-territorial redrawing of the 
Elizavetpol guberniya with the aim of constructing ethnic Armenian units. It analyses ethnic, 
historical, economic, geographical and security arguments the Armenian Government 
submitted to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 to substantiate its vision of territorial 
delimitation between Armenia and Azerbaijan regarding Garabagh. The chapter also 
considers the position of the Azerbaijan Republic, the Ottoman Empire, the Allied Powers 
and Bolshevik Russia on the political status of Garabagh and assesses the impact of their 
stance on the settlement of the conflict.     
 
It should be noted that ‘Garabagh’ refers to Mountainous Garabagh and Zangazur.730  
 
8.1 Historical background 
 
The first serious attempts to territorise various ethnic groups in the South Caucasus were 
made during the conferences on the introduction of zemstvo (local administrative council) into 
the region in 1905 and 1909 on the initiative of Illarion Vorontsov-Dashkov, Caucasian 
Viceroy, which did not yield any results.731 The issue became pressing in March 1917 after 
the establishment of the Provisional Government.732 The government’s aim was at least to 
issue a decree on the zemstvo reforms in the South Caucasus before the opening of the 
Constituent Assembly.733  
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Taking advantage of the presence of representatives of the peoples and political parties of the 
South Caucasus at the Conference on the elaboration of the draft act on the elections to the 
Constituent Assembly in Petrograd, the Russian Interior Ministry organised a Special 
Conference. It raised the following questions: 1) whether it was necessary to adopt local 
administration and self-administration reforms in the Caucasus within the existing 
administrative division of the region or whether it was necessary to make preliminary 
administrative readjustment; 2) if the readjustment was necessary, in which form should it be 
realised.734 
 
For the Interior Ministry, the idea of introducing self-administration in the South Caucasus 
necessitated the ‘correct’ administrative division of the region, since the creation of ethnically 
and culturally compact administrative units would facilitate better administration.735 The 
attention of the Ministry was first drawn to the areas of the region populated by Armenians 
and Tartars (Azerbaijanis).736 Two of the administrative units considered for administrative-
territorial redrawing were Elizavetpol and Erevan guberniyas (see Map 8). The current section 
considers the discussions on Elizavetpol guberniya, since it included the Garabagh region. 
The zemstvo issues with regard to Erevan guberniya will be considered in the next chapter on 
the Nakhchyvan case.   
   
According to the Interior Ministry report of 21 July 1917, the mountainous (south-western) 
part of Elizavetpol guberniya was populated mainly by 419,000 Armenians, whereas its plain 
valleys in the Kur and Araz Rivers were dominated by 797,000 Muslims. Both peoples were 
present in every uezd, however, the Armenians in the guberniya formed a minority in all 
uezds except for Shusha, where they constituted a small majority.737 The Ministerial report 
did not indicate the source of these population data. Comparison of the Interior Ministry data 
with those of the Russian official statistics in Kavkazskiy kalendar’ (Caucasian Calendar), 
prepared for 1916, reveals that the Armenians in the latter source also constituted a small 
majority only in one uezd out of eight in Elizavetpol guberniya (see Annex I and Maps 8 and 
12).  
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The Ministry proposed to divide the Elizavetpol guberniya into two separate guberniyas: 
Gandzak (Armenianised form of ‘Ganja’, renamed Elizavetpol in 1804738) guberniya with the 
centre in the Armenian part of the Elizavetpol town (Ganja town until Russian occupation in 
1804) with up to 20,000 people and Elizavetpol guberniya with the centre in the Muslim part 
of the Elizavetpol town with up to 40,000 inhabitants739 (see Map 9). According to the 
Elizavetpol uezd administration, in 1916, the number of Muslims (Azerbaijanis) of the town 
was 38,158 (excluding 84 Kurds and 89 Dagestanis),740 with 12,125 Armenians.741 
Comparison of the Ministerial figures with the 1916 statistics reveals that although the 
number of Muslims of the town is closer, changing from 38,158 to 40,000, the number of 
Armenians differs by about 7,800, rising from 12,125 to 20,000 within one year. This 
difference, in no way a result of natural growth, can be explained by one of the following 
suggestions: one of the sources is not reliable or settlement of the Armenians in the town.  
 
According to the Ministerial report, the projected administrative readjustment of the 
Elizavetpol guberniya would give predominance to Muslims in the projected Elizavetpol 
guberniya and Armenians in the projected Gandzak guberniya742 (see Map 9). Before its 
submission for the consideration of the Provisional Government, the project was submitted to 
the Special Transcaucasian Committee.743 During its 14-15 October 1917 zemstvo sessions, 
the Committee discussed the official readjustment project and another such project advocated 







                                                 
738 Note: ‘Gandzak’ was the Armenianised form of ‘Ganja’, which had been the name of the town from the 
Middle Ages up until the occupation of Ganja khanate by Russia in 1804, when its name was changed to 
Elizavetpol. The town regained its name in 1918, but in 1935 it was re-changed to Kirovabad. In 1991, when 
Azerbaijan restored its independence, the historical name of the city was returned, and is still called ‘Ganja’. The 
name in translation from Persian means ‘treasure’.  
739 STsIA, fn 2080,  l 1, fl 707, pp 7op-8op 
740 Kavkazskiy kalendar’ na 1917 god, Tiflis: Tipografiya Kantselyarii Namestnika Y.I.V. na Kavkaze, 1916,                 
pp 192-193 
741 Ibid., p 191 
742 Ibid., p 11 
743 Ibid., p 5op 
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Table 8.1 Population distribution in the officially projected Gandzak guberniya744 
 
Uezds Armenians Muslims Others Total 
Karavansaray 61,000 – 83% 9,000 – 11% 4,000 – 5% 74,000 
Gandzak 67,000 – 59% 29,000 – 25% 18,000 – 16% 114,000 
Shusha 150,000 – 70% 58,000 – 27% 5,000 – 3% 213,000 
Zangazur 88,000 – 69% 38,000 – 30% 1,000 – 1% 127,000 
 366,000 – 70% 134,000 – 25% 28,000 – 5% 528,000 
 
 
Table 8.2 Population distribution in the officially projected Elizavetpol guberniya745 
 
Uezds Armenians Muslims Others Total 
Nukha 40,000 – 18% 163,000 – 74% 17,000 – 8% 220,000 
Elizavetpol 6,000 – 4% 156,000 – 91% 9,000 – 5% 171,000 
Barda 3,000 – 3% 92,000 – 97% 4,000 – 3% 95,000 
Jabrayil 
(Garyagin) 
– 119,000 – 97% 4,000 – 3% 123,000 
Arash 4,000 – 5% 70,000 – 95% – 74,000 
Gazakh – 63,000 – 98% 1,000 – 2% 64,000 




                                                 
744 STsIA, fn 2080, l 1, fl 707, p 9; Note: Gandzak guberniya would include: 1) part of Gazakh uezd, which 
would be called Karavansaray uezd with fifteen village communities of Gazakh uezd (parts of I, II, III and IV 
uchastoks): Baranin, Bashkand, Kulaly, Tatlykand, Tovuzgala, Old Dilijan, New Dilijan, Garagoyunlu, Kotkand, 
Askipara, Mikhaylovsk, Chambarak, Uzuntala, Karavansaray and Garadash; 2) part of Elizavetpol uezd, which 
would include the following village communities of Elizavetpol uezd: the second uchastok without Pirijan 
village community, the third uchastok without Goranboy-Ahmadli, Zeyva and Mingachevir village communities, 
Frezov village community, the fourth uchastok and fifth uchastok  (Elenin, Mikhaylov, Bayan, Damzhalan, 
Zaylik, Dastafur, Aghjakand, Borisy, Erkech, Chardakhly, Frezov, Gadabay, Slavyansk, Miskinli, Garamurad 
(Ayrum), Novosaratovsk), as well as the right bank of Elizavetpol town; 3) Shusha uezd would contain parts of 
Shusha uezd: the first uchastok of Shusha uezd, excluding Gulably village community, the second uchastok 
without Skobolev and Gajar village communities and Arpaduz village and the Aghoghlan valley of Arpaduz 
village community; parts of Javanshir uezd: the third uchastok of the same uezd without Maraghaly village 
community and Talysh village community from the fifth uchastok; parts of the Zangazur uezd: the village 
communities from the second uchastok (part of Jijimli, namely Gushchular, Mazutlu, Safian, Malik-payasy and 
Baghyrbayli, Galadarasi, Hajysamly); and parts of Jabrayil uezd (village communities of Hadrut, Edilli and 
Arakul); 4) Zangazur uezd would consist of the rest of this uezd excluding the village communities of Temir-
Muskanli, Dondarly, Shykhoven, Khojahan, Mollaburhan and Raband (STsIA, fn 2080,  l 1, fl 707, pp 7op-8op). 
745 STsIA, fn 2080, l 1, fl 707, p 9; Note: Elizavetpol guberniya would constitute: 1) Nukha uezd with the 
following village communities of Arash uezd annexed to it: Hajaly, Baylarkand, Gayabashy and Boyuk Soyudlu; 
2) The village communities which were not included in Gandzak uezd would form Elizavetpol uezd; 3) Barda 
uezd would contain the village communities of Javanshir uezd and part of Shusha uezd which were not included 
in Shusha uezd (Aghdam, Goytapa, Zangishaly, Giyasly, Garakhanly, Saryjaly-Guzanly, Shykhlar-Garvand, 
Novruzlu, Hindarkh, Lambaran and Gulably); 4) Garyagin uezd would consist of the village communities of 
Garyagin and Shusha uezds which were not included in Shusha uezd (Skobelev, Afatli, Khojavand, Garadaghly, 
Khalfali and Gajar) with the annexation of six village communities of the Zangazur uezd which were not 
included in Gandzak guberniya; 5) Arash uezd would constitute the village communities of Arash uezd which 
were not included in the Nukha uezd; 6) Gazakh uezd would constitute the village communities of Gazakh uezd 
which were not included in Karavansaray uezd (STsIA, fn 2080,  l 1, fl 707, pp 7op, 8op-9). 
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Table 8.3 Population distribution in the counter-project advocated by the Muslims on 
the readjustment of the Elizavetpol guberniya746  
 
Cantons Armenians Turco-Tartars Others Total 
Karavansaray 55,702 – 93.5% 3,189 – 5.3% 673 – 1.2% 59,564 
Gandzak 68,923 – 80.3% 9,054 – 10.5% 7,823 – 9.2% 85,800 
Shusha 109,958 – 77.4% 29,190 – 20.5%  2,879 – 2.1% 142,027 
Jabrayil 
(Garyagin) 
– 45,403 – 99.99 % 6 – 0.01 % 45,409 
Gazakh 2,530 – 4.3% 54,636 – 94.3% 836 – 1.4% 58,002 
Elizavetpol 11,638 – 9.9% 104,934–88.7% 1,758 – 1.4% 118,330 
Aghdam 486 – 0.6% 74,826 – 99.4% – 75,312 
Arash 16,631 – 27% 44,626 – 72.6% 255 – 0.4% 61,512 
Nukha 17,230 – 13% 104,871 – 81.2% 7,062 – 5.5% 129,163 
Upper Gazakh 3,317 – 3.3% 36,339 – 78.3% 5,906 – 13% 45,562 
Javanshir 4,661 – 13.2% 30,238 – 85.6% 495 – 1.2% 35,394 
Zangazur 83,129 – 52.9% 74,454 – 46.9% 1,072 – 0.2% 158,755 
 
The discussions revealed different positions. According to the journal of the session of 15 
October, for the Armenian Arsham Khondkarian (Social-Revolutionary), the readjustment 
should have been a preliminary condition for the introduction of zemstvo into the Eastern 
Transcaucasia.747 The Tartar Akbar agha Sheykh-ul-Islamov (Hummat) opposed the position 
of Gazar Ter-Gazarian (Social Democrat), who favoured the official project. Sheykh-ul-
Islamov insisted on the organisation of volosts (unity of village communities or cantons), 
which was supported by the Tartar Khudadat bay Malik-Aslanov (non-partisan). Sheykh-ul-
Islamov considered that the decision of the session should be limited to whether the redivision 
was necessary. Malik-Aslanov was also against the redivision as a precondition for the 
introduction of zemstvo.748  
 
The Muslims opposed the Armenian-favoured official project because it would replace the 
existing four Muslim-dominated uezds in the border between Erevan and Elizavetpol 
guberniyas with four projected Armenian-dominated uezds: Gazakh, Elizavetpol, Javanshir 
and Zangazur uezds with Muslim majority would be replaced with Karavansaray, Gandzak, 
Shusha and Zangazur uezds with Armenian majority (compare Maps 8 and 9). The Muslim 
delegates aimed to prevent this project with their counter-project giving two Muslim-
dominated (Upper Gazakh and Javanshir) and one Armenian-dominated (Karavansaray) 
canton in the border between Elizavetpol and Erevan guberniyas, while Zangazur canton, also 
                                                 
746 ARDA, fn 970, l 1, fl 257, pp 4-5 
747 Ibid., p 14op 
748 Ibid., pp 14op-15 
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on the border of the two guberniyas, would have almost equal Muslim and Armenian 
populations749 (compare Map 10 with 8 and 9). 
 
Comparison of the official project favoured by the Armenians and the canton project favoured 
by the Muslims as related to Garabagh shows that in the former, the Armenians would have 
had two predominantly Armenian uezds (Shusha and Zangazur) in Garabagh, whereas in the 
latter they would have only Shusha canton with a significant Armenian majority in Garabagh, 
since neither Armenians nor Muslims would be ethnically dominant in Zangazur canton 
(compare Maps 9 and 10). Even if both projects were realised, neither Shusha uezd of the 
Armenian-favoured official project, with 70% of its population, nor Shusha canton of the 
Muslim-favoured canton project, with 77.4% of its population, would have been fully 
ethnically homogenous. The realisation of any of the projects would not create a compact 
Armenian area in the South Caucasus either, as its realisation would need to minimise the 
solid Muslim mass in the area between the Armenians of Elizavetpol and Erevan guberniyas 
(see Map 12).  
 
Armenian support for the official project was influenced by the fact that it corresponded to the 
plan adopted by the regional meeting of Dashnaktsutiun at the end of 1916 and suggested, 
like the official project, the formation of three Armenian provinces: Gandzak, 
                                                 
749 Note: The proposed redivision of Elizavetpol guberniya into cantons would create three more or less compact 
Armenian units with a total of 287,391 people in the projected Karavansaray, Gandzak and Shusha cantons 
(highlighted in red on Table 8.3 and see Map 10) with 83.5% Armenians and 12.2% Muslims; eight more or less 
compact Muslim units with a total of 568,684 people in the projected Jabrayil, Gazakh, Elizavetpol, Aghdam, 
Arash, Nukha, Upper Gazakh and Javanshir cantons (highlighted in blue on Table 8.3 and see Map 10) with 
9.9% Armenians and 87.2% Muslims; and Zangazur canton (highlighted in green on Table 8.3 and see Map 10) 
with a total of 158,755 people with a mixed population of 52.9% Armenians and 46.9% Muslims. The statistical 
data on Table 8.3 was noted by the referred source, to be for 1914, according to which the total population of 
official Elizavetpol guberniya was 1,014,568 with 374,205 Armenians and 611,866 Tartars, which contradicted 
the official data of 1914. According to the official statistics in the Kavkazskiy kalendar’, the total population of 
the guberniya was 1,165,836 with 396,815 Armenians and 700,590 Muslims (Kavkazskiy kalendar’ na 1915 
god, Tiflis: Tipografiya Kantselyarii Namestnika Y.I.V. na Kavkaze, 1914, pp 227-229). Moreover, the figures 
on the Zangazur uezd also do not correspond to the official data in the Kavkazskiy kalendar’, according to which 
in 1914 the total population of the uezd was 209,951 with 89,906 Armenians and 118, 146 Muslims (Ibid.,        
pp 231-233). This means that the number of Muslims in the Zangazur canton should have been more than the 
number of Armenians, which allows classification not as ‘mixed’, but with Muslim predominance. Although the 
data in 1914 is based on religion and confession and the division in the projected canton readjustment statistical 
table is ethnic, in the canton project the terms ‘Tartar’ and ‘Muslim’ were used interchangeably. It should be 
admitted that the referred source itself noted the absence of reliable statistic data, which contradicted each other 
and made the study of the administrative readjustment issue even more complicated (ARDA, fn 970, l 1, fl 257,    
p 1). 
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Alexandropol750 and Erevan (see Map 9). These provinces encompassed the area of a large 
South Caucasian Armenian province of fifteen counties, ten with absolute Armenian majority, 
which was suggested by Stepan Kamsarakan, a non-partisan. The territory of the suggested 
Armenian province would include Erevan guberniya, southern parts of Tiflis guberniya, part 
of Kars oblast, and the western half of Elizavetpol guberniya751 (see Map 8). 
 
After long discussions, the Special Transcaucasian Committee adopted a resolution stating 
that zemstvo were to be introduced into those administrative units where there was no issue on 
the readjustment of the administrative borders. Zemstvo could not be introduced into the 
Elizavetpol guberniya, which was declared, together with Erevan guberniya, Kars and 
Kaghyzman okrugs of the Kars oblast and Borchaly and Akhalkalaki uezds of the Tiflis 
guberniya, disputed by the Special Transcaucasian Committee session of 15 October (see 
Map 8). Administrative readjustment of the Elizavetpol guberniya within one month of the 
date of the issuance of the decree of the Provisional Government was declared to be a 
precondition for the introduction of zemstvo.752  
 
Khachatur Korchikian, on behalf of the Dashnaktsutiun representatives attending the session, 
read the statement on their refusal to take part in future sessions on administrative redivision 
and issued their ‘special opinion’ on the resolution, signed by Korchikian and Avetik 
Shakhatunian. They argued that the introduction of zemstvo into some guberniyas and uezds, 
leaving ‘the disputed regions without it would aggravate relations of neighbouring peoples’. 
They stated that a full agreement on the disputed issues was impossible, since the three 
months’ work in the commissions and sub-commissions had brought agreement on some 
questions, whereas the disputed paragraphs had revealed that the interested parties could not 
make further compromises. These questions, Dashnaktsutiun continued, were discussed in 
detail: the views of the parties were clear and definite and could serve as comprehensive 
material for the final settlement of the issue. The party representatives viewed that the 
                                                 
750 Note: The Alexandropol guberniya was projected to be created by taking from Tiflis guberniya Akhalkalaki 
uezd, three village communities of Trialet uchastok (Nardevan, Ashkalin and Avramly) and Lori uchastok of 
Borchaly uezd with cutbacks from Borchaly and Ekaterinin uchastoks of the same uezd and two villages of Gori 
uezd (Gyzylkilsa and Molit); from Kars oblast Kars and Kaghyzman uezds, and finally from Erevan guberniya 
Alexandropol uezd (without its first uchastok) and the fourth uchastok of Echmiadzin uezd, annexing it to the 
former (STsIA, fn 2080,  l 1, fl 707, p 9op). 
751 Hovannisian R, Armenia on the Road to Independence, p 91 
752 STsIA, fn 2080, l 1, fl 707, pp 16op-17 
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postponement would not give new results, so were not reasonable. In their opinion, a decree 
on the administrative readjustment could be issued on the basis of the results of the work of 
the commissions and zemstvo could be introduced into the whole of the South Caucasus.753 
 
On 1 December 1917, the Transcaucasian Commissariat issued a decree on the introduction of 
zemstvo, which declared similar conditions to those of the Special Transcaucasian Committee 
resolution of 15 October 1917. One of the points of the decree stated that within one month 
from the date of the issuance of the decree the Tanscaucasian Commissariat was to redraw the 
administrative borders in the disputed guberniyas and uezds (okrugs), requesting the 
preliminary opinion of the Armenian, Georgian and Muslim national committees on the issue 
and to introduce zemstvo administration immediately in the mentioned guberniyas and uezds 
(okrugs) in the new borders. Also among the disputed administrative borders were 
Elizavetpol, Gazakh, Javanshir, Shusha, Zangazur and Jabrayil uezds of the Elizavetpol 
guberniya754 (see Map 8).  
 
No agreement could be reached between the Armenians and the Muslims until the declaration 
of the Armenian and Azerbaijan republics,755 so the administrative boundaries of Shusha, 
Javanshir and Jabrayil uezds, which included Mountainous Garabagh, and Zangazur uezd 
were not redrawn and were left as they were before the zemstvo projects of 1917 (see Map 8). 
 
Thus, the Dashnaktsutiun vision of the territorial division of Elizavetpol guberniya was not 
realised in this period. The next discussion of the territorial issues between the Armenians and 
the Muslims took place during peace negotiations in Batumi on 11 May-4 June 1918.  There, 
the Armenian National Council (represented by Alexander Khatisian, Ovannes Kachaznuni 
and Mikayel Papajanian) gave up its claims to the Elizavetpol guberniya,756 including 
                                                 
753 Ibid., pp 19-19op 
754 ARDA, fn 970, l 1, fl 87, p 1 
755 Hovannisian R, The Republic of Armenia. Volume I, p 81; Note: Armenian claims, among others, to parts of 
Akhalkalaki and Borchaly uezds of Tiflis guberniya caused opposition from the Georgians, who found these 
areas to be connected to Tiflis guberniya from historical, geographical and economic points of view. The 
Armenians considered Akhalkalaki uezd to be Armenian both geographically and ethnically, arguing that it was 
a natural continuation of the ‘Armenian plateau’ and predominantly Armenian. The Armenians argued the same 
about the Lori uchastok of Borchaly uezd, which they found to be ethnically Armenian (for the Georgian and 
Armenian arguments on the issue see STsIA, fn 2080, l 1, fl 627, pp 3-12). 
756 ARDA, fn 897, l 1, fl 11, pp 236-236op   
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Garabagh,757 and in return, the Azerbaijani National Council (represented by Mahammad 
Amin Rasulzada and Mammad Hasan Hajynskiy) gave up its claims to the rest of the Erevan 
and Echmiadzin uezds, which were not under Ottoman control, and the New Bayazid uezd.758 
As a result of this ‘agreement’, Azerbaijan conceded Erevan to serve as the capital of the 
Armenian Republic on 29 May 1918,759 and Armenia’s government moved there on 19 July 
1918.760  
 
The Batumi Treaties of 4 June 1918 between the Ottoman Empire and each of the South 
Caucasian republics, as mentioned in Chapter 7, did not define the borders between Armenia 
and Azerbaijan, which was left to the republics concerned. However, there was the above-
mentioned understanding between Armenia and Azerbaijan on their borders. Despite this, 
soon after the signing of the Batumi Treaty, Armenia declared Garabagh disputed and sought 
the support of the Central Powers, including the Ottoman Government, to include it in 
Armenia.761    
 
The Armenian Republic’s change of position with regard to Mountainous Garabagh and 
Zangazur was related to the change in the situation in Zangazur owing to the violent activities 
of General Andranik Ozanian, himself an Ottoman Armenian. Ozanian, whose operations 
against the Muslims in Nakhchyvan had failed, changed direction towards Zangazur in July 
1918762 with 45,000 Ottoman Armenian refugees and turned 80,000 Muslims of Zangazur 
into refugees in Persia, Nakhchyvan and parts of Baku guberniya.763 This became the main 
source of hope for the realisation of the Armenian territorial aspirations.    
          
                                                 
757 Avalov Z, op cit., p 57; ARDA, fn 897, l 1, fl 11, pp 236-236op 
758 ARDA, fn 897, l 1, fl 11, pp 246, 256-256op 
759 ARSPIHDA, fn 970, l 1, fl 1, p 51 
760 Hovannisian R, Armenia on the Road to Independence, p 210 
761 Hovannisian R, op cit., pp 231, 235; ARDA, fn 894, l 10, fl 31, pp 16, 20-21 
762 Note: Referring to one report from the US Archives, Richard Hovannisian wrote that ‘Andranik arrived in 
Zangazur with 12,000 men and 40,000 refugee followers’, whereas according to Hovannisian himself, there were 
about 30,000 Armenian refugees in Zangazur, of whom 15,000 were from Nakhchyvan (Hovannisian R, The 
Republic of Armenia. Volume I, pp 87, 189-190). 
763ARSPIHDA, fn1, l 1, fl 69a, pp 2, 5-6; Hovannisian R, Armenia on the Road to Independence, p 194 
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The Armenian Government tried to present Andranik as persona non grata and declared that it 
was ready to disarm him ‘if he entered the bounds of the Republic’.764 But the Armenian 
Prime Minister’s statement on 28 March 1919 that Andranik was expected to arrive in Erevan 
with his force, to be taken by the Armenian Army,765 the Armenian officials’ welcome of 
Andranik in the railway station of Ararat,766 and the words of Avetis Aharonian, Head of the 
Delegation of the Republic of Armenia at the Paris Peace Conference, on 26 February 1919 
that the ‘renowned Andranik’ fought against ‘Abdul Hamid and Turkish tyranny for 30 
years’,767 suggest the opposite.        
 
Andranik’s goal was to prevent the submission of the local Armenian population of Garabagh 
to the Azerbaijani Government, urging them to fight against it. According to Andranik’s 
letter, published in the Dashnak newspaper Nor Horizon in Tiflis on 27 November 1918 and 
republished in the Azerbaydzhan newspaper in Baku on 17 December 1918, the ‘local 
population [of Garabagh – I.K.], which during the whole war was not subjected to any 
violence and did not suffer, yet showed us [Ottoman Armenian refugees and soldiers who 
followed Andranik – I.K.] a cold and indifferent, and in some places hostile attitude’.768  
‘Most of my forces’, Andranik went on, ‘not meeting any confidence and support of the 
population of Zangazur, left Garabagh’.769 Andranik was not happy that the population of 
Zangazur wanted ‘to meet the demands of the enemies [Azerbaijani Government – I.K.] and 
accept its citizenship’, but ‘thanks to my decisive opposition, this intention was 
abandoned’.770  
 
Fatali Khan Khoyskiy, Prime Minister of Azerbaijan, in his speech to the Azerbaijani 
Parliament on 20 December 1918, referred to numerous telegrammes from different parts of 
Garabagh on the atrocities perpetrated by Andranik. He cited one case: ‘in one of the villages, 
where the bands of Andranik were repulsed, a wounded local Armenian gave the following 
                                                 
764 Hovannisian R, op cit., p 214; Note: The protest of the Azerbaijani Government of 15 August 1918  to the 
Armenian Government on Andranik’s advancement into Zangazur and Garabagh and the reply of the Armenian 
Government of 23 August 1918 can be found in ARDA, fn 897, l 1, fl 11, pp 192-193. 
765 FO 371/3658, p 519 
766 Hovannisian R, The Republic of Armenia. Volume I, pp 190-191 
767Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Paris Peace Conference, 1919. Volume IV,          
p 149 
768 Azerbaydzhanskaya Respublika. Dokumenty i materialy 1918-1920 gg., Baku: Elm, 1998, dok 49, p 77 
769 Ibid., p 78 
770 Ibid. 
204 
evidence: Andranik terrorised the local Armenians as well, forcefully recruiting them to his 
bands. Those who resisted were hung cruelly; thirty old Armenian men who did not share his 
opinion were jailed in Gorus. As long as Andranik is here, – the wounded man says, – there 
cannot even be talk of peaceful coexistence between the Armenians and the Muslims.’771 
 
During the First World War, Britain subsidised Andranik’s force to fight against the Turks. 
The force was disbanded by the British Command in the South Caucasus, as it found his 
presence in the region undesirable after the Mudros Armistice.772 For his services to the 
British interests in the past, Andranik was allowed by William Thwaites, the Director of 
Military Intelligence Department of the War Office, to proceed to England. 773     
 
Nevertheless, Armenia did not abandon its claims to Garabagh, as can be seen from the joint 
Armenian memorandum submitted by the Republic of Armenia and the Armenian National 
Delegation, representing Ottoman Armenians, to the Paris Peace Conference on 26 February 
1919. According to this memorandum, Armenia must include the entire Erevan guberniya, 
southern part of Tiflis guberniya, south-western part of Elizavetpol guberniya, and Kars 
oblast (excluding northern Ardahan) in the South Caucasus, and the provinces of Van, Bitlis, 
Diyarbakyr, Mamuret-ul-Aziz, Sivas, Erzurum and Trabzon (excluding regions to the south of 
Tigris and to the west of the Ordu-Sivas line) and four sanjaks (counties) of Cilicia (Marash, 
Khozan (Sis), Jebel-Bereket and Adana, including Alexandretta) in Anatolia774 (see Map 13).  
 
8.2 Armenian arguments on Garabagh 
 
The Republic of Armenia tried to substantiate its claims to Garabagh with ethnic, economic, 
historical, and geographical and security arguments in another memorandum submitted to the 




                                                 
771 Ibid., dok 73, p 110 
772 FO 371/3657, p 481 
773 Ibid., pp 483, 480 
774The Armenian Question before the Peace Conference, New York: Press Bureau, The Armenian National 




The settlement of territorial conflicts between the South Caucasian republics was the subject 
of the South Caucasian Conference, convened on 27 April 1919 in Tiflis and continuing until 
19 May 1919.775 The Azerbaijani delegation proposed to include the territorial issues in the 
conference programme and to establish a commission to define the principles and means for 
their settlement. The proposal was strongly opposed by the Armenian delegation, but after 
long discussions the delegation was compelled to accept it.776  
 
The Armenian delegation presented its vision for the settlement of territorial problems 
between the South Caucasian republics at the sessions of the Territorial Commission of the 
South Caucasian Conference on 17-19 May 1919. The discussions revealed different 
approaches among the members of the Armenian delegation. Stepan Mamikonian supported 
the ethnic principle, but opposed the economic and strategic ones. He rejected the economic 
principle on the grounds that economically the whole of the South Caucasus gravitated 
towards Russia and the South Caucasian republics towards Georgia. Also, the destiny of 
‘Turkish Armenia’ was not yet defined and Armenia did not have an independent outlet to the 
sea. Mamikonian considered the strategic principle777 unacceptable, but did not substantiate 
his position.778 Samson Arutunian supported the principle of self-determination for the 
settlement of contiguous borders, and did not oppose the other principles. He favoured the 
settlement of border disputes by plebiscite, both in the disputed province and in its part within 
any republic.779 Sirakan Tigranian considered that disputes on contiguous borders should be 
settled on the basis of self-determination and auxiliary principles.780 
 
The common position of the Armenian delegation was presented by Tigranian in a written 
form as the ‘main guidelines’ to be followed during the settlement of the territorial questions: 
the creation of independent republics in the South Caucasus, which started from the principle 
                                                 
775 Note: The idea of convening such a conference for the liquidation of territorial problems by peaceful means 
was first expressed by the Azerbaijani Government in 1918. Since the idea was opposed by Armenia, it could not 
be realised. This time the idea was realised at the proposal of the Georgian Government and it was attended by 
three South Caucasian Republics, as well as Mountainous Republic (ARDA, fn 970, l 1, fl 215, pp 20-21). 
776 ARDA, fn 970, l 1 secret, fl 79, pp 38-38op 
777 Note: ‘Strategic principle’ should be taken to mean the geographical and security arguments. 
778 ARDA, fn 970, l 1, fl 72, p 1 
779 Ibid., p 1op 
780 Ibid., p 3 
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of self-determination, should have been finalised so that every nation could have a compact 
territory, which would include a significant part of the relevant people within the borders of 
the South Caucasus, leaving only a small minority of that people under the rule of other 
republics.781  
 
As seen above, the principle which dominated the Armenian vision of the territorial 
delimitation in the region was ethnic: the Armenian Republic was striving to include as much 
Armenian-populated territory as possible within its borders, leaving only a small Armenian 
minority outside. This demonstrates the aim of the Armenian Government to build an 
Armenian ethno-nation, once again proving Anthony Smith’s ethno-symbolist approach and 
setting the Armenian case within his ‘ethnic’ type of nationalism.  
 
The principle of self-determination was also considered as a basis for the settlement of 
territorial problems by the Azerbaijani delegation, whose position was presented in a written 
form by Khalil bay Khasmammadov. According to the Azerbaijani position, if the dispute 
was on the districts, which from economic and historical points of view were inseparably 
connected with other undisputed districts, a referendum should be held among the population 
of all these districts.782  
 
Whilst the South Caucasian Conference was meeting, Avetis Aharonian submitted the above-
mentioned memorandum on Armenian claims to the Paris Peace Conference on 17 May 1919. 
The part of the memorandum dedicated to ethnic considerations started with the explanation 
of the intention of the Russian authorities behind the administrative divisions of the Caucasus. 
According to this document, the Russian Government had deliberately created administrative 
divisions in which Tatar (Azerbaijani) and Armenian populations were mixed, so as not to 
have compact ethnic groups to foster national ambitions. It was argued that the Russian 
Government joined entirely different geographical and physical environments with 
incompatible cultures and customs. Based on these considerations, the memorandum found it 
necessary ‘to rectify this artificial creation of the Russian autocracy which is the result of the 
famous precept “Divide et Impera”’.783  
                                                 
781 Ibid., p 2 
782 Ibid. 
783 FO 608/82, p 324 
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Here it should be noted that it was because of the Russian settlement of Armenians from 
Persia and the Ottoman Empire, discussed in Chapter 4, and the administrative divisions that 
in 1916 Armenians could get a 52.3% majority in Shusha uezd and 44.6% significant minority 
in Zangazur uezd in addition to 29% and 24.3% minorities in Javanshir and Jabrayil uezds 
respectively (see Map 8). It appears that the Russian rule favoured the Armenians, not the 
Muslims, who until then significantly outnumbered Armenians in the whole province of 
Garabagh. It was due to the Russian authorities that the Armenians could create compact areas 
and subsequently declare their state in the South Caucasus.  
 
The mixture of mountains and plains in Garabagh was not a Russian construction. They 
constituted parts of this historical and geographical region before its occupation by Russia, 
whereas the idea of their separation emanated from the Armenian nationalists. ‘Mountainous 
Garabagh’ was a notion politically constructed by the Armenians during the zemstvo 
conferences in 1917. This notion did not exist either before the Russian occupation of 
Garabagh in 1805 or during the Russian rule in 1805-1917. The aim was to separate the areas 
populated by Armenians from Muslim-dominated Garabagh in order to construct 
predominantly Armenian units. In order to achieve this aim, the memorandum advanced both 
ethnic arguments and administrative units with contradictory data. Thus, while in the letter to 
the Peace Conference, the total population in the mountainous parts of Elizavetpol guberniya 
in Gazakh, Elizavetpol, Shusha, Javanshir, Jabrayil and Zangazur uezds was claimed to be 
‘494,000 with 358,000 Armenians, 24,000 other Christians and 112,000 Muslims’,784 in the 
accompanying copy of the memorandum itself, the total population was presented as 419,000 
with 328,000 Armenians and 91,000 Muslims.785 The same was true of the ethnic data on 
Zangazur uezd, which had two different statistics in the same memorandum: 1) total 
population of 127,000 with 90,000 Armenians and 37,000 Muslims; 2) total population of 
152,000 with 100,000 Armenians and 50,000 Muslims.786 Further contradictory data was 
provided in the Armenian delegation’s letter of 1 January 1920, according to which 
Mountainous Garabagh had 300,000 Armenians and 113,000 Tartars.787 
 
                                                 
784 Ibid., p 318 
785 Ibid., p 325  
786 Ibid., pp 325, 342 
787 FO 608/273, p 11 
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According to the official Russian statistics of 1916, there were 373,938 Armenians and 
573,571 Muslims in Gazakh, Elizavetpol, Shusha, Javanshir, Jabrayil and Zangazur uezds (see 
Map 8). Of these, 243,627 Armenians and 327,705 Muslims were in Garabagh, with 142,572 
Armenians and 204,310 Muslims in the uezds of Javanshir, Shusha and Jabrayil in 
Mountainous Garabagh, and 101,055 Armenians and 123,395 Muslims in Zangazur. For 
Alimardan bay Topchubashov, Head of the Azerbaijani Delegation at the Paris Peace 
Conference, three quarters of the population of mountainous Garabagh were Tartar, as in 
order to avoid taxation and the possibilities of military service the Tartars always understated 
the number of their sons, and for other reasons did not include a number of their unmarried 
women.788  
 
Comparing the figures of the Armenian memorandum with those of the official Russian 
statistics, it can be argued that the number of Armenians in Mountainous Garabagh could not 
more than double in 1916-1919 from 142,572 to 300,000. This increase can represent gross 
exaggeration, include Armenian refugees, or both. The highest available number of Armenian 
refugees in the whole of Garabagh was estimated to be in Zangazur: 45,000, as mentioned 
earlier. Even this figure does not make the number of Armenians in Zangazur more than 
150,000, and in the whole of Garabagh more than 300,000. Comparing official and 
memorandum figures, though contradictory, it can be suggested that the number of Ottoman 
Armenian refugees who came to Zangazur with Andranik, has not been included in the 
Armenian population of the uezd in the memorandum, whereas the Muslim population had 
been decreased significantly in both statistics. This suggests that in the case of the Muslims, 
the memorandum had taken into account the number of Muslim refugees who left Zangazur 
for other places populated by Muslims, in the first data a decrease of about 85,000 in 
comparison with that of 1916, and in the second statistics a decrease of about 73,000 
Muslims.     
 
After considering the memorandum’s ethnic arguments, it can be concluded that in order to 
substantiate its territorial claims to Garabagh, the Republic of Armenia presented distorted 
ethnic data to the Paris Peace Conference, exaggerating the number of Armenians and 
underestimating that of the Muslims. As the official ethnic statistics of the Garabagh region 
                                                 
788 FO 608/84, p 100 
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were not favourable for the memorandum, it tried to construct arguments, artificially dividing 
the historically, geographically and economically established region into mountainous and 
plain parts.   
 
Even in this case, in order to annex Armenian-populated parts of Garabagh, the Armenian 
Republic would need to minimise the solid Muslim mass between Garabagh and the compact 
Armenian settlements around Erevan (see Map 12). The area included Javanshir and Zangazur 
uezds of the Elizavetpol guberniya and Nakhchyvan, Sharur-Daralayaz and Erevan uezds of 
the Erevan guberniya. In these uezds, according to the official data of 1916, there were 
412,018 Muslims as against 206,437 Armenians living in areas separated from each other in 
the form of islands.789 If we deduct from this figure about 30,000 Muslims of Javanshir uezd, 
who lived in the east of mountainous Garabagh, even in this case their number would count 
382,018, which means that Muslims outnumbered Armenians by 175,581.  
 
Armenia tried to ‘neutralise’ this Muslim barrier with the help of Armenian refugees, who 
were settled in the Daralayaz part of Sharur-Daralayaz uezd and in Zangazur uezd on the lands 
and properties of the expelled Muslims, as the occupation of these areas and their settlement 
with Armenians were important to connect the Armenian settlements around Erevan with 
Garabagh: all Armenian efforts to subjugate Nakhchyvan uezd and to connect with 
Mountainous Garabagh through it failed. On the other hand, occupation of these areas would 
mean the dissociation of the Muslim-dominated parts of Elizavetpol guberniya from 
Nakhchyvan.  
 
It was this obstacle in the substantiation of the Armenian territorial claims which the 
memorandum wanted to eliminate with the construction of the arguments blaming the Russian 
administrative divisions for the lower number of Armenians in these areas than Muslims, 
seeking to create artificial divisions separating mountains from plains and turning the 
Armenians into a compact mass constituting the majority in the claimed territories.  
 
The application of the ethnic principle to the Armenian Republic would mean that its area 
should have included Erevan, Echmiadzin and Alexandropol uezds and the western part of 
                                                 
789 Kavkazskiy kalendar’ na 1917 god, pp 191-197, 219-221 
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New Bayazid uezd of Erevan guberniya (see Map 12). Only in these areas did Armenians 
constitute a compact mass. The application of the self-determination principle would not 
allow Garabagh to be regarded as ‘contiguous’ to the Armenian Republic, since the former 
bordered on the west with the Muslim-dominated Sharur-Daralayaz and Nakhchyvan uezds of 
Erevan guberniya. As Garabagh could not be considered a border area adjacent to the 
compact Armenian areas, it could not be involved in the delimitation of the border areas. The 
issue of Armenians in Garabagh could be solved under minority status with the recognition of 
their cultural rights within Azerbaijan. The application of the same ethnic principle to the 
provinces of the Ottoman Empire, which the joint Armenian memorandum claimed at the 
Paris Peace Conference, would also fail. Neither before nor after 1915 did Armenians 
constitute a majority in any of the claimed provinces, as argued in Chapters 3 and 5. In this 
case both Armenians and the British Government interpreted self-determination in such a way 
that both ‘Armenians and Jews had “for historical reasons” claims to consideration out of 
proportion to their numbers’.790  
 
This approach shows that ethnic arguments could be ignored when the Great Powers were 
intent on constructing ‘ethnic’ states. The ethnic gap was considered to be filled by attracting 
Armenians from all over the world to these areas both before and after the construction of this 
state, as discussed in Chapter 7. Until then, the principle more suitable for application seemed 
to be ‘historical’, since history could also be constructed on an ethnic basis. Although Eastern 
Anatolia was a historical habitat of the Armenians, they were an isolated minority there. 
Armenian nationalists blamed external factors for the decrease of their numbers in Eastern 
Anatolia. But, as discussed in Chapter 4, in the early nineteenth century, it was on the 
initiative of the Armenian leaders that a great number of Armenians moved from their 
historical territories in Eastern Anatolia to the South Caucasus. At that time, the Armenian 
leaders were concentrating on establishing an Armenian autonomy under Christian Russia and 
did not seem to be concerned about the resulting decrease of their number in Eastern Anatolia. 
The emergence of Armenian trade and merchant colonies all over the world from the Middle 
Ages onward also tells us that Armenians were inclined to move from one place to another, 
with economic benefits being of paramount consideration. The idea of ‘historical homeland’ 
became important after the nationalist movement, gaining importance in the eyes of those 
                                                 
790 Hovannisian R, The Republic of Armenia. Volume I, p 269 
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nationalist leaders who themselves lived away from Eastern Anatolia, in diaspora. Although 
in the case of Eastern Anatolia, the Armenian leaders in 1919 referred to history, in the case 




According to the official Armenian memorandum, Garabagh had been part of Armenia from 
time immemorial ‘known as the three provinces of Siunia, Artsakh and Uti’791 (for the 
localisation of these provinces by Mik’ayel Ch’amch’yants’ see Map 4: N9 (Seunies), N10 
(Arzakh) and N12 (Uti)). The document continued, ‘this is one of the Armenian regions 
where the population has always been resolutely loyal to the nation; it has remained pure and 
free from any mixing with the neighbouring populations and has rarely migrated. Centuries 
have passed, but the national character and the moral physiognomy of this population have 
remained intact until today, in spite of the continuous invasions and assaults of foreign 
races.’792 The memorandum also argued the historical racial, religious and cultural 
connections between the ‘Armenians’ of Garabagh, ‘Ararat’ (for the localisation of Ararat 
province by Ch’amch’yants’ see Map 4: province N15) and the Van region, and considered 
the Garabagh melikates (counties), discussed earlier in the thesis, to be the ‘last refuge of the 
Armenian national idea in the 16th-18th centuries’.793 
 
As it appears from the Armenian memorandum’s arguments, Armenia included Garabagh 
from time immemorial. Although it did not refer to any source while making this argument, 
our investigation revealed that the passage on the historical belonging of Artsakh, Uti and 
Siunia provinces to Armenia was based on the Armenian ‘Geography’, discussed in                 
Chapter 4. This work in turn was based on the work of Faustos Buzandatsi, the Armenian 
historian of the fifth century. He is considered to be the first Armenian historian, who 
attempted to write a periodised history of Armenia from the beginning until 387 AD, which 
was first published in Istanbul in 1730.794 Buzandatsi, who was not contemporary to the 
                                                 
791 FO 608/82, p 323 
792 Ibid. 
793 Ibid. 
794 Ch’amch’yants’ M, History of Armenia: From B.C. 2247 to the Year of Christ 1780 or 1229 of the Armenian 
Era (translated from the original Armenian text by Johannes Avdall), Vol I, Calcutta: Bishop’s College Press, 
1827, p XXVI 
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events he described in his work, according to Levon Khachikian, author of the introductory 
part of the translation of this history into Russian, ‘did not use almost any written sources for 
the description of the events’.795 However, this work, which included more than half of the 
South Caucasus in ‘Greater Armenia’ until 387 AD, has been one of the major sources of 
reference for the study of the ancient history and geography of the South Caucasus by 
Armenian, European and Russian scholars.    
 
Since the topic of the current thesis is not the history and geography of ancient Armenia, its 
‘territorial’ components will not be discussed in this section. Moreover, the historians dealing 
with this issue either do not make reference to any source or refer to the later manuscripts or 
different editions based on the later manuscripts of the ancient Armenian sources, because of 
the absence of their originals. Different people scribed these later manuscripts in various 
periods, leaving their traces in terms of interpolations depending on the demands of the time 
and the persons ordering the scribing.796 As expressed by Nicolas Adontz, ‘historical literature 
underwent repeated revisions and re-workings to bring it into agreement with the spirit and 
demands of the period. Consequently, the literary heritage, too, is by no means free from 
tendentious colouring both in the presentation of material and in the fusion of the true with the 
false.’797   
   
As for the argument of the memorandum that Garabagh ‘Armenians’, being ‘resolutely loyal 
to the [Armenian] nation’, ‘have remained pure and free from any mixing with the 
neighbouring populations’, study of the works of the Armenian historians, including those 
who wrote closer to the date of submission of this memorandum in May 1919, reveals a 
somewhat different picture. Thus, in 1908, Adontz wrote that ‘the only certain fact is that 
                                                 
795 Istoriya Armenii Favstosa Buzanda (perevod s drevnearmyanskogo i kommentarii M.Gevorgiana pod 
redaktsiey S.Eremiana), Erevan: Izdatel’stvo Akademii Nauk Armyanskoy SSR, 1953, pp XI-XII 
796 Nikol’skiy M (ed.), Drevnosti Vostochniya. Trudy Vostochnoy Kommissii Imperatorskago Moskovskago  
Arkheologicheskago Obshchestva. Protokoly zasedaniy Vostochnoy Kommissii Imperatorskago Moskovskago  
Arkheologicheskago Obshchestva za 1888-1895, tom II, vyp 1, Moscow, 1896, pp 118-120; Adontz N, Armenia 
in the Period of Justinian: The Political Conditions based on the Naxarar System, p 254; Khorenats’i M, History 
of the Armenians (translation and commentary on the literary sources by Robert Thomson), p 52; Istoriya 
Armenii Moiseya Khorenskago (noviy perevod  N.O.Emina s primechaniyami i prilozheniyami), pp VI, XIX-
XXI; Armyanskaya Geografiya VII veka po R.Kh. (pripisyvavshayasya Moiseyu Khorenskomu) (perevod s 
drevnearmyanskogo i kommentarii K.P.Patkanova), pp II-XXVI; Ch’amch’yants’ M, History of Armenia: From 
B.C. 2247 to the Year of Christ 1780 or 1229 of the Armenian Era (translated from the original Armenian text by 
Johannes Avdall), Vol I, p XXVI; Istoriya Armenii Favstosa Buzanda (perevod s drevnearmyanskogo i 
kommentarii M.Gevorgiana pod redaktsiey S.Eremiana), loc cit. 
797 Adontz N, Armenia in the Period of Justinian: The Political Conditions based on the Naxarar System, loc cit. 
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Siwnik [Siunia – I.K.], the Albanian borderland of Armenia, had a population which differed 
somewhat from that of the central districts of Armenia. The tribal peculiarity of Siwnik was 
supported and reinforced by a stream of migrations from the adjacent mountains, which have 
left traces in the toponymy.’798 Another Armenian historian, Kevork Aslan, in 1914, in his 
work in French dedicated to the history of Armenia, translated into English in 1920, 
mentioned that during the days of the Arsacids, whose rule he dated from the second century 
AD to the third century AD,799 the kingdom of Armenia included different ‘territories or 
countries’. The historian included ‘Sunik’ (Siunia), ‘Oudi and Artzakh [Uti and Artsakh – 
I.K.], inhabited principally by Albani’ in this list.800 As his footnotes explain, by ‘Sunik’ he 
meant ‘Karabagh’ and he considered that the ‘Albani, known to Armenian writers as the 
Aghuanis, who embraced Christianity in the fourth century, were finally merged into the 
Armenians’.801  
 
In 1904, Joseph Hübschmann wrote that Siunia was a country in its own with its own 
people.802 Based on the above-mentioned Armenian historian of the fifth century, Faustos 
Buzandatsi, the scholar interpreted that ‘Artsakh seems to have belonged to Albania 
originally, was then conquered by the Armenians and still belonged to Armenia in the first 
half of the fourth century. In the year 387 it was returned to Albania, where it remained.’803 
As for Uti, Hübschmann, based on two editions of the Armenian ‘Geography’ in 1865 and 
1881, gave unclear localisation such as ‘between Albania and the Kur River’ and ‘between 
Artsakh and the Kur River’.804  
 
Nicolas Adontz, Kevork Aslan and Johann Hübschmann, despite their works being based on 
the ancient Armenian sources, did not consider Siunia, Artsakh and Uti to be Armenian-
populated provinces. This means that the official Armenian memorandum did not follow 
either the Armenian or non-Armenian historians of its time. Although based on ancient 
                                                 
798 Ibid., p 325 
799 Aslan K, Armenia and the Armenians: From the Earliest Times until the Great War (1914) (translated from 
the French by Pierre Crabites), New York: The Macmillan Company, 1920, p 29, note 26 
800 Ibid., p 30; see also there: notes 32 and 34 
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802 Hübschmann J, Die Altarmenischen Ortsnamen, Strasbourg: Verlag von Karl J.Trübner, 1904, p 263 
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Armenian sources, the memorandum included these provinces in Armenia; it was not 
consistent in its loyalty to the historical Armenian narrative. Thus, it did not take into account, 
among others, the information related to the Albanians, which can be found in all translations 
of the historical work of the ‘father’ of Armenian history, Moisey Khorenski, including in its 
Russian and English translations. Both translations of this work of Khorenski, whose lifetime 
was debated between the fifth and the tenth centuries,805 gave information on the ‘tribe of 
Sisak, which inherited the plain of Albania and the mountainous region of the same plain 
from the river Araxes as far as the fortress called Hnarakert [localised on the border of 
modern Georgia and Azerbaijan by specialists – I.K.]. And the country was called Aluank 
[Albania] after the gentleness of his mode of life; for they called him alu. Descended from 
him was this famous and valiant Aran whom the Parthian Valarshak made military governor. 
From his offspring, they say, descend the families of Uti and Gardman and Tsovdek and the 
principalities of Gargar.’806 The language of one of these tribes, Gargarians, who lived in 
Gargar, one of the historical names of Garabagh, the source called a ‘guttural, harsh, 
barbarous, and very rough tongue’.807 
 
Unlike the sources whose originals have been lost and the conflicting information in their 
later manuscripts and editions open way to conflicting interpretations, the events of the 18th-
early 19th centuries can be studied with the use of original sources contemporary to the period. 
These documents, as cited in Chapter 4, narrate information about the Albanian people in 
Garabagh. However, in 1919, when the Armenian memorandum made claims to Garabagh, 
this Christian population of Garabagh was already Armenian, though mostly converted, which 
was also discussed in Chapter 4. This nineteenth-century conversion made it easier for the 
Armenian Government to demonstrate the above-mentioned primordialist approach to the 
history of Garabagh by constructing a historical ethnic link between Garabagh and the 
Armenian people from time immemorial, and by arguing the historical territorial connection 
between Garabagh and the Armenians.  
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Here, the Armenian case once again suggested the accuracy of the ethno-symbolist approach, 
since the memorandum tried to substantiate its claims based on the constructed ethnic history, 
trying to create an unbreakable ethnic link between the Armenians of 1919 and several 
millennia ago. The Armenian nationalist activists some forty years previously in 1881 seemed 
to have no idea about the ‘Armenian’ counties of Garabagh, which the official Armenian 
memorandum of 1919 presented as the ‘last refuge of the Armenian national idea in the 16th-
18th centuries’. In 1881, Raffi, the ideological father of the Armenian nationalist movement, 
reacting to the indifference of his nationalist friends to the history of Garabagh, was surprised 
that the ‘people who argued about the cuneiform inscriptions of Van and who wrote about the 
periods before the Flood, regarded events which happened recently, just fifty years ago, as 
fiction, figments of the imagination.’808  
 
The Armenian nationalists who argued about the ancient history and seemed to be more 
concerned about Van and the adjacent areas ignored another well-known fact about the recent 
past of Garabagh. This fact was the Kurakchay Treaty, which could be found, among other 
sources, in the second volume of Akty sobranniye Kavkazskoy Arkheograficheskoy Komissiey 
(Acts collected by the Caucasian Archeographic Commission), published in Tiflis in 1868. 
This treaty, signed between Pavel Tsitsianov, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian forces in 
Caucasia, and the Muslim Ibrahim khan of Garabagh on 14 May 1805809 (see Map 6), was the 
last legal document on the status of Garabagh before its annexation by Russia, which was also 
reaffirmed by the Gulustan Treaty of 12 October 1813 between Russia and Persia. It was on 
the basis of the Kurakchay Treaty that, after the annexation of the region to Russia, the son of 
Ibrahim khan, Mehdigulu khan, ruled as khan of Garabagh within Russia until 1822, when the 
khanate was abolished and turned into a province810 (see Map 7). The Muslims, who 
constituted a majority in Garabagh, came to be called Tartars, Turco-Tartars, Azerbaijani 
Turks, Azerbaijani Tartars and, finally, Azerbaijanis after the Russian occupation and the 
establishment of the first Azerbaijan Republic.    
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Even though the historical claims related to time immemorial should not have mattered, given 
the situation on the ground in the 19th and 20th centuries, these historical claims did play a role 




The Armenian memorandum also presented economic arguments. According to it, ‘the great 
tragedy of Armenian life is the hundred-year old struggle to safeguard an essentially 
agricultural culture against the nomadic races.’811 It argued that the ‘nomadic farmers who 
spend winter on the lower steppes of the current Republic of Azerbaijan […] have always 
been attracted towards the alpine pastures […] in the middle of regions populated by 
Armenians […] In spring, as soon as the grass dries out because of the heat, the Tartars get 
ready to migrate with their herds towards the alpine pastures […] Hundreds of thousands of 
hungry cattle cross Armenian villages through sown lands and wheat fields. The local 
population, made up of Armenian farmers, sees this migration as a plague they have to guard 
against. The farmers get ready to attack and arm themselves. As soon as the hungry herds rush 
towards the fresh greenery, a relentless war starts between nomads and farmers. These 
perpetual conflicts between nomads and farmers, starting up again every spring and autumn, 
only intensify the hatred that Muslim nomads harbour towards Armenian farmers. This fight, 
initially purely economic, has become more complex since the second half of the nineteenth 
century and had gradually been complicated by religious and national considerations.’812  
 
The memorandum declared that ‘the deliverance of the Armenian farmer from the recurring 
nomad invasions with their hungry herds is a prerequisite to the political and economic 
revival of Armenia’ and ‘the state economy and the general progress of a country require 
alpine pastures to be run by the population living in the alpine area or the nearby regions.’813  
 
These alpine areas or highlands were not populated by Armenians, but by Muslims, who had 
used them as pastures for centuries. The ‘nomad invasions’ was a politically constructed 
argument under which the Armenian Government tried to get rid of the Muslim population 
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inhabiting the alpine area. If the problem was indeed an economic one, the memorandum 
would not try to substantiate it with ethno-religious factors. In doing so, it once again 
demonstrated that the Armenian nationalism was ethnic nationalism.         
 
For Azerbaijan, the plains and mountains of Elizavetpol guberniya were not contrasting 
entities, but complementary components of a single unit.814 According to the Azerbaijani 
arguments, the economic gravitation of Elizavetpol guberniya, including Garabagh, towards 
Azerbaijan was clearly demonstrated by the fact that nearly every primary road led eastward 
towards Baku, not westward towards Erevan. The Armenians of Garabagh depended on Baku 
for a large share of their supplies, and thousands of them were seasonal labourers or 
permanent employees in the oil fields and offices of Baku.815 This view was shared at that 
time by Anastas Mikoian, an Armenian and a member of the Caucasian Committee of the 
Russian Communist (Bolshevik) Party, who, in his report to Vladimir Lenin of 22 May 1919, 
wrote that ‘Dashnaks, agents of the Armenian Government, try to annex Garabagh to 
Armenia. However, for the Garabagh population that would mean to be deprived of its life in 
Baku and to be connected to Erevan, with which it has never been connected with 
anything.’816  
 
The date mentioned by the memorandum for the deterioration of the Armenian-Muslim 
relations in Garabagh in the second half of the nineteenth century suggests that a major source 
of the problem was Armenian nationalism. The economic argument in the Armenian 
memorandum again suggests the accuracy of the approach of Anthony Smith that it was the 
intense preoccupation of nationalist intelligentsia with an ‘authentic’ vernacular culture and 
history817 that turned the Muslims and Christians who had lived side by side in Garabagh for 
centuries into enemies.    
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Approaching the foothills, the zone is replaced with the mixed zone of Muslim-Armenian population. Rising to 
the mountains, we meet an almost absolutely Armenian population. After this zone again the Muslim zones of 
Zangazur come and further Nakhchyvan, and then the territory of Armenia. Thus, the Armenian district is 
surrounded by Muslim districts.’ (Azerbaydzhanskaya Respublika. Dokumenty i materialy 1918-1920 gg.,                 
dok 163, p 202) (see Map 12). 
815 Hovannisian R, loc cit.   
816 K istorii obrazovaniya Nagorno-Karabakhskoy Avtonomnoy Oblasti Azerbaydzhanskoy SSR (1918-1925). 
Dokumenty i materialy, Baku: Azerbaydzhanskoe Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel’stvo, 1989, p 16 
817 Smith A, National Identity, p 130 
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Geographical and security arguments 
 
Geographical and security arguments were also considered by the Armenian memorandum: 
Garabagh was the direct prolongation of the ‘Armenian plateau’ with the same physical and 
geological characteristics and constituted the natural and strategic defence of Armenia.818 
 
Chapter 1 of the current thesis has presented the views of different scholars on the ‘Armenian 
plateau’ and argued that they did not offer a clear picture of what areas they meant by 
‘Armenian plateau’, some localising it in Eastern Anatolia, some extending it up until 
Garabagh and some with conflicting descriptions in works published in different periods, like, 
for example, Suren Eremian, the main specialist on Armenian historical geography. In 1952, 
Eremian localised the ‘Armenian plateau’ in Eastern Anatolia (see Map 3 for ‘Armyanskoe 
nagor’ye’), whereas in 1980 he extended it as far as Garabagh.819    
 
Martin Lewis and Karen Wigen in their work dedicated to the critique of metageography, by 
which they meant the ‘set of spatial structures through which people order their knowledge of 
the world’, convincingly argued for the constructed nature of geographical notions. They 
wrote that it was in the nineteenth century that the categories of continental systems were 
increasingly naturalised, coming to be regarded, as ‘real geographical entities that had been 
“discovered” through empirical inquiry’, but not as ‘products of a fallible human 
imagination’.820 The fact that the ‘Armenian plateau’, itself being a creation of the nineteenth 
century, has not found its exact boundaries up until the present day, suggests that it is not a 
‘real geographical’ notion, but a politically motivated construction.  
 
As for the British position on the delimitation of borders between Armenia and Azerbaijan, 
according to Arnold Toynbee, consultant of the British delegation at the Paris Peace 
Conference, ‘along the Armenia-Azerbaijan border the Tatars and Armenians are hopelessly 
intermingled and it is impossible to draw a frontier that is even roughly ethnographic. The 
boundary between the former Russian provinces of Erivan and Elizavetpol is therefore 
                                                 
818 FO 608/82, p 324 
819 Istoriya armyanskogo naroda, 1980, p 7 
820Lewis M and Wigen K, The Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography, Berkeley/Los 
Angeles/London: University of California Press, 1997, pp IX, 30 
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suggested as being the best physical frontier, and as leaving roughly equal Armenian and 
Tatar minorities on the wrong side, respectively, of the line.’821 It is not clear from this 
position of Toynbee in his minute of 26 April 1919 which ‘border’ he meant while describing 
the ethnic situation ‘along the Armenia-Azerbaijan border’, since there was no established 
border between the countries yet, which he himself was attempting to draw. However, it is 
clear that Toynbee was looking for the satisfaction of the geographical and ethnic frontiers 
with more preference given to the ‘physical frontier’.  
 
This suggestion was opposed by Avetis Aharonian, Head of the Delegation of the Republic of 
Armenia at the Paris Peace Conference, on the grounds that in that case Garabagh Armenians 
would remain on the Azerbaijani side and would not agree to make an exchange with the 
Tartars from Erevan guberniya. The Armenian representative declared himself willing to give 
up Nakhchyvan uezd in exchange for the Armenian parts of Garabagh. Toynbee’s attitude to 
the territorial exchange was that in that case alien minorities would be reduced, but ‘nothing 
approaching an ethnographic frontier would be attainable while a satisfactory physical frontier 
would become difficult to find’.822 Later, on 16 May 1919, Aharonian in his interview with 
Louis Mallet, Assistant Secretary for British Foreign Affairs and chief Near Eastern adviser, 
also a member of the British delegation, did not favour this territorial exchange.823  
 
The exchange of views between Aharonian and Toynbee demonstrates that, unlike Aharonian, 
Toynbee considered the Elizavetpol-Erevan guberniya frontier rather than the eastern 
frontiers of Mountainous Garabagh to be the best geographical one. Aharonian’s ‘Armenian 
plateau’ argument was sympathised with by Louis Mallet and Eric Forbes Adams, members 
of the British delegation. The latter wondered why Garabagh, ‘which is admittedly 
preponderantly Armenian and, according to M.Aharonian, belongs geographically to Armenia 
as being the N.E. corner of the Armenian “plateau”, should not be attached to the Armenian 
Republic or Erivan instead of Azerbaijan’.824 
 
                                                 
821 FO 608/80, pp 40-41 
822 Ibid. 
823 Ibid., pp 46-46op 
824 Arslanian A, op cit., pp 99-100 
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The consideration of the geographical arguments and attempts at their satisfaction, alongside 
with ethnic arguments, at the Paris Peace Conference, testifies to the popularity of ‘physical 
frontier’ approach in the early twentieth century. According to Juliet Fall, the popularisation 
of the idea of ‘natural boundaries’, which had passed down from antiquity, started with the 
French Revolution, with a famous speech of Danton proclaiming France’s boundaries as 
‘divinely ordained’.825 However, at the end of the nineteenth century, she went on, Friedrich 
Ratzel, German geographer and ethnographer, referred to this idea as a tool of definition of 
political boundaries, which was also shared by Lord Curzon of Keddleston, since it ‘reflected 
their experiences of imperial ambitions’.826 The geographical arguments of Toynbee and 
Aharonian suggest that ‘natural boundaries’ were indeed not ‘divinely ordained’, but 
constructed with political motivations, the success of which depended on their 
correspondence to the interests of the Great Powers.   
 
The real intention behind Toynbee’s arguments was the realisation of the British policy of 
leaving Garabagh as part of Azerbaijan and giving Nakhchyvan to Armenia or Persia. This 
would secure strategic railways and roads on the suggested Armenian-Persian border under 
British control. This argument is strengthened by the further views of Toynbee on the 
Armenian borders. ‘Armenia’, he went on, ‘cannot, of course, trench on the integrity of 
Persia, though there is a considerable Armenian element in Dilman and Khoi, while the Maku 
district of Persia makes an awkward salient into Armenian territory. The awkwardness is 
increased by the fact that this salient is traversed by a railway from Bayazid to Shakh Takhti 
(built by the Russians during the war and not marked on the million map) which will be of 
considerable importance for communication between different parts of Armenian territory. If 
Armenia obtains the Nakhitchevan district in the forthcoming settlement, she might later on 
negotiate with Persia with a view of exchanging it for Maku.’827   
 
As it appears from these considerations of Toynbee, he was more inclined to give ‘Tatar-
dominated’ Nakhchyvan to Armenia or Persia rather than to Azerbaijan. Although in the case 
of the discussion of the Armenia-Azerbaijan boundaries, he objected to the exchange of 
                                                 
825 Fall J, Drawing the Line: Nature, Hybridity and Politics in Transboundary Spaces, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005, 
pp 17-18 
826 Ibid., p 18 
827 FO 608/80, p 41 
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Nakhchyvan and Garabagh, substantiating this with his preference to ‘physical frontier’, when 
it came to the border between Armenia and Persia, he did not seem to be concerned about the 
satisfaction of the ‘physical frontier’. On the contrary, under the suggested exchange of 
Nakhchyvan between Armenia and Persia, the Araz River would no longer be a ‘natural 
boundary’ between the two countries. This once again demonstrates that geographical 
arguments were informed by political aims: when necessary, Garabagh could be turned into a 
part of the ‘Armenian plateau’ or when it suited British interests, the ‘physical frontier’ could 
be either preferred or ignored.  
   
Regarding the security arguments, the memorandum again referred to the Muslims of South 
Caucasus and Asia Minor as a people who with an irresistible tendency wanted to unite to 
form a compact Muslim world. This, it argued, meant ‘leaving Garabagh to the pan-Turanian 
fanatics’ which would ‘clear the way to endless invasions, threaten peace in the East and 
undermine the basis of a political balance’ and ‘the north-eastern borders of Integral Armenia 
would remain defenceless if Garabagh was not part of it’.828  
 
The argument on the ‘pan-Turanism’ danger was well known to the Azerbaijani Government, 
and was considered one of the impediments to the establishment of friendly relations and the 
settlement of territorial problems between Armenia and Azerbaijan: Armenia suspected 
Azerbaijan of sympathy towards Turkey, whereas Azerbaijan suspected Armenia of seeking 
to conclude a special agreement with the Russian White Army general Denikin against 
Azerbaijan,829 giving the republics mutual security concerns.  
 
On 17 May 1919, when the Armenian Government had presented its memorandum to the 
Paris Peace Conference, including security arguments, the Ottoman Empire did not present a 
real danger to the Armenians, because both the South Caucasus and the Ottoman Empire were 
under Allied control. Unlike Armenia, Georgia, also Christian and non-Turkic, did not have 
‘pan-Turanism’-related security concerns regarding the Ottoman Empire and Azerbaijan. 
Although Azerbaijan and Georgia also had territorial problems, they solved them peacefully 
between themselves. However, Georgia had gone to war with Armenia in December 1918 
                                                 
828 FO 608/82, p 324 
829 ARDA, fn 970, l 1, fl 190, p 24op 
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over Lori in the Borchaly uezd. They also had territorial problems related to Akhaltsikh and 
Akhalkalaki uezds in Tiflis guberniya (see Maps 8, 9 and 12). 
 
For Georgia, the major perceived threat was Denikin’s Army. This was also the reason for the 
conclusion of the Georgian-Azerbaijan Defensive Treaty on 16 June 1919, under which both 
republics bound themselves ‘to act conjointly, using all their military forces and military 
means, against any attack which threatens the independence on the territorial inviolability of 
one or both of the contracting republics’.830 The paragraph did not apply to frontier conflicts 
in respect to territorial boundaries of the South Caucasian republics. Armenia was also given 
‘the right to announce its willingness to join this Treaty within two weeks from the date of the 
official announcement of the Treaty’.831  Armenia did not join this treaty, which means that it 
did not consider Denikin’s Army to be a threat. 
 
As for Armenia’s concerns related to Azerbaijan, the latter tried to assure the Armenian 
delegation attending the Armenian-Azerbaijani conference in Baku on 14-21 December 1919 
that there was no basis for the suspicion towards Azerbaijan, as its delegation at the Paris 
Peace Conference, as well as the representatives of the Azerbaijani Government, repeatedly 
and officially stated the desirability of the independent existence of Azerbaijan and its 
confederation only with its neighbours in the form of a unity of independent states under the 
aegis of either the League of Nations or any other All-European organisation or strong 
power.832  
 
Alimardan bay Topchubashov, Head of the Azerbaijani Delegation at the Paris Peace 
Conference, in his interview with Mallet on 23 May 1919, referred to the possibility of a 
confederation of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Dagestan along the lines of the 
Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic discussed in Chapter 7.833 In his interview 
with Prof Simpson from the British delegation on 27 June 1919, about ten days after the 
conclusion of the Georgian-Azerbaijan Defensive Treaty, Topchubashov noted that the 
Armenians were inclined to stand aloof on the confederation issue on the ground that they 
                                                 
830 FO 371/3664, p 95 
831 Ibid.  
832 ARDA, fn 970, l 1, fl 95, pp 24-24op, 46 
833 FO 608/84, pp 91-92 
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believed themselves to be ‘special pets’ of America, and likely to get anything that they want 
without working things out with the other elements in Caucasus.834 The same could be a 
reason for Armenia’s refusal to join the Defensive Treaty.  
 
If ‘pan-Turanism’ was a real danger to world peace, including to the security of Armenia, as 
argued by the memorandum, the Lesser Caucasus Mountains in Garabagh would not be able 
to prevent it. Moreover, by including Garabagh, Armenia would not solve a security problem, 
but instead create one, since in this case, not only the Muslim-dominated or, in the words of 
the memorandum, predominantly ‘pan-Turanist’ Garabagh region, but also the Muslim-
dominated Nakhchyvan region in the west of Garabagh, would be included in Armenia. As 
for the Turkish danger from the west, when this memorandum was presented in May 1919, 
the Ottoman Empire was under Allied occupation after the Mudros Armistice, so it was not 
realistic to think of the presence of such danger at that time. One could counter-argue that the 
Allied involvement in the region was not going to last and the League of Nations was not 
going to provide any real guarantee for the existence of the Armenian state, so under these 
circumstances gaining control of territory to create defensible borders was necessary. Here 
one could counter-argue that the Ottoman Empire being in a more advantageous position in 
May-June 1918 did not prevent the establishment of the Armenian Republic. If Armenia at 
that time indeed thought that the Allied presence in the region was temporary, it would try to 
solve the problems with its neighbours directly and would not make territorial claims from the 
Mediterranean to Garabagh (see Map 13). It was belief in the durable Allied presence at that 
time that emboldened the Armenian nationalists to make such claims. Armenia should have 
been aware that these territorial claims formed the basis of its neighbours’ distrust and enmity, 
which means that the insecurity concerns emanated not from its neighbours but from 
Armenia’s claims. Moreover, Armenian nationalists had representatives in all camps, i.e. 
Allied, including Denikin, and Bolshevik. As the development of events showed, Armenia 
could gain more territories due to Sovietisation than it could during the domination of the 
Allied Powers. In summary, the concerns of the Armenian Republic were not security, but 
territorial-related.  
 
                                                 
834 Ibid., p 99 
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8.3 Garabagh and the Ottoman Empire, the Allied Powers and Bolshevik 
Russia  
 
The Garabagh problem was at the centre of the politics of all external powers involved in the 
region. Here we examine the approach of each of these powers to the Garabagh case and the 
impact of their positions on the settlement of the issue.  
 
Garabagh and the Ottoman Empire835 
 
The Ottoman Government considered Garabagh an integral part of the Azerbaijan Republic 
and the Armenian Government was aware of this fact. When the Armenian Government was 
asked by Halil bey, Ottoman Commander of the Army Group of the East, during his first 
official visit to Erevan on 30 August, about Armenian General Andranik’s slaughtering of the 
Muslim population in Zangazur, Armenian Prime Minister Kachaznuni mentioned that 
Andranik was persona non grata and would be disarmed ‘if he entered the bounds of the 
Republic’. He stated that Nuri Pasha, commander of the Islamic Army, ‘had refused to permit 
any regular Armenian units into Zangezur or Karabagh on the grounds that these were 
Azerbaijani territories’.836 He asked Halil bey ‘to refrain from supporting the Azerbaijani 
pretensions’ to these areas.837    
  
The Armenian premier’s statement shows that the Armenian Government was not happy with 
the fact that Mountainous Garabagh and Zangazur were outside the ‘bounds’ of the Armenian 
Republic. It also demonstrates that both the Armenian and Ottoman Governments considered 
these areas to be parts of the Azerbaijan Republic.   
 
Garabagh and the Allied Powers 
 
The signing of the Armistice of Mudros on 30 October 1918 between the Ottoman Empire 
and the Allied Powers and that of Compiegne on 11 November 1918 between Germany and 
                                                 
835 Note: Due to the fact that the Ottoman recognition of Garabagh as part of Azerbaijan has not been disputed by 
Armenian historians, the section does not go into detailed discussion of the issue, rather confining itself to the 
articulation of the position of the Ottoman Empire on the matter.  
836 Hovannisian R, Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918, pp 214-215 
837 Ibid., p 215 
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the Allied Powers replaced Ottoman-German control in the South Caucasus with that of the 
British, whose military control of the region lasted until 28 August 1919 (it stayed longer in 
Batumi), when it was replaced by the British diplomatic mission.838 The British attitude to the 
independence of the South Caucasian republics is reflected in the secret memorandum of the 
Foreign Office’s Political Intelligence Department of 1 November 1918, just one day after the 
Mudros Armistice.  
 
Although the document was clear enough on the Azerbaijani territories, in which it included 
Elizavetpol and Baku guberniyas839 (see Map 8), it did not have the same clear position about 
‘Armenia’ in general, including ‘Russian Armenia’. Unlike the Azerbaijani territories, it did 
not mention which territories were considered to be ‘Russian Armenian provinces’.840 
However, one very clear point was that it did not include Garabagh, part of Elizavetpol 
guberniya, in Armenia, although the British control of the region gave rise to Armenian hopes 
regarding the realisation of their claims to Garabagh, since the Armenians fought against the 
Ottoman Empire with the Allied Powers.   
 
On 15 January 1919, the Azerbaijani Government established a temporary Garabagh General-
Governorship consisting of Javanshir, Shusha, Jabrayil and Zangazur uezds, with Azerbaijani 
Khosrov bay Sultanov as its governor-general.841 This position was supported by the British 
Command in Baku, which officially recognised Sultanov as Garabagh Governor-General on 3 
April 1919.842 Britain had also disbanded Andranik’s force in January-February 1919, which, 
as noted by a confidential Foreign Office document, ‘had its origin among Turkish 
Armenians, and which represented their ideals’.843 The main source of opposition to the 
British policy on Garabagh was considered to be Dashnaktsutiun. In the words of British 
General William Thomson, Commander of Allied forces in Eastern Transcaucasia, moderate 
                                                 
838 FO 371/7729, pp 17-18 
839 CAB 24/69, ‘The future settlement of Transcaucasia with special regard to British interests’, 1 November 
1918, p 61 (2) 
840 Ibid. 
841 Azerbaydzhanskaya Respublika. Dokumenty i materialy 1918-1920 gg., dok 102, p 142 
842 ARDA, fn 970, l 1, fl 65, p 76; Hovannisian R, The Republic of Armenia. Volume I, p 170  
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Armenians were working well with them, giving an example of Dastakov,844 the President of 
the Local Armenian Council, who on Thomson’s request joined the Azerbaijani Cabinet.845  
 
Politically constructed Armenian arguments on Garabagh presented by Aharonian confused 
the British Foreign Office staff with regard to the War Office decision on the region.846 The 
Foreign Office did not have representatives in the region, which was under the responsibility 
of the War Office. The latter obtained information on the details of the territorial conflicts 
directly from its representatives in the conflict zones.847 British General William Thwaites, 
the Director of Military Intelligence Department of the War Office, ‘consistently pooh-
poohed the Armenian complaints as to the Karabagh situation’, ‘expressed doubt in 
Aharonian's good faith’ and stated that Aharonian shared ‘a propensity frequently observed in 
Armenian communications to looseness regarding details and dates’.848   
 
On 22 August 1919, a temporary agreement was signed between the Government of the 
Republic of Azerbaijan and the Armenians of Mountainous Garabagh, which included the 
former Albanian malikates (counties) of Dizak, Varanda, Khachyn and Jraberd in the uezds of 
Shusha, Javanshir and Jabrayil. Under this agreement, the Armenian-populated sector of 
mountainous Garabagh regarded itself to be provisionally within the boundaries of the 
Azerbaijan Republic. Shusha, Javanshir and Jabrayil uezds were organised into a separate unit 
of the Garabagh Governor-Generalship, in the Armenian-populated part of which an 
administration of Armenians would be appointed with the rights of all minorities guaranteed. 
The parties accepted the provisional agreement until the Peace Conference rendered a 
decision, which both sides would accept as an equally binding solution. The Armenians of 
Garabagh would enjoy rights of cultural autonomy. The activities of the Armenian National 
                                                 
844 Note: Abraham Dastakov, member of Dashnaktsutiun, was the Minister of Healthcare in the Fourth Cabinet 
of the Azerbaijan Republic.  
845 FO 371/3658, p 65 
846 Note: The British Foreign Office staff, getting their information from Aharonian, wondered why Garabagh, 
which is ‘admittedly preponderantly Armenian’ and according to Aharonian, ‘belongs geographically to 
Armenia as being the N.E. corner of the Armenian “plateau”’, should not be attached to the Armenian Republic 
instead of Azerbaijan; or  another confusion like ‘Aharonian had placed the Armenian population of Karabagh at 
72 per cent, a figure which differed ‘only by 1 or 2 per cent from the Russian statistics of some years ago’ 
(Arslanian A, ‘Britain and the Question of Mountainous Karabagh’, Middle Eastern Studies, vol 16, no 1, 1980, 
p 100).  
847 Arslanian A, op cit., p 98 
848 Ibid., pp 99-100 
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Council would be regulated by the Government of the Azerbaijan Republic through Armenian 
intermediaries. The agreement would have remained in effect in all circumstances.849  
 
Based on the Armenian archival documents, the Azerbaydzhan newspaper published in Baku, 
the Bor’ba newspaper published in Tiflis and the Hayrenik newspaper published in Boston, 
Hovannisian wrote that on the same day, Garabagh General-Governor Sultanov, Garabagh 
bishop Vahan and other Muslim and Armenian notables spoke of ‘interracial brotherhood and 
of the vital need to end the mutually calamitous strife’ and signed the agreement.850 
According to the telegramme of Azerbaijani Prime Minister and War Minister published in 
the Azerbaydzhan newspaper on 3 August 1919, during the visit of the Azerbaijani Prime 
Minister and War Minister to the Armenian church in Shusha on 30 July 1919, they were met 
with bread and salt, and the Armenian bishop made a speech in Azerbaijani. In the Armenian 
bazaar, two arches were created with the slogan ‘Long Live the Azerbaijan Republic’.851  
 
Scotland Liddell, a British journalist in Tiflis, wrote that the Dashnak allegation that 
‘Azerbaijan is trying to destroy all the remaining Armenian population in her boundaries’ was 
‘absolutely untrue. The case of Garabagh proves this. For some time this district was in great 
unrest […] Fortunately, the local Armenians have made an agreement with Azerbaidjan and 
the Karabagh Tartars and Armenians are now on excellent terms. The local Armenians have 
agreed to be under the rule of Azerbaidjan: many of them are serving in Azerbaidjan 
government positions: and there is […] a state of peace and order in Garabagh such as has 
never existed before.’852 
                                                 
849 ARDA, fn 897, l 1, fl 31, pp 141-142; Hovannisian R, The Republic of Armenia. Volume I, pp 186-187 
850 Hovannisian R, op cit., p 185; Note: With regard to this agreement, Nasib bay Usubbayov, Azerbaijani Prime 
Minister, in his speech in the Azerbaijani Parliament on 22 December 1919, touched upon the peaceful 
settlement of the Garabagh problem with the recognition of the cultural rights of the Armenian ethnic minority. 
‘The issue of recognition of national minorities,’ he noted, ‘is written in national programmes, is mentioned in 
the speeches, but, unfortunately, very little is seen in the deed. The Azerbaijani people without hesitation 
recognised this natural right of their Armenian co-citizens in Garabagh. Despite the fires and massacres, which 
occurred in Surmali, New Bayazid and Echmiadzin [meaning the massacres of the Muslim population by 
Armenian Government in 1918-1919 – I.K.] all the time before events, it did not remove this from its wording. 
Now our co-citizens, Armenians in Garabagh, take an active part in the local administration, are busy with 
opening and enlarging schools and in the betterment of enlightenment in general. For that end, the Government 
allocates, when needed, millions and will not refuse from now on. In the Caucasus, so far for the first time this 
example is demonstrated by us and we wish that our neighbours also follow this example.’ (Azerbaydzhanskaya 
Respublika. Dokumenty i materialy 1918-1920 gg., dok 368, p 402) 
851 K istorii obrazovaniya Nagorno-Karabakhskoy Avtonomnoy Oblasti Azerbaydzhanskoy SSR (1918-1925). 
Dokumenty i materialy, pp 22-23 
852 FO 371/3664, ‘The Georgian Mall’, 8 October 1919, p 1  
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The British journalist also answered other Armenian allegations writing that the ‘British never 
“forcibly” removed Karabagh from Armenia: it was separated geographically as it was. The 
British never took Nakhitchevan away from Armenia: nor did they take away Akhalkalaki. 
And regarding the statement that there are 320,000 Armenians in Karabagh and Zangezour, 
and 70,000 in Sharur and Nakhitchevan, and 175,000 in Lori and Akhalkalaki, it would be 
interesting to know the exact figures of the Mussulmans there.’853 He continued, ‘one can 
understand very well how violent is the agitation against the Tartar when one reads the 
Dashnak abuse of the British – “the friends of long years.” The pity is that so much of this 
false news finds its way abroad. Only a few days ago we received a British wireless message 
from England in which a great massacre of Armenians by Tartars in the Kars district was 
reported. This wireless message went all over the word. There was not a single word of truth 
in it as we here know very well. It is simply another instance of the false propaganda which is 
of so much propaganda as it is stupid and criminal provocation.’854 Liddell went on, ‘we have 
many Armenian friends and we hesitate to say a single word which would hurt their feelings, 
but the fact remains that the Armenian in the Caucasus is generally disliked. That is his own 
fault. It is also a fact that in other countries he is generally sympathised with. But there is a 
great danger that he will lose the world’s sympathy if the Dashnak campaign of lies 
continues.’855 
 
It was not only the British journalist who accused Dashnaks of the ‘campaign of lies’. As 
mentioned earlier, despite the inclination of top Foreign Office officials to trust the 
information, including arguments and statistics, provided by Aharonian, the Armenian 
Government’s representative at the Paris Peace Conference, British generals in Transcaucasia 
dealing with the conflicts in the region directly doubted the good faith of Aharonian, did not 
trust him and criticised Dashnaktsutiun.856   
 
Despite the agreement on Mountainous Garabagh, the situation on the western half of the 
Zangazur uezd, where the Ottoman Armenian refugees and those from Nakhchyvan were 
gathered, continued to be unresolved, although a cease-fire agreement was signed between 
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Armenia and Azerbaijan on 23 November 1919, where both governments pledged ‘to stop the 
present hostilities and not resort again to force of arms’.857  
 
Colonel Claude Stokes, the British political officer at Baku, blamed France for supporting 
Armenian claims to Zangazur, claiming that this support was linked to France’s interest in a 
copper mine in southern Zangazur and the Alat-Julfa railway. Stokes expressed his concern 
that it seemed, ‘as a result of French and Armenian propaganda, the Allies will give Armenia 
far more favourable treatment than Georgia or Azerbaijan despite the fact that it has been the 
misconduct and dishonesty of the Armenians which has prevented those concerned in trying 
to keep the situation quiet from achieving success’.858 The reason for the French support of 
Armenian claims to Garabagh and its dissatisfaction with the British support of Azerbaijan in 
Garabagh was that Britain supported the Armenian claims to Cilicia, which was claimed by 
France, considering it to be a northern part of Syria.859 The disagreements of the Allied 
Powers over territorial issues negatively affected relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan 
and impeded the settlement of the territorial problems.    
 
Meanwhile, the failure of Denikin’s campaign, the Entente’s ally against Bolshevik Russia, in 
December 1919, and the growing threat of Bolshevism, compelled the members of the League 
of Nations to recognise the independence of Azerbaijan and Georgia de facto on 12 January 
1920, followed with the recognition of Armenia on 19 January 1920.860 The de facto 
recognition of both Azerbaijan and Armenia came without the settlement of the territorial 
conflicts between the two countries: they could not be resolved until the end of the Paris 
Peace Conference on 21 January 1920.    
 
On the other hand, relations between the Turkish Nationalist and Bolshevik movements were 
allegedly progressing. Based on information given by Fuad Bey, Turkish general and former 
Ottoman Under-Secretary of State of War, Olivier Wardrop, head of the British diplomatic 
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mission in the South Caucasus, wrote to Earl Curzon, British Foreign Secretary, on 12 March 
that ‘Mustapha Kemal has agreement with Lenin to allow Bolsheviks free hand in North 
Caucasus and Azerbaijan in order to secure free passage of arms for him’.861 Although this 
information was denied by the Azerbaijani Government, Admiral John de Robeck, 
Commander of the Allied Mediterranean Fleet and British High Commissioner in Istanbul, 
was convinced that an understanding existed ‘if not between two Governments at least 
between Azerbaijan and Turkish Nationalists’.862  
 
The Bolshevik occupation of Azerbaijan was approaching, but Azerbaijan had sent its best 
troops against Armenia in Garabagh, leaving its northern border without enough defence. 
Wardrop, referring to Malik-Aslanov, Azerbaijani Minister of Trade and Communications, 
wrote to Earl Curzon on 26 March 1920 that the March troubles in Garabagh were the result 
of the war supplies that the Allies had sent to Armenia, and begged the Foreign Secretary to 
‘deny this officially in order to quell anti-Allied agitation’.863 Touching upon the March 
events, based on Russian archival documents, Barberowski wrote that as a result of the long 
prepared revolt of the Armenian partisans in Shusha on 23 March 1920, which then rapidly 
spread to Zangazur, Gazakh and Javanshir uezds, they were joined by Azerbaijani and 
Armenian regular units, who even used gas bombs. About 20,000 soldiers and other military 
personnel participated from both sides. The Armenian quarter of Shusha, he went on, was 
‘wiped off the face of the earth’: 25 houses were left out of 1,700, and 8,000 Armenians were 
killed during one night in Shusha.864 
      
Concern over the escalation of the conflict between the two countries was conveyed to Earl 
Curzon by Wardrop and Admiral de Robeck on 4 and 6 April 1920 respectively.865 On 8 
April, the British Foreign Secretary, in turn, met an Armenian deputation consisting of Bogos 
Nubar Pasha, Erevan Archbishop and Avetis Aharonian and ‘spoke to them in the strongest 
possible manner about foolish and indefensible conduct of their compatriots on North-Eastern 
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frontiers of Armenia’.866 Curzon continued that the ‘detailed list of outrages committed since 
beginning of year by Armenians on one hand and Tartars on other’ showed a ‘heavy balance 
against Armenians’, and told them that ‘we were not at all keen about giving them arms to 
fight Turks which they would almost certainly use to fight Azerbaijan.’867 The Georgian 
representative to Istanbul, M.Rtzkhiladze, in his meeting with British Admiral de Robeck on 6 
April 1920 touched upon the March events in Garabagh, mentioning that ‘consequent on the 
misguided policy of the Erivan Government in the Karabagh district and the oppressive 
measures carried out against the Tartar population, the Azerbaijan Government had been 
obliged to transfer troops to that district, and the northern frontiers of the State were, in 
consequence, not sufficiently well guarded for a successful defence to be opposed to any 
Bolshevik force which might advance south.’868 According to Wardrop’s letter of 12 April, 
the fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan proceeded on an extended front869 and 
Azerbaijan seemed ‘to be on the point of pro-Turk-Bolshevik attitude in despair of promised 
Allied help’.870 
 
The Bolshevik menace compelled the Supreme Council of the League of Nations to adopt a 
decision on the mandate over Armenia in San-Remo on 25 April 1920. According to this 
decision, Armenia’s borders with Azerbaijan and Georgia were to be established by the 
Supreme Council simultaneously with its borders with Turkey.871   
 
By 28 April, Soviet rule had been established in Azerbaijan. According to the act of the 
Azerbaijani parliament on 27 April, the full independence of Azerbaijan ruled by the Soviets 
would be maintained; the final form of administration in the country would be defined by the 
supreme legislative body of Azerbaijan in the person of the Soviet of workers, peasants and 
soldier deputies of Azerbaijan.872 The Bolshevik seizure of power in Azerbaijan made the 
San-Remo decision redundant, since the borders with Armenia were not going to be defined 
by the Allies.  
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Garabagh and Bolshevik Russia 
  
On 30 April 1920, two days after the establishment of Soviet rule in Azerbaijan, the 
Azerbaijani Soviet Government sent a note to the Government of the Armenian Republic 
demanding to ‘clear Garabagh and Zangazur from your troops’, to ‘retreat to your own 
borders’ and to ‘stop international massacre’; otherwise Azerbaijan would consider itself in a 
situation of war with Armenia.873  
 
The note demonstrated the Azerbaijani Soviet government’s position on Garabagh, including 
Zangazur, which was regarded by Azerbaijan as being within its borders. On 19 June 1920, 
Sergo Orjonikidze, Head of the Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian 
Communist (Bolshevik) Party, in his letter to Georgiy Chicherin, People’s Commissar for 
Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR, informed him that ‘Soviet rule was declared in Garabagh and 
Zangazur and above-mentioned territories consider themselves as parts of the Azerbaijani 
Soviet Republic’.874 
 
However, the protocol of the session of the Bureau of the Central Committee of the 
Azerbaijani Communist (Bolshevik) Party on 10 July 1920 shows that although the situation 
in Javanshir and Jabrayil uezds of Garabagh had been normalised, this was not the case in 
Shusha and Zangazur uezds. According to this document, ‘the situation in Shusha is the 
worst… Zangazur has been destroyed by Ararat troops, the main supporters of which are 
Turkish [i.e. Armenian] refugees, who were always fed by Anglo-American capital’.875  
 
The same day, the common opinion of Nariman Narimanov, Head of the Azerbaijani 
Revolutionary Committee, Anastas Mikoian and Viktor Naneyshvili, members of the 
Azerbaijani Communist Party, Budu Mdivani, member of the Caucasian Bureau of the 
Russian Communist (Bolshevik) Party, and three representatives of the Revolutionary 
Military Soviet of the Eleventh Red Army was sent to the Central Committee of the Russian 
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875 K istorii obrazovaniya Nagorno-Karabakhskoy Avtonomnoy Oblasti Azerbaydzhanskoy SSR (1918-1925). 
Dokumenty i materialy, p 53; ARSPIHDA, fn 1, l 1, fl 18, p 9op 
233 
Communist (Bolshevik) Party. It appears from this common opinion that Mountainous 
Garabagh and Zangazur were going to be declared ‘disputed’ by the Centre, and the above-
mentioned representatives warned against this position: ‘The Muslim masses will consider 
this an unexpected change to the old and [will regard the] inability of the Soviet power to 
secure Azerbaijan within its previous borders as treason, Armeniaphilia or weakness on the 
part of the Soviet power […] We warn the Centre against hesitations in the issue of Garabagh 
and Zangazur in the interests of not turning Azerbaijan into a bastard in the hands of the Red 
Army and distributing [it] among the Armenians and Georgians, instead of creating a strong 
centre and a base for class revolution in the East.’876 On 14 July, after discussions with the 
Azerbaijani Government in Baku, Orjonikidze and Boris Legran, plenipotentiary envoy of 
Soviet Russia in Dashnak Armenia sent a telegram to Chicherin proposing to ‘fully and 
unconditionally annex Garabagh to Azerbaijan, but declare Zangazur disputed’.877  
 
Notwithstanding Azerbaijani opposition,878 on 10 August 1920, the agreement between Soviet 
Russia and the Armenian Republic – signed by Boris Legran on the Russian side and Arshak 
Jamalian and Artashes Babalian on the Armenian – ‘proceeding from the recognition of 
independence and complete independence of the Republic of Armenia’ declared that ‘2. […] 
Troops of RSFSR occupy disputed provinces: Garabagh, Zangazur and Nakhchyvan’ and         
‘3. Occupation of disputed territories by Soviet troops does not foreclose the issue of rights to 
these territories of either Republic of Armenia or Azerbaijani SS Republic. By this temporary 
occupation the RSFSR intends to create favourable conditions for the peaceful settlement of 
territorial disputes between Armenia and Azerbaijan…’879  
 
According to Boris Klimenko, in international law, the existence of a territorial dispute in 
certain degree depends on its admittance by the sides as such.880 Despite the claims of the 
Armenian Republic to Mountainous Garabagh and Zangazur and their consideration as 
disputed, the Azerbaijan Republic did not consider them disputed. Despite this agreement 
between Armenia and Russia, Azerbaijan continued considering both regions as undisputed 
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territories of Azerbaijan, something also mentioned in Narimanov’s letters to Lenin, 
Chicherin and Orjonikidze.881 
     
On 29 November 1920, the Revolutionary Committee of Armenia declared Armenia a Soviet 
Socialist Republic. It stated its firm belief that the proclamation of Soviet rule would solve all 
the problems between Armenia and Azerbaijan.882 The next day, the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of Azerbaijan suddenly adopted a decision to transfer Zangazur to Soviet 
Armenia and to grant a right to self-determination to Mountainous Garabagh.883  
 
Two days later, on 2 December, an agreement was signed in Erevan between RSFSR in the 
person of Legran and the Republic of Armenia in the person of Dashnak Dro Kanaian and 
Arutyun Terterian. The agreement declared Armenia an ‘independent socialist republic’ and 
‘Russian Soviet Government recognised as undisputed parts of Socialist Soviet Republic of 
Armenia the Erevan guberniya… part of Kars oblast… Zangazur uezd… part of Gazakh 
uezd… those parts of Tiflis guberniya which were in the possession of Armenia until 23 
October 1920’. Under the agreement, the Government of the Republic of Armenia had to 
remove itself from power, which temporarily had to be transferred to the military 
command.884 
 
The first Sovietisation of Armenia did not last long, as on 18 February 1921, Dashnaks 
headed by Simon Vratzian carried out a coup d’état in Erevan, which lasted until 2 April 1921 
when the Dashnaks were driven to Zangazur under Soviet pressure. It was there in the 
autumn-winter that the Dashnaks under Nzhde established ‘Autonomous Sunik’, to be 
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transformed into ‘Mountainous Armenia’ in April 1921.885 According to Hovannisian, after 
getting assurance that Zangazur would be ‘permanently incorporated into Soviet Armenia 
rather than into Soviet Azerbaijan’, its members left for Persia on 16 July 1921,886 which can 
be considered the date of the beginning of the second Sovietisation of Armenia.  
 
The agreement of 2 December 1920 between Soviet Russia and Armenia had included 
Zangazur uezd in Armenia, but it appears that the Dashnaks were given ‘assurances’ about its 
incorporation into Armenia, which suggests that the processes around Zangazur were not 
developed in accordance with the agreement of 2 December; otherwise there would be no 
need for such assurances. For reasons to be discussed in the next chapter, Nakhchyvan, which 
was also included in Armenia under this agreement, was later returned to Azerbaijan. It is also 
known that both the Azerbaijani Democratic Republic and Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist 
Republic had always been against the transfer of Zangazur to Armenia. However, the 
Azerbaijani Government on 30 November 1920, as mentioned above, suddenly decided on its 
transfer to Armenia. The author of this strategy was Stalin, who in early November 1920 
declared that the transfer of Zangazur to Armenia could be realised only ‘in extreme case’, 
only if Soviet rule was established there.887    
 
Zangazur uezd here referred to its larger western part, populated by local Armenians and 
Ottoman Armenian refugees and occupied by Dashnaks. This is confirmed by the decision of 
the Azerbaijani Revolutionary Committee of 18 September 1920 on the settlement of the 
Zangazur issue only after the readjustment of its Muslim section into a separate uezd.888 The 
adoption of this decision between the agreement of 10 August and the agreement of 2 
December suggests that the issue was settled in the proposed way, and that Zangazur uezd in 
the last agreement meant just the western part of Zangazur. The fears of the Dashnaks about 
Zangazur in July 1921 were connected with their failure to include Nakhchyvan in Armenia 
and concerns that after their surrender to the Soviets the western part might also be returned to 
Azerbaijan. As later developments would show, the western part of the Zangazur uezd was 
not returned to Azerbaijan.     
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The same was the case with Mountainous Garabagh, in the sense that although the region was 
not included in the Armenian SSR under the agreement of 2 December, it was the subject of 
negotiations. On 4 July 1921, the plenum of the Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee 
of the Russian Communist (Bolshevik) Party decided ‘to include’ it in the Armenian SSR, but 
with strong objections by Narimanov, it was decided to submit the issue for the final decision 
of Central Committee of the Russian Communist (Bolshevik) Party.889 In order to pacify the 
Dashnaks on the mountains of Zangazur and to establish Soviet rule there, Russia was 
prepared to give Mountainous Garabagh to Armenia, but it faced strong objections from the 
Azerbaijani side and, on 5 July 1921, Orjonikidze and Amayak Nazaretian, Secretary of the 
Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist (Bolshevik) Party, 
raised the issue on the reconsideration of the decision of the previous plenum on Garabagh. It 
was decided that ‘taking into account the necessity of national peace between the Muslims 
and the Armenians, the economic relations between Upper and Lower Garabagh and its 
permanent relations with Azerbaijan, Mountainous Garabagh shall be retained within the 
Azerbaijan SSR and broad autonomy shall be given to Mountainous Garabagh with Shusha 
city as an administrative centre’.890  
 
The issue of granting autonomy to Mountainous Garabagh had been raised by Orjonikidze in 
a telephone conversation with Narimanov before the conclusion of the agreement of 2 
December. Orjonikidze had proposed that Narimanov grant autonomy to Mountainous 
Garabagh, which should have not been mentioned in the peace agreement with Armenia, but 
should have come from Azerbaijan. He had repeated the same proposal in a telegram to 
Chicherin.891 The Azerbaijani decision of 30 November 1920 on granting a right to self-
determination to Mountainous Garabagh and the lack of mention of Mountainous Garabagh in 
the agreement of 2 December showed Orjonikidze’s influence. Although the Dashnak 
rebellion in Zangazur compelled Russia to change this strategy, Azerbaijani objections 
prevented it, and resulted in the granting of autonomy status to Mountainous Garabagh within 
Azerbaijan SSR.      
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Ottoman recognition of Garabagh as part of Azerbaijan was based on the understanding that 
the region was populated mostly by Muslims, who shared their ethnicity and religion. The 
British position on the issue can be explained by its political considerations of creating 
balance to support the Azerbaijani position on Garabagh and the Armenian position on 
Nakhchyvan, to be discussed in the next chapter. Bolshevik Russia’s aim was to achieve the 
Sovietisation of both Azerbaijan and Armenia: first to satisfy the Azerbaijani position on 
Garabagh in order to achieve its Sovietisation, since the Bolshevik forces were advancing 
from the East, so Azerbaijan should have been Sovietised first. After fulfilment of this goal, it 
was necessary to Sovietise Armenia, which required the satisfaction of Armenian demands 
without alienating Azerbaijan and trying to keep a balance between them. The evaluation of 
all three positions suggests that their decisions derived from their own interests, but if 
Garabagh was not recognised as part of Azerbaijan by the Ottoman Empire or Allied Powers, 
it might not have been considered as such by Bolshevik Russia as well.  
 
The decision of Soviet Azerbaijan on the Mountainous Garabagh Autonomous Oblast did not 
come straight away. On 26 September 1921, the session of the Organisational and Political 
Bureau of the Central Committee of the Azerbaijani Communist (Bolshevik) Party decided to 
reconsider its decision on the organisation of Mountainous Garabagh into autonomy. The 
same was decided at the session of the Conference of senior officials of Garabagh together 
with the members of the Organisational Bureau of the Central Committee of the Azerbaijani 
Communist (Bolshevik) Party on 21 October 1921. The session considered it unreasonable to 
organise Mountainous Garabagh into a separate autonomous oblast and instead suggested that 
measures should be taken to eliminate nationalist tendencies and promote internationalism.892  
 
On 12 March 1922, the Transcaucasian Federation of three Soviet republics (Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia) was established. This idea dated back to 22 April 1918, when the 
Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic was established. On 26 May 1918, the 
federation collapsed and three republics emerged on its area. Then in 1919, a confederation of 
these republics together with Dagestan was proposed as a mean of settling existing problems 
between the republics. This idea could not be realised because of the opposition of Armenia. 
Again, after Sovietisation, the federation of three republics was proposed, and was realised on 
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12 March 1922, reorganised into the Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic on 
13 December 1922 and joining the USSR on 30 December 1922.  
 
The creation of the federation was supposed to solve the territorial issues between the 
republics. Nevertheless, the territorial autonomy for Mountainous Garabagh was still pushed 
through the session of the Transcaucasian Committee of the Russian Communist (Bolshevik) 
Party on 27 October 1922, which was attended only by one Azerbaijani, the rest being 
Armenians, Georgians and Russians,893 and on 7 July 1923, the Azerbaijani Central Executive 
Committee of Soviets issued a decree ‘On the formation of the Mountainous Garabagh 
Autonomous Oblast’ ‘out of Armenian part of the Mountainous Garabagh as a constituent 
part of Azerbaijan SSR with the centre in Khankandi’.894 On 18 September 1923, the session 
of the Garabagh Oblast Committee of the Azerbaijani Communist (Bolshevik) Party decided 
to change the Azerbaijani name ‘Khankandi’ into the Armenian name ‘Stepanakert’, in 
honour of Bolshevik and Dashnak Stepan Shaumian.895 The area of the autonomous oblast 
corresponded to that of ‘Armenians of Mountainous Garabagh’ under the temporary 
agreement they had concluded with the Azerbaijan Government on 22 August 1919 
mentioned earlier.  
 
The federation, realised by the Soviets, also did not last long, and in December 1936, it was 
dissolved and the constituent republics became parts of the USSR separately (see Map 15). 
Thus, confederation and/or federation ideas did not justify themselves as means of settling 
territorial problems between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as the former continued its territorial 
claims and achieved territorial autonomy for the Mountainous Garabagh within Azerbaijan 
SSR.  
 
The solution declared by the US President Woodrow Wilson in 1918 for small peoples was 
threefold: 1) statehood; 2) disputed border areas decided by plebiscite; and 3) too small or 
dispersed ethnic groups, not eligible for either course of action, to benefit from the protection 
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of special minorities regimes, supervised by the Council of the new League of Nations, to 
solve the problem of ‘peoples, of ethnic communities, nations or nationalities distinguished by 
language and culture crisscrossing the lines of the existing political entities’.896 
 
The first solution was already realised by the establishment of the Armenian Republic in 
1918. A plebiscite could not be applied to Mountainous Garabagh, as there was a solid mass 
of Azerbaijani population between the Armenian-populated areas of the Republic of Armenia 
and Mountainous Garabagh, which means that Armenians living in mountainous parts of 
Garabagh did not border with Armenians of Armenia. This in itself brought the third solution, 
which meant that both Armenians within the borders of Azerbaijan and the Azerbaijanis 
within the borders of Armenia should have enjoyed cultural, including language, rights.  
 
In the Soviet system, minority rights were realised by the application of Stalin’s plan of 
national-territorial delimitation. In the Soviet Union, only Armenians, in addition to their 
union republic, had an autonomous region within another union republic, in this case 
Azerbaijan. The same strategy was not applied to Azerbaijanis, who compactly resided in 





Practical steps towards the realisation of the Armenian aspirations with regard to Garabagh 
were made during the zemstvo conferences in 1917. It was during these conferences that the 
notion of ‘Mountainous Garabagh’ came into being. The aim was to separate the areas 
populated by Armenians from Muslim-dominated Garabagh in order to construct 
predominantly Armenian units. Despite the efforts of the Provisional Government to construct 
compact Armenian units in Elizavetpol guberniya, the project could not be realised because of 
the opposition of the Muslims to the replacement of Muslim-dominated units with Armenian-
dominated ones. The project could not be realised during the de facto Transcaucasian 
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government and Transcaucasian Republic either and turned into a claim of the Armenian 
Republic to Garabagh after the declaration of independence.     
 
The arguments (ethnic, historical, economic, geographical and security) presented by the 
Armenian Republic to the Paris Peace Conference to substantiate its claims to Garabagh were 
largely political constructions. The problem with the inclusion of Mountainous Garabagh in 
Armenia was related to its separate geographical location from the compact contiguous areas 
of settlement of Armenians in the northern part of Erevan guberniya and the failure to enlist 
Ottoman, British and Bolshevik Russian support. In order to Sovietise Armenia, the 
Bolsheviks decided to partially satisfy the Armenian demands, granting territorial autonomy 
to the Armenian-populated areas of mountainous Garabagh within Azerbaijan SSR. The 
inclusion of the larger western part of Zangazur uezd of Garabagh in Armenia in 1921 was 
also connected with the Bolshevik aim of Sovietisation of Armenia, which could have been 
jeopardised by not giving partial satisfaction to the demands of the Dashnak rebels in the 
mountains of Zangazur. In general, the area of Armenia increased from about 10,000 square 
kilometres (about 3,860 square miles) in June 1918 to 29,800 square kilometres (about 11,506 
square miles) owing to the sovietisation.  
   
Neither confederation nor federation ideas put forward to solve the territorial problems 
between the South Caucasian republics could prove themselves in practice. Under the 
Wilsonian principles, only cultural rights could be applied to Armenians living in Azerbaijan, 
including Mountainous Garabagh. Instead of being settled under minority rights with the 
recognition of cultural rights, Mountainous Garabagh was given territorial autonomy in 
Azerbaijan, although Armenians already had their national entity, and Mountainous Garabagh 
did not border with Armenia. This compromise, which was one-sided as it was not made vis-
a-vis Azerbaijanis compactly residing in Armenia, led to further political demands on the 
annexation of the region to Armenia. This contributed to the war between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan in 1991 and the occupation of not only Mountainous Garabagh Autonomous 
Oblast, but also the surrounding districts, including those that constituted the part of Zangazur 
uezd which was left in Azerbaijan in 1920, by Armenia.  
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Armenian nationalism was ethnic nationalism and aimed to include in Armenia as much 
Armenian-populated territory as possible and build an Armenian ethno-nation. Once again, 
the ‘ethno-symbolist’ approach to nationalism proves to be particularly useful in the analysis 









































Case study: Nakhchyvan 
 
The chapter explores the territorial conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the 
Nakhchyvan region. It analyses the historical background of the Armenian aspirations vis-a-
vis Nakhchyvan, the positions of both countries on the region, and the arguments of the 
Armenian Government submitted to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 to substantiate its 
vision of territorial delimitation between the two republics with regard to the region. The 
chapter also examines the positions of the Ottoman Empire, the Allied Powers, Bolshevik 
Russia and Kemalist Turkey on the Nakhchyvan problem and assesses the impact of their 
stance on the settlement of the issue.   
 
It should be noted that ‘Nakhchyvan’ refers to Nakhchyvan and Sharur-Daralayaz uezds of the 
Erevan guberniya.897 
 
9.1 Historical background 
 
The origins of the modern national Armenian aspirations regarding the Nakhchyvan region go 
back to 1828, when Russia created an Armenian oblast on the basis of Nakhchyvan and 
Iravan (Erevan) khanates (see Maps 6 and 7). The claim was based on an Armenian  historical  
narrative which included Nakhchyvan in ‘ancient Armenia’ (see Map 4). The Armenian 
oblast of 1828-1840 was transformed into the Erevan guberniya in 1849 with minor territorial 
changes (compare Maps 7 and 8). In July 1917, the guberniya was on the Russian Interior 
Ministry’s list for undergoing administrative-territorial readjustment with the aim of 
constructing compact Armenian units, as in the case of Elizavetpol guberniya, discussed in 
the previous chapter. Apart from Erevan guberniya, the administrative-territorial readjustment 
project involved the southern parts of Tiflis guberniya and Kars and Batumi oblasts.  
                                                 
897 Note: Before the occupation by Russia in 1828, the area of these uezds constituted the Nakhchyvan khanate, 
which was turned into the Nakhchyvan province after the occupation in 1828 and into the Nakhchyvan uezd in 
1840, whereas Sharur-Daralayaz uezd was created out of Nakhchyvan uezd in 1873 (Sbornik statisticheskikh 
svedeniy o Kavkaze, tom 1, Tiflis: Tipografii Glavnago Upravleniya Namestnika Kavkazskago i Melikova i Ko, 
1869, otdel’ 1, chast’ 3; Geografichesko-statisticheskiy slovar’ Rossiyskoy Imperii, tom 5, Saint Petersburg: 
Tipografiya ‘V.Bezobrazov i Kompaniya’, 1885, p 857) (compare Maps 6, 7 and 8).   
243 
According to the official Russian statistics of 1916, in Erevan guberniya, Armenians formed a 
significant majority in Alexandropol (89.6%), Echmiadzin (68.6%) and New Bayazid (68.5%) 
uezds, and 52% in Erevan uezd. They were a significant minority in Nakhchyvan uezd 
(39.6%), not constituting a compact area and being dispersed among the Muslim population. 
In Tiflis guberniya, the Armenians were a majority with 77% in Akhalkalaki uezd and a 
minority with 37.6% in Borchaly, 29% in Akhaltsikh and 13.6% in Gori uezds. In Kars oblast, 
they were 32.5%, with 31% in Kaghyzman and 28.7% in Kars okrugs. In Batumi oblast they 
were 12.4% with 7% in Batumi and 25% in Artvin okrugs (see Annex II and Maps 8 and 12).   
 
The Muslims constituted a majority in the uezds of Sharur-Daralayaz (67%), Nakhchyvan 
(59.7%) and Surmali (58%) and a significant minority in Erevan uezd (45.5%) of Erevan 
guberniya. Moreover, they formed 79% in Ardahan and 34.5% in Kars okrugs of Kars oblast. 
In Batumi oblast, they were 70.3% with 70.4% in Batumi and 70% in Artvin okrugs (see 
Annex II and Maps 8 and 12).   
 
The Provisional Government aimed to construct one compact Armenian guberniya in the 
form of Alexandropol guberniya. The projected guberniya would include: Alexandropol uezd, 
to incorporate a great portion of Alexandropol uezd and part of Echmiadzin uezd of Erevan 
guberniya; Akhalkalaki uezd, to incorporate the whole of Akhalkalaki uezd, parts of Borchaly 
and Gori uezds of Tiflis guberniya; Lori uezd, to incorporate a great part of Borchaly uezd of 
Tiflis guberniya; and Kars and Kaghyzman okrugs of Kars oblast, without redrawing the 
borders of these okrugs898 (compare Maps 8 and 9). 
 
Analysis of the projected Alexandropol guberniya shows that the Armenians in this unit 
would have significant predominance, constituting a majority in all its projected uezds (see 
Table 9.1 and Map 9). Comparing the Russian Interior Ministry report of 21 July 1917 on the 
administrative-territorial readjustment project in the South Caucasus with the memorandum 
presented by the Republic of Armenia to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 reveals exactly 
                                                 
898 Note: The Alexandropol guberniya was projected to be created by taking Akhalkalaki uezd, three village 
communities of Trialet uchastok (Nardevan, Ashkalin and Avramly) and Lori uchastok of Borchaly uezd from 
the Tiflis guberniya with cutbacks from Borchaly and Ekaterinin uchastoks of the same uezd and two villages of 
Gori uezd (Gyzylkilsa and Molit); Kars and Kaghyzman uezds from Kars oblast; and finally Alexandropol uezd 
(without its first uchastok) and the fourth uchastok of Echmiadzin uezd, annexing it to the former from Erevan 
guberniya (STsIA, fn 2080, l 1, fl 707, p 9op). 
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the same arguments: complaints on the official administrative division on the grounds that the 
mountainous parts were populated by Armenians and the plains by Muslims, so the separation 
of mountainous parts from plains was necessary on historical, ethnic and cultural grounds; 
and the reasonability of creating ethnic units. This creates an impression that the Russian 
official report on this project was informed by the arguments of the Armenian side.  
 
Table 9.1 Population distribution in the officially projected Alexandropol guberniya899 
  
Uezds Armenians Muslims Others Total 
Alexandropol 170,000 – 83% 22,000 – 11% 12,000 – 6% 204,000 
Akhalkalaki 94,000 – 79% 10,000 – 8% 16,000 – 12% 120,000 
Lori 92,000 – 77% 14,000 – 12% 14,000 – 11% 120,000 
Kars 83,000 – 43% 49,000 – 25% 61,000 – 32% 193,000 
Kaghyzman 35,000 – 43% 26,000 – 32% 21,000 – 25% 82,000 
 474,000 – 66% 121,000 – 17% 124,000 – 17% 719,000 
 
Moreover, the report stated that in Kars and Kaghyzman okrugs of Kars oblast, the 
Armenians allegedly constituted a ‘relative majority with a bit less than the half’ and Muslims 
about one fourth.900 Comparison of the official Russian statistics of 1916 and those of the 
above-mentioned project demonstrates that the Armenians in these okrugs constituted 29.4% 
(see Annex II and Maps 8 and 12). The remaining okrugs of the Kars oblast, Ardahan and 
Oltu were also proposed to be annexed to Alexandropol guberniya rather than to Batumi 
oblast on the grounds of homogenous topography and climate, the same way of life and 
convenient communication lines with Alexandropol. This meant that these arguments were 
preferred to the religious and cultural lines between the Muslims of Ardahan and Oltu and 
those of Batumi oblast901 (compare Maps 8, 12 and 9). 
 
While preferring to include the Armenian-dominated part of Borchaly uezd with 37.6% of its 
population in the projected Alexandropol guberniya, the Russian Interior Ministry preferred 
to retain the rest of the uezd in Tiflis guberniya,902 not proposing the annexation of the 
Muslim-dominated part of Borchaly uezd with 30.3% of its population to the neighbouring 
Gazakh uezd of the Muslim-dominated Elizavetpol guberniya (see Annex II and Maps 8 and 
12). Instead the argument was that the separation of the Armenian-dominated part would 
                                                 
899 STsIA, fn 2080,  l 1, fl 707, p 10 
900 Ibid., p 7 
901 Ibid., p 9op 
902 Ibid., p 7 
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serve to increase the Georgian element in Borchaly uezd,903 ignoring the Muslims. The rest of 
Erevan guberniya, after the exclusion from it of a great portion of Alexandropol uezd and part 
of Echmiadzin uezd, was projected to undergo an internal administrative readjustment through 
redrawing the borders of most of its uezds (see Table 9.2 and Map 9): 
 
Table 9.2 Population distribution in the officially projected Erevan guberniya904  
 
Uezds Armenians Muslims Others Total 
Echmiadzin 95,000 – 72% 36,000 – 27% 1,000 – 1% 132,000 
Erevan 154,000 – 65% 73,000 – 31% 11,000 – 4% 238,000 
New Bayazid 100,000 – 68% 45,000 – 32% 1,000 – 1% 146,000 
Sharur 18,000 – 19% 80,000 – 81% – 98,000 
Nakhchyvan 58,000 – 41% 84,000 – 58% 1,000 – 1% 143,000 
Surmali 34,000 – 31% 63,000 – 58% 12,000 – 11% 109,000 
 459,000 – 53% 381,000 – 44% 26,000 – 3% 866, 000 
 
In the projected Erevan guberniya, Armenians would have a majority of 53% against 44% 
Muslims. In six projected uezds, Armenians and Muslims would have a majority in three 
uezds. In Erevan uezd, the centre of which would serve as the capital of the first Armenian 
Republic, the ratio of Armenians would increase from 52% to 65%, whereas that of Muslims 
would decrease from 45.5% to 31%. Two of three projected uezds with Muslim majorities 
would be Sharur and Nakhchyvan uezds, projected on the basis of Sharur-Daralayaz, Erevan 
and Nakhchyvan uezds. The third uezd with a Muslim majority would be Surmali uezd, the 
ratio of the Muslims and Armenians remaining unchanged (compare Maps 8 and 9). 
 
In comparison with the existing Sharur-Daralayaz and Nakhchyvan uezds, which together had 
62.5% Muslims and 36.7% Armenians, the projected Sharur and Nakhchyvan uezds would 
have 68% Muslims and 30.7% Armenians. Muslims constituted 59.7% as against 39.6% 
Armenians in the existing Nakhchyvan uezd; in the projected one, this would be 58% and 
                                                 
903 Ibid. 
904 Note: Internal administrative readjustment of Erevan guberniya would include the following changes: 1) 
Echmiadzin uezd without the fourth uchastok; 2) Erevan uezd without the fourth uchastok with the annexation of 
the first and second uchastoks from the New Bayazid uezd separating from the latter the villages of Pashakand, 
Noraduz and Ayrivang of the Aghzybir village community; 3) New Bayazid uezd, which would contain the rest 
of the second uchastok (the abovementioned villages from Aghzybir village community and the villages of 
Aghzybir, Bayli-Huseyn, Saryjly and Hajy-Mughan), the third and fourth uchastoks with the annexation of the 
second uchastok of Sharur-Daralayaz uezd, excluding Martiros village community and parts of Gendyvaz village 
community, namely the villages of Gayaly, Chaykand, Arynj and Terp; 4) Sharur uezd would contain the first 
uchastok of the Sharur-Daralayaz uezd and the fourth uchastok of Erevan uezd; 5) Nakhchyvan uezd would 
constitute Nakhchyvan uezd, Martiros village community and the villages of Gayaly, Chaykand, Arynj and Tarp 
of Gendyvaz village community of Sharur-Daralayaz uezd; 6) Surmali uezd (Ibid., pp 10-10op). 
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41%. Muslims dominated the existing Sharur-Daralayaz uezd with 67% as against 32% 
Armenians; in the projected Sharur uezd, Muslims would have a significant majority of 81%, 
with 19% Armenians (compare Maps 8 and 9). 
 
According to the Russian Interior Ministry’s report, the projected readjustment of Erevan 
guberniya would create three Armenian-dominated mountainous uezds on the one hand, and 
three predominantly Muslim uezds, mostly on the plains, on the other. Moreover, the 
administrative-territorial readjustment would create national balance and simplify local 
administration and judicial affairs.905 At first sight the internal readjustment of Erevan 
guberniya would appear to create an ethnic balance, with three Armenian-dominated and 
three Muslim-dominated uezds, where ‘Muslims and Armenians would be in an equal 
position’.906 Careful study of the project reveals a different picture. The projection of 
Armenian-dominated uezds on the border of Erevan and Elizavetpol guberniyas would leave 
the Muslim-dominated uezds of the Erevan guberniya in the centre of the projected 
Armenian-dominated area from Kars to Mountainous Garabagh and dissociated from the 
Muslim-dominated Elizavetpol guberniya. If realised, the Muslim-dominated Nakhchyvan 
uezd would border with the Armenian-dominated Zangazur uezd of the projected Gandzak 
guberniya instead of bordering with the Muslim-dominated Zangazur uezd of Elizavetpol 
guberniya; Muslim-dominated Sharur-Daralayaz uezd would be distributed among three 
uezds of the Erevan guberniya, denying it a border with Muslim-dominated Zangazur and 
Javanshir uezds of the Elizavetpol guberniya: instead, the projected Armenian-dominated 
New Bayazid uezd would border with the projected Armenian-dominated Shusha, Gandzak 
and Karavansaray uezds of the projected Gandzak guberniya (compare Maps 8 and 9). As 
argued in the previous chapter, the realisation of the Russian Interior Ministry’s project would 
implement the Dashnaktsutiun plan on the formation of three Armenian provinces: Gandzak, 
Alexandropol and Erevan.  
 
The rationale behind the projection of Alexandropol, Erevan and Gandzak guberniyas was to 
strengthen the Armenian element in the pre-war Ottoman-Russian border in addition to 
increasing their number in the occupied Ottoman territories in Eastern Anatolia on one hand, 
and to decrease the number of Muslim-dominated administrative units in the western half of 
                                                 
905 Ibid., p 10op 
906 Ibid., p 11 
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the South Caucasus by redrawing their borders so as to turn them into Armenian-dominated 
units wherever it was possible to do so on the other. When it was impossible to apply this to 
Muslim-dominated uezds, Armenian-dominated uezds were to encircle the Muslim-dominated 
ones to disrupt their compact neighbourhood with each other (compare Maps 8 and 9). 
Although the project did not envisage redrawing the borders of Kars and Kaghyzman okrugs 
in Kars oblast, comparison of the Russian official statistics of 1916 and the project’s figures 
on both okrugs reveals a decrease in the number of Muslims and an increase in Armenians 
(compare Maps 8 and 9). As mentioned in Chapter 6, this decrease in the Muslim population 
of both okrugs was the result of their exile at the beginning of the war by the Russian 
authorities and the influx of Armenian refugees. The projection of Alexandropol guberniya 
meant that the Russian authorities did not intend to return the displaced Muslims; on the 
contrary, the Provisional Government tried to use this situation to contain the Muslim element 
even more in its border with the Muslim Ottoman Empire. The predominantly Muslim 
Surmali uezd on the pre-war Ottoman-Russian border was projected to be encircled by the 
projected Erevan uezd with a decreased number of Muslims and increased number of 
Armenians through redrawing its borders.  
 
The Special Transcaucasian Committee resolution of 15 October 1917907 and the 
Transcaucasian Commissariat decree of 1 December 1917 declared Erevan guberniya 
disputed, as they did Elizavetpol guberniya.908  
 
It is worth noting that Akbar agha Sheikh-ul-Islamov, voicing the views of Muslims, favoured 
the creation of cantons (administrative units smaller than uezds) in both of the disputed 
Elizavetpol and Erevan guberniyas. In Hovannisian’s opinion, the realisation of the canton 
project would make Muslims dominant in four of Erevan guberniya’s seven uezds and the 
Armenians would be limited in size and surrounded by Muslim cantons.909 Irrespective of the 
canton project, under the existing Russian administrative division of Erevan and Elizavetpol 
guberniyas, the Armenians were already surrounded by Muslim-dominated areas. It was this 
                                                 
907 Ibid., p 16op 
908 ARDA, fn 970, l 1, fl 87, p 1 
909 Hovannisian R, Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918, p 92; Note: Since I could not find a 
geographical description of the canton project in the Erevan guberniya, I have not prepared its map. I could only 
find a description of the canton project in the Elizavetpol guberniya, on the basis of which I have prepared                
Map 10. 
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actual division that the Armenians tried to change with their projects on relatively large uezds. 
The aim was to create a barrier of Armenian-dominated uezds in the Muslim-dominated 
borders of the existing Erevan and Elizavetpol guberniyas.  
 
The Armenian-favoured Erevan and Alexandropol guberniya projects were never adopted 
because of the opposition of the Georgians and Muslims.910 The involvement of Akhalkalaki 
and Borchaly uezds of Tiflis guberniya in these projects provoked the opposition of the 
Georgians, who argued that these were connected to Tiflis guberniya from historical, 
geographical and economic points of view. The Armenians claimed Akhalkalaki uezd to be 
Armenian both geographically and ethnically, being a natural continuation of the ‘Armenian 
plateau’ and predominantly Armenian. They argued the same about Lori uchastok (circuit) of 
Borchaly uezd, which they claimed to be ethnically Armenian.911 The Muslims did not see 
any need for the administrative-territorial readjustment, and in the case of readjustment, they 
preferred the canton project, which was opposed by the Armenians.  
 
Thus, the Nakhchyvan and Sharur-Daralayaz uezds of Erevan guberniya entered a new stage 
of political development with the declaration of the Azerbaijan and Armenian Republics 
without administrative-territorial changes. After the establishment of the Republic of 
Armenia, the Armenians tried to realise almost the same project. This means that the 
Azerbaijani Government was already familiar with the Armenian claims and arguments. 
However, according to the Batumi treaties of 4 June 1918 between the Ottoman Empire and 
each of the South Caucasian republics, two-thirds of Nakhchyvan uezd, the western Sharur 
part of Sharur-Daralayaz uezd and the southern part of Erevan uezd were left to the Ottoman 
Empire,912 (see Map 11) whereas the eastern Daralayaz part of Sharur-Daralayaz uezd and 
Ordubad part of Nakhchyvan uezd at its east end, which were not left to the Ottomans, were 
claimed by both Azerbaijan and Armenia.  
 
As noted in Chapter 7, Hovannisian, in his ‘Armenia on the road to independence, 1918’, 
published in 1967, did not include Daralayaz in the area of the Armenian Republic.913 But in 
                                                 
910 Hovannisian R, The Republic of Armenia. Volume I, p 81 
911 Note: For the Georgian and Armenian arguments on the issue see STsIA, fn 2080, l 1, fl 627, pp 3-12. 
912 Note: See the description of the borders of the Ottoman Empire in Article 2 of the Batumi Treaties of 4 June 
1918.  
913 Hovannisian R, Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918, p 195  
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his ‘The Republic of Armenia. Vol I. The First Year, 1918-1919’, published in 1971, he 
added it to the republic’s territories.914  
 
Daralayaz was claimed by the Armenian delegation in Istanbul in their interviews with Enver 
Pasha in summer 1918, but this was opposed by the Azerbaijani delegation on the grounds 
that Daralayaz was populated mostly by Muslims.915 The Armenian delegation also laid claim 
to Nakhchyvan uezd, including its Ordubad area,916 which was not occupied by the Ottomans 
and was also claimed by the Azerbaijani delegation in Istanbul.917 The efforts of the Armenian 
delegation in Istanbul to include Nakhchyvan and Sharur-Daralayaz uezds in the Armenian 
Republic did not succeed. The signing of the Mudros Armistice on 30 October 1918 and the 
replacement of Ottoman control with British in the South Caucasus created grounds for the 
active campaign by the Armenians to annex these uezds.  
 
9.2 Armenian arguments on Nakhchyvan 
 
As with Garabagh, the Republic of Armenia tried to substantiate its claims to Nakhchyvan 
and Sharur-Daralayaz uezds with ethnic, historical, economic, geographical and security 




According to the official Armenian memorandum, the Azerbaijani Government wanted to 
annex Nakhchyvan and Sharur ‘under the pretext of the relative majority of the Muslim 
population’ and ‘so penetrate the heart of Armenia’.918  
 
In order to substantiate its argument, the memorandum presented ethnic data, not only on 
Nakhchyvan and Sharur, but also on Zangazur, Erevan and Echmiadzin. Presenting these 
                                                 
914 Hovannisian R, The Republic of Armenia. Volume I, p 37  
915 ARDA, fn 894, l 10, fl 31, p 27 
916 Ibid., pp 20-21 
917 Topchibashev A, Memorandum pred’’yavlenniy nakhodyashchimsya v Konstantinopole pochyotnym 
predstavitelyam derzhav Antanty chlenom pravitel’stva Azerbaydzhanskoy Respubliki, chrezvychaynim 
ministrom-poslannikom pri pravitel’stvakh Blistatel’noy Porty, Armenii i Gruzii Ali Mardanbekom 
Topchibashevym (noyabr’ 1918), p 20 
918 FO 608/82, pp 342-343 
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uezds as the ‘border districts of the Araz valley’, the memorandum noted that ‘it would be 
enough to study the ethnographic data in the bordering districts of the Araz valley to be 
convinced that the facts speak in favour of Armenia’919 (see Table 9.3). 
 
Table 9.3 Statistics provided by the Armenian memorandum in 1919 
 
Uezds Total Armenians Muslims Kurds Other 
Christians 
Zangazur 152,000 100,000 50,000 - 2,000 
Nakhchyvan 119,000 51,000 68,000 (inc.Kurds) - - 
Sharur 90,000 30,000 58,000 - 2,000 
Erevan 199,000 106,000 86,000 7,000 - 
Echmiadzin 167,000 115,000 41,000 11,000 - 
 727,000 402,000 303,000 18,000 4,000 
 
Thus, the Armenian memorandum added Zangazur uezd, which was part of Garabagh in the 
Elizavetpol guberniya, to the list of Nakhchyvan and Sharur in the Erevan guberniya, 
although the subject was Azerbaijani claims to Nakhchyvan and Sharur. Adding Zangazur 
uezd, which bordered Nakhchyvan from the east, was not enough to turn the Armenians into a 
majority in these three uezds on the basis of either the official Russian data of 1916 (265,466 
Muslims and 184,429 Armenians – see Table 9.4) or Armenian memorandum figures of 1919, 
which excluded the Muslim-dominated Daralayaz part of the Sharur-Daralayaz uezd (176,000 
Muslims and 181,000 Armenians – see Table 9.3). For that reason, Erevan and Echmiadzin 
uezds on the north of the Sharur-Daralayaz uezd were added to the list in order to construct 
the claim that Muslim-dominated uezds were located well into the centre of the Armenian 
populated areas and the total number of Muslims was less than that of the Armenians in these 
five uezds, excluding the Daralayaz part of Sharur-Daralayaz uezd (see Map 9). 
 
Table 9.4 Official Russian statistics of 1916920 
 
Uezds Total Armenians Muslims Others 
Zangazur 226,398 101,055 123,395 1,948 
Nakhchyvan 136,859 54,209 81,714           936 
Sharur 90,250 29,165 60,357 728 
Erevan 205,617 106,933 93,554 5,130 
Echmiadzin 167,786 115,026  50,963 1,797 
 826,910 406,388 409,983 10,539 
 
                                                 
919 Ibid., p 342 
920 Kavkazskiy kalendar’ na 1917 god, Tiflis: Tipografiya Kantselyarii Namestnika Y.I.V. na Kavkaze, 1916, 
pp 194-197, 214-221 
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The construction of the suitable border areas continued with the construction of ethnic data by 
playing with figures. Thus, in the same memorandum, figures on Zangazur uezd differed from 
each other. In the claims to Garabagh, Zangazur’s population was 127,000 with 90,000 
Armenians and 37,000 Muslims;921 in the claims to Nakhchyvan, the total population of 
Zangazur was increased to 152,000 with 100,000 Armenians and 50,000 Muslims, whereas 
according to the official Russian statistics of 1916, the total population of the uezd was 
226,398 with 101,055 Armenians and 123,395 Muslims (see Table 9.4 and Map 8).  
 
The figures on Nakhchyvan also did not correspond to the official Russian figures of 1916: 
the total population of Nakhchyvan was shown as 119,000 by the memorandum, whereas in 
the official statistics it was 136,859 (see Table 9.4 and Map 8). If the decrease was the result 
of the Ottoman occupation of the area in June-October 1918, then it should have increased the 
number of Muslims from 81,714 in 1916 in the uezd, not reduced it to 68,000 as shown in the 
memorandum. It should have decreased the Armenian population significantly from 54,209 in 
1916, not to 51,000 as shown in the memorandum. The reason for such argument is that as a 
result of the Ottoman occupation of Surmali uezd and parts of Nakhchyvan, Sharur-
Daralayaz, Echmiadzin and Erevan uezds, about 100,000 Muslims of other parts of the Erevan 
guberniya under Armenian control moved to the territories occupied by the Ottoman Empire 
and the Armenians who lived in the latter areas moved to those outside the Ottoman 
Empire.922 The population move from both sides increased the number of Muslims in 
Nakhchyvan, Sharur, the southern part of Erevan uezd and Surmali uezd on the one hand and 
that of the Armenians in Echmiadzin, the rest of Erevan uezd and Daralayaz part of Sharur-
Daralayaz uezd, Muslim-dominated until then, on the other. Moreover, the activities of 
Andranik in Zangazur compelled its Muslim population to find refuge, among other places, in 
Nakhchyvan. This means that if the memorandum took the population move into account, the 
Muslims should have had majority in Nakhchyvan; and if the memorandum did not take the 
population move into account, the Muslims should again have dominated. In other words, 
there is no logical explanation for the reduced number of Muslims in Nakhchyvan given in the 
memorandum.  
 
                                                 
921 FO 608/82, p 325 
922 Azerbaydzhanskaya Respublika. Dokumenty i materialy 1918-1920 gg., dok 95, p 137 
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Regarding Sharur-Daralayaz uezd, the memorandum only included ethnic data on Sharur 
(excluding Daralayaz). After the signing of the Mudros Armistice and the replacement of 
Ottoman control with British in the South Caucasus, armed bands of Ottoman Armenians 
from Sasun and Mush had settled 15,000 Armenian refugees (Hovannisian gives the number 
of Armenian refugees in Daralayaz as 36,000923) in the lands and properties of the expelled 
Muslims in Daralayaz in November and December 1918.924 Although Daralayaz was part of 
Sharur-Daralayaz uezd and Azerbaijan made claims to the whole uezd on the grounds of its 
Muslim predominance, the memorandum did not consider it: owing to the occupation by the 
Ottoman Armenians, the Republic of Armenia found Daralayaz, which was necessary to 
connect Erevan with Zangazur and Mountainous Garabagh, to be part of it and avoided its 
consideration in its memorandum. In addition to this, despite the Muslim population influx 
into and Armenian exodus from Sharur, as with Nakhchyvan, increasing the already existing 
Muslim majority in Sharur, the Armenian memorandum data again reduced the number of 
Muslims here, instead of increasing that of Armenians.       
  
The comparison of the ethnic data for Erevan and Echmiadzin uezds in the 1916 official 
Russian source and 1919 Armenian memorandum reveals almost the same figures for the 
Armenian population, whereas the number of Muslims in Erevan uezd decreased from 93,554 
in 1916 to 86,000 in 1919 and in Echmiadzin uezd from 50,963 in 1916 to 41,000 in 1919 
(compare Tables 9.4 and 9.3). This shows that the memorandum took Muslim displacement 
from these uezds, as well as from Zangazur (though with contradictory data), into account, 
whereas it did not apply the same approach to Nakhchyvan and the Sharur part of Sharur-
Daralayaz uezds, where the Armenian population also decreased.   
 
In total, in these five uezds (Zangazur, Nakhchyvan, Sharur(-Daralayaz), Erevan and 
Echmiadzin), in the memorandum’s calculations, there were 402,000 Armenians and 303,000 
Muslims (see Table 9.3). The memorandum claimed that the figures it had presented were 
provided ‘by the old imperial governing body of Russia (Caucasian Calendar), where 
censorship did its best to reduce the exact figures of the Armenian population to a minimum 
in order to stifle any ambition towards independence’.925 In reality, the figures provided by 
                                                 
923 Hovannisian R, The Republic of Armenia. Volume I, p 127 
924 Ibid., p 229 
925 FO 608/82, p 343 
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this calendar, referred to in this thesis, including this section (see the source of Table 9.4), 
differed from the Armenian figures in the memorandum. According to this source, there were 
406,388 Armenians and 409,983 Muslims in these five uezds in 1916 (see Table 9.4). 
Comparison of the official Russian statistics on these uezds with those of the memorandum 
reveals a 4,388 decrease in the Armenian population and a 106,983 decrease in the number of 
Muslims.  
 
Concerning the memorandum’s claim that the Russian authorities intentionally reduced the 
number of Armenians to stifle national ambitions, it should be mentioned that it was because 
of Russia that the number of Armenians increased in the South Caucasus. Moreover, the 
territorial-administrative readjustment project of the Russian Interior Ministry of July 1917, 
discussed elsewhere, disproves this argument: it was pro-Armenian biased rather than against 
Armenian intentions to create compact Armenian units. The fact that the project favoured the 
construction of compact Armenian units was not connected with the favourable attitude of 
Russia towards Armenians. This should be explained by the Russian intention of disrupting 
the compactness of the Muslims in the South Caucasus, including in the border areas with the 
Muslim Ottoman Empire, which could only be achieved with the help of the Christian 
Armenians, since they were the most numerous Christians in the neighbourhood of the 
Muslims in the region, including in the border with the Ottoman Empire. This policy had 
being applied since the Russian occupation of Muslim-populated areas of the South Caucasus 
in the early nineteenth century.  
 
Regarding the number of Muslims, as also mentioned previously, in the opinion of Alimardan 
bay Topchubashov, Head of the Azerbaijani Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, 
‘Russian statistics of population were always incorrect from the Tartar point of view, as in 
order to avoid taxation and the possibilities of military service the Tartars always understated 
the number of their sons and for other reasons did not include a number of their unmarried 
women’.926 Topchubashov’s argument is more convincing than that of Avetis Aharonian, 
Head of the Delegation of the Republic of Armenia at the Paris Peace Conference, who 
submitted the memorandum, and this suggests that not the number of Armenians but the 
number of Muslims was lower in the Russian official statistics than in reality.   
                                                 
926 FO 608/84, p 100 
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The memorandum continued, ‘it is also important to understand that these figures are based 
on the old Russian administrative system with its artificial divisions, because if the 
neighbouring districts of the Araz valley were divided according to the geographical and 
ethnographical conditions of the country, we would obtain the following figures for the five 
districts under discussion: 446,000 Armenians and 309,000 Muslims. We also take these 
figures from official sources.’927 If this ‘official source’ was the ‘Caucasian Calendar’, as 
mentioned in the memorandum, then the official source was distorted by the memorandum, 
since this calendar did not contain the figures cited there. Moreover, the Armenian document 
did not follow the ‘old Russian administrative system with its artificial divisions’, as it 
claimed, but cut off the Daralayaz part of the Sharur-Daralayaz uezd. 
 
Trying to substantiate the reasons behind the lower number of Armenians than Muslims, the 
memorandum also argued that this was due to the Safavid Shah Abbas who in the early 
seventeenth century ‘forced all the Armenians of the Araz valley to emigrate to the interior of 
Persia’.928 Armenian historians give different totals for the number of Armenians deported in 
the early seventeenth century, ranging between indefinite expressions such as ‘large numbers’ 
and 20,000 to 500,000.929 Following the logic of the memorandum that Shah Abbas wanted to 
                                                 
927 FO 608/82, p 343 
928 Ibid., p 343; Note: Referring to the French traveller, Tavernier, the memorandum argued that ‘27,000 
Armenian families (i.e. 200,000 Armenians in today’s terms [in 1919 – I.K.]) were forced by Shah Abbas to 
settle in Gilan alone. A more considerable number of Armenians were sent to Isfahan. A third group was 
dispersed between Shiraz and Isfahan. The whole part of the country between Erevan and Tauris was completely 
ruined by Shah Abbas to make it useless to the Ottoman army as supply centres. He wanted to make the country 
a desert. All the Julfa inhabitants were deported to Persia’ (Ibid., pp 343-344). 
929 Ch’amch’yants’ M, History of Armenia: From B.C. 2247 to the Year of Christ 1780 or 1229 of the Armenian 
Era (translated from the original Armenian text by Johannes Avdall), Volume II, pp 356-357; Gregorian V, 
‘Minorities of Isfahan: The Armenian Community of Isfahan 1587-1722’, Iranian Studies, vol 7, no 3/4, 1974,           
p 664; Bournoutian G, ‘Eastern Armenia from the Seventeenth Century to the Russian Annexation’ in  
Hovannisian (ed.), The Armenian People from Ancient to Modern Times, Volume II, p 96; Kouymjian D, 
‘Armenia from the Fall of the Cilician Kingdom (1375) to the Forced Emigration under Shah Abbas (1604)’ in 
Hovannisian (ed.), The Armenian People from Ancient to Modern Times, Volume II, p 25; Payaslian S, The 
History of Armenia, p 106; Nalbandian L, The Armenian Revolutionary Movement: The Development of 
Armenian Political Parties through the Nineteenth Century, pp 17-18; Herzig E, ‘The Armenian Merchants of 
New Julfa, Isfahan: A Study in Pre-modern Asian Trade’, Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Oriental Studies for 
the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Oxford, 1991, pp 60-61; Here it should also be 
mentioned that while talking about the deportation of Armenians, Armenian authors include in this story, as well 
as in the number of deported Armenians, the Caucasian Albanians, who were of the same confession as 
Armenians, presenting them as Armenians and narrating all events related to them as part of Armenian history.  
As for non-Armenian historians, one being John Perry, based on primary sources, he concluded that about 3,000 
families of Georgians, Armenians and Turks, who survived the deportation initiated by Shah Abbas, were settled 
at New Julfa by Isfahan and on lands around the capital and in the Bakhtiari foothills, where their descendants 
still live. Five hundred Armenian families were sent to Shiraz at the request of the governor. However, according 
to the memorandum, the number of Armenians who were settled in Isfahan was even greater than the number of 
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turn the area between Erevan and Tauris (modern Tabriz in Iran) into a desert,930 Shah Abbas 
would have had to deport not only the Armenians, but the whole population in this area, 
including Muslims. The British scholar on the Safavid period, Edmund Herzig, referring to 
one colophon of 1604, echoed by other colophons and supported by European sources, wrote 
that Shah Abbas’s decision was ‘to deport the entire civilian population (Christian and 
Muslim)’ when he realised that he could not face the Ottoman forces in the field.931 This 
suggests that if the Armenian population had been decreased by Shah Abbas’s deportation, 
the number of Muslims could also be expected to decrease.  
 
This argument is further strengthened by the facts offered by John R.Perry, the American 
scholar of Iranian studies. Thus, with reference to Abbasgulu agha Bakykhanov, he wrote that 
Shah Abbas moved 30,000 Turkic Gajar families from Ganja (in present-day Azerbaijan) to 
Marv and Astarabad in Iran.932 Referring to Iskandar Munshi, he mentioned that in 1615, 
Shah Abbas ‘continued his depopulation of Transaraxian Azerbaijan’:933 many of the settled 
populace, ‘who had fled from war-torn Qarābāgh and Shirvān to Georgia were extradited and 
sent to Mazandaran, together with both peasants and tribesmen still in Qarābāgh and Shirvān 
who were suspected of having collaborated with the Ottomans. Again, those who resisted – as 
the Ahmadlū of Qarābāgh – were massacred. Some 50,000 families were thus resettled at 
Abbas’ favourite Caspian resort of Farahābād, “both to develop that province and to requite 
their ingratitude.” The following winter they were joined by 2-3,000 Georgian and Ganja’i 
prisoners, survivors of Abbas’ campaign against the “rebel” Tahmūras.’934 Based on Marie-
Félicité Brosset and Alexandre Manvelichvili, Perry also wrote about the deportation of 6,000 
families of Georgians and 12,000 Turks from Tiflis in 1735 by Nadir Shah of Iran. Referring 
                                                                                                                                                        
those settled in Gilan, i.e. more than 27,000 families, whereas Perry’s data suggests that this figure should have 
been fewer than 3,000 families. Out of this number, 500 Armenian families were sent to Shiraz to engage in 
viticulture (Perry J, ‘Forced Migration in Iran during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries’, Iranian Studies, 
vol 8, no 4, 1975, p 207). 
930 FO 608/82, p 344 
931Herzig E, ‘The Armenian Merchants of New Julfa, Isfahan: A Study in Pre-modern Asian Trade’, Thesis 
submitted to the Faculty of Oriental Studies for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Oxford, 
1991, p 53 
932 Perry J, op cit., p 206 
933 Note: According to Perry, ‘Greater Iran’ was divided into ‘six mega-provinces: Azarbaijan (including all 
Transaraxian territories); Kurdistan (including Luristan and the Bakhtiari mountains); Central Iran (Isfahan, 
eastern Irāq-i Ajam and the Caspian littoral); Fars (including Khuzistan, Dashtistān and Lār); Khurasan 
(including Gurgān and Mary, but excluding Herat); and Afghanistan (effectively Herat and Qandahār provinces)’ 
(Ibid., p 204). 
934 Ibid., p 207 
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to Ann S. K. Lambton, he continued that Agha Mahammad Shah Gajar of Iran also 
‘contributed to the chronic depopulation of northern Azarbaijan in his irredentist campaigns 
against Georgia’ at the end of the eighteenth century.935 
 
The above-mentioned facts show that the forced deportations realised by Safavid Shah Abbas 
in the seventeenth century and by Nadir Shah Afshar and Agha Mahammad Shah Gajar in the 
eighteenth century affected not only Armenians, but other peoples as well, and resulted in a 
decrease in the numbers of Muslims and Georgians in the South Caucasus as well. For that 
reason, the Armenian memorandum’s argument, which connected the lower number of the 
Armenians than Muslims in the region with Shah Abbas’s deportations, is unsustainable.  
 
According to the same memorandum, it was only after the Turkmanchay Treaty in 1828 that 
‘Armenia’ could live a ‘more or less free life and its population reached the aforementioned 
figures’.936 This treaty was indeed the starting point of the increase of the Armenian 
population in the South Caucasus (see Table 9.5). Because of the settlement process, 
discussed in Chapter 4, the Armenians increased from 17% in 1828 (Nakhchyvan khanate) to 
36.7% in 1916 (Nakhchyvan and Sharur-Daralayaz uezds), whereas Muslims decreased from 
83% to 62.5% (compare Table 9.5 and Annex II). Comparison of the data reveals a more than 
doubling in the number of Armenians in 1828-1916 against a 24.7% decrease in the number 
of Muslims in the same period. Although the Armenian population, despite intensive 
settlement, could not form a majority in the region, nevertheless, with its scattered 
distribution, it violated the compact distribution of the Muslim population and ethnic 
proportion, which Armenian nationalists tried to use in their claims (see Map 9).    
 
The existence of peasantry constitutes a powerful claim to territory.937 This claim in the 
Armenian case in the Nakhchyvan region started to be created in the early nineteenth century, 
and means that in 1918, in the Nakhchyvan region, though distanced and isolated because of 
Muslim-dominated lands, the Armenians had some compact lands. Despite the Armenian 
minority and dispersed distribution, these lands formed the basis of the Armenian claims to 
the whole area of these two uezds.    
                                                 
935 Ibid., pp 209, 211 
936 FO 608/82, p 344 
937 Burghardt A, ‘The Bases of Territorial Claims’, Geographical Review, vol 63, no 2, 1973, p 232 
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Table 9.5 Statistics on the Armenians in the Nakhchyvan region in the early 19th century938 
 
  
                                                 
938 Note: The table has been prepared on the basis of Shopen I, Istoricheskiy pamyatnik sostoyaniya Armyanskoy Oblasti v epokhu eya prisoedineniya k Rossiyskoy Imperii,   
pp 635-638. 
939 Note: These two units were created on the basis of the former Nakhchyvan khanate after the creation of the Armenian oblast as its parts. 
Names Muslims Local 
Armenians  















11,992 from Persia 
 (99.8% of all Armenian 
settlers and 29% of total 
population)  
27 from Ottoman  
Empire (0.2% of all  
Armenian settlers and 
0.06% of total population) 
 
Villagers 17,482  
(54% of total 
villagers and 
42% of total 
population) 
4,359  
(13% of total 
villagers and 
10% of total 
population) 











(78% of total 
population) 10,700 from Persia  
(99.7% of all Armenian 
settler villagers and 33% 
of total villagers) 
27 from Ottoman 
 Empire (0.25% of all 
Armenian settler villagers 
and 0.07% of total 
villagers ) 
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Finalising the ethnic argument, the memorandum noted that ‘today, as we have already said, 
the Armenian population of the five neighbouring districts of the Araz valley, Zangazur, 
Nakhchyvan, Sharur, Erevan and Echmiadzin, is 436,000, while the Muslim population is 
only 296,000’.940 First, these figures were different from those which the memorandum had 
‘already said’. Those figures for these five uezds were 402,000 Armenians and 303,000 
Muslims, whereas by the end, the number of Armenians had increased to 436,000 and that of 
the Muslims was reduced to 296,000. A similar issue occurred with the ethnic arguments on 
the Armenian claims to the mountainous parts of the Elizavetpol guberniya in the same 




As in the case of Garabagh, the official Armenian memorandum presented historical 
arguments. It argued that the ‘valley of Araz has been for centuries the scene of Armenian 
history. Our civilisation and the politics of our past were formed around this valley. It is there 
that we find the centres, the metropolises of the intellectual life of Armenia. It is there that the 
city of Vagarshabad, the residence of Tiridates the Great, the first to convert to Christianity, 
was located. Armavir, Artashat and Dvin were also situated there. This valley was also the 
natural centre around which our moral and religious life were organised. The famous 
Echmiadzin Cathedral – the headquarters of the Catholicos – was established there in 303-
305.’942 It continued: ‘It is in the valley of Araz that Armenian art manifested itself in all its 
brilliance. Many admirable historical monuments, many convents, churches, tombs, 
inscriptions, most of which had been conserved up until today despite being through so many 
tests, testify to a powerful and rich Armenian civilisation that flourished around this valley. 
The economic life was as flourishing as the spiritual culture. Many cities and villages 
prospered around the edges of Araz.’943 
 
With regard to these arguments, first it should be mentioned that the ‘Araz valley’ extended 
along the Araz River, starting in Erzurum province in Eastern Anatolia, covering the areas in 
                                                 
940 FO 608/82, p 344 
941 Ibid., pp 318, 325 
942 Ibid., pp 344-345 
943 Ibid., p 345 
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Surmali, Echmiadzin, Erevan, Sharur-Daralayaz and Nakhchyvan uezds of Erevan guberniya 
up to Zangazur uezd of Elizavetpol guberniya in the South Caucasus. The memorandum did 
not clarify in which particular part of the Araz valley these historical place names were 
localised. The fact is that only two of the five place names mentioned by the memorandum, 
namely Echmiadzin and Vagarshabad, could be found on the official Russian maps by that 
time. Concerning the rest of the place names, as was discussed in Chapter 4, the 
archaeological excavations undertaken in the area in the late nineteenth century could not 
localise ‘Armavir’ in the place suggested by the Armenians on the borders of Echmiadzin and 
Surmali uezds, whereas no archaeological investigations were conducted with the purpose of 
localising Artashat and Dvin in the Tsarist period: they were made in the Soviet period. 
Although no archaeological investigation was undertaken with regard to the localisation of 
Vagarshabad either, it has been suggested that Vagarshabad’s ‘localisation’ closer to 
Echmiadzin on the official maps of the late nineteenth century could be explained by the 
impact of the Armenian nationalist movement.  
 
The statement made by Avetis Aharonian, Head of the Delegation of the Republic of Armenia 
at the Paris Peace Conference, at the meeting of the Council of Ten on 26 February 1919, was 
more specific in terms of the ‘localisation’ of the mentioned place names than the above-
mentioned memorandum he presented on 17 May 1919 to the Conference. Thus, while talking 
about the historical importance of the South Caucasus for the Armenians, he had noted, ‘the 
ecclesiastical centre for all Armenians is situated within the territory of the Republic at 
Echmiadzin, on the banks of the Arax. Within this territory are also to be found nearly all the 
capitals of the various dynasties of Great Armenia, i.e. Armavir, Vagharchapat, Dvin, 
Artachat, Yervandakert, Yervandachat and Ani.’944 Aharonian had included three more place 
names in his list, namely ‘Yervandakert, Yervandachat and Ani’, in February 1919 and 
localised them together with those in the memorandum ‘within the territory of the [Armenian] 
Republic’, which did not include either Sharur-Daralayaz or Nakhchyvan uezd in February. 
As for Ch’amch’yants’, the area where he ‘localised’ Vagarshabad, Armavir, Artashat and 
Dvin on his map of the late eighteenth century corresponded to the Echmiadzin and Erevan 
uezds of Erevan guberniya in 1919, with Ani in the border of Kaghyzman and Kars okrugs of 
the Kars oblast, whereas neither ‘Yervandakert’ nor ‘Yervandachat’ can be found on his map.  
                                                 
944 Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Paris Peace Conference, 1919. Volume IV, 
Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1943, p 151 
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Concerning ‘Armenian tradition’ with regard to Nakhchyvan, it was considered to be the 
‘residence of Noah after the landing of the ark’.945 Lloyd Bailey, scholar of the Old 
Testament, wrote that an attempt to trace the tradition of the landing place of Noah’s ark atop 
Aghry Daghy to the first century AD is made by quoting Josephus Flavius that ‘“the ark 
rested on the top of certain mountain in Armenia ... both he [Noah] and his family went out ... 
the Armenians call this place ‘The Place of Descent’.”’946 He argued against the interpretation 
of William Whiston (translator of the ‘Antiquities of the Jews’ by Flavius in 1737), who 
seemed to identify this “place of descent” with modern ‘Nakhichavan’ as meaning “the first 
place of descent”.947 Bailey, based on Joseph Hübschmann, wrote that the earliest form of this 
place name is ‘Naxcavan, which, contrary to the often quoted opinion of Whiston, does not 
mean “place of descent” and thus cannot be equated with anything in Josephus’ text. Rather, 
the name consists of a place name, Naxč (or ‘Naxuč’) plus avan, “market town”’.948  
 
This issue was discussed in Friedrich Murad’s volume ‘Ararat und Masis’, published in 1901. 
According to Hübschmann, Murad ‘attempted to present evidence for a native Armenian 
flood story […] which supposedly gave rise to the designation Naxčavan for a city lying 
approximately 100 kilometres southeast of the mountain’.949 The evidence provided by Murad 
was a quotation from Flavius and the interpretation of the word ‘Naxčavan’ through the 
Armenian language: Naxčavan (=Naxiĵavan), which means “first settling place” (from nax, 
“at first, before, prime”, and ijawan, “shelter, temporary quarters, station, stopping place”).950 
Hübschmann argued that the forms ‘Naxijavan, Naxijevan, Naxjavan, [and] Naxjuan (along 
with Naxčavan and Naxčuan), are traceable in documents only after the tenth century’.951 
Discussing the issue, the scholar wrote that ‘Josephus merely leaves us with his statement that 
the ark’s location was “in Armenia, on the peak of a mountain”’, and speaks neither of the 
province of Ararat nor of the mountain of Masis nor of the city of Nakhchyvan.952  
 
                                                 
945 Bailey L, Noah: The Person and the Story in History and Tradition, Columbia: University of South Carolina, 
1989, p 190 
946 Ibid., pp 71-72 
947 Ibid., p 72 
948 Cited in Bailey L, op cit., p 73 
949 Ibid., p 190 
950 Ibid. 
951 Ibid., pp 191-192 
952 Ibid., p 195 
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In the context of debates among the 19th-early 20th century scholars about the location of the 
mountain on which Noah’s ark came to rest, the Armenian nationalists supported the 
geographical vision which located the mountain not on the south of Lake Van (one possible 
and dominant interpretation), but on the north, on the border of the South Caucasus and 
Eastern Anatolia, as this geography aided the construction of a new Armenian national 
historical narrative. This ‘localisation’ was also instrumental in the construction of such 
notions as the ‘plain of Ararat or, in a most limited sense, the valley of Araz’ by the official 
Armenian memorandum.953  
 
Mass Armenian settlement in the South Caucasus, as discussed in Chapter 4 and this chapter, 
dated back to the 19th-early 20th centuries, which created some small compact, but dispersed 
Armenian areas in Nakhchyvan. However, even these settlements were distanced from the 
compact Armenian areas in Alexandropol, Echmiadzin and Erevan uezds (see Map 12). The 
reference to historical arguments by the Armenian memorandum was guided by the aim of 
strengthening the validity of the claims to Nakhchyvan on the grounds of a long-term 
Armenian presence in the area, presenting it as the border region of the ‘Araz valley’, 
although not giving any specific historical place name in Sharur-Daralayaz and Nakhchyvan 
uezds.   
 
The rejection of an Armenian primordialist interpretation does not lead to its replacement by 
an Azerbaijani primordialist interpretation. This is linked to the process of the establishment 
of the first Azerbaijan Republic and the formation of the Azerbaijani national identity, the 




According to the memorandum, the Araz valley, where the Nakhchyvan and Sharur-
Daralayaz uezds were located, was the most vital artery for the economic life of Armenia, 
through which exchanges of goods between the mountainous districts took place and helped 
support economic relations with neighbouring nations. Moreover, it was argued that as 
Armenia was a mountainous country, it had little land suitable for agriculture. For that reason, 
                                                 
953 FO 608/82, pp 336-337 
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the Araz valley was presented as the only place where the Armenians could practise 
subtropical cultivation: the Araz River watered the land, so it was fertile. The memorandum 
argued that Azerbaijan had eighteen times more fertile lands than the lands that could be 
farmed in the Araz valley, so Azerbaijan did not need the valley. Emphasizing the importance 
of the Araz valley for Armenia, the document also noted that without it Armenia would be 
divided into many mountainous units and provinces without any link between them, 
economically poor and backward. The population would be obliged to emigrate, and Armenia 
would soon become a desert.954  
 
The economic importance of the valley for Armenia was underlined by the railway line 
between Alexandropol and Erevan, following the course of the Araz River, which connected 
Kars, Erevan and Alexandropol to Nakhchyvan, to Zangazur and through Zangazur to 
Mountainous Garabagh. Moreover, according to the memorandum, so-called Turkish 
Armenia and Russian Armenia were connected by the Araz valley and if the Armenians were 
deprived of this valley up to Zangazur, not only would the link between the two main parts of 
Armenia be broken, but so-called Russian Armenia would be devoid of all means of 
communication.955 
 
Regarding the economic arguments of the Azerbaijani Government, irrigation systems (in 
some cases flowing from Garabagh through the mountains), common routes of livestock 
transhumance and pastures, the same way of economic life, and the same fields of speciality 
crop (cotton, rice, etc) united Nakhchyvan and Garabagh into one inseparable unit in an 
economic sense. Already existing trade relations between the two regions would be 
strengthened even more with the finalisation of the construction of the Baku-Julfa railway.956   
 
According to Yuriy Barsegov, ethnic, language, economic, historical and other factors should 
be combined while delimitating national territories. Under economic factors, he included 
economic and trade relations, division of labour between different provinces of the national 
territory, presence of markets and raw material reserves, access to the sea or to international 
water arteries taking into account the character of national transport systems and their 
                                                 
954 Ibid., pp 338-339 
955 Ibid., p 338 
956 ARDA, fn 970, l 1, fl 227, p 20 
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importance for the economy of the country. However, his consideration of the economic 
factor excluded the possibility of territorial expansion with reference to the economic needs of 
establishment of ‘vital space’ for some countries.957 
 
The area claimed by the Armenians in Eastern Anatolia had two major rivers, the Tigris and 
Euphrates and access to the Mediterranean and Black Seas (see Maps 5 and 13). Moreover, 
the Kars-Julfa railway passed through Kars okrug and Alexandropol, Echmiadzin and Erevan 
uezds, which were mostly under Armenian control (see Map 8). This means that even without 
the Nakhchyvan region the economic needs of Armenia could be satisfied, since apart from 
the above-mentioned advantages of Eastern Anatolia with its access to two major rivers and 
seas, the fertile Araz valley started in the Armenian-claimed Eastern Anatolia, in Erzurum 
province (see Map 5). Through the latter, it could also have a border with Persia. Moreover, 
Armenia already had access to a railway, which could be extended from Kars okrug through 
Erzurum province to trade with Persia. Also taking into account the fact that Garabagh and 
Nakhchyvan were not as fertile as Eastern Anatolia and could not be considered economically 
advantageous areas, the Armenian memorandum’s reference to the Nakhchyvan region 
derived from the aim to connect Garabagh through Nakhchyvan to the Erevan uezd and 
further to Eastern Anatolia under the Araz valley-related economic argument. For that reason, 
the Armenian claims could be placed within Barsegov’s ‘vital space’ category, and can be 
considered not economic, but land-related.  
 
Geographical and security arguments 
 
The memorandum presented the Araz valley as part of ‘Upper Armenian plateaus’. Trying to 
make another link to Armenia, the memorandum added that ‘the Araz valley formed the major 
route through the Armenian mountains up to Zangazur’, and ‘had all the characteristics of the 
mountainous countries without any link whatsoever with the plain that extends to the Caspian 
Sea’.958 According to this document, the divisions of the Russian administrative system were 
artificial and not based on ethnic and geographical considerations.959 
                                                 
957 Barsegov Yu, Territoriya v mezhdunarodnom prave: yuridicheskaya priroda territorial’nogo verkhovenstva i 
pravoviye osnovaniya rasporyazheniya territoriey, Moscow: Gosyurizdat, 1958, p 137 
958 FO 608/82, p 337 
959 Ibid., p 343 
264 
The ethnic figures on Armenians and Muslims have been analysed earlier and demonstrated 
that Muslims constituted a majority in the region, despite their possibly reduced ethnic data in 
the Russian statistics. It was also argued that the Russian administrative divisions were not 
artificial and were not a Russian construction, as was claimed by the Armenian memorandum. 
The boundaries between Elizavetpol and Erevan guberniyas in the area concerning the current 
case almost corresponded to the boundaries between the khanates of Garabagh (western 
border of the Zangazur uezd) and Nakhchyvan (eastern borders of the Nakhchyvan and 
Sharur-Daralayaz uezds) (compare Maps 6 and 8). As for the connection which the 
memorandum tried to create between the ‘Araz valley’ and the ‘Armenian plateau’, as was 
argued in Chapter 8, the latter was a politically-motivated construction.  
 
According to the memorandum’s security arguments, the Araz valley was also the only means 
of defence of Armenia: ‘Anyone who possesses the Araz valley from Zangazur up to Surmali 
or Nakhchyvan will be the master of the heart of Armenia, Ararat and Erevan’.960 From a 
strategic point of view, the Araz valley was argued to be ‘not a frontier to Armenia, but its 
vital centre’. It was also argued that even in the future, when another city became the capital 
of Armenia, Erevan would remain the unique centre of northern Armenia around which the 
Armenians of Kars, Kaghyzman, Alexandropol, Pambak, Elizavetpol, Lori, Gazakh, 
Mountainous Garabagh and Zangazur would be united with a population of 1,300,000 
inhabitants. Without this valley the idea of a united Armenia, in the words of the 
memorandum, would always remain an unachievable dream. It was argued that the desire of 
Azerbaijan to annex the Araz valley was motivated by the intention to prevent the Armenians 
from achieving their territorial unity by dividing Armenia into two parts. Control over the 
Araz valley was considered to be important to deter the menace of pan-Islamism and pan-
Turanism and deny Caucasian Tartars from having a common border with Turkey.961 
 
On one hand, Armenia presented ‘pan-Turanism’ as a danger, on the other hand claiming the 
Nakhchyvan region which was predominantly Muslim or, by the logic of the Armenian 
memorandum, predominantly pan-Turanist. This means that the inclusion of the region in 
Armenia would not solve but create security problems. Taking into account that the 
Nakhchyvan region was located between Garabagh and other Armenian-claimed areas to the 
                                                 
960 Ibid., p 340 
961 Ibid., pp 340-341 
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west, the Armenian claims to Nakhchyvan were related to its geographical position as a 
bridge to Garabagh. However, taking into account also the fact that while making claims to 
the Nakhchyvan and Sharur-Daralayaz uezds, the Armenian memorandum excluded 
Daralayaz, since considered as an integral part of Armenia, this bridge could have been 
established through Daralayaz as well without any need for other parts of the Nakhchyvan 
region. With regard to another role of the Nakhchyvan region for Armenia, i.e. in cutting off 
the border between the Ottoman Empire and Azerbaijan, it should be noted that even with the 
Nakhchyvan region, Azerbaijan would not have a common border with the Ottoman Empire 
since they would be dissociated through Eastern Anatolia, also claimed by Armenia, and 
British-controlled Persia.962 These arguments demonstrate that the Armenian concerns were 
not security, but land-related.  
 
The Azerbaijani desire to annex the region was based on more valid considerations: the area 
being predominantly Muslim was the continuation of other Muslim-populated areas in the 
east, which were economically and geographically connected with each other and all of the 
primary roads of these areas led towards Baku, not towards Erevan, as mentioned previously.      
 
9.3 Nakhchyvan and the Ottoman Empire, the Allied Powers, the Soviets and 
Kemalist Turkey     
 
As mentioned earlier, a great part of the Nakhchyvan uezd and Sharur part of the Sharur-
Daralayaz uezd were left to the Ottoman Empire under the Batumi treaties of 4 June 1918. 
Only a small part of Nakhchyvan uezd, the Ordubad area, and the Daralayaz part of Sharur-
Daralayaz uezd were left outside the Ottoman-South Caucasian border (see Map 11). This 
section examines the positions of major external powers involved in the South Caucasus from 
the Batumi treaties to 1921 on the Nakhchyvan and Sharur-Daralayaz uezds and assesses the 
impact of their stance on the fate of these uezds. 
 
                                                 
962 Note: Persia considered the declaration of the republic of ‘Azerbaijan’ on the north of the Araz River in 1918, 
which was the same as the name of the province on the south of the Araz River in Persia, as a political challenge 
to its territories. For that reason, relations between Azerbaijan and Persia could not be regarded as cordial. 
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Nakhchyvan and the Ottoman Empire963 
 
According to Vehib Pasha, Commander of the Third Ottoman Army, whom Hovannisian 
considered a ‘moderate’ element of the Committee of Unity and Progress, Armenia could 
consist of New Bayazid and parts of the Erevan, Echmiadzin and Alexandropol uezds:964 the 
Ottoman Empire did not consider either Daralayaz or Ordubad as parts of the Armenian 
Republic. Moreover, Ordubad, which connected other parts of Nakhchyvan with Garabagh, 
which the Ottoman Government considered as part of Azerbaijan, could not be regarded by 
the Ottoman Empire as part of Armenia anyway, since otherwise there would be no direct 
connection between Azerbaijan and the Ottoman Empire, which would impede the realisation 
of its strategic aims in the region. 
 
Nakhchyvan and the Allied Powers 
 
The British occupation of the South Caucasus after the Mudros Armistice brought a new 
development in the Nakhchyvan region. According to Article 11 of the Armistice, ‘part of the 
South Caucasus’ had already been ordered to be evacuated by the Ottoman forces and the 
evacuation of the rest would be decided after consideration of the situation on the ground.965 
Although the article did not state exactly which part of the South Caucasus had already been 
ordered to be evacuated, the establishment of the British military representation on 26 January 
1919 together with the ‘local Tartar Government as an administrative Council’ in 
Nakhchyvan966 ‘to preserve law and order until the Paris Peace Conference had decided on 
the future of the district’967 showed that it was no longer under Ottoman control. 
 
According to Hovannisian, the Armenian Government yielded to the establishment of British 
military representation together with the local Tartar Government, since it lacked the 
                                                 
963 Note: As already mentioned, a great part of the Nakhchyvan region was included in the Ottoman Empire 
under the Batumi treaties and the smaller part was claimed by Armenia and Azerbaijan during Ottoman control 
of the South Caucasus from June to October. Since the period was very short and there is no evidence on the 
change of the Ottoman position on the area under consideration, the section is short.  
964 Hovannisian R, Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918, p 195 
965 Erim N, Devletlerarası hukuku ve siyasi tarih metinleri, cilt I (Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Andlaşmaları), p 521  
966 FO 608/84, p 392; FO 371/3670, p 539 
967 Hovannisian R, The Republic of Armenia. Volume I, p 231 
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necessary military power to subject the region.968 British military rule together with Muslim 
government did not last long, and on 6 April 1919, the British military authorities decided to 
hand over Nakhchyvan to the Armenian Government.969 This decision corresponded to the 
British memorandum of 7 February 1919, according to which, in the case of integration of the 
‘Armenian provinces of the Caucasus’ into the new Armenian state to be established in the 
territory of the Ottoman Empire, the boundary was to encompass the districts of Oltu, Kars, 
Alexandropol, Erevan and Julfa (including Nakhchyvan).970 Taking into account the plans of 
the Allied Powers with regard to the establishment of Armenia consisting of Eastern 
Anatolian and South Caucasian provinces and also that ‘district’ meant uezd or okrug and 
there was no uezd or okrug called ‘Julfa’, it may be suggested that the British memorandum 
meant a great part of Nakhchyvan uezd until Julfa and the Sharur part of Sharur-Daralayaz 
uezd.  
 
According to the Wilsonian principles, the fate of disputed border areas should be decided by 
plebiscite. Although Muslim-dominated Nakhchyvan and Sharur-Daralayaz uezds bordered 
Armenia, a plebiscite was not considered by the British and the region was handed over to 
Armenia. The Azerbaijani Government protested against this decision to the British 
Command on 30 April 1919 and spoke out against the comparison of the Garabagh case with 
that of Nakhchyvan. The protest noted that ‘both the geographical position of these territories 
and the ethnic composition of their population in percentages are different’: Zangazur, 
Javanshir, Shusha and Jabrayil uezds (Garabagh) were ‘located well into the centre of 
Azerbaijan, surrounded by a solid Muslim population and the Armenian population in the 
territory of Garabagh lived in small groups, nowhere comprising a solid mass, which was not 
the case in Nakhchyvan, Surmali and Sharur-Daralayaz uezds, where the Muslim population 
formed a solid mass’ (see Map 12). Moreover, Zangazur, Javanshir, Shusha and Jabrayil 
uezds were in the Azerbaijani Government’s sphere of administration, and only a small part of 
this province, seized by Andranik, was temporarily taken from the administration of the 
Azerbaijani Government. For that reason, the transfer of the administration of the mentioned 
districts to Azerbaijan was just the restoration of the previous normal order. Nakhchyvan, 
Sharur-Daralayaz, Surmali and parts of Erevan uezd had never constituted part of the 
                                                 
968 Ibid., pp 230-231 
969 FO 371/3670, p 539 
970 Hovannisian R, op cit., p 270 
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Armenian Government, so the transfer of the administration of these districts to the Armenian 
Government would not restore the previous situation, but would create a new one.971 
 
The Azerbaijani protest went unheeded. Armenian jurisdiction over Nakhchyvan was declared 
publicly on 3 May 1919.972 However, at the end of June, reports started coming in about the 
strained relations between the Armenians and the Muslims. On 18-20 July a Muslim uprising 
started in Nakhchyvan: unable to cope with the situation, the Armenians fled the town during 
the night of 25 July.973  
 
The document on the situation in Nakhchyvan which the acting British High Commissioner 
forwarded to Earl Curzon on 11 August 1919 characterised Armenian rule in Nakhchyvan as 
tactless. According to this document, instead of obtaining the cooperation of the existing 
Tartar administrative bodies, which had worked under the British governor, the Armenian 
governor immediately dismissed the local councils and abolished the Tartar administrative 
arrangements. Moreover, attempts to disarm the Muslim population, especially the country 
folk, many of whom were stock owners who needed the arms to protect their property, was 
another main concern, which brought bloodshed and compelled the British authorities to 
advise the Armenian Government to repeal this order. The acting British High Commissioner 
summarised that the situation therefore could not be called satisfactory, although the British 
military representatives prevented the Armenian authorities from pursuing a policy of open 
aggression against the Tartars. He warned that this state of determined opposition to the 
Armenians on the part of the majority of the population would come to a head.974 In early 
August, the Tartars declared Nakhchyvan as an integral part of the Azerbaijan Republic.975  
 
                                                 
971Imranli K, op cit., pp 117-118; the source cited by Imranli K: ARDA, fn 2898, l 1, fl 6, pp 41-41op; Note: 
Muslim notables of Nakhchyvan in their interview with Percy Cox, British Minister in Tehran, on 11 May 1919 
begged to lay their case before the British Government. They said that ‘when the British first came to 
Nakhchyvan they promised that until the fate of Caucasus had been decided at the Paris Peace Conference, they 
would be left to govern themselves but that now the Armenian Government had published notice saying that 
with approval of British military authorities they were taking over the country as far as Julfa and would shortly 
be in Nakhchyvan’. They complained that the British Government had no idea ‘how impossible it was for them 
to live with and be governed by Armenians, whom they outnumbered by at least 4 to 1’ (FO 608/11, p 155).   
972 Hovannisian R,  op cit., p 243 
973 FO 608/78, p 287  
974 FO 371/3670, pp 539-540 
975 Imranli K, op cit., p 120; the source cited by Imranli K: ARSPIHDA, fn1, l 1, fl 132, pp 1-1op 
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Meanwhile, on 5 July 1919, the Supreme Council appointed an American Colonel, William 
Haskell, as Allied High Commissioner in Armenia on behalf of the US, British, French and 
Italian Governments to take charge of all measures in Armenia by the various relief 
organisations.976 According to the telegram from the British Secretary of State to the Civil 
Commissioner in Baghdad of 17 July, the area covered by Haskell’s Commission was 
‘intentionally not defined, but may for working purposes be regarded as comprising area in 
Caucasus now under control of Armenian Government at Erivan, plus six vilayets in 
Turkey’.977 It is impossible to understand from this which territories in the Caucasus were 
considered to be under the control of the Armenian Government. 
 
On 29 August 1919, during his meeting with the members of the Azerbaijani Government, 
Haskell stated that Nakhchyvan and Sharur-Daralayaz should be declared a neutral zone, 
whereas Zangazur and Mountainous Garabagh should remain part of Azerbaijan.978 On 1 
September 1919, Haskell forwarded to the Prime Minister of Armenia the conditions on 
which the neutral zone was to be established in Sharur-Daralayaz and Nakhchyvan uezds.979   
 
According to the Armenian Prime Minister Khatisian’s letter of 5 September 1919, the 
Armenian Government found it useful and agreed to the establishment not of a neutral zone, 
but an American Governor-Generalship.980 However, Khatisian found it impossible to include 
in this, according to the first point of the agreement of 29 August 1919, the Daralayaz part of 
Sharur-Daralayaz uezd. Presenting the former as a separate uezd and the latter as a former 
uezd, the letter argued that Daralayaz was already cut off from Sharur-Daralayaz uezd, which 
was ‘incontestably and quietly ruled by the Government of Armenia even during the 
occupation of Armenia by Turks’. The inclusion of Daralayaz in the zone, in the opinion of 
the Armenian Government, completely cut off Zangazur from Armenia, and by this act 
Zangazur was included in Azerbaijan. With these considerations, the Armenian side opposed 
Point 12, which stated that ‘the Azerbaijan Government agrees to facilitate in every way such 
relief measures as may be taken in Shusha and Gerusi [Zangazur – I.K.] districts by the Near 
                                                 
976 FO 608/80, pp 67-68 
977 FO 371/3671, p 253 
978 ARDA, fn 970, l 1, fl 144, annex 2; FO 371/3663, p 78 
979 FO 608/78, pp 638-641; ARDA, fn 894, l 10, fl 99, pp 10-12; Note: The English text of the project consisted 
of twenty one points, whereas the Russian text had twenty points, since Points 15 and 16 in the English text were 
under Point 15 in the Russian text. The discussion on the issue is based on the English text.  
980 FO 608/78, p 643 
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East Relief’, finding such a decision, even temporary, impossible.981 The Armenian 
Government also opposed Point 3 of the agreement, which stated that the ‘local Government 
shall be Tatar except in localities where the Armenian population predominates’. It found it 
necessary ‘to add’ that ‘in the Central Council attached to the Governor, Tatar and Armenians 
participate proportionately to their number in the whole Governorship’.982  
 
Khatisian was also against Point 15, according to which the railway under construction from 
Baku to Julfa should have been under the exclusive control of Azerbaijan and its construction 
should not have been interfered with; the frontier between the neutral zone and Armenia along 
the railway should have been at the place called ‘Gurd gapysy’ (Wolf’s Gap) on the border of 
Sharur-Daralayaz and Erevan uezds. According to the Armenian Government, ‘the railway 
must be built by the Government of Azerbaijan in the limits of Azerbaijan and by the 
Government of Armenia in the limits of Armenia or on the principle of special agreement 
between the two Governments’.983 The Armenian premier also objected to Point 17 on the 
supply by the Azerbaijani Government of money for the expenses of the administration of the 
zone, saying that Points 15 and 17 would give the Azerbaijani Government privileged 
conditions in comparison with the Armenian Government, and that ‘the Government of 
Azerbaijan must have no relation with the American Governor-Generalship’.984 
 
The Armenian Government argued that ‘if one of the two Governments must be in privileged 
position in relation to the zone, then of course it must be the Armenian Government: first, 
according to the rights given to it by the British High Command; second, by the reason of 
immediate neighbourhood and third by the reason of vital and economic ties which bind this 
region with the Republic of Armenia and with Persia who is friendly to Armenia. It has still 
more right, because the Government of Azerbaijan partook in the organisation of the uprising 
in this region and violated by this its duties towards the Conference of Paris and towards the 
neighbouring Republic.’985  
 
                                                 
981 Ibid., pp 643-644, 640 
982 Ibid., p 645 
983 Ibid., pp 643, 645  
984 Ibid., pp 643-644 
985 Ibid., p 643 
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Although the Armenian Government mentioned that Persia was friendly to it, the position of 
Persia on the Nakhchyvan issue was unequivocal: it also made claims to Nakhchyvan and had 
protested against the British decision to hand the region over to Armenia in May 1919.986 As 
for the participation of the Azerbaijani Government in the uprising of the Nakhchyvan 
Azerbaijanis, Azerbaijan supported the revolt with its organisation, i.e. giving military advice 
and material support to the local Muslim population. The difference between the Azerbaijani 
opposition to the Armenian rule in Nakhchyvan and the Armenian opposition to the 
Azerbaijani rule in Garabagh is that in the former case it involved the local Muslim 
population, which was hostile towards the Armenians and their rule, whereas in the latter case 
the opposition was instigated and directed by the Armenian Republic and the Ottoman 
Armenians. The evidence is that the situation in Mountainous Garabagh could be stabilised 
after the departure of Andranik and his men. The agreement was signed between the 
Azerbaijan Government and the Mountainous Garabagh Armenians in August 1919, 
recognising the Azerbaijani jurisdiction in Mountainous Garabagh, despite the continuing 
protest and strong opposition of the Armenian Government. Although British support was 
important in the signing of this agreement, the same British support to Armenia in the 
Nakhchyvan case could not subdue the Nakhchyvan Azerbaijanis to Armenian rule. Ovannes 
Kachaznuni, the first premier of the Armenian Republic, would mention in his memoirs that 
in Sharur and Nakhchyvan, the Armenians could not establish their rule even with arms.987 In 
the Nakhchyvan case, opposition was based on the local Muslim population, whereas in the 
Garabagh case, the opposition was alien, so it could not last long and brought about peace 
only with the removal of the source of instability, until it appeared again.  
 
The Armenian Government’s considerations were sent to the Azerbaijani Government for 
approval by Haskell. The Azerbaijani Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mammad Yusif Jafarov, in 
his letter to Haskell, noted his government’s concerns about the modification of the draft 
agreement with Azerbaijan, which necessitated a new exchange of views on the issue and the 
satisfaction of the Azerbaijani claims based on the right of people to self-determination. This 
met with a sharp reaction from Haskell, who warned that ‘no measures will be taken for the 
                                                 
986 FO 608/11, pp 154, 160 
987 Kachaznuni Ov, Dashnaktsutyun bol’she nechego delat’!, p 121 
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establishment of a neutral zone with Denikin or for the settlement of other issues unless a 
neutral zone consisting of Nakhchyvan and Sharur districts are established’.988  
 
The Azerbaijani Government’s 29 September reply to this warning was the same, repeating 
that it was not against the ‘establishment of a special General-Governorship in Sharur-
Daralayaz and Nakhchyvan uezds of the Erevan guberniya’, but some points of the proposed 
conditions caused objections.989 Haskell’s reaction to this telegram on 1 October was again 
very tough, noting that the ‘Peace Conference does not recognise the rights of Azerbaijan to 
dictate conditions for the administration of the zone of American governorship […] This zone 
will be created and will consist of Sharur and Nakhchyvan uezds’. Haskell added that he was 
leaving for Paris soon, where he was going to present Azerbaijani claims to the full 
possession of the disputed areas on the condition that the Azerbaijani Government supported 
this temporary agreement.990  
 
The Azerbaijani Minister of Foreign Affairs in his reply of 4 October noted that they did not 
oppose the High Commissioner’s project on the administration of the mentioned uezds, which 
constituted an inseparable part of the Azerbaijan Republic and hoped that the just claims of 
the Azerbaijani people would be supported by him before the Peace Conference in accordance 
with the principles declared by Wilson on the rights of peoples and in accordance with the de 
facto established will of the Azerbaijani people.991    
 
On 25 October 1919 a zone of Allied Governorship was created in Sharur and Nakhchyvan 
with Colonel Edmund Delli as governor-general.992 Before the declaration of the 
establishment of the Allied Governorship in the form of a neutral zone, Colonel James Rhea, 
Haskell’s deputy, who replaced Haskell after he left for Paris, visited Baku. During his visit 
he asked the Azerbaijani Government to send its representative to Nakhchyvan in order to 
demonstrate that the Azerbaijani Government agreed to the establishment of an American-
ruled neutral zone. The Azerbaijani Government refused on the grounds that it could not 
mislead the population and would not participate in the establishment of the order, which was 
                                                 
988 ARDA, fn 894, l 10, fl 99, p 8; ARDA, fn 970, l 1, fl 93, p 7 
989 ARDA, fn 970, l 1, fl 93, p 8 
990 Ibid., p 9 
991 ARDA, fn 894, l 10, fl 99, p 9 
992 Imranli K, op cit., p 131; the source cited by Imranli K: ARSPIHDA, fn 277, l 2, fl 57, p 392 
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not approved by the Azerbaijani Government and which did not correspond to the project 
worked out by them. This did not prevent Colonel Rhea from returning to Nakhchyvan alone 
and declaring the establishment of the neutral zone on the basis of the Armenian 
considerations until the settlement of the claims to the area by Armenia and Azerbaijan at the 
Paris Peace Conference. Despite Azerbaijani disapproval of the project points, the declaration 
stated that the zone was created with the ‘agreement and support’ of both the Azerbaijani and 
Armenian Governments. However, Colonel Rhea had to leave his representative, not a 
governor-general, in the area, whom the population refused to accept.993 Galust Galoian wrote 
that Haskell had to abandon the neutral zone in January 1920, as he did not have sufficient 
troops to keep the governorship and suppress the resistance of the local population.994  
 
Thus, neither the British Military Governorship, the British-arranged Armenian rule nor the 
American-ruled neutral zone could last long. None of the arrangements could settle the 
problem and the Muslim population overthrew the imposed orders. Until the Bolshevik 
seizure of power in Baku on 28 April 1920, the Allies did not apply any other form of 
administration to the Nakhchyvan region.  
 
Nakhchyvan, the Soviets and Kemalist Turkey   
 
According to the 24 June 1920 telegram from Sardar Bunyatzada, plenipotentiary of the 
Eleventh Red Army of Bolshevik Russia, to Nariman Narimanov, head of the Azerbaijani 
Bolshevik Government, Soviet rule was established in Nakhchyvan, which joined the Soviet 
Azerbaijan.995 Five days earlier, Sergo Orjonikidze, head of the Caucasian Bureau of the 
Central Committee of the Russian Communist (Bolshevik) Party, in his letter to Georgiy 
Chicherin, People’s Foreign Affairs Commissioner of the RSFSR, had already written that 
Azerbaijan made claims to Nakhchyvan and Sharur-Daralayaz and that the former was in the 
hands of Muslim rebels, but he had no information about the situation in Sharur-Daralayaz.996 
However, on 15 July 1920, the session of the Bureau of the Central Committee of the 
                                                 
993 Imranli K, op cit., pp 132-131; the source cited by Imranli K: ARDA, fn 970, l 1 , fl 144 , p 430; FO 371/3664, 
p 467 
994 Imranli K, op cit., p 133 
995 K istorii obrazovaniya Nagorno-Karabakhskoy Avtonomnoy Oblasti Azerbaydzhanskoy SSR (1918-1925). 
Dokumenty i materialy, p 51 
996 Imranli K, op cit., p 140; the source cited by Imranli K: ARSPIHDA, fn  609, l 1, fl 21, p 100 
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Azerbaijani Communist (Bolshevik) Party decided to give up their claims to Nakhchyvan and 
Sharur-Daralayaz and propose their occupation by Russian forces.997  
 
The Azerbaijani communists changed position in response to Orjonikidze, who, under 
pressure from Chicherin and the Armenians, compelled Azerbaijan to give up its claims to 
Nakhchyvan and Sharur-Daralayaz in return for Mountainous Garabagh and Zangazur.998 
These proposals had earlier met with a sharp reply from Narimanov, declaring that 
Nakhchyvan was entirely populated by Muslims, and had got rid of and defended itself 
against the Dashnak Government.999  
 
According to the agreement between Soviet Russia and the Armenian Republic of 10 August 
1920, military operations between RSFSR and the Republic of Armenia were declared to be 
stopped. Under the same agreement, the northern part of Nakhchyvan uezd and the whole of 
Sharur-Daralayaz uezd came under Armenian control. The rest of Nakhchyvan uezd, 
alongside with Mountainous Garabagh and Zangazur, was declared disputed.1000  
 
The same day, Alibay Bektashi, head of the Revolutionary Committee of Nakhchyvan uezd, 
in his letter to Narimanov, wrote that with the decision of the absolute majority of the 
population of Nakhchyvan, it was recognised as an inseparable part of the Azerbaijan SSR.1001    
 
On 10 August, as mentioned in Chapter 7, Dashnak Armenia signed the Sevres Treaty 
between Turkey and the Allied Powers, according to which Turkey recognised Armenia as an 
independent country and both agreed to the arbitration of their borders by the US President, 
Wilson. The borders between Armenia and Azerbaijan would be determined by direct 
agreement between the two countries. If they failed to determine the border by agreement by 
                                                 
997 K istorii obrazovaniya Nagorno-Karabakhskoy Avtonomnoy Oblasti Azerbaydzhanskoy SSR (1918-1925). 
Dokumenty i materialy, p 57; ARSPIHDA, fn 1, l 1, fl 18, p 13op 
998 K istorii obrazovaniya Nagorno-Karabakhskoy Avtonomnoy Oblasti Azerbaydzhanskoy SSR (1918-1925). 
Dokumenty i materialy, pp 32-34 
999 Ibid., p 35; ARSPIHDA, fn 609, l 1, fl 21, p 122 
1000 Velikaya Oktyabr’skaya sotsialisticheskaya revolyutsiya i pobeda sovetskoy vlasti v Armenii (Sbornik 
dokumentov), dok 270, pp 384-385  
1001 Imranli K, op cit., p 120; the source cited by Imranli K: ARSPIHDA, fn  609,  l 1, fl 69, p 27 
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the date of the decision on the Turkish-Armenian borders, the border line would be 
determined by the Allied Powers.1002  
 
However, as also mentioned in Chapter 7, on 26 November 1920, Armenia issued a 
declaration rejecting the Sevres Treaty as a Turkish prerequisite for the start of peace 
negotiations, which were concluded with the signing of the Gumru (Alexandropol) Treaty on 
2 December 1920. Under this treaty, Dashnak Armenia declared the Sevres Treaty annulled 
and gave up its claims to Nakhchyvan and Sharur, which, apart from Nakhchyvan uezd and 
the Sharur part of Sharur-Daralayaz uezd, included the south of Erevan uezd. Armenia would 
not interfere in the administration of these areas, which was to be decided by means of 
plebiscite and temporarily placed under the protection of Turkey.1003  
 
Meanwhile, after the rejection of the Sevres Treaty by Dashnak Armenia, Soviet rule was 
declared in Armenia on 29 November 1920.1004 The Bolsheviks entered Armenia ‘without any 
resistance’,1005 owing to the military failure of the Armenians and their desire to draw the 
Soviet Russia into a war with Turkey.1006 The next day, the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of Azerbaijan adopted a decision on the transfer of Nakhchyvan, together 
with Zangazur, to Soviet Armenia.1007 On 1 December, Nariman Narimanov, Head of the 
Azerbaijani Revolutionary Committee, made a declaration on the establishment of Soviet rule 
in Armenia, stating the above-mentioned transfer of Nakhchyvan to Armenia,1008 and on 2 
December, in the agreement between RSFSR and the Armenian Republic, which declared 
Armenia an ‘independent socialist republic’, Russia recognised, among others, Erevan 
guberniya as undisputed part of the Armenian SSR.1009  
                                                 
1002 Application by the Armenian Republic for Admission to the League. Memorandum by the Secretary–General, 
League of Nations. Assembly Document №56, pp 5-6 
1003Imranli K, op cit., pp 145-146; the source cited by Imranli K: Velikaya Oktyabr’skaya sotsialisticheskaya 
revolyutsiya i pobeda sovetskoy vlasti v Armenii (Sbornik dokumentov), dok 294, pp 438-439; Türkiye 
Cumhuriyeti’nin anlaşmaları, cilt 1, pp 3-4 
1004Imranli K, op cit., p 147; the source cited by Imranli K: Velikaya Oktyabr’skaya sotsialisticheskaya 
revolyutsiya i pobeda sovetskoy vlasti v Armenii (Sbornik dokumentov), dok 291, p 433 
1005 Imranli K, op cit., p 147 
1006 Ibid., p 156 
1007 Ibid., p 147; the source cited by Imranli K: ARSPIHDA, fn 1, l 1, fl 24, p 54op 
1008 Imranli K, op cit., pp 147-148; the source cited by Imranli K: Newspaper Kommunist (Baku), 2 December 
1920, p 1 
1009 Imranli K, op cit., p 148; the source cited by Imranli K: Mezhdunarodnaya politika noveyshego vremeni v 
dogovorakh, notakh i deklaratsiyakh. Chast’ III (Ot snyatiya blokady s Sovetskoy Rossii do desyatiletiya 
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The inclusion of Nakhchyvan and Zangazur in Armenia was in line with Stalin’s policy, 
declared on 9 November 1920 at a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee 
of the Azerbaijani Communist (Bolshevik) Party. According to his view, transfer of 
Nakhchyvan and Zangazur to Armenia would be possible only if Soviet rule was established 
there.1010 Although Soviet rule in Armenia was established to annul the Gumru Treaty, on 25 
December 1920, Turkey rejected its re-consideration.1011 It can be suggested that it was the 
tough position of Kemalist Turkey on the rejection of the annulment of the Gumru Treaty that 
compelled the Revolutionary Committee of Armenia to issue a declaration on 26 December 
1920 on Nakhchyvan, stating that Soviet Armenia ‘sees its power in the clearly expressed will 
of the [Nakhchyvan] population itself’ and believing that the working masses of Nakhchyvan 
could give their organised opinion on desirable relations with Soviet Armenia.1012 The 
declaration was followed by another declaration issued on 28 December, in which Armenia 
recognised Nakhchyvan as an independent republic and gave up territorial claims to 
Nakhchyvan.1013 Based on the archival document from the Nakhchyvan Autonomous 
Republic, Ismayil Musayev wrote that in early 1921, representatives of RSFSR, the 
Azerbaijan SSR and the Armenian SSR held a poll in Nakhchyvan on the opinion of the 
region’s population on the above-mentioned declarations of the Azerbaijan and Armenian 
Revolutionary Committees on Nakhchyvan. Ninety per cent of the population of Nakhchyvan 
voted for the region to be granted autonomy within Azerbaijan.1014 Behbud Shahtakhtinski 
was appointed a Commissar of Nakhchyvan by the decision of the Revolutionary-Military 
Council of the Organisational and Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the 
Azerbaijani Communist (Bolshevik) Party on 12 January 1921.1015 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Oktyabr’skoy Revolyutsii). Vyp 1 (Akty Sovetskoy diplomatii), dok 41, pp 75-76; Velikaya Oktyabr’skaya 
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1010 Imranli K, op cit., p 150; the source cited by Imranli K: ARSPIHDA, fn 1, l 1, fl 14, p 19  
1011 Imranli K, op cit., p 151; the source cited by Imranli K: Dokumenty vneshney politiki SSSR, tom 4, Moscow: 
Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo politicheskoy literatury, 1960, p 711 
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p 17  
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None of the Allied Powers or the Supreme Council had considered a plebiscite as a means of 
settling the problem of Nakhchyvan. The same was true of the Soviets, who compelled 
Narimanov to apply the right of self-determination to the Garabagh Armenians, on the basis 
of which Mountainous Garabagh was declared an autonomous oblast within Azerbaijan, but 
they did not consider a plebiscite as a way of solving the border problem over Nakhchyvan, 
and, like the British, included Nakhchyvan in Armenia. Only Turkey included this right of the 
Nakhchyvan population in the Gumru Treaty.    
 
The failure of Armenian expectations that Soviet rule would lead to an expansion of the 
Armenian territories was instrumental in the Dashnak takeover in Erevan on 18 February 
1921.  
 
On 26 February 1921, a conference started with the participation of Soviet Russia and 
Kemalist Turkey in Moscow. The Turks opposed the participation of Azerbaijan in the 
conference on the grounds that Turkey and Azerbaijan did not have any disputed issue and a 
treaty with Azerbaijan would be signed separately. The Turks were against the participation 
of Armenia as well, since they considered the Gumru Treaty in force and did not want to give 
it up.1016 During the consideration of Turkish borders with Armenia at the Political 
Commission session on 10 March 1921, the Turkish delegation stated that it was ready to 
transfer the protection of Nakhchyvan to Azerbaijan ‘on the condition that Azerbaijan would 
give a guarantee that it would not concede it to a third state’.1017 The Russian delegation 
proposed the formula that ‘Nakhchyvan province would be permanently connected to 
Azerbaijan and would enjoy autonomy under Azerbaijan’s protectorate’. At the request of the 
Turkish side, the formula was edited to read ‘on condition that Azerbaijan would not concede 
this protectorate to a third state’.1018     
 
The Russian-Turkish Conference finished with the signing of the Moscow Treaty between  
Soviet Russia and Turkey on 16 March 1921, which stipulated that Nakhchyvan would have 
autonomy under the Azerbaijani protectorate on condition that Azerbaijan would not concede 
                                                 
1016 ARSPIHDA, fn 609, l 1, fl 94, p 2 
1017 Ibid., p 45 
1018 Ibid. 
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this protectorate to a third state. The area of Nakhchyvan corresponded exactly to the area 
claimed in the Gumru Treaty for the autonomy of Nakhchyvan.1019 
 
The status of Nakhchyvan was also reflected in the Kars Treaty of 13 October 1921 signed by 
Russia, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia. According to Article 5 of the treaty, the 
governments of Turkey, Soviet Azerbaijan and Armenia agreed that the Nakhchyvan province 
was an autonomous territory under the ‘patronage’ of Azerbaijan.1020 Thus, the ‘protectorate 
of Azerbaijan’ of the Moscow Treaty was turned into ‘patronage of Azerbaijan’ in the Kars 
Treaty, without the condition that it could not be conceded to a third state. Moreover, the area 
of the autonomy was decreased in comparison with that in the Moscow Treaty. The area 
between Ararat Mountain, Saraybulag Mountain and Arazdayan station, allocated to 
Nakhchyvan in the Moscow Treaty, was conceded to Armenia in the Kars Treaty. The aim of 
this rectification was to shorten the length of the border between Turkey and Azerbaijan, as 
efforts to cut it off completely, by Russia in the Moscow negotiations and Armenia in general, 
failed. On 9 February 1924, the Nakhchyvan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was 
established in Azerbaijan SSR (see Map 15), which until then was an autonomous krai within 
Azerbaijan. 
 
Later during Soviet rule, the area of Nakhchyvan ASSR was further decreased in favour of 
Armenia as, in comparison with 5,979 km2 in 1924, Nakhchyvan ASSR had an area of 5,500 
km2 in 1989, a decrease of 479 km2. By contrast, an area of Mountainous Garabagh increased 




The origins of the modern nationalist Armenian claims to the Nakhchyvan region were laid 
down in 1828 by Russia, and adopted and adapted by Armenian nationalists and politicians in 
the early twentieth century during the zemstvo conferences. The territorial-administrative 
readjustment project of the Provisional Government with the aim of constructing ethnic 
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279 
Armenian units in the western half of the South Caucasus could not be realised because of 
Muslim and Georgian opposition. The Armenian-favoured readjustment project could not be 
adopted during the de facto Transcaucasian government rule either and the borders of 
Nakhchyvan and Sharur-Daralayaz uezds were left unchanged until the declaration of the 
Azerbaijan and Armenian Republics.   
 
During Ottoman control of the region between the Batumi treaties and Mudros Armistice, 
Armenia did not make active claims to the Nakhchyvan region, most of which had been left to 
the Ottoman Empire under the Batumi treaties, with the rest claimed by Armenia and 
Azerbaijan. After the Mudros Armistice, Armenia started making active claims to the region, 
presenting ethnic, historical, economic, geographical and security arguments to substantiate 
its claims at the Paris Peace Conference using distorted and misleading information. All of 
these arguments lacked strong substantiation, were politically constructed and unconvincing.  
According to Wilsonian principles, the Nakhchyvan problem, as a province with an 
Azerbaijani majority on the Armenian border, should have been settled on the basis of ethnic 
principles through a plebiscite. Neither Britain nor the US, as Allied Powers, nor the Soviets 
wanted to apply this right to Nakhchyvan, which Britain and the Soviets preferred to be 
included in Armenia. The decision was opposed by both the Azerbaijan Republic and the 
Nakhchyvan population, who protested against Armenian rule and declared the region to be 
part of the Azerbaijan Republic. Despite this clearly expressed will of the Nakhchyvan 
population, the region was not included in Azerbaijan by the Allied Powers and Soviets, 
contrary to their declarations on the rights of people to self-determination.  
 
Kemalist Turkey, unlike other states, gave this right to the Nakhchyvan population in the 
Gumru Treaty. It can be argued that it was this treaty and Turkish insistence that brought 
about the declaration of the Armenian Revolutionary Committee on the future fate of 
Nakhchyvan, and it was on the basis of this declaration that the poll of the Nakhchyvan 
population was held, leading to the Moscow and Kars Treaties on the autonomous status of 







This thesis studied the process leading to the construction of the first Armenian Republic in 
1918 and its territorial conflicts with Azerbaijan in 1918-1921. It also examined the main 
theoretical issues around nations, nationalism, state-building and territorial delimitation. The 
thesis resulted in empirical and theoretical findings.   
 
The thesis’s findings showed that the Armenian nationalist movement was initiated in the 
Armenian diaspora communities. Examination of the origins of the Armenian nationalist 
movement in the Ottoman Empire revealed that it was facilitated by the gradual decline of the 
Empire; the success of the nationalist movements in the Balkans; the national ‘awakening’ of 
the Armenians; the Russian success in the 1877-1878 Ottoman-Russian war; and the Berlin 
Treaty of July 1878. These factors were instrumental in raising Armenian confidence in their 
control of their own destiny, to be expressed through establishing Armenian autonomy in 
Eastern Anatolia. The Berlin Treaty did not bring about the realisation of the Armenian 
project, which failed because of the scattered Armenian minority distribution over the 
projected area, the clash of interests of the Berlin Treaty powers-signatories and related 
absence of Great Power sponsorship.  
     
The notion of the ‘Armenian homeland’ was reconstructed in the early twentieth century by 
Dashnaktsutiun, the major Armenian political and nationalist party, which included the 
construction of ethnic Armenian units in the South Caucasus in its second programme in 
1907. This derived from the work on Armenian history of Mik’ayel Ch’amch’yants’ (1738-
1823), an Armenian Catholic monk, at the end of the eighteenth century. He constructed an 
Armenian national territory in the area from the Mediterranean to the juncture of the Kur and 
Araz Rivers. Another factor in the notion’s reconstruction was the mass settlement of 
Armenians from Persia and the Ottoman Empire in the Russian Empire (South Caucasus) in 
the 19th-early 20th centuries. This led to the emergence of compact Armenian masses in parts 
of the South Caucasus and became instrumental in the inclusion of the area of Erevan 
guberniya, the western half of Elizavetpol guberniya and southern parts of Tiflis guberniya in 
the reconstructed ‘Armenian homeland’. An additional factor was the liquidation of the 
Albanian Catholicosate in the early nineteenth century and the subordination of its dioceses to 
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the Armenian Echmiadzin Catholicosate, which turned the monophysite Albanians into 
adherents of the Armenian church. Under the Armenian nationalist movement, Armenian 
church identity became synonymous with Armenian ethnic identity and played an important 
role in the inclusion of the larger western part of Elizavetpol guberniya in the notion of the 
reconstructed ‘Armenian homeland’.  
 
The Armenian nationalists considered the First World War to be conducive for the realisation 
of their project, for the purpose of which they sided with the Allied Powers, including Russia, 
against the Ottoman Empire. The 1915 Armenian revolts in Eastern Anatolia, which created 
anarchy on the Ottoman-Russian front, ensured the advancement of the Russian army, 
together with Armenian volunteer units, and the occupation of a great portion of the Ottoman 
territories by Russia. The Ottoman Government regarded the behaviour of the Ottoman 
Armenians as treachery, resulting in a strong Ottoman counter-reaction, including relocation 
of the Armenians outside Eastern Anatolia in the period between the retreat of the Russian 
troops and their re-occupation of the area in summer 1915. The relocation resulted in the 
killing of a great number of Armenians, as well as their deaths and other sufferings from 
starvation, illness and weather conditions. The number of Armenians who died as a result of 
the relocation is a very controversial topic, the figures varying between 300,000 and more 
than 1,000,000. The territories on which the Armenian nationalists had been striving to 
construct an ‘Armenian homeland’ since the Berlin Treaty were divided between Russia and 
France in April 1916. Thus, the events of 1915 and the lack of Great Power support led to 
another failure of ‘Armenian homeland’ construction in the Ottoman Empire in 1914-1916.    
 
The overthrow of the Tsarist regime in February 1917 gave new hopes for the realisation of 
the project in Eastern Anatolia, with the Provisional Government’s ‘Act on the arrangement 
of administration in the Russian-occupied parts of Turkish Armenia’. The act, which by 
‘Russian-occupied parts of Turkish Armenia’ meant Erzurum, Van and Bitlis provinces, 
envisaged the adoption of measures for the gradual return to the area of the Armenian 
refugees of the First World War and previous wars. The Provisional Government’s 
administrative-territorial readjustment project on the construction of ethnic Armenian units in 
the western half of the South Caucasus was another source of hope. The realisation of both 
projects would have facilitated the construction of an ‘Armenian homeland’ in the area 
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extending from Van to Garabagh. Although the Provisional Government was overthrown in 
October 1917, the Armenian project in Eastern Anatolia was given new hope with the coming 
of the Soviets, but this also faded away with the Brest-Litovsk Treaty of March 1918, which 
returned Eastern Anatolia to the Ottoman Empire. The de facto Transcaucasian government, 
which was established in the South Caucasus after the October Revolution and did not 
recognise the Bolshevik regime, protested against this treaty and entered into direct peace 
negotiations with the Ottoman Empire on the initiative of the latter. However, the insistence 
of the latter and the refusal of the former to accept the Brest-Litovsk Treaty led to the 
Ottoman-Transcaucasian war in April 1918 and resulted in the failure of Transcaucasia. The 
war was fought on the Transcaucasian side by the Armenians and Georgians, who had 
replaced the Russian troops on the Ottoman-Russian front in the late 1917. Transcaucasia had 
to give up its claims for Armenian autonomy in Eastern Anatolia within the Ottoman Empire 
and declare its independence from Russia in the form of the Transcaucasian Democratic 
Federative Republic in April 1918.  
 
Further territorial demands on the part of the Ottoman Empire, combined with the Soviet 
danger and internal disagreements within the Transcaucasian Republic, led to its dissolution 
and the declarations of independence of Georgia, then Azerbaijan. Armenia was left with no 
alternative but to declare independence and sign the Batumi Peace Treaty with the Ottoman 
Empire in June 1918. Ottoman government officials did not oppose the establishment of the 
Armenian Republic, provided it did not turn into a British and Russian tool against the 
Ottoman Empire and did not make claims on Ottoman territories. Despite mutual Ottoman-
Armenian hatred and Armenian dissatisfaction with the Batumi Treaty, the Ottoman 
Government was the first to recognise Armenia as an independent state. It was not recognised 
by Soviet Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary or Bulgaria. It was with the help of the Ottoman 
Government that the Armenian delegation in Istanbul strove to expand the Armenian 
Republic in the South Caucasus.  
 
Although the Brest-Litovsk and Batumi Treaties deprived the Armenians of claims to Eastern 
Anatolia, the Mudros Armistice and Sevres Treaty gave new hopes for the extension of the 
Armenian Republic into Eastern Anatolia. Armenia was recognised as an independent state by 
Turkey under the Sevres Treaty of August 1920, and the US President defined the borders 
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between the two countries, giving Armenia four Eastern Anatolian provinces with access to 
the Black Sea in November 1920. But Kemalist Turkey, defeating the Armenians in the South 
Caucasus, compelled the Armenian Republic to give up the Sevres Treaty. Owing to the 
absence of Great Power will to support the Armenian project and the US Senate’s refusal of 
the Mandate for Armenia, the Armenians declared it annulled under the Gumru Treaty of 
December 1920 with the Kemalists. The Sevres Treaty was not ratified and was replaced by 
the Lausanne Treaty in July 1923, which made no mention of Armenia. This meant the failure 
of the extension of the area of the Armenian Republic into Eastern Anatolia.   
 
The thesis made a detailed examination of the Armenian territorial claims to Garabagh and 
Nakhchyvan. It was argued that the Armenian claims to Garabagh were articulated by the 
Provisional Government’s project to construct compact Armenian units in Elizavetpol 
guberniya, which could not be realised because of Muslim opposition. The latter saw the 
project as an intention to replace Muslim-dominated uezds in the border between Elizavetpol 
and Erevan guberniyas with Armenian-dominated ones. Javanshir, Shusha, Jabrayil 
(Garyagin) and Zangazur uezds, which constituted Garabagh in Elizavetpol guberniya, did not 
undergo administrative-territorial redrawing, and their borders were left unchanged until the 
declaration of the Armenian and Azerbaijan republics in 1918.  
 
‘Mountainous Garabagh’ was a politically constructed notion, the aim of which was to 
separate the areas populated by Armenians from Muslim-dominated Garabagh in order to 
construct predominantly Armenian units. Mountainous Garabagh could not be included in 
Armenia because of both its geographical location, isolated from compact Armenian areas in 
the northern part of Erevan guberniya, and failure to get Ottoman, British and Bolshevik 
Russian support. The Ottoman Empire considered Garabagh to be part of the Azerbaijan 
Republic. Britain also recognised Garabagh as part of Azerbaijan. In order to Sovietise 
Armenia, the Bolsheviks decided to partially satisfy the Armenian demands, granting 
territorial autonomy to the Armenian-populated areas of mountainous Garabagh within the 
Azerbaijan SSR in July 1921 and thus becoming instrumental in the construction of the 
Mountainous Garabagh Autonomous Oblast in July 1923. The inclusion of the western, 
larger, part of the Zangazur uezd of Garabagh in Armenia in 1921 was also connected with the 
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Bolshevik aim of Sovietising Armenia, which might fail without the partial satisfaction of the 
demands of the Dashnak rebels in Zangazur.  
 
The modern Armenian political claims to the Nakhchyvan region were laid down in 1828 by 
Russia, which constructed an Armenian oblast in the territories of the occupied Nakhchyvan 
and Iravan (Erevan) khanates, and were activated during the zemstvo conferences in 1917. 
Despite the Provisional Government’s territorial-administrative readjustment project with the 
aim of constructing ethnic Armenian units in the western half of the South Caucasus, the 
project could not be realised because of the opposition of the Muslims and Georgians, and the 
borders of Nakhchyvan and Sharur-Daralayaz uezds were left unchanged until the declaration 
of the Azerbaijan and Armenian republics.  
 
Under the Batumi treaties of June 1918, two thirds of Nakhchyvan uezd and the Sharur part of 
Sharur-Daralayaz uezd were left to the Ottoman Empire and the rest was claimed by Armenia 
and Azerbaijan. After the Mudros Armistice of October 1918 and Ottoman withdrawal from 
the region, Armenia, emboldened by the British control of the region, started making active 
claims to the entire area of both uezds. Britain supported the Armenian claim to the region and 
handed it over to Armenia, whereas the US tried to realise a neutral zone project. Bolshevik 
Russia also intended to include the region in Armenia. These decisions were opposed by both 
the Azerbaijan Republic and the Nakhchyvan population, who revolted against the Armenian 
rule designed by Britain, the neutral zone projected by America and the inclusion of 
Nakhchyvan in Soviet Armenia intended by Russia, and declared the region part of 
Azerbaijan. Kemalist Turkey gave the right to self-determination to the Nakhchyvan 
population in the Gumru Treaty of December 1920 between the Armenian Republic and 
Kemalist Turkey. This treaty and Turkish insistence led to a poll among the Nakhchyvan 
population, the results of which defined the autonomous status of the region within 
Azerbaijan in the Moscow and Kars Treaties of March and October 1921 respectively.  
 
The thesis’s empirical findings were conceptualised through the prism of primordialist, 
modernist and ethno-symbolist theories. It looked into the issues of nations, nationalism and 
state-building and the delimitation of the borders of newly emerged states. The primordialist 
theory about the existence of nations from time immemorial and about direct links between 
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peoples of the past and the present times, modernist theory defining nations as a construct 
following the emergence of states, and ethno-symbolist theory containing elements of both 
primordialist and modernist views with emphasis on the role of ethnic and/or ethno-religious 
communities in the formation of nations were explored and applied to the Armenian case. The 
typology of nationalism offered by the ‘modernist’ Ernest Gellner and ‘ethno-symbolists’ 
Anthony Smith and Miroslav Hroch were also examined. Ethnic, historical, economic, 
geographical and security arguments of the Armenian Republic in support of its claims on 
Garabagh and Nakhchyvan were analysed in detail. The positions of external powers were 
explored in order to assess their role in the delimitation of the Armenian-Azerbaijan borders 
and thus in the practical implementation of the above-mentioned principles.  
 
By applying the diaspora nationalism concept put forward by Gellner and Smith and ‘long-
distance nationalism’ proposed by Benedict Anderson, it was concluded that Armenian 
nationalism had its origins in diaspora nationalism. Exploring the whole process of the 
Armenian national movement and applying Hroch’s A, B and C phases of national 
movements, it was argued that, although Armenian nationalism had features of the three 
phases, they did not occur in Hroch’s chronological order. Elements peculiar to Phase A could 
be found in the eighteenth and second half of the nineteenth century. Moreover, features of 
Phases A, B and C could take place simultaneously, or Phase C could take place in one 
diaspora community earlier than Phases A and B in other diaspora communities. For that 
reason, it was argued that the Hroch approach is only partially applicable to the Armenian 
case.  
 
It was argued that Mik’ayel’ Ch’amch’yants’ was the founder of Phase A, disseminating an 
‘Armenian awareness’ of ‘Armenian history’, and constructing ‘golden ages’ of ‘his’ people 
with ‘national territory’ from the Mediterranean to the juncture of the Kur and Araz Rivers. 
He laid the basis of the subsequent construction of the Armenian ethnic identity. The case of 
the Armenian nationalists proved Smith’s approach that nationalists enquired into their 
history, not for its own sake, but for the reappropriation of a mythology of the territorialised 
past of ‘their people’; where history was deficient for the pursuit for their aims, they 
reconstructed and even invented it. The case of Ch’amch’yants’ showed how nationalists 
politicised cultural heritage through the cultivation of its poetic spaces and the 
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commemoration of its golden ages. The Armenian case also confirmed Anderson’s opinion on 
the role of maps in the construction of historical narratives of the realm by the colonial states 
and their adoption and adaptation by the nation-states. 
 
The views of many scholars on the formation of the Armenian people have been 
primordialist: they tend to argue that the Armenian people was formed more than two 
thousand years ago and a continuous historical narrative can be written about it, although an 
empirical study of the issue demonstrates that the Armenians of the second half of the first 
millennium BC were not the Armenians of the late nineteenth century. Other specialist, 
notably Ronald Suny, takes a modernist approach. Applying the modernist approach, it was 
argued that the construction of the Armenian state in 1918 did not make any change in the 
composition of the Armenian nation, since it did not include other peoples living in its area. 
Applying the ethno-symbolist approach, it was shown that the new Armenian identity was 
constructed in the nineteenth century through the mixing of the Armenians with the Caucasian 
Albanians, as well as through the dissemination of different visions of the Armenian ‘national 
homeland’. The construction of the new Armenian identity preceded the construction of the 
Armenian Republic in 1918, since it was due to the Armenian church in the nineteenth 
century, not the Armenian state in 1918, that the new Armenian identity could be constructed. 
Part of this Armenian ethno-religious community turned into the Armenian nation after the 
emergence of the Armenian Republic. Applying primordialist, modernist and ethno-symbolist 
approaches to the Azerbaijani and Georgian cases, it was argued that only the ethno-symbolist 
approach is useful in studying these cases. The reason was that not all citizens of these 
republics identified themselves with the respective nations, with only peoples of religious or 
ethnic kin identifying themselves as members of the Azerbaijani or Georgian nations.  
 
Comparing the Armenian and Azerbaijani cases by applying Hroch’s phases of national 
movements, it was shown that the Azerbaijanis were well behind the Armenians, being still in 
Phase A, when the Armenians had passed all three phases. The reason for the late national 
‘awakening’ of Azerbaijanis was considered to be Islam, which was a unifying factor rather 
than a separating one like nationalism, whereas the early national ‘awakening’ of Armenians 
was connected with the European-influenced Armenian diaspora. It was the last decades of 
the nineteenth century that the Armenian political parties made national-territorial autonomy 
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demands in the Ottoman Empire their immediate objective, adding the South Caucasus to the 
list in 1907. The realisation of the ‘Armenian homeland’ necessitated solving the land 
problem in Eastern Anatolia and the South Caucasus. The efforts made to solve this problem 
in the South Caucasus were stimulated by the February and October Revolutions in 1917 and 
were instrumental in the territorial ‘awakening’ of the Azerbaijanis and their demand for 
national-territorial autonomy. The latter might have been not made if not for the important 
national and political ‘awakening’ process that had been taking place since the end of the 
nineteenth century, especially in the early twentieth century. Unlike the Armenian case, 
Hroch’s phases of national movements for Central and Eastern European countries apply 
directly to the Azerbaijani case: all three phases occurred almost in chronological order, 
whereas Hroch’s typology of national movements for European countries is useful in studying 
both the Armenian and Azerbaijani cases: in the former, the national movement acquired a 
mass character under the old regime, which produced armed insurrections; and in the latter, 
national agitation also got under way under the old regime, but the transition to a mass 
movement was delayed after a constitutional revolution in Russia.   
 
Not all states are the products of nationalist movements, as seen with Liberia, and not all 
nationalist movements end in the emergence of states, as was the case with the Kurds. The 
success or failure of both cases depended on Great Power support, since it was US support 
which brought about the construction of Liberia and it was lack of Great Power support that 
meant that the Kurdish nationalist movement did not end in a Kurdish state. Without British 
support, Jews would not have been able to establish a homeland in Palestine in 1919, where 
they were a very small minority. Despite their dispersed minority distribution in Eastern 
Anatolia, Armenians were more numerous than Jews in their respective locations, but unlike 
Jews, the Armenian nationalist movement did not bring about the construction of autonomy in 
Eastern Anatolia until the First World War, since there was no Great Power sponsorship. 
Although wars and the collapse of empires are considered opportunities for the creation of 
national states, in the Armenian case this did not happen in Eastern Anatolia because of the 
events of 1915 and the absence of the US mandate. This means that the diaspora nationalism 
discussed by Gellner and Smith may not end in state construction in the ‘historical homeland’ 
if there is no Great Power support.  
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The acquisition of lands was considered the main problem for diaspora nationalism by 
Gellner, using the example of the Jews. In the Armenian case, the land problem started to be 
solved about a century before the declaration of the Armenian Republic, by possessing 
Muslim lands in the South Caucasus after 1828: in the early twentieth century this was no 
longer an issue, owing to the settlement of about one million Armenians in the region 
throughout the 19th-early 20th centuries. The declaration of the Armenian Republic in parts of 
these settlements showed that diaspora nationalism can also end in the declaration of state in 
areas where there is no historically contiguous mass presence of a people in a particular 
territory, if there is strong external power support. For that reason, the Armenian case could 
be viewed as a distinct case between the cases of Liberia, as a dispersed people who 
established their state without a nationalist movement, not in what could be constructed 
‘historical homeland’, and with US support, and Israel, as a diaspora nationalism whose 
nationalist movement, mostly outside their ‘homeland’, resulted in the construction of a state 
in what was viewed by the Jewish national movement as the ‘historical homeland’, with 
British support.  
 
Ethnic, historical, economic, geographical and security principles were applied to the 
Garabagh and Nakhchyvan cases while discussing the delimitation of the borders of the 
Armenian and Azerbaijani republics. The discussions revealed that the ethnic principle was 
the main principle supported by the Armenian Republic, since its aim was to include as much 
Armenian-populated territory as possible, leaving only a small Armenian minority outside its 
borders, and to build an Armenian ethno-nation, despite the fact that both Garabagh and 
Nakhchyvan were Muslim-dominated and distanced from the compact Armenian areas in 
Erevan, Echmiadzin and Alexandropol uezds. This once again showed the usefulness of the 
ethno-symbolist approach, demonstrating that the Armenian nationalism was ethnic 
nationalism. In order to strengthen its claims to Nakhchyvan and Garabagh, the elites of the 
Armenian Republic constructed a notion of the national ‘Armenian territory’ from time 
immemorial in both regions, based on arguments about the historical ethnic connection 
between the regions and the Armenian people and a long-term Armenian presence in the area. 
Thus, the Armenian case once again demonstrated the usefulness of the ethno-symbolist 
approach, since the Armenian Republic tried to substantiate its claims based on the 
constructed ethno-national historical narrative.  
289 
The Armenian Government made claims to Garabagh and Nakhchyvan, based on the 
economic needs of Armenia, although none of these regions were rich economically; the 
Armenians of Garabagh had earned money in the Baku oil fields, and the Eastern Anatolian 
part of the Araz valley had more fertile lands than its Nakhchyvan part. Apart from access to 
the Araz valley and Kars-Erevan railway in the South Caucasus, with the territories it claimed 
in Eastern Anatolia, the Armenian Republic had access to the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers and 
the Mediterranean and Black Seas. This suggests that Armenia could satisfy its economic 
needs without the Garabagh and Nakhchyvan regions. It could also establish a border with 
Persia through Eastern Anatolia and build future trade relations by extending the railway from 
Kars to Persia through this region. The analysis of the Armenian economic arguments 
demonstrated that Armenian claims to these regions were not, in fact, economic, but land-
related.  
 
The Armenian geographical argument aimed to construct historical geographical boundaries 
from the Mediterranean through Nakhchyvan in the Araz valley to the Lesser Caucasus 
Mountains in Garabagh, connecting this with a ‘pan-Turanism’ security argument regarding 
the Turks and Azerbaijanis. On one hand, Armenia tried to substantiate its claims to Garabagh 
and Nakhchyvan with references to the ‘pan-Turanism’ menace; on the other hand it wanted 
to include the Garabagh and Nakhchyvan regions in Armenia, despite a very strong Muslim 
presence there. Rather than solving security issues, the inclusion was likely to create new 
ones.  
 
The Ottoman Empire and the Allied Powers recognised Garabagh as part of Azerbaijan, 
whereas Britain handed Nakhchyvan over to Armenia and the US tried to apply its neutral 
zone project to Nakhchyvan. These powers were not guided by common principles while 
settling territorial problems, but by political considerations. Without the Bolshevik threat, the 
Allied Powers might not have given de facto recognition to the South Caucasian republics, 
including Azerbaijan and Armenia, in January 1920. The Sevres Treaty of August 1920 
envisaged the establishment of borders between Armenia and Azerbaijan by direct agreement 
between the two countries. If this agreement could not be achieved by the time of the 
definition of the Turkish-Armenian borders by the US President Wilson, they would be 
established by the Allied Powers. But Azerbaijan was already subject to Soviet control in 
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April 1920, and the treaty itself was given up by the Armenian Republic on the insistence of 
Kemalist Turkey under the Gumru Treaty of December 1920. The territorial problems 
between the two countries were settled by the Soviets: Mountainous Garabagh was given 
ethno-territorial autonomy within Azerbaijan, the western part of Zangazur uezd in Garabagh 
was given to Armenia, and Nakhchyvan was granted autonomous status within Azerbaijan.  
 
Comparing the ways in which the Garabagh and Nakhchyvan issues were settled, it was 
concluded that the Soviets were also not guided by the principles discussed above, but by 
political considerations. They carved the territories populated by Armenians out of Garabagh 
and organised them into Mountainous Garabagh Autonomous Oblast, meaning that the 
Armenians of Garabagh were granted ethno-territorial autonomy despite the facts that the area 
did not border Armenia and the Armenians already had their national entity. This compromise 
was not made vis-a-vis Azerbaijanis compactly residing in Armenia. As for the autonomy 
status of Nakhchyvan within Azerbaijan, if the Turks had not demanded that a poll be held in 
Nakhchyvan, the results of which were instrumental in its inclusion in Azerbaijan on 
autonomy rights grounds, Nakhchyvan would have been given to Armenia. Not satisfied with 
this outcome, the Soviets tried to delimit the borders of Nakhchyvan in an attempt to shorten 
the border connection between Azerbaijan and Turkey.  
 
In the end, neither the confederation nor federation ideas put forward to solve the territorial 
problems between the South Caucasian republics could be realised in practice. The territorial 
settlement of the Garabagh problem led to war between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1991 and 
the occupation by Armenia of not only Mountainous Garabagh Autonomous Oblast, but also 
the surrounding districts, including those that constituted part of Zangazur uezd, which was 
left in Azerbaijan in 1920. In doing so, Armenia deepened the territorial gap between 
Nakhchyvan and other parts of Azerbaijan with the intention of including Nakhchyvan in 
Armenia in the future, as projected by Armenian nationalists during the Dashnaktsutiun and 
zemstvo conferences in the early twentieth century.  
 
Comparing different world cases, it can be argued that the Armenian case has most 
similarities with that of Israel. In both cases, the nationalisms were diaspora nationalisms, 
with one difference: Israel was constructed in its ‘historical homeland’, Armenia in diaspora. 
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In both cases there were population settlements in the territory of the state-to-be: in Israel, 
Jews from different parts of the world came to Israel after it was declared a homeland with 
British support in 1919 and continued when the State of Israel was declared in 1948; and in 
the Armenian case, a great number of Armenians from Persia and the Ottoman Empire moved 
to the South Caucasus in the Russian Empire from the early nineteenth century until the early 
twentieth century, where the Armenian Republic was declared in 1918. The construction of 
both states was influenced by wars: the First Word War and events of 1915 in the Armenian 
case, and the Second World War and Holocaust in the case of Israel. Moreover, neither state 
was satisfied with its borders and both started expanding their areas. In the case of Israel, the 
need to accommodate population increase through natural growth and migration led to claims 
for a larger territory and the creation of settlements in the disputed territories. Armenia 
increased its area significantly under Soviet rule, and in addition, after 1991, it occupied the 
territories of Azerbaijan, i.e. Mountainous Garabagh and the surrounding districts. As in the 
case of Israel, Armenia encouraged the settlement of Armenians from different parts of the 
world in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. Another similarity is that a great number of 
the local populations have become refugees from the territory of these states and have become 
internally displaced peoples, and the non-acceptance of the occupation of their territories by 
the occupied countries and their populations, as well as at the international level. Both Israel 
and Armenia have tried to substantiate their expansion with reference to the need for 
economically viable and secure borders, with the support of some Great Powers. One more 
similarity is that Armenia achieved the disconnection of Nakhchyvan from other parts of 
Azerbaijan, and Israel achieved the non-connection of Gaza with other parts of Palestine.  
 
The thesis presented a full analysis of the issues raised which goes beyond the limitations of 
the existing historiography. Its contribution to the conceptualisation of the process of state-
formation and territorial delimitation can be summarised as follows: Armenian nationalism 
was to a large extent diaspora nationalism. The theory of phases of national movements 
proposed by Miroslav Hroch for Central and Eastern European countries are only partly 
applicable to the Armenian case, whereas it is almost fully applicable to the Azerbaijani case. 
The typology of national movements offered by Hroch for European countries is applicable to 
both the Armenian and Azerbaijani cases. The ethno-symbolist approach to nationalism and 
nations is particularly useful to studying the Armenian case, since Armenian nationalism was 
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an ethnic nationalism and the construction of an Armenian state did not make any change to 
the composition of the Armenian nation, so the Armenian nation is an ethno-nation. Not all 
nationalist movements end in state construction in the ‘historical homeland’ if there is no 
Great Power support. States can also be constructed without nationalist movements, if there is 
Great Power support, and diaspora nationalism can also end in state construction within the 
diaspora, if there is external power support.  
 
Moreover, the ethnic principle in practice is usually not the main principle of delimitation of 
the borders of newly emerged states. When an ethnic minority within one state already has a 
national state, the ethno-territorial autonomy option for that ethnic minority may not solve, 
but instead develop, ethnic problems, and can lead to separatist claims. For that reason, ethnic 
minority problems for those peoples who have national states are usually better solved by 
guaranteeing their cultural rights without establishing ethno-territorial autonomy. 
 
The implications of the delimitation of borders between Armenia and Azerbaijan have been 
felt up to the present day. The ethno-territorial autonomy granted to the politically constructed 
Mountainous Garabagh Autonomous Oblast, which mostly included the Armenian-populated 
parts of Garabagh, laid the basis of further Armenian territorial claims to Azerbaijan. The 
conflict, which still continues, resulted in about one million Azerbaijani refugees and 
internally displaced people in 1987-1994 from Armenia and occupied Azerbaijani territories 
in Garabagh, and a great number of Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan. However, unlike the 
Armenian refugees, who mostly moved to Russia and other countries, the Azerbaijani 
refugees and displaced people gathered in Azerbaijan, with resulting serious problems for the 
country. The most important lesson of the current thesis is the bitter consequences of extreme 
ethnic nationalism and its dangers. Another important lesson is the consequences of one-sided 
political compromise: Armenian ethno-territorial autonomy in Azerbaijan without granting 
the same status to Azerbaijanis in Armenia.  
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Annex I. Population distribution in Elizavetpol guberniya in 19161022 
 
                                                 
1022 Kavkazskiy kalendar’ na 1917 god, Tiflis: Tipografiya Kantselyarii Namestnika Y.I.V. na Kavkaze, 1916, pp 190-197 










Sunni and Shi’a 
(Azerbaijanis) 
Kurds Kartvelians  Other Total  
Elizavetpol 
guberniya 
783,065 – 61.41% 3,802 – 0.298% 287 – 0.02% 10,726 – 0.84% 797,880 – 62.57% 418,859 – 32.84% 743 – 0.058% 57,649 – 4.52% 1,275,131 
Shusha uezd 85,622 – 45.36% – – 49 – 0.025% 85,671 – 45.38% 98,809 – 52.35% 60 – 0.03% 4,205 – 2.22% 188,745 
Garyagin  
(Jabrayil) uezd  
65,587 – 73.21% 45 – 0.05% 9 - 0.01% – 65,641 – 73.27% 21,755 – 24.28% – 2,188 – 2.44% 89,584 
Javanshir uezd 50,798 – 67.07% – – 2,200 – 2.9% 52,998 – 69.98% 22,008 – 29.06% – 724 – 0.95% 75,730 
Zangazur uezd 119,705 – 52.87% 3,638 – 1.6% – 52 – 0.02% 123,395 – 54.5% 101,055 – 44.63% 62 –  0.027% 1,886 – 0.83% 226,398 
Elizavetpol 
uezd 
177,355 – 65.09% 84 – 0.03% 122 – 0.04% 89 – 0.032% 177,650 – 65.19% 68,714 – 25.2% 335 – 0.12% 25,778 – 9.46% 272,477 
Gazakh  uezd 67,950 – 49.58% 35 – 0.025% – 231 – 0.168% 68,216 – 49.77% 61,597 – 44.94% 279 – 0.2% 6,957 – 5.07% 137,049 
Nukha uezd 136,958 – 73.73% – 156 – 
0.083% 
8,105 – 4.36% 145,219 – 78.18% 25,760* – 13.86% – 14,769 – 7.95% 185,748 
Arash uezd 79,090 – 79.56% – – – 79,090 – 79.56% 19,161 – 19.27% 7 – 0.007% 1,149 – 1.15% 99,400 
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Erevan uezd 86,741 – 
42.18% 
6,763- 3.28% – 50 – 0.02% 93,554 – 45.49% 106,933- 
52.005% 





517 – 0.37% – 6 – 0.004% 81,714 – 59.7% 54,209 – 39.6% 168 – 
0.12% 







– 3 – 0.003% 60,357 – 66.87% 29,165 – 32.31% – 728 – 0.80% 90,250 
Alexandropol 
uezd 







– – 53,677 – 28.4% 129,347 – 68.48% – 5,835 – 3.08% 188,859 




– – 50,963 – 30.37% 115,026 – 68.55% – 1,797 – 1.07% 167,786 




– – 60,633 – 57.86% 32,686 – 31.19% – 11,472 – 
10.9% 
104,791 
                                                 



















Gori uezd  174 – 0.07% – 73 – 0.03% 80 – 
0.033% 











3 – 0.003% 53,696 – 55.38% 28,225 – 29.11% 10,280 – 
10.6% 
4,746 – 4.89% 96,947 




9,228 – 8.6% 82,772 – 77.23% 7,427 – 
6.92% 
7,746 – 7.22% 107,173 
Borchaly uezd 51,230 – 
30.25% 




















Ardahan okrug 45,430 –  51% 24,679 – 
27.71% 





3,621 – 4.35% 26,709 – 
32.09% 
– 32 – 
0.038% 
30,362 – 36.49% 25,826 – 31.03% – 27,020 – 
32.47% 
83,208 




– 869 – 
0.45% 





Oltu okrug No data No data No data No data No data No data No data No data No data 








86,320 – 70.28% 15,192 –  12.37% 8,598 – 7% 12,701 – 
10.34% 
122,811 
Batumi okrug 14,649 – 
17.15% 
552 – 0.646% 44,697 – 
52.3% 









26,116 –  69.8% 9,428 – 25.12% 1,187 – 
3.17% 
683 – 1.82% 37,414 
                                                 
1024 Note: This table contains statistics on four uezds, which were considered for administrative-territorial readjustment in 1917, out of nine in Tiflis guberniya.  
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